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ABSTRACT
The Labour party*s colonial policy, particularly towards 
Africa, has not been as extensively studied as its inter­
national or its domestic policy. However, colonial policy 
is important in indicating the nature of the Labour party 
in its formative years. This study is concerned to examine 
the development of the Labour party's policy towards the 
African colonies and to ascertain whether the Labour party 
kept its promises on colonial policy to try to ensure that 
Africa was governed in the interests of the Africans. An 
attempt will be made to ascertain how far the Labour party 
has achieved what might be expected to be the aims of a 
'democratic socialist* party as far as colonial policy 
towards Africa is concerned. A study of the policy-making 
process for colonial policy also shows whether the Labour 
party's claim to be a democratic policy-forming body was 
true for all areas of policy. The main aim is to discover 
whether the Labour party's reputation for a positive colonial 
policy towards Africa is justified.
The interwar period is of particular interest because 
it was during this period that the Labour party developed 
into the main opposition party to the Conservative party 
and had its first experience of office. Before the First 
World War there was little serious discussion within the 
Labour party concerning the problem of the colonies, 
particularly the rights of the Africans. By the outbreak 
of the Second World War the African people were beginning 
to demand independence for themselves. It was during the 
interwar period that Britain had an opportunity to prepare 
the African colonial peoples for future independence by
peaceful means. Although the Labour party was not In power
for most of this period, it did have the opportunity to show 
the African people whether it was determined to do all it 
could to press for their progress towards independence. It 
was during the interwar period that the Labour party had the 
main opportunity to develop a positive African colonial policy 
for implementation when it achieved power.
This study has concentrated -on Labour party documents, 
parliamentary reports and papers. Cabinet papers, departmental 
papers and private papers. Attention has been paid to the 
Labour party*s performance in Parliament because the Labour 
party committed itself to using Parliament as the main means 
of achieving political change. An attempt has been made to 
determine what effect the Labour party’s decision to follow 
British constitutional practice had on the party's policies. 
Emphasis is also placed on the work of the Labour Party’s 
Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions which was mainly 
responsible for formulating the party’s colonial policy *
towards Africa. The study begins with a brief discussion 
of the thinking of Labour party figures on the African 
colonies before the outbreak of the First World War to show 
that there was no coherent colonial policy before the First 
World War. The period after the war produced the first 
important statement on colonial policy prepared by the Crown 
Colonies Committee which was a forerunner of the A.C.I.Qo 
This policy was largely ignored by Thomas when he was 
Colonial Secretary. After the fall of the first Labour 
Government, the policy was restated by the A.C.I.Q., gaining 
official N.E.C. backing and international approval at the 
Commonwealth Labour Conference and the Labour and Socialist 
International. Lord Passfield, the second Labour Colonial 
Secretary, was not very determined to implement this policy,
much to the disappointment of the A.C.I.Q., although he did 
produce a White Paper on Native Policy and set up a Joint 
Committee on Closer Union« After the collapse of the Second 
Labour Government, the A.C.I.Q. again revised the colonial 
policy pamphlet which was discussed at the 1933 party 
conference. It also issued a pamphlet on the issues raised 
by the German and Italian claims for colonial territories.
With the beginnings of industrialisation in Africa, the T.U.C. 
began to show interest in colonial affairs and set up a 
Colonial Advisory Committee, largely staffed by members of the 
A.C.I.Q. Labour colonial policy towards Africa was largely 
made by a small group of experts who were motivated by 
humanitarian concern for the Africans. The majority of the 
party showed little interest in colonial affairs.
The party did not study the complex issue of economic 
development in the African colonies in any detail. The 
Labour party did not achieve as much as it could have done to 
protect African interests in the interwar years, mainly because 
the leadership was unwilling to abandon traditional British 
assumptions about colonial policy. . There was remarkably 
little development in the Labour party*s African policy in 
the interwar years. The Labour party*s failure to develop 
its colonial policy towards Africa during this period meant 
that it was ill-equipped to cope with the rapidly changing 
situation in Africa after the Second World War. The Labour 
party has a better reputation for helping the African people 
than is warranted by its performance in office. Those 
members of the party such as Wedgwood, Leys, Ross and later 
Brockway who did devote time and effort to trying to help 
the Africans were often ignored by the leadership when the 
party was in office. Creech Jones did make a more determined 
attempt to implement Labour*s policy than Thomas or PasSfield
but the policy was no longer appropriate in 19^5 because the 
interwar years had been largely wasted*
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INTRODUCTION
A major problem with the Labour party is that references 
to 'socialism' in Labour party programmes and conference 
resolutions often bear little relation to what the party 
actually does in office* This disparity between pinciples 
and practice is a subject of continuing debate about the 
Labour party. One of the major problems in this debate is 
that there is not an agreed definition of 'socialism*. This 
is not surprising because there are considerable difficulties 
involved in trying to achieve an agreed definition of 
'socialism*. A recent attempt was made by Parekh* who states 
that four principles distinguish 'socialism' from all other 
political doctrines. First, the recognition of man's 
sociality; second, social responsibility for the well-being 
of all members of society and a rejection of the doctrine 
of self-help; third, the extension of co-operation to all 
areas of life, particularly the economic; and, fourth, the 
idea of planning as an expression of man's conscious control 
of his resources and destiny. This assessment of 'socialism* 
cannot be taken as completely definitive. One of the main 
omissions is that there^is no mention of equality, which 
writers such as Tawney and Crosland^ have argued that 
•socialism' is about. This illustrates the difficulty of 
trying to tie 'socialism* down to a definite set of values 
or principles.
4Berki does not attempt to answer the question 'What is
1 . 'The Concept of Socialism' (London, 1975)
2. R.H. Tawney, 'The Acquisitive Society* (Fontana ed.,1966). 
Equality itself is a difficult concept. It can either mean 
complete equality or equality of opportunity.
3. A. Crosland, 'The Future of Socialism* (London, 1956)
4. R.N. Berki, 'Socialism* (London, 1975)
3Socialism?* but states that it is not a single thing but a 
range, an area, an open texture.'*' It is not a coherent 
body of thought but a ’living contradiction*. It is a 
mixture of libertarianism, humanism,egalitarianism, moralism, 
rationalism, messianic elitism, patriotism and cosmopolitanism. 
From these values and beliefs, Berki identifies four main 
tendencies of ’socialism* which are prevalent in the world- 
egalitarianism, moralism, rationalism, and libertarianism.
As Berki states, ’socialism* means different things to 
different people. The 'socialism* of;the Soviet Marxist is 
not the same as that of the Western Social Democracy.
The concern of the present writer is not to discern 
the essence of 'socialism', for, as Berki points out, there 
are many different interpretations of 'socialism'• The 
point is to ascertain wha^ if anythingj the Labour party has 
taken it to mean. Berki thinks that the British Labour 
party's 'socialism* is based on 'moralism*. The chief values 
of 'moralism* are, according to Berki, social justice, peace, 
co-operation and brotherhood. One of its main soirees is 
Christianity. The main criticism of capitalist society 
is that capitalism inflicts misery and suffering on the very 
people who produce society's wealth. It sets man against 
man and extolls selfishness and mutual enmity in the guise 
of 'free competition*. The 'moralist socialist* believes 
that society should not try to amass more and more material 
wealth but should find contentment in redistributing the 
present amount of wealth. The aim of life should be to 
serve others to create a society where people work for each 
other rather than themselves. Tawney, an example of a 1
1 . D. Healey seems to favour this type of approach. *1 don't 
think that a systematic statement of socialist philosophy is 
possible or desirable. Socialism is essentially a sense of 
direction.''The Observer' 27 March 1977.
4Christian socialist, stated that the aim of the Labour 
party was to ‘extend those (democratic) principles from the 
sphere of civil and political rights, where, at present, 
they are nominally recognised, to that of economic and 
social organisation, where they are systematically and 
insolently defied. * 1
It is an oversimplification to say that the Labour
party was based upon one tendency of ‘socialism* but the
Labour party‘s conception of ‘socialism* has owed a lot
to a Christian desire to change society into one that is
based on co-operation rather than competition. In 1906,
a survey of Labour M.P.s found that 60 per cent of the
respondents had been brought up in the nonconformist faith.
The book that had influenced them most was the Bible. Marx
was not among the most influential writers. By 1976, the
influence of Marx had increased but Tawney, the Christian
2socialist, had an equal impact on Labour M.P.s. As the
•Economist* puts it, ‘Labour’s philosophy has always been
a British mixture of a little Marxism, some Methodism and
3much more muddle.
Labour’s philosophy has always been rather muddled. 
Wedgwood Benn states the ’sources of inspiration* of the 
Labour movement have heen Christian socialism, Fabianism, 
Owenism, trade unionism, radical Liberalism, and, to a 
lesser extent, Marxism. The main aim that emerges from 
these 'sources of inspiration* is to create social justice 
and co-operation in Britain. As well as its commitment 
to reforming society, the Labour party has had an equal 1234
1. R.H. Tawney, 'Equality* (London,1931)
2. J.Hall and J.Higgins, 'What Influences today's Labour 
M.P.s?*, New Society 2 December 1976.
3. 'The Economist* 12 March 1977,p.17.
4. A.Wedgwood Benn, 'The Guardian', 13 December 197&.
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commitment to the method of parliamentary democracy to 
achieve its reforms» As Shirley Williams says, 'the 
Labour party has always been as devoted to the method of 
democracy - progress by persuasion rather than compulsion - 
as to the objectives of socialism.
2Miliband, D. Coates and D. Howell have suggested that
it is because the Labour party has been so attached to
parliamentary politics that it has failed to carry out its
promises to reform society» The main theme of these
writers is that the Labour party has led socialists in
Britain into a 'dead end* because its 'socialism' has been
so muddled and reformist and because it has been completely
attached to the parliamentary road. D, Coates thinks that
the Labour party's 'socialism* is not rigorous enough»
Coates believes that 'socialism* involves a qualitative
transformation in human experience and a break for all time
with the alienation of human experience and of human labour
associated with capitalist modes of production and their
associated class systems of domination» He believes that
'socialism* cannot be achieved without a total break from
the system of free wage labour on which capitalism is
built, «aid a dismantling of the system of property relations»
Coates goes on to assess whether the Labour party has
achieved its own version of 'socialism', let alone the
Marxist version» He concludes that the Labour party's
history shows that 'the central economic, social and
political features of British capitalism have proved
surprisingly immune to the impact of Labour in power»'
His argument is that the Labour party 'is not only not a
1 . S. Williams, 'The Guardian', 13 December 1976»
2» R. Miliband, 'Parliamentary Sodalism* (London, 1964),
D. Coates 'The Labour Party and the Struggle for Socialism, 
(Cambridge, 1975), D, Howell fBritish Social Democracy' 
(London, 1976)o
6revolutionary party but that it is not a successful reformist 
party either.* The main reason for this lack of success has 
been that the party has chosen to define *socialism*, even in 
its most radicalperiods as public ownership, state planning 
and welfare provision - a set of social changes that would be 
implemented by capturing the parliamentary state in open 
electoral battle. The problem, according to Coates, is that 
the party has always relied, in its pursuit of its notion of 
’socialism*, on the voluntary co-operation of the very social 
forces whose power and privileges it should be seeking to 
undermine. The party has attached too much importance to 
parliament. It has seen the parliamentary road as an 
alternative to a radicalised proletariat and the use of 
industrial power to achieve ’socialism*. By seeking to 
avoid the confrontation of classes, the parliamentary road 
to *socialism* has led nowhere, not even to radical reform. 
The implication is that the Labour party has not achieved 
anything at all because it has chosen the parliamentary road 
and not adopted a 'Marxist version of socialism*. The 
implication is that the only way to achieve real reform is 
to adopt *Marxist socialism* and abandon the parliamentary 
path to reform.
Another group of writers regard the Labour party in a 
different light. Barker, Beattie and McKibbin think that 
too much emphasis has been placed on 'socialism'* in 
discussions about the Labour party. The Labour party, 
they argue, has never been a full-bloodied socialist party 
and should not be judged as one. They think that the Labour 
party did not set out to radically reform society but to 
redistribute some of the benefits of society. From this 
point of view, they argue that the Labour party has achieved
7
reasonable success.
Barker, McKibbin and Beattie argue that 'socialism9 was 
only one of* the elements which made up the British Labour 
party. The major influence on the Labour party was the trade 
union movement. McKibbin* believes that the political aims 
of the Labour party were essentially trade union ones.
According to him, to accept the Labour party did not mean 
accepting 'socialism* but an intricate network of trade union 
loyalties.
Beattie thinks thattrade unionists and Labour politicians 
of the 1920s did not think of 'socialism as anything more than 
a vague long term aim of little relevance to immediate 
circumstances'. This may have been true of Macdonald and 
most of the leadership in Parliament and the trade unions, 
hut there were many in the Labour party who did see socialism 
as something more than a vague longing. Men like Cripps,
Cole, Laski, Tawney and Lansbury did believe the task of the 
Labour party was to transform society into a more co-operative 
one. Barker^ writes that to most Labour M.P.s socialism 
meant little more than a sensible development of liberal and 
progressive policies. This underestimates the influence of 
socialism on the Labour party. Without a theory of socialism, 
the Labour party would have remained little more than a trade 
union pressure group. The importance of socialism in the 
Labour party is proved by the fact that, as Rose points out, 
the Labour party has never been able to throw off its 
socialists. The commitment to change society was shown when 
Gaitskell tried to persuade the party to abandon clause 4 of 
the constitution. Since 1918, the Labour party has regarded 1234
1 . McKibbin, 'The Evolution of the Labour Party 1910-1924 
(Oxford, 1974)-
2. A.J. Beattie, 'English Party Politics' (London, 1970)
3. R. Barker, 'Education and Politics' (Oxford, 1974)4. R. Rose 'Problem of Party Government• (London, 1974)
8socialism as one of its aims but its socialism has not been 
of the Marxist variety* It has tended to equate socialism 
with social justice and been dedicated to achieving it by the 
democratic method. Socialism has been one of the elements 
that make up the Labour party but not the only one. The 
Labour party has never been completely committed to socialism 
as its only goal.
McKibbin's conclusion is that, within its limits, the 
Labour party has had reasonable success, and *if people object 
that it has not served the cause of socialism'or even the ’true* 
interests of the working class the answer is that it was 
never designed to do so.1* This seems to be a debateable 
statement. The Labour party was not designed to serve the 
cause of Marxist socialism but it did aim to serve the cause 
of democratic socialism and it is doubtful, even within its 
limits, whether the party has had reasonable success. The 
Beattie, Barker, McKibbin school seem, in contrast to 
Miliband, Howell and Coates, to put too little emphasis on 
socialism. The Labour party was formed by a combination of 
trade unionists, politicians and socialists. Many of the 
trade unionists and politicians were also socialists.
Many people have joined the Labour party because they saw 
it as a vehicle for changing society,and not just a means 
of protecting trade union, interests. The Trade unions 
are a factor of very great importance in the Labour party, 
but the party has, since 1918, never been solely a trade 
union party.
According to Barker, the Labour party sought to 
distribute the benefits of the existing order, not to change
it,but the writings of Tawney, Cole, Laski, Cripps and even 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb do indicate that they saw the task
1 . McKibbin, op.cit.,p.247.
as to change society. There were, and are, many people 
within the Labour party who want to radically change society. 
To state that the Labour party did not exist to change 
society is leaving out a large part of the picture. There 
were some in the party who Just wanted to distribute the 
benefits of the existing order but there were also others 
who thought in terms of total transformation. To ignore 
this section, or to state that it was of little importance, 
is to paint a false picture. 'Labour and the New Social 
Order* stated that 'the view of the Labour Party is that 
what has to be reconstructed after the war is not this or 
that Government Department, or this or that piece of social 
machinery; but so far as Britain is concerned, society 
itself.
Miliband, Coates, Howell et al. tend to Judge the 
Labour party in terms of Marxist socialism which is 
unrealistic since the mainstream of the Labour party has 
never embraced Marxism (although some Labour figures such 
as Laski, Bevan, and, even Morrison, have been influenced 
by Marxist thought). They tend to think that because 
the Labour party has not been a fully Marxist party, it 
has achieved nothing. The British Labour party has been 
much less influenced by Marxism than continental socialist 
parties. It has based its socialism on ethical rather 
than economic foundations. As Barker states, English 
socialism was vastly different from continental socialism 
because it was reformist and parliamentarian« However, he 
seems to think that this meant that Labour M.P.s and Labour 
theorists did not want to see a radical change in society. 12
1 . Labour and the New Social Order, (The Labour Party, 
January 1918) p.5.
2. Wedgwood Benn, op.cit.
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Barker, McKibbin, Beattie et al. seem to attach too little
importance to the ‘socialism* of the Labour party. Without
some socialist commitment, the Labour party would have been a
purely working class trade union party with very limited
vision, Miliband et al,judge the Labour party by too
rigorous a yardstick whereas Barker et.al, judge the party
by too loose a criterion. The fairest method is to judge
the party by its own criterion of socialism and its <xm
assessment of itself as a democratic socialist party.
The basic statement of the Labour party*s approach to
socialism is contained in the 1918 statement’’Labour and
■the New Social Order* and the 1918 constitution. Clause 4 of
the constitution stated that the aim of the Labour party was
*to secure for the producers by hand or brain the full fruits
of their industry, and the most equitable distribution
thereof that may be possible, upon the basis of the Common
Ownership of the Means of Production and the best obtainable
system of popular administration and control of each industry
or service.*^ McKibbin argues that this statement was put
in to differentiate the Labour party from the other political
2parties but was only intended for show. This interpretation 
does not seem completely correct in the light of the furious 
arguments unleased when Gaitskell tried to dispense with 
clause 4, As Miliband writes, the 1918 documents, although 
rather ambiguous, would, if implemented, have made a vast
3difference to the character and texture of British society.
The documents* implementation would not have instituted a 
•socialist society* in the Marxist sense where the guiding 
principle would have been1from each according to his ability,
1. H. Pelling, *A Short History of the Labour party* (3rd 
ed., London, 1968)p,44
2. McKibbin, op,cit.,pp,96-97,
3. Miliband, op.cit.,pp.6l-62.
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to each according to his need1,1 but it would have made a 
radical change. It was because the 1918 programme and 
constitution held out a promise of large-scale reform and 
social justice that many intellectuals and socialists came 
to join the Labour party. Although the statements were 
partly rhetorical, since 1918 the Labour party has been 
known as a 'socialist* party. This use of the term 
Socialist* would be taken by Marxists to be too loose a 
description, Miliband prefers to describe the 1918 statements
~ pas defining 'Labourism* not 'Socialism*. However, the 
Labour party should be judged in terms of its efforts to 
achieve this type of society. It has always been firmly 
committed to the idea of 'social justice',and,should be 
judged in terms of whether it has achieved social justice 
aid not whether it has installed a socialist utopia in Britain. 
Has the Labour party been a moderately successful reformist 
party or has it failed to achieve any significant reforms?
The main aims of a democratic socialist party are to provide 
social justice at home and abroad. In domestic affairs 
this means a vast extension of welfare services and serious 
efforts to redistribute the wealth of.the community by 
taxation and subsidies. It also involves making public 
ownership the dominant form of ownership. In foreign 
affairs, this means decolonization, disarmament, attempts 
to settle disputes by peaceful means and support for 
international organisations which have been set up to 
achieve that aim. Concerning the empire, Labour and the 
New Social Order stated that 'the Labour party stands for 
its maintenance and progressive development on the lines of 
local automony and 'Home Rule All Round',^and not on 'an 
enforced domination over subject nations, subject races or
1 . K. Marx. Selected Works, Vol.2 (Moscow, 1955)p»242. Milibana, op.cit•,pp.61-62.3 . pp.41-42
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subject colonies'* This statement, like much of Labour
party rhetoric, is rather vague. One aim of this thesis
is to examine how the Labour party converted its aspirations
about the African empire into reality.
There have been many studies of the Labour party's
domestic and foreign policy but less attention has been
given to the Labour party's record on colonial policy.
There have been studies of the Labour party's record over
India‘S and an overall study of the party's attitude to imper- 
2ialism but there has been little work on Africa, except 
Mower's^ which is now dated. Histories of the Labour party 
have largely ignored colonial affairs. The Labour party's 
record however, has to be seen in terms of its colonial 
policy as well as its domestic and international policy.
The party's record has to include a study of its colonial 
policy because although it was an issue which did not bring 
many electoral dividend, it was a very important long term 
problem. A party which wanted to change society to make 
it socially fair and just should also have been concerned 
with the problems of the underdeveloped colonies. It 
should have made a vigorous effort to advance the colonies 
to independence with a chance of developing their natural 
resources. If the Labour party was more than a trade union 
party, one would have expected some concern with the problems 
of Britain's colonieso If the Labour party was concerned 
with social justice at home, it should also have been 
concerned with achieving social justice in the colonies. 
Social justice at home could not be based upon exploitation 12
1 . 6. Fischer, The Labour Party and India»(Paris,1966).
2. P.S. Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 
Cambridge, 1975.
3« J.H. Mower, 'The Development of the Colonial Policy of 
the British Labour Party 1918-L939 (unpub. Ph.D.thesis 
Harvard, 1951).
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abroad, as MacDonald wrote, in ‘Labour and the Empire
Colonial policy is also important because the 
conventional opinion is that the Labour party has a good 
record on colonial policy. Ivor Richard, the Labour 
Government's chairman, of the unsuccessful Geneva conference 
on independence for Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, stated, to the African 
delegates, that the Labour party has always tried to help the 
Africans and has a good record on colonial policy. This 
thesis will make a detailed study of the Labour party's 
colonial policy towards Africa between the wars to see how 
far this assessment is borne out. The interwar period is 
chosen because less work has been done on this period than 
on the postwar period. There have been many studies of 
decolonization after the second world war but few studies 
of the development of the Labour party's colonial policy 
towards Africa. The interwar period is also particularly 
suitable for study because full documentation is available.
The main works that have been written relating to this 
period are those by Mower and Gupta. Mower's work was 
finished in 1951 and was written without the benefit of 
Cabinet or private papers which now enable a fuller picture 
to be built up. Gupta's work is a comprehensive survey of 
the Labour party's imperial policy. He is testing Lenin's 
thesis that the absence of revolutionary ardour in Western 
socialist parties, particularly Britain, was directly linked 
with imperialism.The idea .beingthat the 'labour aristocracy* 
was 'bought off' by the 'ruling class' with the fruits of 
the Empire. Lenin believed that the existence of the 
empire enabled the 'capitalists' to exploit and develop the 
empire. This enabled them to make concessions to the
1 . See pp.44-46.
2. Sunday Times, 31 October, 1976.
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workers in Britain* However, Gupta concludes that the 
British workers could hardly be described as living off 
•the fact of exploited colonial workers*, and *in the final 
analysis reformist social democracy neither needed nor could 
afford an imperialist p o l i c y T h e  Labour party had enough 
to do trying to create a 'near-self-sufficient socialist 
Britain* and became primarily concerned with 'remedying the 
sense of relative deprivation from which the working classes. •• 
suffered vis-a-vis the middle and upper classes.* It may 
be true that reformist social democracy did not need an 
•imperialist policy* for preserving the empire, but the 
Labour party certainly did need to have a policy for the 
colonies. The colonial empire could not be ignored,some 
policy had to be worked out for it, even if it was one of 
abandonment. Even the policy of abandonment would have 
required some sort of timetable. Gupta seems to conclude 
that the Labour party abandoned thinking about the colonies 
to concentrate on building a 'socialist Britain*, implying 
that the Labour party abandoned any great effort at social 
reform in the colonies to concentrate on social reform at 
home. This thesis will try to test whether this is so, 
whether the Labour party had a more radical approach to 
domestic than colonial affairs, or, whether the policies 
pursued in these areas were linked. Did the Labour party 
become a different type of party when it was considering 
the colonies from the type of party it was when it was 
considering domestic issues?
The main aim of this thesis will be to try to shed 
light on the nature of the Labour party by studying one 
particular area in detail. The Labour party's policy 
towards the colonies will not be Judged against a Marxist
1 . Gupta, op.cit., pp.387-391.
2. ibid.
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definition of socialism but against the Labour party's own 
statements of its aims. The aim was to achieve large-scale 
social reform at home and abroad in the colonies* As *The 
Empire in Africa: Labour's Policy* put it: MAt home Labour is 
attempting to substitute a system of equal economic opportunity 
and industrial democracy for a system based upon the economic 
exploitation of the worker by the capitalist. In Africa« the 
policy of Labour must follow the same lines; it must aim at 
substituting a system based on the common economic interest 
of the inhabitants for the existing system based on the 
economic exploitation of the native by the white An
attempt will be made to assess whether the Labour party has 
been successful within its limits«. s or, whether it has failed 
to achieve its own aims. The main questions to be asked will 
be: what were the main influences on the Labour party's 
colonial policy? Did the Labour party make much effort to 
implement the policy when in office? If it was not very 
successful, was this due to its minority position between 
the wars or was it due to a lack of will? Did the Labour 
party have anything distinctive to say on colonial policy or 
was its policy following in the tradition of Conservative and 
Liberal colonial policy? Which body in the Labour party 
played the most important part in determining the party's 
colonial policy? Was the policy democratically determined? 
Did the party take a lead in trying to educate the British 
people into an understanding of the problems of Africa or did 
it follow the apathy of the British people on this subject?
Did the party ignore the issue because it was not of immediate 
electoral Importance or was the party farsighted enough to 
prepare a radical colonial policy which it was ready to
implement, if given the chance? What does a study of colonial
1 . 'The Empire in Africa: Labour's Policy' (The Labour Party, 
1920)pp.2-3o
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policy show about the nature of the Labour party? Is it 
true; as Coates implies, that the Labour party has been a 
failure as a reforming party, or, is McKibbin right, when he 
says it has been successful within its limits? An attempt 
will be made to discover how far the Labour party*s 
reputation for a progressive colonial policy is justified, 
aid, whether its colonial policy was linked with its domestic 
policy* The main aim will be to determine whether the Labour 
party made a reasonable effort to secure for the indigenous 
peoples of the African colonies *the full fruits of their 
industry, and the most equitable distribution thereof that 
may be possible, upon the basis of the common ownership of 
the means of production and the best obtainable system of 
popular administration.••• The aim will be to ascertain 
whether the Labour party made an attempt to implement these 
principles in the colonies, 01; whether its policy was based 
upon expediency.
NOTES CN THE SITUATICN IN,AFRICA
A word must be said about the state of Britain's Dependencies 
in Africa during this period* The Dependencies were classified as 
colonies,protectorates, and mandated territories.A Colony was a 
British territory inhabited by British subjeots. A, protectorate 
was technically a foreign territory. The African inhabitants 
did not enjoy the rights of British subjects but were "British 
protected persons". Mandated Territories were former colonies 
of the countries whioh had been defeated in 1918. They had been 
confiscated after the war and handed over to the League of Nations 
which then gave them to the victorious powers to administer as 
*a sacred trust of civilisation' as they were 'inhabited by 
people not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world'. African self-government was the 
ultimate objective of "trusteeship''.
Britain's colonies and protectorates in West Africa were Nigeria, 
the Gold Coast (with Ashanti and Northern Territories)»Sierra Leone 
(crown colony and protectorate) and Gambia. In East Africa there 
were Kenya,Uganda, Zanzibar, Somaliland and Nyasaland. Northern 
Rhodesia was a protectorate in the Southern part of Africa.Bfechuanaland, 
Swaziland and Basutoland were protectorates which were heavily 
dependent on South Africa. Britain's mandated territories were 
British Cameroons,Togoland and Tanganyika. Southern Rhodesia was 
also a British colony but it was given a large measure of self- 
government in 1923« Beehuanaland,Swaziland, Basutoland and Southern 
Rhodesia were the conoera of the Dominions Office.
The other Dependencies were administered by officials responsible 
to the Secretaryof State for the Colonies in Britain*
The Secretary of State was responsible to his
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colleagues In the Cabinet and to the UoK. Parliament 
for colonial policy, colonial administration and for every 
official act of his subordinates in the Colonial Office and 
the Colonial Service. The Secretary of State had the 
legal authority to legislate for the colonies without 
consulting Parliament in advance. This power became less 
important as local legislative structures developed but the 
Secretary of State had the power to veto local legislation. 
This was rarely necessary because there was usually an 
official majority in the Legislative Councils.
The Secretary of State had no direct executive 
authority in the colonies, but his power was exercised by 
the Governor (or Commissioner or High Commissioner in a 
protectorate). The Governor set up an Executive Council 
which included officials and often nominated or elected 
members of the Legislative Council, the practice varying 
in different colonies. The Governor had to consult the 
Executive Council except in emergencies. If he rejected 
the advice of his Council he had to report the circumstances 
to the Secretary of State.
The membership of the Legislative Council varied 
between the dependencies. Each contained representatives 
of the main interest groups which existed in the local 
community - agriculture, commerce and missions - and the 
main heads of government departments who constituted the 
majority. In East Africa, Africans were indirectly 
represented by Europeans, usually missionaries. Unofficial 
members were usually nominated but in Kenya they were elected. 
The Legislative Council in Kenya consisted of the Governor, 
twenty official members, eleven elected Europeans, five 
Indians, one Arab, and, one white man to represent the
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interests of over two and a half million Africans.If the unofficial 
members of a Legislative Council were resolutely opposed to a bill 
put forward by the Governor,he would usually consult the Secretary 
of State before using the official majority to pass the measure.
In West Africa,the system varied. In I9l8,Bome West African
t
Dependencies did not have Legislative Councils but in most countries
these developed during the interwar period. The Gold Coa«t had the
most developed system. By the thirties the Legislative Council
of the Gold Coast consisted of fifteen officials,five nominated
Europeans,three representatives of town Africans and six Chiefs.
Although Africans did appear on the counoils in West Africa,they
were heavily outnumbered by white officials and representatives.
In West Africa and Tanganyika a system of ’indirect rule* was
used to administer the territories.The leading advocates of this
I 2policy were Lord Lugard and Sir Donald Cameron. The basio idea 
of the polioy was that use should be made of the indigenous 
institutions to administer the colonial territories.This meant 
that the African chiefs and councils should help the colonial 
administration by collecting taxes and administering justice.
The advantage of this policy was that it reduced costs and the 
number of white administrators needed. The hope was that by 
using ’indirect rule* the Africans would! be trained in local self- 
government and that this would serve as a basis for political 
advance in the future. One of the main questions of debate 
during this period was whether 'indirect rule' would help or 
hinder eventual African self-government.Some thought it would
I»Governor of Hong Kong, I907-I2| Governor of Nigeria,I9I2-I9.
2.Govemor of Tanganyika, 1925-31? Governor of Nigeria,1931-35»
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provide useful training in self-government but others 
thought it gave too much power to the African chiefs and 
tribal authorities who acted as a restraining influence on 
the development of the young Africans. Some argued that for 
the African colonies to take their place in the modern world 
it was necessary to break with old tribal customs and 
traditions whereas 'indirect rule* made this more difficult.
Most people in Britain,if they thought about the colonial 
empire at all, thought that there was no likelihood of the 
Africans ruling themselves for many generations to come.
Most politicians whether Conservative, Liberal or Labour, 
regarded the Africans as children who would have to wait until 
they were 'grown up* before they could take part in the 
discussion about what policy should be pursued in Africa. 
African political consciousness was not very highly developed 
during the interwar period. Although African political 
organisations did begin to develop in Kenya in the twenties - 
the Kikuya Central Association and the North Kavirondo 
Taypayers Welfare Association, they did not have very much 
effect on events. Archdeacon Owen, a white man, was the 
driving force behind the N.K.T.W.A. When Kenyatta of the 
K.C.A. came to London in 1930 to present evidence to the 
Joint Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, the committee 
refused to hear him, although it did listen to the evidence 
of 'approved* African witnesses.
Between the wars there were hardly any Africans in 
positions of real responsibility in their own countries. It 
was a period when all important initiatives in Africa were 
taken by Europeans but a few Africans did begin to emerge 
from schools and colleges and they began to develop African 
opinion during the Second World War and after. However, 
for most of the interwar period African opinion was not very
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clearly developed and was not paid much attention to by the 
British politicians. As a result of this, the thesis is 
mainly concerned with discussions between tte politicians and 
the parties in London.
The major area of controversy between the parties during 
this period was over the question of Kenya where the white 
settlers wanted •self-government* by which they meant that 
they should rule the whole territory, including the Africans, 
without interference from London. The question of Kenya 
dominated discussion about colonial policy in the Labour 
party, particularly in the twenties when the other territories 
were largely ignored. Kenya is discussed more thah the 
other colonies because it was the main preoccupation of the 
Labour party*s African experts during this period.
The indigenous peoples of African colonies and 
protectorates were referred to as 'natives* in contemporary 
discussion during the inter-war years. Throughout this work 
they are referred to as *Africans* unless quotations, direct 
or indirect speech is used.
CHAPTER 1
THE BOER WAR AND AFTER
Before the first world war the Labour party devoted 
little time to international and imperial problems. Leonard 
Woolf comments that the rank and file were naturally concerned 
with the industrial and economic aspects of politics of which 
their knowledge and interest made them acutely aware and ‘even 
their middle class leaders and instructors like the Webbs« 
before the 1914 war ignored and were ignorant of international 
and imperial problems• **"
The major occasion when the Labour Movement was forced to 
consider imperial questions was the Boer war. The reactions 
anong the heterogeneous organisations which federated to form 
the Labour Representation Committee were various. The war 
was popular with the majority of trade unionists. Robert 
Blatchford, a socialist writer« also supported it in his 
paper *The Clarion*. He warned that *socialists had better 
understand that they could not have it both ways: they must 
either be willing to give up their colonies or to fight for 
them. To give them up would be difficult and dangerous to
ous and not good for the colonies.*^ The Fabians were also 
inclined to support the war. However, the I.L.P. and the
S.D.F. came out strongly against the war and gained 
unpopularity because of their pro-Boer stance.
The leaders of the Fabian society, Sidney Webb and George 
Bernard Shaw, supported the war. They were joined in their 
support by the majority of the Fabian Society but there were 
Fabians who were against the war. Sydney Olivier, about to 
leave to become the Governor of Jamaica, wrote to the Fabian 
Society to say that if it kept silent on the major issue of 
the Boer war, it would proclaim itself nothing more than a
1» L. Woolf *Downhill All the Way* (Hogarth Press, 1967),p»219.
2. F. Bealey, *Les Travaillistes et la Guerre des Boers*, 
Mouvement Social, December 1963, 45, pp.39-70.
3. Clarion, 21 October 1899, p«332 quoted B. Semmel 'Imperialism 
and Social Reform*, (London,1960)p.226.
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•Hutchinson Trust Annexe* .1 The pzo-war members of the 
Society were content to avoid making any pronouncement on 
•the war; it was the pro-Boer members who pressed for the 
Society to issue a pamphlet on the war. The Fabians were 
still hoping to influence the two main parties and Sidney 
Webb did not want to antagonise the imperial wing of the 
Liberal party which he thought would be the most likely 
executors of the Fabians* domestic programme. Beatrice Webb 
wrote in her diary that 'Sidney is pro-Boer in sentiment; 
but he agrees with Asquith and Haldane« by reason; but he 
has not thought out the question« he has paid little or no 
attention to it.* In a subsequent entry« she quoted
Bernard Shaw as having advised the Webbs to *plunge in with
3Rosebery as the best chance of moulding home policy.*
The leader of the section of the Fabian Society trying 
to persuade the Executive to issue a statement of opposition 
to the war was S.G. Hobson. He declared that the war was 
the responsibility of the British governing classes and it 
was imperative that the Fabian Society should dissociate 
itself from *the imperialism of capitalism andvain glorious 
nationalism. * Shaw put forward an amendment which seemed to 
assume that the war against the Boers should be carried to 
a successful conclusion. The amendment went on to recommend 
to the British government the policy which it should pursue 
after it had achieved victory. This amendment of Shaw*s 
was decisively rejected by 58 votes to 27 despite support from 
members of the Executive. Hobson's motion also failed to 123
1 . M. Cole *The Story of Fabian Socialism' (London« 1961)
2. B. Webb, 'Our Partnership* pp.217-20 (ed. B. Drake and 
M.I. Cole, 1948).
3. ibid.
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pass« the motion for the previous question was carried
instead by a vote of 59 to 50 . 1 The meeting ended in
uncertainty with no decision having been taken. However,
Rams8#MacDonald,a member of the Fabian Executive, managed to
persuade them to take the sense of the membership on the
2question by a postal referendum. To the amusement of the 
press, the question asked was not *is the war right or wrong?* 
but 'are you in favour of an official announcement being made 
by the Fabian Society on Imperialism in relation to the war?* 
It was generally assumed that a vote for a pronouncement was 
an aati-imperialist pronouncement and eight urged against it. 
The result of the vote was 217 in favour of a declaration and 
259 against it. Accordingly, no immediate announcement was 
made by the Society on the war.
This inaction on the part of the Fabian Society led 18 
members who felt very strongly about the South Africa war to 
resign from the party, including J. Ramsay MacDonald, two 
trade union leaders, G.N. Barnes and Peter Curran, Walter 
Crane, an associate of William Morris, and Mrs. Emmeline 
Pankhurst. The issue at question had really been imperialism 
versus anti-imperialism, although strictly speaking, the 
Socifety had only voted in favour of not making a pronouncement 
against imperialism. However, Shaw had tried to persuade the 
Society that *a Fabian is necessarily an imperialist*. A 
link was being formed between the Webbs and Lord Rosebery.
The victory of the imperialists was confirmed when elections 
were held for the National Executive. Not a single member of 
the eight man majority which had opposed an anti-imperialist 
announcement lost his seat. 123*
1 . A.M. MeBriar, 'Fabian Socialism and English Politics* 
(Cambridge, 1962),pp.l21-3* B. Porter, *Critics of Empire* 
(Macmillan, 1968),p.110
2. D. Marquand »Ramsay MacDonald* (London,1977) p.66.
3. B. Porter, op.cit., p.124, B. Webb, *0ur Partnership*,op.cit., p.198.
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The new Executive did, however, decide that a pamphlet 
should be issued setting out the Fabian attitude to the war. 
Bernard Shaw prepared the first draft, the proofs of which 
were sent out to every member for correction and amendmeitt 
However, Shaw managed to incorporate his own view into the 
collective tract despite the large minority of anti-imperialists 
in the society. 1
2*Fabianism and the Empire* was the first major statement 
by the Fabian Society concerning foreign and imperial affairs.
It claimed that imperialism was the new stage of the interna­
tional policy and the issue was whether Britain would remain at 
the centre of one of the world-empires of the future or whether 
she would rashly lose all her colonies and be reduced to the 
status of a small island. Shaw accepted imperial domination 
as a necessity and stipulated that the domination should be 
efficient and sensible. He thought that a great power would 
•consciously or unconsciously* govern in the interests of 
civilisation as a whole and it was not in that interest that 
goldfields and the formidable armaments which could be built 
upon them should be wielded irresponsibly by small communities 
of frontiersman. The value of a state lay in the quality of 
its civilisation. A state which obstructed international 
civilisation would have to go whether it was big or small.
As McBriar writes, *the Fabians not only recognised that the 
world was being divided up amongst the Imperialist powers, but 
in a general way they approved and justified the tendency.*^
However, Fabian imperialism was not jingoism. The empire 
which the Fabians wished to see was different from that which 
the Conservatives were building. It was to be 'socialistic* 
in the Fabian sense which meant *the effective social
organisation of the whole Empire and its rescue from the strife
1 . McBriar, op.cit., p.125. , „  ^ .
p. «Fabianism and the Empire', ed.G.B. Shaw (The Fabian Society,
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of classes and private i n t e r e s t s . W h e n  the war was over 
imperial officials not subject to local parliamentary authority 
should enforce fair standards of life in the South Africa mines 
for whites and coloured alike. The pamphlet concluded that in 
order to keep the Empire intact there should be a thorough 
review of the consular system. It was also suggested that the 
factory act should be amended to extend the age for half-time 
employment to 21t in order to leave more time for drills and 
military training to defend the empire. This was the 
extraordinary conclusion of an extraordinary •socialist* 
pamphlet. The ideal portrayed seemed to be government from 
enlighted Britain of the Empire. The Fabians would ensure 
that Britain forced 'socialism* on the uncivilised nations of 
the world. The Fabians committed themselves to the idea 
that a *civilised* nation was entitled to rule over an 
•uncivilised* nation for the benefit of the 'uncivilised* 
nation and the world as a whole. This was essentially the 
doctrine of 'trusteeship* which the Labour party later came 
to adopt as the basis of its colonial policy. Imperialists 
approved of the pamphlet. It was well received by the press 
and won praise from Beatrice Webb and Lord RcsBberyt but the 
general public seemed to ignore it.
The Independent Labour Party did not view the Empire and 
the Boer war in the same light as the Fabians. On 9 September 
1899 the National Administrative Council of the I.L.P. met at 
Blackburn and adopted a resolution which protested 'against the 
manner in which the governnmt, by the tenor of their despatch» ’ 
and their warlike preparations have made a peaceful settlement 
difficult with the Transvaal Republic.* The resolution went 
on to assert that there was an ulterior and unworthy motive 
behind the pretence of broadening the political liberties of
Yl— ^Fabianism and the Empire} p.6.
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the Uitlanders. This was the pressure of capitalists who 
wanted control of the goldfields* The resolution felt that 
even if the grievances of the Uitlanders were the real reason 
for the threatened hostilities war would be *an extreme course 
quite uncalled for.*^ The resolution was signed by J. Keir 
Hardie, Philip Snowden* J. Ramsay MacDonald, Francis Littlewood,
J. Bruce Glasier* H. Russell Smart* James Parker* Joseph 
Burgess and John Penny.
The I.L.P. and the S.D.S. which were opposed to the war
were unrepresented in Parliament until Keir Hardie became a
member in December 1900. All the Labour politicians in
Parliament were unanimous against the war in 1900 with the
one exception of Havelock Wilson. John Burns led the
parliamentary battle until Hardie was elected. Hardie carried
on a campaign against the Boer war in the ‘Labour Leader*•
In an article on Rhodes, he declared that the founder of
Rhodesia was a 'confirmed drunkard - a dipsomaniac in the
2language of social and conventional diplomacy.* In other 
articles* the 'Labour Leader* drew attention to the share 
lists of the Chartered Company and De Beers Limited, suggesting 
that the companies were benefiting from the war. It also 
thought that members of these companies were in a position 
to influence the colonial policy of the government.^ Keir 
Hardie declared that the war was *a capitalists* war begotten 
by capitalists* money* lied into being by a perjured mercenary 
capitalist press* and fathered by unscrupulous politicians* 
themselves the merest tools of the capitalists.... As
4socialists* our sympathies are bound to be with the Boers.*
The fullest exposition of the anti-capitalist argument was
1 . quoted in 'J. Keir Hardie*, William Stewart, p.150.
2. quoted in B. Porter, op.cit.* p.125
3. W. Stewart, *J. Keir Hardie**p.l53.
4. Labour Leader, 6 January a 900,p.4.
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given by Burns in the Houte of Commons in February 1900.
He declared that the war was not being fought for the franchise 
but for the gold and diamonds of South Africa. It had been 
engineered by a financial gang led by Rhodes and Beit.^
Hardie, in contrast to the Fabians, thought that in order 
to achieve 'socialism', the Empire would have to be sacrificed. 
He wrote that *a great and extended Empire lengthens the period 
required for the change from production for profit to 
production for use, and thus prolongs the misery* and 
consequently it followed that the loss of the Empire would 
hasten the advent of socialism. 'The greater the Empire the 
greater the military expenditure and the harder the lot of the 
mrkers. Modern Imperialism is, in fact, to the socialist,
osimply capitalism in its most predatory and militant phase.*
The I.L.P. organised many anti-war demonstrations in 
various parts of the country despite the intimidation of the 
war party. These were held in Leeds, Manchester, York, 
Birmingham, Glasgow, Edinburgh and other places. The violent 
opposition of the press to these demonstrations helped to 
advertise the aims of the I.L.P. The 'Labour Leader' 
continued to thunder against the 'capitalist war*,in which 
the British merchant was hoping to secure markets for his 
goods, the investor an outlet for his capital, the speculator 
looking for more 'fools' to make money out of, and the mining 
companies wanted cheaper labour and increased dividends.^
Hardie hoped that he could unite the I.L.P. with the 
enti-war forces in the Liberal party. He wrote a letter to 
John Morley stating that 'already two hundred and twelve 
thousand have paid affiliation fees to the L.R.C. What is
1 . Hansard, Fourth Series, Vol .78 col.785-96, 6 February 1900.
2. W. Stewart, op.cit., p.154.
3. ibid, p.157*
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wanted to fuse these elements Is a man with the brain to dare, 
the hand to do, and the heart to inspire, will you be that man?** 
Morley did not respond to this open invitation. However,
Hardie still hoped that he could get some agreement with the 
Liberal anti-imperialists and he invited opinions in the 
•Labour Leader* on whether the I.L.P. should issue a white list 
of candidates other than Labour party nominees who, because of 
their consistent opposition to the war policy, should receive 
the support of the I.L.P. electors. It was thought that men 
such as John Morley, Leonard Courtney, Dr. Clark and Lloyd 
George might be on the list. At its Conference on 29 
September 1900 a proposal that the branches should be stror^y 
recommended to vote in favour of those candidates with a good
anti-imperialist record and a Labour recommendation was defeated
2by the close vote of 42 to 39»
While Keir Hardie was trying and fdling to get the support
of the Liberal anti-imperialists, Sidney Webb was trying to get
the support of the imperialists. Webb thought that the
I.L.P.*s attitude to the war was hopelessly out of touch with
•modern* attitudes, and public sentiment. He wrote in 1901
that *when the war came the secret was out, outside the two
spheres of Labour and local government, the majority of
socialist leaders proved to be with regard to the British
Empire, mere administrative nihilists - that is to say,
ultra-Nationalists, ultra-Gladstonian, Old Liberal to the
fingertips.••••• They out-Morieyed Morley on the burning topic
of the day, and are now as hopelessly out of the running as
3the Gladstonian party.* Beatrice, however, did not seem to 
share this opinion, she wrote in her diary for 19 July 1900
1. ibid, p.l69
2.ibid, p.170
3. »Nineteenth Century*, September 1901,p.374.
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that 'the Fabian Society is completely out of it# the
majority believing in the inevitability of war, whilst the 
minority regard the majority as being the worst kind of
prominent Fabians towards the war helped to undermine both
their influence and interest in the larger political Labour 
2movement.
While the majority of members of trade unions probably 
supported the Empire, the leadership of the T.U.C. tried to 
ensure that its membership saw the relevance of the war to 
their immediate interests. Not only was the industrial situation 
in South Africa similar to that in England, they argued, but 
the war would bring 'great suffering and irreparable injury 
to the workpeople of both countries* by diverting the peoples 
attention away from social reform and the government's failure 
in this field, by increasing the tax burden and by diminishing
3the opportunities for white emigre employment in South Africa.
Blatchford was, says Semmel, the leading spokesman for the
rank-and-file socialists. He was an advocate of economic
nationalism, imperialism, militarism and jingoism. 'We
4were Britons first and Socialists next.' However, Pelling 
argues that there was no 'continuous support for the cause of 
imperialism among any sections of the working class'. It 
seems that, as Price states, the main attitude of the working 
class to the Boer war was one of indifference.^
The S.D.F.'s analysis of the w a n e s  that it had been 
brought about by the machinations of international armaments 
rings sponsored by international financiers. All the various
1 . B. Webb Diaries, op.cit., 19 July 1900
2. P. Poirier, 'The Advent of the Labour Party', (London,1958)
p.103.
3. B. Porter, op.cit.,p.132.
4. B. Semmel, 'Imperialism and Social Reform*,pp.222-224,(i960)
v «  ^  am m •  m  _  _ ____ «■ - __ H  ^  % _2 .A. J  . • A • O i l  W  . m
traitors. •1 Poirier writes that the attitude of the more
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groups came together for the first Labour party Conference 
which took place in February 1901. The motions passed on 
Imperialism and the Boer war were supplied by the anti­
imperialist forces. J. Burgess of the I.L.P. moved that modern 
impedalism was a ‘reversion to one of the worst phases of 
barbarism* inimical to social reform and disastrous to trade 
and commerce, a fruitful cause of war, destructive to freedom, 
fraught with menace to representative institutions at home and 
abroad, and must end in the destruction of democracy*. The 
Conference desired ‘most earnestly* to impress upon the working 
class the urgent need to combat imperialism in all its 
manifestations. The resolution on the war was also supplied 
tythe I.L.P. This stated that 'congress, believing the 
harrowing war in South Africa to be mainly due to the corrupt 
agitation of the Transvaal mine owners, having for its object 
the acquisition of monopolies and a cheap supply of coloured 
and European labour, protests against the destruction of the 
two republics. The resolution invited the government to
cease hostilities and submit to arbitration under the Hague 
Convention all matters in dispute between Great Britain and 
the countries with which she was at war. Both resolutions 
were passed unanimously.
During its discussion of the Boer war, the Labour party 
showed no widespread or constant concern for the welfare of 
the Africans in South Africa. Hardie protested occasionally 
about the working conditions of the Africans but the movement 
as a whole did not show much concern for the Africans.
As Henderson states, that the *T.U.C. was primarily concerned 
with the welfare of the white labour, with which the welfare 
of Native labour might well be incompatible. * 2
1 . Labour Party Conference Report, February 1901.
2. I. Henderson, 'The Attitude and Policy of the Main Sections 
of the British Labour Movement to Imperial Issues,1899-1924• 
(unpub. B.Litt. thesis, Oxford 1965)» p«47.
After the upsurge in interest in imperial questions at 
the time of the Boer war, the Labour Movement showed little 
concern for the Empire between 1902-191^. Henderson describes 
the Labour attitude as *apathetic and s o m n o l e n t T h e  Labour 
movement managed some protest against the importation of Chinese 
Labour into the Transvaal* The T.U.C* saw the issue as the 
simple one of undercutting. Tsiang writes that the sympathy 
shown by British labour for the trade unionists in South Africa 
was especially noteworthy, but the *predominant characteristic 
of the reaction of British labour to British imperialism in 
Africa from 1880 to 1920 is a c q u i e s c e n c e . H e n d e r s o n  states 
that *when it came to basic native rights the Labour Party
kcould hardly summon enough interest to vote, far less to speak** 
One of the few pamphlets, apart from •Fabianism and the 
Empire* to be issued by an organisation connected with the 
Labour"party was •Imperialism* published by the City of London 
branch of the I.L.P. in May 1900. Porter thinks that it may 
have been written by MacDonald.^ The pamphlet stated that 
imperialism was a world policy, not merely a colonial policy.
•It implies that in our relations with other states we are to 
be guided not so much by the ideals of co-operation as by the 
assumptions of superiority; it inevitably leads to territorial 
expansion and to an increasing burden of political responsibility 
over native races.* Imperialism and militarism went hand in 
hand with the result that the military had greater influence 
upon industry and government. The attention of the electorate
1 . ibid, p.49
2. ibid, p.71
3. Tingfu Fuller Tsiang, ‘Labour and the Empire^Columbia U.P.)p.95
4. I. Henderson, op.cit., p .56
5. •Imperialism*, (City of London branch, I.L.P., May 1900)
6. B. Porter, op.cit., p.136. However the pamphlet's criticism 
of imperialism is stronger than MacDonald usually used.
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was diverted from domestic politics and a class of demagogues 
disputed between themselves for the government of the country* 
By impoverishing the skill of the country and by encouraging 
the worst forms of financial capitalism« imperialism crushed 
out every budding hope that labour had of becoming economically 
and politically free.
The pamphlet stated that the Labour party stood for 
domestic reform first and should not be led astray by the 
pseudo-social reform which imperialism promoted. The social 
reform of imperialism was either a species of political bribery 
or of aristocratic philanthropy. Both were equally fatal to 
the state. *We shall do more to civilise Africa by civiliskig 
the East End of London than by governing from Cape to Cairo... 
Our responsibility for the weaker peoples must be that we 
protect them from our vices and guard them against those 
exploiting classes which are our own gravest m e n a c e . I t  
was not Britain's responsibility to 'teach* civilisation to 
alien races. Civilisation was a growth determined by the 
religion« history and circumstances of a people: it could 
not be carried about. A Western civilisation could not be 
imposed on an Eastern or a Temperate upon a Tropical people.
•We can no more send our civilisation to central Africa than 
we can send our climate there.* This was attacking the 
Fabian idea of Imperialism as a civilising mission. It was 
not possible stated the i.L.P. pamphlet to have a 'sane' or 
•non-jingoistic• imperialism. 'Imperialism meant the constant 
extension of territory, whether we like it or not, the 
continued subjection of peoples, whether we intend it or not.
The only difference between the 'Jingo* and the 'sane* 
imperialist was that the former knew his own mind and something
X. 'Imperialism', op.cit., p.15
2. ibid. p.7.
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of the influence of the imperial idea in history, whilst 
the latter knew neither his own mind nor his history.
The emphasis of the pamphlet was critical of the 
Fabian's policy of the civilising mission of imperialism.
It emphasised John Stuart Mill's statement that "the govern­
ment of a people by itself has a meaning and a reality; but
such a thing as government of one people by mother does not,
2and cannot, exist." Another writer who was also critical 
of the Fabian's view of the Boer War and imperialism was 
J.A. Hobson.
Hobson's was the most influential intellectual case 
against Imperialism. He was not a socialist but a Liberal 
economist. His book 'Imperialism* formed the basis of 
socialist thinking on imperial and colonial questions, 
influencing Lenin as well as British socialists. Hobson 
believed that Britain's foreign policy was primarily aimed 
at obtaining profitable markets for investment. The investor 
could not find profitable use for his capital at home so he 
insisted that the government should help him to secure 
profitable and safe investment abroad. These investors, 
living on returns from their investment abroad, then had an 
ever-increasing incentive to persuade the government to enable 
them to extend the field of their private investments and to 
safeguard and extend their existing investments. Hobson 
thought that the South African war had been undertaken largely 
for the benefit of big financiers who had made immense profits 
by war contracts and freezing out the smaller interests in 
the Transvaal. Finance was not the 'motor power* of 
Imperialism, this was provided by the patriotic forces which 
politicians, philanthropists and traders generated but finance
1 . ibid, p.10.
2. Quoted, ibid, p.l.
3. J.A. Hobson 'Imperialism', (London, 1902).
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was the 'governor of the imperial engine* which manipulated 
these forces. The standard of consumption of the working 
class of Great Britain was kept down and, as a result, there 
was an excess of goods and capital and opportunity for profit­
able overseas investment. This occurred because wages were 
based upon the cost of living and not upon the efficiency of 
labour. The result was that the population did not have 
enough to spend on anything other than the basic necessities.
According to Hobson, a fouth of the population of England^- 
was in poverty. (These he called the inefficient fourth*)
•If by some economic readjustment, the products which flow 
from the surplus saving of the rich to swell the overflow 
streams could be diverted so as to raise the incomes and the 
standard of the inefficient fourth,there would be no need for 
pushful imperialism, and the cause of social reform would have 
won a great victory.* Trade unionism and socialism were the 
natural enemies of imperialism because they strove to take 
away from the imperialist classes the surplus incomes which 
formed the economic stimulus of imperialism. No social 
reforms could be seriously advanced as long as the expansion 
of the Empire and its satellite (militarism) absorbed the time, 
energy and money of the state. Another result of the 
existence of the empire which tended to prevent reform was 
that it had created a class of men who mainly lived in the 
South of Englad and possessed social and local influence 
whose character had been formed and whose incomes were chiefly 
derived from the maintenance and furtherance of imperial rule.
1 . This may have been an exaggeration but studies by Rowntree 
and Booth at this time had shown that in some major cities 
over 3 0% of the people were in what they classed as *poverty*.
2. J.A.'Hobson *Imperialism*, p.86.
Hobson thought that the solution was to secure popular 
government which he believed would lead to internationalism 
while to retain class government would retain military- 
imperialism and international conflict as a result of the 
conflict of rival imperial powers for markets.
Hobson established two principles for the relations 
between ’civilised* nations and the less developed. The 
first was that all interference on the part of the 'civilised 
white nations with lower races' was not prima facie illegitimate 
and second 'that such interference cannot be safely left to 
private e n t e r p r i s e * I n t e r f e r e n c e  with 'native* peoples 
should be attended by an improvement and elevation of the 
character of the people who were brought under control. In 
order to ensure that the interference was directed towards the 
well-being of the 'natives' and not the special interest of 
the interfering nation, Hobson thought that an international 
organisation should be established. 'Sane* imperialism 
was devoted to the protection, education and self- development 
of a lower race whereas 'insane* imperialism handed over these 
races to the economic exploitation of the white colonists.
Hobson thought that the difference between these two policies 
could be observed in the difference adopted in Basutoland and 
that followed in Johannesburg and Rhodesia.
Hobson saw a dangerous tendency in politically powerful 
classes in Great Bri-taLn deriving their income from capital 
invested outside the British Empire. He feared that it would 
mean a growing tendency for them to use their political power 12
1 . ibid, p.232.
2. In 'The Scientific Basis of Imperialism', Political Science 
Quarterly XVII, 1902, p.489| Hobson argues for a federation of 
civilised nations but recognises that this would form the 
supreme test of civilisation. Would a federation of civilised 
states be able to maintain the force requisite to keep order in 
the world without abusing its power by political and economic 
parasitism?
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to interfere with the political condition of these states 
where they had an industrial stake. The only way to stop 
it was by an absolute ban on the right of British subjects 
to call upon their government to protect their persons and 
property from injury or danger incurred on their private 
initiative. Hobson ended his book by declaring that 
•Imperialism is a depraved choice of national life, imposed 
by self-seeking interests which appeal to the lusts of 
quantitative acquisitiveness and of forceful domination 
surviving in a nation from early centuries of animal struggle 
for existence. Its adoption as a policy implies a deliberate 
renunciation of that cultivation of the higher inner qualities 
which for a nation as for an individual constitutes the 
ascendancy of reason over brute impulse. It is the besetting 
sin of all successful states, and its penalty is unalterable in 
the order of nature. * 1
The key to Hobson's theory is contaiied in the statement 
that 'over production in the sense of an excessive manufact­
uring plant, and surplus capital which could not find sound 
investments within the country, forced Great Britain, Germany, 
Holland, and France to place larger and larger portions of 
their economic resources outside the area of their present 
political domain, and then stimulate a policy of political 
expansion so as to take in the new areas.* Economists have 
questioned whether he supplies sufficient * evidence to support 
the claim that colonies were the product either of a demand 
for new investment opportunities, or of security for existing 
investments. He shows that during the period when British 
possessions increased by 4754m. square miles and by a 
population of 88 millions that British overseas investments 12
1 . J.A. Hobson, 'Imperialism*, p .368
2. ibid, p.80.
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also increased enormously from £l44 m to £1698 m between 
1862 and 1893 alone. Hobson believed that there was a 
connection between these sets of figures. However, Fieldhouse 
shows that Hobson in no sense proved that there was any 
connection between the investments made overseas and the 
territory acquired at the same time. 1 Hobson*s theory is 
dented somewhat by the fact that there was nearly as much 
investment in Europe and the Americas as in the Empire, but 
Britain had no political control over those territories.
The dependent African colonies provided only 2.5 per cent of 
investment.
Although Hobson's analysis was flawed a large number of 
people were eventually influenced by it. His analysis 
formed a basis on whxh a coherent attack on imperialism could 
be made. Lenin made use of it in his pamphlet 'Imperialism, 
the highest stage of capitalism* to suggest that imperialism 
was the last stage of capitalism and in order to destroy
Ocapitalism, imperialism would also have to be destroyed.
Hobson's book also influenced members of the Labour movement 
and those who were to form its colonial policy after the 
war. As Henderson writes,'it required the shock of World 
War One to make the Labour Movement take Hobson seriously.
The Labour party was to take up the idea of a reforming 
imperialism, based on international control.
Tie Marxist position on colonies was that, as Lenin 
declared, for a socialist to have a colonial policy was a 
contradiction in terms. Imperialism was the dying stage of 
capitalism therefore the struggle of the workers in Britain
1 . D.K. Fieldhouse, Economic History Review, Vol.XIV, No.2,
1961, p .190
2. V.I. Lenin 'Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism',1916.
3. I. Henderson, op.cit., p.71.
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ard the struggle of the Africans in the colonies was a struggle 
against the same thing, bourgeois capitalism. The workers of 
Britain should join with the Africans of the colonies in 
smashing capitalism. For workers to have a policy for 
administering imperialism was a betrayal of the class struggle 
and their own interests. Lenin believed that the workers of 
Britain had been bribed by the bourgeoisie into accepting the 
colonies and imperialism. The workers of Britain were 
benefiting from the exploitation of the colonies, rather than 
realising that if they were going to abolish capitalism they 
would have to fight imperialism. By supporting imperialism 
they were supporting capitalism. Lenin thought that the 
British workers were *opportunists* who were unable to see where 
their*true* interests lay.
Engels had been the first to point out this tendency in 
the British working class. On 7 October 1858, he wrote to 
Marx that *the English proletariat is becoming more and more 
bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is 
apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a bourgeois 
aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat as well as a 
bourgeoisie. For a nation which exploits the whole world 
that is, of course, to a certain extent justifiable. * 1 On 
August U, l88l, he wrote of *the worst type of English trade 
unions which allow themselves to be led by men bought, or at 
least paid by, the bourgeoisie.* Engels wrote to Kautsky 
on 12 September 1882, *You a^k me what the English workers 
think about colonial policy? Well, exactly the same as they 
think about politics in general. There is no workers* party 
here, there are only Conservatives and Liberal Radicals, and *20
1 . Engels to Marx, 7 October 1858, in Marx and Engels selected 
correspondence, Moscow 1953, English trans., p.132-3
20 Engels to Marx, 11 August l88l, ibid, (in Lenin *Imperialism
O......', op.cit., p e1 29).
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the workers merrily share the feast of England*s monopoly 
of the colonies and the world market.'*
Engels was probably correct in stating that the working 
class had no definite ideas about colonial policy. There 
seemed to be massive indifference among the working class to 
imperial problems, particularly those of indigenous peoples.
Lenin stated in *Imperialism, the highest stage of 
capitalism* that *the receipt of high monopoly profits by 
the capitalists in one of the numerous branches of industry, 
in one of the numerous countries, etc., makes it economically 
possible for them to bribe certain sections of the workers, 
end for a time a considerable minority of them, and win them 
to the side of the bourgeoisie of a given industry or given 
nation against all the others. The intensification of the 
antagonism between imperialist nations for the division of the 
world increases this striving. And so there is created that 
bond between imperialism and opportunism, which revealed 
itself first and most clearly in England, owing to the fact 
that certain features of imperialist development were
oobservable there much earlier than in other countries.*
While it may not be true that British labour was directly 
"bought off" by the profits of imperialism, as Lenin stated« 
it was true that the British working class did not seem very 
revolutionary. The Conservative and Liberal parties carried 
out just enough reform to prevent the upsurge of revolutionary 
politics. Most Labour leaders were prepared to accept the 
empire and did not devote much thought to it. However, Keir 
Hardie was one of the few to address himself to the problems 
of the empire.
Hardie had moods when he thought that the Empire should 12
1 . Engels-to Kautsky, 12 September 1882
2. Lenin,'Imperialism....*,op.cit., p.152
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be abolished. He had written in the 'Labour Leader* that 
'the loss of Empire would hasten the advent ofSocialism*.*
He also showed concern for the plight of the Africans. 
Commenting on the Natal massacres, he wrote a letter to Mr. 
Bankole Bright, an African leader, which was published in the 
'Central African Times*; 'the wholesale massacre of natives 
which is now going on in South Africa, under the pretext of 
suppressing a rebellion which does not exist fills one with 
shame and horror. I hope the day will speedily come when 
your race will be able to defenJitself against the barbarities 
being perpetuated against it by hypocritical whites, who regard 
the black man as having been created in order that they might 
exploit him for their own advantagel Hardie went on to state 
that the press and politicians in England were keeping the 
people in ignorance of the real conditions of the 'native* in 
South Africa.
Macxpnald was the other Labour leader to show interest in 
the empire. After his election to Parliament in 1906, he 
wrote to Morel of the Congo Reform Society to ask whether the 
Labour party could further the aims of the Society in the 
House of Commons. He became one of Morel's leading 
parliamentary allies. When martial lawwas imposed in Natal 
as a result of African riots, Macdonald moved an adjournment 
motion in protest. He thought that the British Government 
should not have sanctioned the execution of ten men who were 
blamed for the riots by the Natal Government. It was the 
job of the British Government to protect the interests of 
the Africans who were not represented in the government of 
Natal . 3 1
1 . quoted, W. Stewart, op.cit., p.154
2. ibid, p .268
3. House of Commons Reports, Fourth Series, 2 ; April 1906;
D. Marquand, op.cit., p.98.
MaciDgnald thought that contact should be made with 
the colonies in order to prevent *anti-labour political 
sections being able to exploit the Labour movement of our 
colonies and the awkward effect such an exploitation might 
have upon our movement during a General Election«*1 He 
hoped to send a deputation to Australia which would draw the 
Colonial Labour movement and the British into closer touch« 
Unfortunately the Australian Labour party did ‘not see their 
way clear to fall in with the suggestion.* However, 
undaunted, MacDonald wrote to Senator J.C« Watson of the 
House of Representatives, Melbourne, in which he stated 
that the Senator would have seen the successes that had met 
the efforts of the L.R.C. to create a Labour party. *We 
are anxious to meet our Colonial friends with a view to 
coming to an understanding with the Democratic and Labour 
forces in the Empire, as we consider this to be the next 
step which the Labour Movements at home and in the Colonies 
should take.* The Labour R.C. had no intention of interfer­
ing with Australian fiscal policy or interfering in internal 
colonial matters but had four main objects:
1 . To rescue the Empire and the Imperial spirit from being 
exploited by the reactionary and anti-social classes at home.
2. To make the Empire stand for Peace and Democratic 
Justice in the eyes of the whole world.
3. To study the various social experiments which have 
been started in the colonies.
(t. To get our colonial fellow-workers to understand the 
Labour Movement of the Mother Country and to feel a share in 
its fortune. 12
1 . L.R.C. Papers 24/341, letter June 26, 1905«
2. L.R.C. Papers 26/245, letter to MacDonald from A.Mitchell 
28 July, 1905.
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Although the Australian party does not seem to have
responded, the letter indicates the Labour party*s attitude
towards the Empire. 1 2 After a tour of Canada, Australia and
New Zealand in the autumn and winter of 1906, Macponald wrote 
2a book on the Empire stating the principles by which he 
thought the Empire should be governed. In contrast to Lenin 
and the Marxists, MacDonald thought that the Empire should
i
not be abolished or ended. It existed and the Labour party 
had to reform it so that it would be an instrument of improve­
ment for its subjects rather than an instrument of exploitation. 
This was to become the Labour party*s general approach to 
the Empire, it believed in reforming it rather than abolishing 
it. MacDonald and the Labour party did not accept that the 
colonial relationship was inevitably one of exploitation.
MacDonald stated there was a contradiction between 
democratic and imperialist principles. The democratic 
method was to develop ‘native* civilisation on its own lines 
while the imperialist method was to impose on it an alien 
civilisation. Democracy and Imperialism were incompatible.
The job of the Labour party in imperial politics, thought 
MacDonald, was to democratise the imperial machine. A trade 
union secretary would make a better job of governing a province 
than the son of an ancient family or someone who was a friend 
of the colonial secretary when he was at Balliol. MacDonald 
thought that the imperialist method of trusting the 'man on 
the spot* led to anarchy and chaos. The Labour party 
realised that there were two men on the spot and the task of 
the British government was to discriminate between the true
1 . L.R.C. 31/431» MacDonald to Senator J.C. Watson, 29 
January 1906.
2. J.R. MacDonald »Labour and the Empire», (London, 1907).
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and the false voices. MacDonald wanted to establish an 
•imperial standard* of behaviour among the colonies and states 
of the Empire. The unity required to adopt this standard of 
•good behaviour* could not be enforced but would have to be 
an expression of an already existing desire. The Labour 
party would be in a better position to gain this co-operation 
because it had not incurred the suspicion of the Colonies. 
Friendly co-operation betweai the Labour parties of the Empire 
was an essential first step to a genuine imperial unity.
The imperial standard consisted of 'certain axioms regarding 
liberty and the administration of justice* which were being 
broken by South Africans 'native* policy. MacDonald did not 
expand on these ideas at any length. It was the duty of 
the imperial authorities to insist that the self-governing 
state should adopt a 'native* policy consistent with the 
honour of the Empire. There should be an imperial authority 
set up which would ensure that the 'imperial standard* was 
adhered to. This authority should*be representative~of each 
impexial state and should not sit in London. The 'imperial 
standard* should be set out in a declaration similar to the 
American Declaration of Independence.
Concerning the dependencies which were governed directly 
by Britain, MacDonald thought that a reform of the civil 
service was needed to ensure that a more sympathetic attitude 
was taken to the aspirations of the 'native' people. The 
Labour party's attitude towards »imperialism is not of the 
aggressive or bragging order; it does not believe in the 
subjection of other nationalities; it takes no pride in 
government of 'other* peoples. To its subject races it 
desires to occupy the position of friend; to its self- 
governing imperial states it seeks to be an equal; to the
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world it asks to be regarded as a neighbour • Towards the
colonies the attitude is one of administering the territories
in the interests of the inhabitants and not in accordance with
the commercial or national needs of Great Britain. The
development of the ,native* organisations, not the imposing of
the ends of British national life should be the aim. *As
long as we regard the native as one we must rule, we are
attempting the palpable impossibility of ruling democratically
at home and despotically abroad. The result will be that our
democratic systems will crumble, eaten to the heart of their
2supports by the autocracy of our dependency rule.*
A clash between the ,marxist,and •reformist* views on 
colonial policy occurred at the 1907 meeting of the Second 
International at Start tgart. The colonial question and 
militarism were the central issues. Macdonald, as 
representative of the Labour party and the I.L.P., supported 
a motion which proposed that *This congress.••.does not 
condemn in principle and for all time every kind of colonial 
policy, which - under a socialist regime - can be a work of 
civilisation* and proposed *an international agreement aiming 
at creating an international law, safeguarding the rights of
natives, of which the contracting nations will be the mutual
3guarantors.•
MacDonald spoke in favour of the motion saying that *we 
must have the courage to draw up a programme of colonial 
policy.•••.capitalists cannot do all they want in the sphere 
of colonial policy for they are generally submitted to the 12
1 . MacDonald, op.cit., p.108-9.
2. ibid, p.103.
3* quoted in R. Fox, *The Colonial Policy of British 
Imperialism* (London, 1933)» p.110. -B.J. Hovde, 
•Socialistic Theories of Imperialism*, pp.589-591 
Journal of Political Economy Vo. XXXVI, 1928.
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control of parliament.1* Mac^>nald*s belief in the power of 
Parliament to check imperialism was not supported by others 
at the conference. Lenin stated that *a wide colonial policy 
has led to the European proletariat party falling into such a 
position that the whole of society does not exist by its labour, 
but by the labour of the almost enslaved colonial slaves. The 
English bourgeoisie, for example, draws bigger revenues from 
the tens and hundreds of millions of the population of India 
and their other colonies than from the English workers. In 
such conditions in certain countries a material and economic
basis is created for the poisoning of the proletariat of this
~ 2or that country by colonial jingoism.* Lenin*s arguments 
won and the motion was rejected; another was passed in its 
place which stated that *the Congress declares that capitalist 
colonial policy in its innermost essence of necessity leads to 
enslavement, forced labour or extermination of the native 
population of the colonised areas. The civilising mission 
which capitalist society professes serves only as a cover for 
the thirst for exploitation and conquest. Only socialist 
society will first offer all nations the possibility of full 
cultural development.*^
This point of viewwas not accepted by the Labour party.
Its policy was to be based on an attempt to civilise the 
colonies and lead them to self-government. The party did 
believe that it was possible to have a *just* colonial 
policy and did not agree with those who thought that all 
colonial policy was a cloak for self-interest. However, 
before the First World War, the Labour party as a whole did 
not devote such attention to colonial policy or the problems
1 . quoted in R. Fox, op.cit., p.lll.
2. ibid.
3. Quoted in R. Palme Dutt, *The Crisis of Britain and the 
British Empire*, (London, 1953),p*322.
of the indigenous peoples of Africa. Leaders such as 
Shaw, Hardie and MacjDonald offered their own thoughts on 
the question of empire but there was no coherent party state­
ment. MacPonald and Hardie made various tours of the empire 
and showed some fascination with it but among the rank and 
file of the party and the trade unions there was general 
apathy. Labour had no clear policy about the empire but 
Macdonald's writings did point the way and indicate that 
when the party formulated a policy it would not be a 
revolutionary but a reformist one.
However, in 1909 when the South African Bill was passing
through the House of Commons, Labour members did join with the
Liberal radicals opposing the act on the ground that inadequate
protection was given to 'native* interests. MacDonald
suggested that a franchise restricted to men of 'European
descent• would have excluded the vote from the founders of
the world's great religions and Keir Hardie pointed out that
the Bill was the last chance the Imperial government would
have to interfere for good in the affairs of South Africa.
But their arguments were of no avail, and Balfour declared
that to give the 'natives* equal rights with the whites
1would threaten civilisation. Discrimination has been 
practised in South Africa ever since. The question of 
equal rights was to become one of the main points of conten­
tion in the later debate. People like Norman Leys 
suggesting that this should be the basis of the Labour 
party's policy.
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i“ House oi1 Commons Reports, Fifth Series, Vol. 9* 16-19 
• August 1909, 96lff.
CHAPTER 2.
BEGINNINGS OF A POLICY
The advent of the 191^-18 war forced the Labour party
to devote more thought to international issues. The way the
working classes of Europe marched off to fight each other for
nationalist causes showed the long way that socialists still
had to go in making international brotherhood more important
than nationalism. Keir Hardie was heartbroken and soon died,
his life’s work had collapsed around him.* Henderson
accepted*a post in the government while MacDonald took an
anti-war stand. MacDonald’s attitude was based on
disagreement with the government’s policy and not the
pacificism of some of his colleagues. "The Times"
castigated him for helping the enemy and he was subject to
2much abuse for his beliefs. The Labour party had been 
united in opposition to the war until it was declared.
Then the party was split into a minority wing, which opposed 
the war, and a majority wing, which supported it. It was 
not until the late summer of 1917» when Henderson left the 
government, that the Labour party became united again.
The war was to play a major part in the decline of the 
Liberal party. The fact that some members of the Labour 
party, principally, MacDonald and those associated with the
I. L.P., opposed the war put them in a similar position to 
that of Liberal radicals and internationlists such as E.D. 
Morel, Arthur Ponsonby, H.N. Brailsford, Charles Roden Buxton,
J. A. Hobson and C.P. Trevelyan who opposed the war through 
the Union for Democratic Control. Ramsay MacDonald and 
Philip Snowden were the main connecting links between the
I.L.P. and the U.D.C., both being in the I.L.P. and on the
1 . I. Mclean Keir Hardie (London, 1975) Chapter 7.
2. Do Marquand, op.cit., Chapter 10.
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Executive Committee of the U.DoC. As Mowat writes, 
MacDonald 'prepared the way for the influx of Liberals 
such as Ponsonby, Trevelyan, Wedgwood, Addison and Haldane 
into the Labour party.** Many Liberals, dissatisfied with 
the Liberal party's reaction to the war and internationalism, 
left the Liberal party and joined the X.L.P., and through 
that the Labour party, to which the X.L.P. was affiliated. 
Cline states that 'these recruits, so articulate on the 
problems of Kenya and India, so vociferous concerning the 
necessity of destroying secret diplomacy, initiating 
taxation of land values, and revising the Versailles treaty 
were almost silent on the central principle of their newly 
adopted party.• E.D. Morel was one of the first of the 
radical founders of the U.D.C. to leave the Liberal party.
He joined the X.L.P. soon after his release from prison at 
the end of January 1918. He was grateful to X.L.P. members 
who had stood by him and who had upheld the principles of 
the U.D.C. He wrote to his friend William Cadbury: "I 
have long been gravitating towards the socialist position - 
of course there is Socialism and Socialism, and mine is of
the reasonable and moderate kind.....I can't help feeling
that the conglomeration of circumstances which have produced 
this frightful catastrophe.....show that the whole fabric of 
society is on the wrong lines - cut throat competition 
instead of co-operation for the common weal.....Party 
Liberalism as represented by both wings - the Lloyd George 
wing and the Asquith wing is right outside my outlook now."^
1 . C.L. Mowat, 'Ramsay MacDonald and the Labour Party* in
Royden Harrison, ed. 'Essays in Labour History'•
D. Marquand,- op.cit., Chapters 10 and 1 1 .
2. C.A. Cline, 'Recruits to.Labour, The British Labour Party
1914-31* 'Syracuse University Press, 1963)p.31.
3. Morel to Cadbury, 7 April 1918, Morel Papers.
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Josiah Wedgwood, the Liberal M.P. for Newcastle-under-
Lyme and member of the famous pottery-family, joined the
I.L.P. in 1919» His daughter wrote in her diary for 8 April
19195^ "I had a letter from father saying he means to join
the I.L.P. in June (after explaining to constituents).....and
although he doesn't entirely agree with them in economics,
there is no doubt his general attitude is much more I.L.P.
than anything else. (I think the business in Russia was
the final straw that made father write straight off to the
I.L.P. - that and the dropping of the Land Valuation Act.)"
It was ex-Liberals such as E.D. Morel, E.N. Brailsford,
CoR. Buxton, J.A. Hobson and Josiah Wedgwood who were to play
a major part in determining the Labour party's international
and colonial policy dTter the war. Semmel writes that
'partially as a result of their influence the postwar Labour
party once again took up the internationalist cause and even
elected J.R. MacDonald, who had been denounced as a wartime
2traitor, as its leader. ' I. Henderson believes that the 
U.D.C.'s influence on Labour's colonial policy was a spiritual 
influence. 'It brought talk of internationalism and 
international control of colonies into Labour circles* and 
'instilled a suspicion of imperialism.'-' As Cline states, 
the ex-Liberals provided an informed leadership on 
international and imperial affairs which the party would 
otherwise have lacked and it is difficult to imagine what 
Labour policy would have been without their efforts.^ These
1 . Diary of Miss H.B. Wedgwood, ed. Mrs. Pease, Wedgwood 
Papers. (KedLe University)
2. B. Semmel, 'Imperialism and Social Refonrf(London,196o)p.2^7
3. I. Henderson, 'The Attitude and Policy of the Main Sections 
of British Labour Movement to Imperial Issues, 1899-1924' 
(unpub. B. Litt.thesis,Oxford 1965),p.l24
4. C.A. Cline, op.cit., p.31.
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people ensured that the Labour party would not ignore 
colonial matters as it had done in the past. This influx 
of ex-Liberals also strengthened the Liberal tendencies 
already present in the party. It brought in a body of men 
who were experts on international and colonial problems, 
men who supported policies of international control and free 
trade rather than the 'little-Englandism» of the pre-war
I.L.P. or the imperialism of the majority of the pre-war 
Fabians. It was these men who were to staff the Labour 
party's advisory committees on international and colonial 
qiestions along with a few Fabians and other members of the
I.L.P. These advisory committees were to be very important 
in the early formulation of Labour's international policy, 
particularly its colonial policy. As Winkler writes, the 
»Advisory Committee on International Questions was of the 
utmost importance* during the period 1918-29.1 These ex-
Liberals directed the Labour party into a concern for colonial 
and international affairs but their outlook was »of the 
reasonable and moderate kind*. They would not lead the 
Labour party into any extreme ways.
The Labour party began to consider its policy and 
organisation in 1917 after Henderson had resigned from the 
Lloyd George government. The Cabinet had left Henderson 
•on the mat' outside the Cabinet room after he had supported 
an international congress in Paris. The Cabinet thought 
that Henderson*s visit to Paris with Ramsay MacDonald might 
be construed as support for MacDonald's views. Lloyd 
George formally rebuked Henderson with the result that 
Henderson resigned in a state of great indignation. He then 
devoted himself to the affairs of the party, shaping a major 1
1 . H.R. Winkler, 'Labour Foreign Policy in G.B., 1918-29', 
Journal of Modern History, vol.28, no.2(1956),p.248.
re-organisation of its structure and also devising a foreign 
policy. This was, says Polling, a ’turning-point in the 
history of the Labour party.*^ The ideas of the U.D.C. 
influenced the foreign policy of the Labour party. The 
Labour Executive appointed a six man sub-committee to draw 
up a programme of foreign policy. The committee consisted 
of Henderson, MacDonald, F.W. Jowett, two trade unionists,
G.H. Wardle and G.H. Roberts, and Sidney Webb. MacDonald 
and Jowett were on the Executive of the U.D.C. and Henderson 
had been a former member. Henderson, MacDonald and Sidney 
Webb were mainly responsible for the foreign policy document - 
•Memo on War Issues*. MacDonald prepared the final version 
and it was largely through him that the U.D.C. exerted its 
influence on the foreign policy *>f the Labour party.
The Memorandum on War Issues was presented to the Labour 
party Executive on August 10 1917 and approved by a special 
conference of the Labour Movement on 28 December 1917« Its 
proposals were similar to those put to the Foreign Office in 
June by the U.D.C«, which had appeared in the ’Manchester
3Guardian* on 2 July 1917» The Memo demanded the establish­
ment of a League of Nations and machinery for the mediation 
of international disputes; internationaltrusteeship of 
African colonies; and international action to deal with 
economic problems such as the supply of raw materials. It 
stated that the ’British Labour Movement disclaims all 
sympathy with the imperialist idea that these (colonies) 
should form the booty of any nation, should be exploited for 
the profit of the capitalists or should be used for the 1
1 . H. Pelling, *A Short History of the Labour Party’ (London, 
1968),pp.4l-2
2. M. Swartz, ’The Union of Democratic-Control in British 
Politics during the First World War* (Oxford, 197l)pp.l65- 
l69î A.J.P. Taylor, ’The Troublemakers’ (London,1964)pp.l40-
3. ’Manchester Guardian*, 2 July 1917.
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promotion of the militarist aims of governments«* It went
on to declare that the *interests of humanity would be best
served by the full and frank abandonment by all belligerents
of any dreams of an African Empire; the transfer of all the
present Colonies of the European Powers in Tropical Africa,
together with the nominally independent Republic of Liberia
to the proposed Supernational Authority or League of Nations
herein suggested, and their administrationby an impartial
Commission .under that Authority with its own trained staff,
as a single independent African state, on the principles of
(l) the Open Door and Equal Freedom of enterprise to the
traders of all nations; (2) Protection of the natives
against exploitation and oppression and the preservation of
their tribal interests; (3) all revenue raised to be expended
for the welfare and development of the African State itself;
and (4) the permanent neutralisation of this African State
and its abstention from participation in international
rivalries or any future wars«*1
This proposal for putting all the colonies of Africa
under a supernational authority to be administered as a
single African state was anovel one. Surprising^ the I.L«P.
disagreed with it and took a more realistic line. In a note
on the Memo, it pointed out that in general terms it supported
the suggestion of the internationalisation and neutralisation
of tropical Africa but there were *enormous and perhaps
insurmountable* difficulties. It would still leave British
colonies in South Africa and South West Africa. There were
also grave doubts as to the practicality of the League of
Nations at present being able thoroughly to administer such
an enormous area as Liberia and the European colonies in
1 . TheLabour Party ‘Memo on the Issues of the War* (London 
August 1917)»PP*67»
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Tropical Africa without roads and railways. The I.L.P. 
thought that rather than try to create an international body 
to administer this area« it would be better if direct 
responsibility for the administration of divided areas of 
Africa were laid upon individual European States under the 
supervision of an International Commission.* However, in
. g
the'Labour Leaded, Philip Snowden wrote that the I.L.P. should 
welcome the Labour party memo and emphasise points of 
agreement in the interests of peace rather than to criticise 
its defects.
The Labour party's statement on war issues formed the
basis of discussion at the Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist
conference which met in London from February 20 - 23, 1918.
The conference had been called by the Labour party and the
T.U.C. Separate representation was refused to the I.L.P.
and the British Socialist Party. The Labour party's
document was toned down by the conference, 'turned upside
3down' according to Taylor. There was a shift of emphasis 
towards the I.L.P. position. The Memo on War Aims, 
prepared by the Inter-Allied Labour* and Socialist Conference, 
declared that the colonies of the belligerents should be 
placed tinder a system of control established by international 
agreement under the League of Nations. This would respect 
national sovereignty but would also be inspired by broad 
conceptions of economic freedom and concerned to safeguard 
the rights of the 'natives* under the best conditions possible 
for them and, in particular, it would take account in each 
locality of the wishes of the people, expressed in the form
X. Note by the I.L.P. on the 'Memo on War Issues' by the 
Executive Committee of the Labour Party, p.4.
2. 'Labour Leader', 3 January 1918.
3. A.J.P.Taylor, op.cit., p.1^1 .
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which was possible for them» The interests of the ‘native*
tribes as regards ownership of the soil should be maintained
and the whole of the revenues should be devoted to the well
being and development of the colonies themselves.* The main
difference between this statement and the Labour party‘s
original document was that the Inter-Allied one was,only
going to put the colonies of the ‘belligerent* nations under
international supervision. These colonies would not be
governed by an international body as the Labour party had
suggested but by countries under the supervision of the
League of Nations. This scheme was more practical but less
altruistic. Philip Snowden thought that the cardinal fault
of the new memo was that its proposals were based upon ‘the
assumption that the fruits of capitalism and imperialism
which have been gathered by the Allied Powers may be justly
retained, and that only those fruits in the possession of
the Central Powers must be disgorged in order to ensure the
ofuture peace of the world.*
The Labour party was prone, as Robinson states, to 
•recurrent propaganda for the internationalisation of 
colonial responsibilites under the League of Nations*#^
The more pragmatic Inter-Allied Conference thought that colonies 
should continue under the administration of separate nations, 
only being supervised by the League, rather than being 
administered by the League. It is surprising that the 
Labour party’s original document containing the radical idea 
of administering the African colonies by the League of Nations 
was written by MacDonald, Henderson and Webb who were later to
1 . Inter—Allied Labour and Socialist Conference, ‘Memo on 
War Aims*, (l9l8),p.3*
2. ‘Labour Leader*, 7 March 1918, p.l.
3. K. Robinson, ‘The Dilemmas of Trusteeship* (Oxford 
University Press, 1965)p«56.
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pursue much less radical policies in the African colonies*
E.D. Morel probably influenced their attitude towards the
African colonies* In 1917 he wrote a book and a pamphlet
on Africa and the peace settlement. The conclusion of his
book'*' was that *the neutralisation of the non-colonisable
area of Africa» the internationalisation of European commercial
activities within that area and such a distribution of
territorial sovereignty as would secure to Germany a
participation commensurate alike with her past achievements
in Africa» and with her economic needs - these, one would
suppose, are the aims which an enlightened statesmanship might
.2be expected to pursue**
In a U.D.C. pamphlet, *Africa and the Peace Settlement1 2, 
Morel wrote that the greater part of Africa was not suitable 
for colonisationby the white races because they could not live' 
in. it* European administration in the non-colonisable parts 
of Africa should be inspired by a sense of trusteeship, the 
basic principles of which were the preservation of the land 
for the peoples, preservation of ‘native* institutions, 
preservation of the principle of trade, regulation of trade 
to prevent monopolies, the abolition of differential tariffs 
and the encouragement of ‘native* industries* He thought 
that the working classes of Europe would suffer if they 
remained indifferent to the claims of the producing classes 
of Africa* The main basis of policy should be to ensure 
that the African retained his land because then he could not 
be made into a wage slave for the Europeans. Morel wanted 
a common international policy for Africa, a charter of ‘native*
1 . E.D. Morel, ‘Africa and the Peace of Europe* (National 
Labour Press, London 1917)»
2. ibid,p*115» By *non-colonisable*, Morel seems to have 
meant the African colonies which were not suitable for 
white settlement.
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rights and a general international procedure which would
preserve the African peoples from being precipitated into
war owing to the stupid and immoral rivalries endangered by
the Imperialistic ambitions of their rulers, and by the
passion for getting rich speedily at the expense of weaker 
1races*
These ideas were to form the basis of Labour policy for 
Africa-trusteeship for the African, preservation of their 
land, internationalisation of European commercial activities 
and international supervision of European administration, the 
abolition of differential tariffs and the pursuit of a policy 
of free trade* This was a liberal policy with its emphasis 
on free trade, internationalisation, ’native* rights and 
charters* It was reformist rather than revolutionary, 
there was going to be no immediate independence for the 
colonial empire but it was going to be reformed to benefit 
the African inhabitants. However, Morel had not, at that 
stage, addressed himself, in detail, to the problem of what 
to do in the territories where there were white settlers.
This was to prove a major problem later.
The Labour party produced its first comprehensive 
policy statement in 1918, ’Labour and the New Social Order’ 
which was drafted by Sidney Webb and Arthur Henderson. A 
conference was held in June 1918 under Henderson’s new 
constitution and the statement was formally adopted by the 
party. As Pelling writes, this policy document ’formed 
the basis of Labour party policy for over thirty years’.2 
The section on colonial policy rejected both the ’Little 
Englander* and imperialist approaches to colonial problems:
1. E.D. Morel, ’The African Problem and the Peace Settlement’ 
(U.D.C., London, 1917)
2. H. Pelling, op.cit., p.kk.
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"If we repudiate, on the one hand the imperialism that 
seeks to dominate other races, or to impose our will on other 
parts of the British Empire, so we disclaim equally any 
conception of selfish and insular •Non-interventionism* 
unregarding of our special obligations to our* fellow citizens 
overseas; of the corporate duties of one nation to another; 
of the moral claim upon us of the non-adult races; and our 
indebtedness to the world of which we are a part.....With 
regard to the great commonwealth of all races, all colours, 
all religions and all degrees of civilisation that we call 
the British Empire, the Labour party stands for its 
maintenance and progressive development on the lines of local 
autonomy and ‘Home Rule All Round*; the fullest respect for 
the rights of each people, whatever its colour, to all the 
Democratic self-government of which it is capable and to the 
proceeds of its own toil upon the resources of its own 
territorial home; the closest possible oo-operation among all 
the various members of what has become essentially not an 
Empire in the old sense, but a Britannic Alliance, and 
especially in India, is the continuous participation of the 
Ministers of the Dominions, of India, and eventually of the 
other dependencies in the most confidential deliberations of 
the Cabinet, so far as Foreign policy and Imperial Affairs 
are concerned; and the annual assembly of an Imperial Council 
representing all constituents of the Britannic Alliance and all 
parties in their local legislation which should discuss all 
matters of common interest, but only in order to make 
recommendations for simultaneous consideration of the various 
autonomous local legislatures of what should increasingly take 
the constitutional form of an Alliance of Free Nations."'*'
1 . Labour Party, »Labour and the New Social Order* (London, 
19l8),ppo21-2
As Goldsworthy points out, these were orthodox liberal 
themes; ’moral obligation, the prevention of exploitation 
and domination and progress towards self-government *• * The
idea of continuous participation of the Ministers of the 
Dominions in the most confidential deliberations of the 
Cabinet on foreign policy and imperial affairs seemed to 
savour of early Fabian imperialism and the influence of 
Milner on Webb. However, this idea was soon dropped and it 
never again found a place in an official party document.
This declaration of policy showed that the Labour party had 
decided to adopt a policy of careful reform aiming at eventual 
self-government but there was no indication of the time 
scale envisaged. The Empire was regarded as something that 
could be made into a force for racial co-operation. Hardie's 
idea that the empire represented 'capitalism in its most 
predatory and militant phase* was ignored. Reform rather 
than abandonment was to be the policy of the Labour party 
for the empire. As might be expected from Sidney Webb the 
policy was evolutionary rather than revolutionary. It read 
well as a list of aspirations, but the problem was in making 
the aspirations a reality.
The Labour party conference of June 1918 which discussed 
the policy statement 'Labour and the New Social Order* did 
not discuss the section on colonial policy, indicating the 
low priority which was attached to the subject. The previous 
conference in January 1918 had not discussed colonial affairs 
as such but had passed a resolution on India, urging the 
•Labour members to do all in their power to bring pressure 
on the present government, without undue delay, in order that
1 . D. Goldsworthy, 'Colonial Issues in British Politics 
1945-61* (Oxford, 1971)pp.117-8
2. Quoted in W. Stewart, 'The Life of Keir Hardie•,p.l54.
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these people shall be given their just rights, which have 
been due to them throughout all time, including the right to 
self-government. * 1 The Labour party thought that India should 
be given self-government but it considered that the colonies 
of Africa were not yet ready for it. The Indians were 
regarded as at a higher stage of development than the 
Africans. One of the problems with the party's policy 
towards Africa was that many in the party regarded the 
Africans as inferiors. There was no indication that many 
members of the party thought that Africans could ever be equal 
to the white man.
The 1918 General Election manifesto gave the briefest
of mentions to colonial and imperial problems - *The
principles which Labour acclaims as Allied war aims, it will
apply to our own subject peoples, and it will extend to all
subject peoples the right of self-determination within the
2British Commonwealth of Free Nations.* This declaration 
seemed very radical but again no time scale was mentioned for 
extending to all subject peoples the right of self-determina­
tion. Self-determination for the African colonies was to be 
for the future rather than the present.
In the reorganisation of the party machine that took 
place at the end of the war, advisory committees were set 
up to provide expert information and advice for the National 
Executive Committee. An International Advisory Committee 
was set up to deal with International and imperial problems. 
This committee set up a sub-committee on 8 January 1919 on 
the Crown Colonies and Dependencies with special reference 
to »Africa and the treatment of the natives.*** The
1. Labour rarty Conference Report, January 1918, p.138.
2. Labour Party, *Laboui% Call to the People* (1918 manifesto)
3. Labour Party, International Advisory Committee Minutes,
8 January 1919»
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membership of this committee consisted of C.R. Buxton,
H. N. Brailsford, Lowes Dickinson, Major Gillespie, Captain 
Stocks, Delisle Burns, Sidney Webb, Leonard Woolf, G.D0H.
Cole and Duncan Hall. Buxton and Brailsford had been on 
the Executive Committee of the U.D.C., Dickinson, Cole and 
Hall were academics, Sidney Webb was the founder of the 
Fabian Society and Leonard Woolf was a Fabian who had 
served in the colonial civil service. The others played 
a less important role on the committee. This committee 
was expanded into a sub-committee on Imperial Questions on 
13 February 1920. The membership of this committee 
consisted of J.C. Wedgwood, C.R. Buxton, N. Buxton, J.L.
Stocks, H. Duncan Hall, Ben Spoor, Bernard Shaw, J. Scurr,
Dr. N. Leys, L.S. Woolf, Sir S. Olivier, J.R. MacDonald 
and A.Jo Toynbee.'*' However, this expanded committee did 
not last very long and at the end of 1920 there was a 
reconstruction of the advisory committees and the sub­
committee was merged back into the Advisory Committee on 
International Questions. A separate committee on Imperial 
questions was not again constituted until 6 February 1924, 
when, on E.D. Morel’s suggestion, an Imperial sub-committee
was appointed with the power to co-opt members and send
omemoranda direct to the National Executive Committee. In 
January 1925 this committee attained full and permanent 
status as the Advisory Committee on ImperialQuestions. The 
membership of this committee consisted of N. Angell, Captain 
Bennett, Dr. E. Bentham, H.N. Brailsford, C.R. Buxton,
G. Lowes Dickinson, J.H. Harris, W.H. Hutchinson,
S. Saklatvala» J. Lawson M.P., E.D. Morel M.P., Jo Scurr M.P., I.2
I . I.A.C. Minutes, 13 February 1920.
2. I.A.C. Minutes, 6 February 1924.
There was no Trade Union member of the committee at this stage.
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T. Smith M.P.# H. Snell M.P., Ben Spoor M.P., Lt.-Colo
T.S.B. Williams M.P., and L.S. Woolf was the secretary.
N. Leys and MacGregor Ross, experts on Africa, were soon
asked to join the committee.
The task of the Advisory committees, according to
Leonard Woolf, was to try to dissipate the ‘profound and
almost universal ignorance of international and imperial
facts and problems* which existed among both the leaders
and the rank and file of the Labour movement.* The people
who were to make most impact on the Labour party‘s colonial
policy were Leonard Woolf, C.R. Buxton, J.C. Wedgwood,
E.D. Morel, Sir S. Olivier, Dr. N. Leys, H.N. Brailsford,
Ben Spoor, H. Snell and J. Scurr.
Leonard Woolf was secretary of both the International
Advisory Committee and the Advisory Committee on Imperial
Questions. He was regarded by the Webbs as ‘the expert*
on international and imperial questions. He was an ex-civil
servant whose experience of the Colonial civil service in
Ceylon had made him dislike imperialism with its relation-
2ships of dominant to subject peoples. He resigned from the 
civil service in 1911 and wrote books for the Fabian Society 
on ‘International Government* and ‘Empire and Commerce in 
Africa*. The latter was an important source of the Labour 
party's colonial policy.
In ‘Empire and Commerce in Africa', Woolf discussed 
the general effect of economic imperialism in Europe, on the 
one hand, and in Africa and Asia, on the other. Woolf 
thought that it was extremely doubtful whether the possession 
of an African Empire had added to the power of any European
1 , L. Woolf, 'Downhill All the Way* (London, 1967),pp.2l8-9 
2.ibid, p .222
3. L.S. Woolf, ‘Empire and Commerce in Africa’ (London,1920)
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state; it certainly had not added to their wealth. The 
budgets of all European states showed that they had always, 
as states, an expenditure which exceeded their revenue in 
Africa. Colonial policy was made by a small set of men 
who were set in motion by small groups of financiers, 
traders and capitalists who were seeking economic ends in 
Africa. There was no actual corruption but the governing 
group was subject to persistent and powerful pressure to 
which it eventually yielded. The policy pursued by Britain 
in East Africa was shaped by the British East Africa Company 
which had invisible lines from the boardroom to *The Times*, 
the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Church of Scotland and the 
establishment generally. So long as the policies of 
European states continued to be dominated by economic 
imperialism and directed to profit-making there could be no 
international peace or security.
Woolf examined the question of whether economic 
imperialism prevented unemployment and depression in Britain. 
He concluded that the British possessions on the East coast 
of Africa were of negligible importance to British industry 
either as a source of raw materials or as a market for 
manufacturers. It was obvious that a population where wages 
were between £2 and £3 a year would never provide a market 
for the products of European industry. A few capitalists 
had made or lost money but generally trade, industry and 
labour had reaped no advantages.
The general effect of European policy in Africa, 
according to Woolf, had been almost wholly evil. *The 
European went into Africa about forty years ago desiring to 
exploit it and its inhabitants for his own economic advantage 
and he rapidly acquired the belief that the power of the state
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should be used in Africa to promote his own economic interests.*^ 
By force or fraud the African chiefs were swindled or robbed 
of their dominions. Even if the European had given to the 
African the gift of law and order this was no justification 
for a system of conquest, partition and economic exploitation. 
Nevertheless, Woolf thought that in the position reached there 
would be no improvement if Europeans abandoned Africa. The 
major problem was how the administration of the European state 
could be changed from an instrument of economic exploitation 
into an instrument of progress for the Africans. One answer 
was to try to place the relations of European states in •non­
adult* countries on a foundation of co-operation rather than 
hostility by working through the League of Nations. Another 
was to change the beliefs and desires of Europeans in Africa 
with regard to the Africans. The African should be regarded 
as an end in himself rather than an instrument of other 
people's ends. The ultimate beliefs and desires which had 
to be changed were economic and social and were part of the 
capitalist system. The passion for buying cheap and selling 
dear was the fundamental cause of theAfrican problem. The 
substitution of international control for national imperialism 
might only result in exploitation being carried on by an 
international rather than a national bo<^ r • Woolf was forced 
to the conclusion that the economic beliefs and desires of 
Europeans would have to undergo a change before European 
administration could become an instrument for good in Africa.
The Europeans should continue in Africa as trustees for 
the African population. Their duty was to promote the 
political, social and economic interests of the Africans. In 1
1 . L.S. Woolf, »Empire and Commerce in Africa' (London,1920) 
P-352.
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order to do this the land should be reserved for the 
Africans, they should be given systematic education and 
gradually Europeans and their capitalist enterprises 
should be expropriated. All revenue raised should be used 
for the development of the country and the education, health 
and well being of the African population. There should be 
an .absolute prohibition of alcohol and Africa should be 
neutralised in international affairs. However, it was 
•ridiculous to imagine that Europe can or will rule the 
forests of Africa in accordance with the maxims of Christ 
and the sermon on the mount and at the same time apply to 
Paris, London and Berlin the doctrines of Machiavelli and 
Bismarck and the ideals of the market and the stock 
exchange.1'1' There would have tobe a revolution in men's 
beliefs and desires in order to substitute the idea of 
trusteeship for that of ownership and exploitation. There 
would have to be an acceptance of the ideal and system of 
international trusteeship. This could be done by interna­
tional commissions administering the territories in the 
interests of the Africans (as had been suggested in the 
Labour party*s memo on war issues) but Woolf thought that 
this idea was probably too idealistic and the most practical 
solution was for the League to formally declare its 
trusteeship of the *non-adult* races and then proceed to 
hand them over to particular states as its mandatories. 
However, Woolf feared that this would mean that everything 
would remain exactly as before since it was improbable 
that the trustee would be particularly hampered by its 
mandate. The old system might operate under a new name. 1
1 . L.S. Woolf, op.cit., p.363.
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It was essential that the trusteed obligations were defined 
in a treaty guaranteed by the League which would have a 
powerful organ.to supervise the execution of treaty 
obligations and which would guarantee absolute equality of 
commercial opportunity by means of free trade and the open 
door* The League should possess the power to revoke a 
mandate if the mandatory power did not fulfil its obligations. 
Unless the League created means for ensuring that mandatory 
nations fulfilled their obligations it would be powerless. 
Woolf's ideas were radical and non-marxlst• He did not 
believe that theeconomic system should be changed in order 
to alter men's beliefs, he thought that men's beliefs should 
alter in order that theeconomic system of exploitation should 
change. Woolf's ideas were based on a humanitarian appeal 
to reason. There would have to be a change but it should 
be brought about by persuasion and reason rather than by 
violence or force. He placed his emphasis on a policy of 
'trustee ship'over the Africans.
Concerning the other members of the A.C.I.Q., C.R. Buxton 
was a member of a familyvhich had been prominent in the anti­
slavery movement of the nineteenth century. Educated at 
Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge, he entered the House 
of Commons in 1910 as a Liberal. Throughout the war he was 
an active member of the U.D.C., joining the I.L.P. in 1917.
In 1922 he was elected as a Labour member of Parliament.
Josiah Wedgwood was mother Liberal member of a famous 
family who joinfed the I.L.P. in 1919. He spent a period 
in South Africa during the Boer war and then as a government 
administrator. Throughout his career he was an enthusiastic 
proponent of a land tax which he regarded as a solution to 
most economic ills. EoD. Morel was another Liberal convert.
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He founded the Congo Reform Association in 1904 and worked 
for the elimination of abuses in the treatment of the 
Africans in the Congo Free State. He was adopted as a 
Liberal candidate in 1912 but his opposition to the war led to 
the resignation of his candidacy. As secretary of the U.D.C.t 
he was one of the most prominent critics of Britain's 
participation in the war and in 1917 was imprisoned under 
D.O.R.A.^ He became a member of the X.L.P. in March 1918 and 
from 1922 until his death in 1924 was a Labour M.P.
Sir Sydney Olivier was one of the founders of the Fabian 
Society and one time Governor of Jamaica.'. He became 
Secretary of State for India in the first Labour government 
and was tie author of the important book 'White Capital 
and Coloured Labour*« which discussed the exploitation of the 
black man by white capital. In the 1920s he wrote articles 
on colonial affairs for the 'New Statesman*.
Norman Leys had practised medicine for 20 years in 
Portuguese and British Africa. In 1910« sympathising with 
African grievances« he gathered material for a book exposing 
the details of European exploitation. In 1918 he returned 
to England having grown more and more critical of the 
settlers. He became a fierce critic of the settlers in 
Kenya« writing many books and articles on East Africa. He 
was a fierce believer in a policy of 'equal rights' for the 
Africans. This meant that all discriminatory legislation 
should be abolished and all Africans should have the franchise 
on the same terms as white settlers. Throughout the 
interwar period« Leys fought to commit the Labour party to 
emphasise the 'equal rights' policy rather than the trusteeship 
policy, which was supported by Woolf and Morel.
H.N. Brailsford was an executive member of the U.D.C.
I.Befence of the Realm Act.
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during the war. He had been a member of the I.L.P. aince 
1907« and edited the I.L.P. newspaper *The New Leader*«
1922- 26.
Ben Spoor was a member of the l.L.P. He was one of 
Labour's main spokesmen in the House of Commons on Colonial 
and Imperial Affairs. Harry Snell was another I.L.P. 
member who became one of Labour's leading spokesmen in the 
Commons. He was secretary of the Labour Commonwealth Croup 
of M.P.s for seven years. J. Scurr was a member of the
I.L.P. He wrote articles on colonial policy and belonged to 
the Home Rule for India movement.
These men were the main framers of the Labour party's 
colonial policy in the twenties. In 1918# the members of 
the Advisory Committee on international questions were 
slightly cut off from the predominantly trade unionist 
Parliamentary Labour party. Nevertheless« the International 
Advisory Committee produced a stream of memoranda which it 
sent up to the National Executive Committee. One of the major 
issues that occupied the International Advisory Committee was 
the question of Africa and the peace settlement. There was 
the problem of what to do with Germany's colonies. As has 
been shown« the Labour party had advocated international 
administration but this had been toned down at the Inter- 
Allied conference to the idea of international supervision 
of mandatories. In September 1918« the International 
Advisory Committee prepared a statement on its attitude to 
the Peace Conference. It was a combination of the Labour 
party's memo on the issues of the war and the Inter-Allied 
statement. The I.A.C. memo stated that the Inter-Allied 
'Memo on War Aims' had laid down four policy proposals 
which should be applied to all colonies and dependencies
/
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of all countries; - (l) The Peace Conference should secure 
to the 'natives' effective protection against the excesses 
of capitalist colonisation* Home Buie should be granted to 
all groups of people that had attained a certain degree of 
civilisation and there should be progressive participation in 
local government for all the others* (2) Colonies captured 
during the war should not be an obstacle to peace but should
be a subject of special consideration at the Peace Conference.
>
(3) There should be economic equality for the peoples of all 
nations in such territories* (4) For sub-tropical Africa a 
system of control should be established by international 
agreement under the League of Nations and maintained by its 
guarantee which« while leaving each colony as at present tinder 
the sovereignty of a European Power« would safeguard economic 
freedom and the rights of the 'natives'* In order to promote 
this policy the Labour party would have to secure three 
separate points;- economic freedom innon-adult possessions 
(i*e* in all colonies and possessions other than self- 
governing colonies)« the political« economic and social rights 
of nations in such possessions and a settlement of the question 
of the captured German colonies* The Labour party programme 
implied that a settlement of these points should be by 
international agreement under the supervisionand guarantee 
of a League of Nations*1
There was considerable discussion of these questions in 
the Labour press* 'The New Statesman* discussed 'The League 
and the German Colonies' on 1 February 1919. It mentioned the 
Labour party's memo on the issues of the war and its plan that 
all the colonies of the belligerents should be brought under 
the common sway of the League of Nations and Smuts' idea that
1 . International Advisory Committee. 'The Colonies' (September«
1918)
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they should be transferred to one or other of the 
victorious white states to govern* The writer seemed to 
be in favour of the latter idea with the white governments 
as •mandatories• exercising a •trust* while the League of 
Nations stood by with permanent machinery to enforce the 
mandate*^
Sir Sydney Olivier, writing in the •Labour Leader*
thought that the inhuman and insane barbarities of Germany's
rule in all her African colonies made it impossible for any
World Conference to propose to reinstate her* He thought
that control should be kept on behalf of the Society of
Nations over the principles of adainistration in all such
territories to secure the rights and welfare of the 'natives',
but immediate sovereignty ought to be vested in one single
national authority* A Charter of the liberties and rights
of primitive peoples everywhere should be drawn up* The
Peace Conference should provide, and the League of Nations
guarantee, the rights of the African populations* There
should also be free access, subject to the rights of the
2Africans, to the peoples of all civilised nations.
In the same paper, Philip Snowden wrote of reports 
that German colonies in Africa were to be handed over to 
South Africa, Japan and Australia as 'trustees1* Snowden 
thought that there could be no assurance of world peace if 
a few countries were given the right to exploit the rich 
tropical and semi-tropical parts of the earth to the 
exclusion of equal opportunities for all nations*^ Travers 
Buxton and J.H. Harris, secretaries of the Anti-Slavery and 1*3
1 . 'New Statesman', 1 February 1919,p .363
2* 'Labour Leader*, 7 November 1918, p*5*
3. ibid*, 6 February 1919» p.l*
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Aborigines Protection Society were apprehensive that 
pressure was being exerted on chiefs and tribes to come 
under a given mandatory when they had a firm desire to come 
under another mandatory power
The 'New Statesman* believed that the terms of the man­
date were vital* The value of the trust deed would depend 
entirely on the means adopted for its observance. Would
there be a guarantee that the grievances of 'natives' 
against members of the League would receive attention?
What remedy would the 'natives' have and who would be 
responsible for setting it in motion? Would it be 
reasonably cheap or would it be the luxury of wealth? The
paper thought that something analogous to the Privy Council
owas needed to which appeals could be made*
The League of Nations Covenant placed the German 
colonies as mandates under the administrationof the 
victorious powers who were to act as 'Trustees' under the 
supervision of the League of Nations* As Winkler writes, 
the Labour party was disappointed with the Covenant*^ The 
party disapproved the plans for the mandate system and 
suspected the motives of the supporters of the system* The 
Permanent Commission of the Labour and Socialist Interna­
tional met at Lucerne between 1-9 August 1919 and passed a 
resolution on the colonies* (The Labour party wasstrongly 
represented at the International.) The motion stated that 
'as regards the Colonies, the International declares that 
upon the question of principle it maintains the point of view 1
1 . ibid., 26 June 1919*
2* 'New Statesman', 9 August 1919,p*40*
3# H*R* Winkler, 'The Emergence of a Labour Foreign Policy 
in Great Britain, 1918-19295 Journal of Modern History, 
vol.28, no.2 (l956)pp248-9 -
•Labour and the Peace Treaty',.(The Labour Party, 1919)
A* Henderson, 'The Peace Terms', (London,1919)
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of past international Congresses on the right of indigenous 
populations and the illegitimacy of exploitation of colonies 
by the capitalism of the Great Powers, but since the colonial 
system continues to exist the International declares that the 
Peace Conference ought not to have deprived Germany of its 
colonies* It is both an injustice and a mistake; an 
injustice, because the other nations cannot very well claim 
moral superiority for their administration; a mistake, 
because they deprive Germany of the possibility of economic 
development at the very moment when certain parts of her 
territory have legitimately been taken from her and restored 
to their original national communion and when heavy indemnities 
are being exacted from her for reparation of damage done*
Taking account, however, of the actual situation created by 
the mandatory system adopted by the Peace Conference, the 
International declares that the following principles should 
be observed in every case on the revision of Article 19 of 
the Covenant: - (l) Equality of economic opportunity in all 
non-self-governing colonies should be assured under the 
League of Nations* (2) All such colonies and not merely 
the conquered German colonies should be subject to the 
mandatory principle* (3) The mandates should be granted 
by the League of Nations, not by the Allies* The conquered 
colonies should be ceded to the League of Nations, not to 
the Allies* (4) Germany should be afforded an opportunity 
to become a mandatory of her former colonies under the League 
of Nations*1 The Labour party supported the motion, 
believing that all colonies should be administered as a 
trust* All colonies should become *mandates* under the 
League of Nations, not just the German colonies*
1 , Labour Party'Nineteenth Annual Conference Report, 1919» 
Appendix XV,p*224*
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However, in an article in the 'Socialist Review*,
Norman Leys wondered how socialists could give their support 
•to that instrument oftreachery to a peace-loving world, 
the League of Nations«* He 6elieved that the League was 
a useless remedy in the critical situation reached in some 
countries in East Africa where the Africans had no political 
rights and were forced to work for the Europeans. The 
spread of education was sowing the seeds of rebellion among 
more Africans every year. The covenant's only value would 
be that it would prove incontestably the moral bankruptcy 
of the capitalist world order« Leys thought that capitalism 
was near its end in Europe and whm it did collapse 'the 
testing time for thewhole Socialist movement will come*; 
the workers would be offered a share in the profits of the 
spoliation of Asiatics and Africans« British Socialists 
had a particular duty because no other country governed so 
many of the unfree« Britain's fate hung upon the wisdom 
she showed in guiding the future of half the world.^ Leys 
was emphasising the situation in East Africa where there 
were white settlers who were 'exploiting» the Africans.
He was trying to focus the Ldmur party's attention on this 
problem« It was to develop into the party's main concern 
during the interwar period«
The 'Socialist Review* also published a letter from an 
English resident in Tanganyika stating that the country was 
worse off as a mandate of Britain than it had been under 
German rule« Leys feared that the League of Nations 
seemed to be a continuation of the old system under a new 
name. Although the Labour party was critical of the annexa­
tion of the German colonies it did favour the internationa-
1« N. J-eys, -The Tropics and the League of Nations', Socialist 
Review, vol.ll8, No«96,Jan-March 1921,pp.68-78.
2. 'Socialist Review', No.100, January 1922, pp.51-2
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libation of colonial, responsibilities.
Leonard Woolf wrote a pamphlet on 'Mandates and the 
Empire1 , which was t© prove influential in the development 
of Labour policy. In this, he stated that there were two 
different systems in operatbn in Africa. On the West Coast 
the African retained the land but in British East Africa 
the land had been alienated from the Africans and they were 
faced with the alternative of starvation or of working for 
a few pence a day on the land which belonged to them but 
which the white man had expropriated. The League of Nations 
should lay down minimum standards for mandatory powers.
These should be that the land should be the property of the 
African, every African should be assured sufficient land for 
his support, African rights in and occupancy of land should 
receive legal sanction, leases to Europeans should only be 
for short periods with the consent of the African communities, 
the government should re-enter where land had been alienated 
to Europeans on such a scale that it was impossible for 
the African to have sufficient for his support. All 
compulsory or forced labour should be abolished. Primary 
schools should be provided for every African child to obtain 
primary education and training colleges should be provided 
for African teachers. The Mandate should specifically 
state the obligation of the mandatory government to encourage 
and educate the Africans in the most economic use of their 
land. Local self-government should be encouraged. The 
League should lay down the form of govetment to be applied 
in each area and should reserve to itself full and adequate 
powers of supervision. These principles should be applicable 
to the treatment of all subject races. Their government 
should be treated as a »trust* for civilisation. 1 The 
1 . L.S. Woolf, «Mandates and Empire* (London, 1920)
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Labour party adopted this idea at a spec'raLl congress 
called to discuss the League of Nations Covenant. The 
duties imposed on the mandatory powers should also apply to 
all other colonial powers in their relations with subject 
peoples.
A motion was passed stating that ‘'the provisions and 
obligations of Article 19* referring to Colonies and Native 
Territories, be applied to all peoples in the position of 
those dealt with in the Article, and that the Article be 
strengthened by protecting the natives from exploitation by 
the alienation of lands, or destruction of customs which 
secure the economic liberty of the people."1
There was a need for a more detailed policy towards 
the colonies. In an article in the 'Socialist Review*,
John Scurr wrote that the I.L.P. could not afford to neglect 
the problems of the Empire. *We have to have a colonial 
policy idiich will hare for its end precisely the same goal 
as our domestic policy. We have to have a colonial labour 
policy which will be directed towards putting the labouring 
classes of the coloured races on their feet, so that first 
of all they may be free and independent, and secondly, 
which will remove the competitbn of their labour.«2 
Capitalism should not be allowed to employ coloured labour 
in competition to white, thereby reducing the white workers* 
standard of life. The standard of living of the Africans 
should be protected to ensure that the cheap competition of 
their labour did not upset the British workers* standard of 
Hiring. This meant pressing for higher wages for indigenous 
African labour. The trade union movement took up this
1. Report of the Executive Committee of the Labour Party, 
1918-1919,p.25.
2. J. Scurr, «Thoughts on I.L.P. Policy*, Socialist Review, 
vol.16, No.91,p.383.
attitude; later its interest in colonial affairs was mainly 
to ensure that British workers* living standards did not 
suffer. As Africa became more industrialised in the 1930s 
the trade unions took more interest in colonial problems. 
However, apart from passing one or two resolutions at 
Congress, the trade union movement largely ignored colonial 
problems in the 1920s.
The sub-committee on' the government of the Crown 
Colonies and Dependencies tried to work out a Labour policy 
for the colonies. The committee was greatly concerned with 
the question of African land. The committee considered that 
the British South African Company which was administering 
Southern Rhodesia should have its charter revoked because it 
had failed to observe African law and custom in dealing with 
African land rights; the Africans had suffered considerable 
expropriation of land rights and had revolted in 1896. The 
committee recommended that Africans should be given secure 
titles to all reserves: those who could show occupancy for 
20 years should be given an unalienable title to the land, 
taxes should be imposed on Africans for administrative 
purposes only and, pending a land settlement, all evictions 
of Africans should be immediately stopped. 1 2 The committee 
sent a memo to the National Executive Committee to this effect 
aid it was decided to send a deputation to the Prime Minister 
in order to secure justice for the dispossessed Africans of 
Southern Rhodesia. The P.M. was unable to receive the 
deputation, including Tom Shaw M.P., Ben Spoor M.P., Josiah
Wedgwood M.P., C.R. Buxton and L.S. Woolf, but it put its
2points to Lord Milner instead.
1 . Labour Party Advisory Committees Monthly Report, April 1919»
2. N.E.C. Minutes, 20 April 1920.
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Later, as will be shown, Lord Passfield, a Labour 
Colonial Secretary, made the situation worse in Southern 
Rhodesia by approving segregation of land.
The sub-committee on Crown Colonies was also concerned 
at the vagueness of the draft Covenant of the League of 
Nations in respect-to African land rights in territories 
to be handed over to mandatory states. The Committee 
passed a resolution on the question which it submitted to 
the N.E.C. It recommended that the principles which had 
been applied in Nigeria, where the African retained the 
land, should be applied to thereat of Africa. (l) The 
tiiole of the lands,whether occupied or unoccupied, should 
be declared African lands. (2) All African lands should 
be administered by the mandatory state for the benefit and 
use of the Africans and no title to the occupation and use 
of any such land should be valid without the consent of the 
League of Nations. (3) The League of Nations and the 
mandatory state should have regard to African laws and 
customs in the existing district in which the land was 
situated.1 This resolution was presented to the N.E.C. 
fy-C.D. Burns and Leonard Woolf.
t' t The main task of the sub-committee was to work out a 
policy statement for Africa. This was delegated to Leonard 
Woolf and E.D. Morel. As Morel later wrote, he and Woolf 
virtually drew up the African policy for the Labour Party.2 3
C.R. Buxton also later paid tribute to the very great part 
that E.Do Morel played in the composition of the first edition 
of the party*s policy on Africa. On the 30 January 1920, 
the pamphlet produced by Morel and Woolf was circulated to
1 . International Advisory. Committee Minutes, 18 March 1919»
2 E.D. Morel to J.H. Thomas, C.O .533 file 34378,June 1924, 
(C.0./533/320)
3. Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1933,P«201.
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the full International Advisory Committee1 and, on 13
OFebruary, it was approved for publication and was 
subsequently published as 'The Empire in Africa, Labour's 
Policy'
The pamphlet was an amalgamation of the ideas of Morel
and Woolf* The main theme of the pamphlet was the same
as had been outlined in Woolf's'Mandates and the Empire';
the Labour party should pursue the 'African' policy which
was being pursued in West Africa rather than the 'European*
policy which was followed in East Africa* The 'African*
policy favoured the 'preservation of the 'native' rights
in the land, assisting the 'native' population to develop the
resources of the land by growing crops or gathering products
- 4
for export'• The 'European* policy favoured the economic 
development of the country by European syndicates and 
planters through »hired» or forced labour».^ Labour's 
basic principles in Africa should be that there should be 
•no economic exploitation of one class (native) by another 
class (white man)*, and that the 'government must secure 
for the native the opportunity of developing, as a free man, 
the economic resources of the land for the benefit of the 
native communities!^ The general policy of Labour, 
applying these principles, ought to be that the land should 
be treated as the property of theAfrlcan community or 
communities, African rights in land and its products should 
be protected, alienation*of land to African or European
1 , I.A.C. Minutes 30 January 1920*
2* I*A*C* Minutes 13 February 1920*
3* 'The Empire in Africa: Labour's Policy' (The Labour Party, 1920)
4* ibid, p*4*
5* ibid, p*7*
6* ibid, p*7*
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should be prohibited and every African family should be 
assured sufficient land for its own support with security 
of tenure. Where a large capital outlay was required the 
government should supply the necessary capital and educate 
the Africans in the use of such machinery. Concessions 
of land to Europeans should take the form of short term 
leases and should only be granted after careful inquiry and 
with African approval; mineral products should be treated 
as the property of the local administration in trust for 
the communities; and mines, railways and any large-scale 
industries should be run by the state. Slavery should be 
prohibited and the use of compulsory labour should be banned 
except for schemes which would benefit the Africans and then 
only in accordance with African law and custom within the 
tribal areas. No labour contracts should be enforceable 
under the criminal law and all contracts should be made in 
the presence of a magistrate or a member of the administration. 
There should be no racial discrimination.
In order to put this policy into effect in East Africa, 
special provisions would be required. »In order togive 
every native family sufficient land for its support, the 
government must, if necessary, re-enter upon alienated 
land. The government must take the power to cancel, revise 
or repurchase concessions of alienated land in order to 
provide land for the natives. T h e  government should also 
stimulate village production in order to stem the 
disintegration of village life and generally improve the 
quality of labour. The development of tribal self- 
government should also be encouraged in whatever form the 
Africans wished. Labour should be free »in fact as well as 
in name everywhere*. Turning to the question of government,
1. ibid, p.8.
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the pamphlet stated that the Labour party's ‘ultimate aim1 
was the establishment of genuine representation both for 
Africans on Native Councils and Indians on the Legislative 
Councils« and gradually the transfer of responsibility to 
these Legislative Councils, after education had spread and 
representation had been established. It was important that 
representation of the Africans should come on the Legislative 
Councils before responsibility was given to these Councils 
in order to prevent legislation in the interests of the 
exploiters. Responsibility should begin in the supervision 
of local government - sanitation, irrigation, roads and 
possibly education. Only after this experience had proved 
successful should responsible government be extended to wider 
areas.
Concerning international control, the pamphlet stated 
that the Peace Conference had adopted the principle, put 
forward by the Labour party, that the 'well-being' and 
development of the peoples of the African territories was 
a 'sacred trust of civilisation* and that European states 
administering African territories should be considered as 
trustees or mandatories answerable for their trust to the 
rest of the world. Although article 22 of the Covenant 
only applied the mandate system to the former German 
colonies, 'the implications of the mandate system and its 
honest fulfilment must be so important that it would not 
only be inconsistent but practically impossible for any 
state not to accept in non-mandated territory the same 
obligations as are accepted under the mandates'. 'The 
principle of trusteeship under a League of Nations cannot 
be arbitrarily confined to particular pieces of territory} 
it must be extended to cover all tropical Africa, and the
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right of the community of nations to supervise the due 
carrying out by the trustee of the obligations of its trust 
must be frankly recognised.
Inconclusion the pamphlet stated that education was of 
paramount importance in the development of this policy. It 
was proposed that in every dependency, primary education 
should be accessible to all children of school-going age, 
training colleges should be provided for teachers, and 
technical colleges should be established providing curriculum 
in the arts and sciences specially adapted to African 
territories. An African university should also be 
established and experimental and model farms should be 
provided to educate the Africans in the best use of their 
land. The education programme should aim at providing 
scientific agriculturists, forestry experts, doctors, 
sanitary officials and accountants rather than lawyers.
The emphasis was on 'useful* skills rather than training 
for administration.
The ideas in this pamphlet seemed to be an expansion 
of Woolf's pamphlet on 'Mandates and Empire' and Morel's 
'The African Problem and the Peace Settlement*. The idea 
that the government should re-enter alienated land and give 
it back to the Africans was a radical one. The pamphlet 
supported the mandate system but thought that it should be 
extended to cover the relations between all dominant and 
subject races. The idea of international administration 
of the African colonies which had been put forward in 1917 
in the Labour party's 'memo on war Issues' was dropped.
The policy of indirect rule was supported. It was thought 
that Local Government could be a useful training ground for
1. ibid, p.10.
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the Africans* The main emphasis was placed on the idea 
of ruling the African territories as a •trust* for 
civilisation until the Africans were eventually able to 
rule themselves. The Labour party had basically accepted 
the Fabian idea that it was the duty of more civilised 
nations to rule less civilised for the benefit of the »non­
adult* races and the world as a whole.
The policy outlined in this pamphlet was to remain the 
basis of Labour policy for Africa throughout the interwar 
period. Future statements of policy »Labour and the Empire: 
Africa* (1926) and »The Colonial Empire* (1933) were largely 
revisions of this pamphlet. The policy advocated was not 
revolutionary. The key to the advancement of the African 
iwas to be education. Independence was regarded as a goal 
but a far distant one. Lord Lugard, colonial administrator 
and author of »The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa*, 
disagreed with the policy. He feared that the Labour 
party *s research department had fallen tinder the influence 
of those who held narrow views and thought that the *native* 
races had been mls-governed and robbed of their lands and 
their proper profits by the greed of exploiters. »They 
would persuade the British democracy that it is better to 
shirk imperial responsibility, and relegate it to 
international committees; that the material development 
benefits only the capitalist profiteer; and that British 
rule over subject races stands for spoliation and self- 
interest. Guided by these advisors - some of the more 
prominent of whom are not even members of the British 
race - the Labour party has not hesitated to put forward its 
own thesis of government of tropical dependencies under the
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Mandates.*1' Despite this outburst, the Labour party's 
policy was not very different from the policy of the other 
parties. They also accepted the idea of 'trusteeship*.
The Labour party's policy was put forward in Parliament 
on 20 April 1920 by Ben Spoor and Josiah Wedgwood. The 
speeches were described as 'first-rate* by the 'Labour 
Leader*. Of Spoor's speech)the writer declared that 'not 
since Hardie had the House of Commons heard such a complete
avowal of the solidarity of British Labour with the coloured
2peoples of the world.*
Spoor stated the Labour party's general principles in 
regard to the question of the subject races. The first 
principle was to abolish all economic exploitation; the 
second was to educate the African so that he could take 
his place as a free man in the economic and political life 
of the country. The Labour party did not stand above the 
coloured man but stood along-side of him. The struggle 
of the coloured man was the struggle of labour the world 
over. Colonial policy should express the new spirit of 
freedom and equality, partly because it would make for 
stability and peace but mainly because it was right.
Colonel Wedgwood put forward what he considered to be 
the most important points of the pamphlet 'The Empire in 
Africa: Labour's p o l i c y H e  stated that the Committee 
had been appointed by the Labour party 'to go into the 
colonial policy of the Labour Ministry if and when it is 
formed'• The Labour party would have nothing to do with 
the system of exploitation developed in East Africa but
1 . Lord Lugard,'The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* 
London, 5th ed. 1965) p.6o8.
2. 'Labour Leader', 6 May 1920,p.3.
3. 128 H.C.Deb.,5s.,col.938ff., 20 April 1920
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would leave the land in the communal tenure of the Africans 
or, as in Northern Nigeria, individual Africans with a 
permanent right of tenure. The Latnir party's policy was 
that Africans should not be forced to work off their own land 
if they preferred to remain cultivating it. In East Africa 
the vote had been restricted to the whites; no votes had 
been given to the Africans or the Indians. It was the 
policy of the Labour party that there should be no colour 
bar - an educational franchise should be available for 
anyone who could qualify for it, so that everyone? who stood 
for election would have to go to African and Indian voters 
and ask for their vote. However, Wedgwood did not want the 
whites to be 'swamped by uneducated people of another race*. 
The educational tests would therefore be stiff but the 
Africans would have a chance of coming-in and it was only 
when they did come in to the electoral system that the 
Colonial Office could throw off its responsibilities for 
the Africans, and allow them to look after themselves• 
Wedgwood concluded by stating that the Labour party stood 
for an Empire extending to all colours, classes and peoples. 
They were not 'Little Englanders' but wanted a Commonwealth 
composed of many colours and classes. Wedgwood placed the 
emphasis on enabling the Africans to work on their own land. 
He was also a strong believer in the policy of 'equal rights* 
over the franchise. This policy was neglected when Labour 
came to power in 1924 and J.H. Thomas became Colonial 
Secretary*
J.H. Thomas put forward his interpretation of the ideas 
of the Advisory Committee in his book 'When Labour Rules ' . 1 
He considered that Britain's management of her colonies was
J.H.Thomas, »When Labour Rules' (London, 1920)1*
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perhaps more important than her relations with other 
countries. Concerning the question of land he stated 
that the Labour party would bring in acts of Parliament to 
make 'native * tenure secure. Labour would aim at the 
establishment of genuine representation of the 'natives• 
upon the councils and, as education progressed, a deepening 
of the responsibilities of Government.
The Labour press printed articles by E.D. Morel and 
Leonard Woolf putting forward some of the ideas expressed 
in their pamphlet. On 22 April 1920 the «Labour Leader« 
printed a front page article by E.D. Morel in which he 
warned that the slave owner spirit was abroad in the colonies 
and that the full rights of man could not be secured by the 
European worker so long as he remained ignorant of, or was, 
at least, not vitally interested in the lot of non-European 
peoples. 1 Leonard Woolf wrote in the «New Statesman« that 
since Britain held East Africa in trust it was the duty of 
the government to aid theAfrican by education and other 
means to make the best economic use of the land. On the 
West Coast the Africans had been successful and there was 
no reason to believe that what had been done in Qambia would 
be found beyond the power of the Africans in East Africa. 2 3
In another article, Woolf declared that British East Africa 
was a test case for imperialism in Africa. The system 
that was being imposed would prove disastrous for the British 
Empire. The final answer and complete disapproval of the 
theory that keeping the land for the white man and compulsory 
labour for the black man was the only economic system for 
Africa was to be found in British West Africa where the 
opposite system had succeeded.^
1 . «Labour Leader* 22 April 1920,p.l.
2. «New Statesman*, 21 February 1920. d d . 57=5-77
3. ibid, 10 April 1920,p.7. *PP
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The Empire was discussed at the 1920 Labour party 
conference* In his address the Chairman declared that the 
Labour party could not face the Labour Movements of other 
countries with clean hands unless it proclaimed in 
unmistakeable terms its attitude on the rights of subject 
peoples of the British Empire* 'When we go to future 
International Conferences we must go bearing a message from 
our workers that they are prepared to play their part, a part 
corresponding to the magnitude and power of Labour within 
the British Empire in the world-wide work of emancipation*
At the same conference a strong resolution on India 
was moved by Ben Spoor M.P* declaring that the conference 
reaffirmed its conviction that only on the basis of self- 
determination, with administrative protection for minorities, 
could any stable or satisfactory settlement of the world be 
arrived at* This principle was applicable to all peoples 
who showed themselves capable of expressing a common will* 
The motion continued that the government should satisfy 
the legitimate aspirations of the people of India and that 
corresponding measures should be taken in Burma and Ceylon 
and other parts of the British Empire in which self- 
government was demanded. It denied the right of any 
government to govern a country against the willoof the 
majority; and while expressing the hope that all peoples 
of the British Empire would prefer to remain as parts of 
the Empire when their aspirations were dealt with in a 
conciliatory manner by the granting or adequate measures
of autonomy, it declared that the final decision must rest
2with the people themselves* 12
1 . Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1920,p*113
2. ibid, p*lf>6*
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Imperialism was again discussed at the Twenty First 
Annual Conference held the next year in Brighton* R.C* 
Wellhead, the I*L*P* leader, moved a motion on 'war and 
imperialism'. This declared that 'imperialism distracts 
public attention from domestic affairs and introduces ideas 
of government by a dominant race which -are inimical to the 
interests and alien to the principles of democracy and that 
it tends to perpetuate the reign of capitalism, not only by 
increasing the power of wealth, but by neglecting the home 
market and leaving the natural resources of the country 
u n d e v e l o p e d * T h e  resolution concluded with a ringing 
assertion of the right to self-determination of all peoples 
and declared in favour of a foreign policy based upon the 
idea that all people should harmoniously co-operate to 
promote peace and liberty in the world and that all the 
resources of the world should be equally accessible to all 
nations* In supporting the motion, Vallhead stated that 
the Empire had not helped the common man and the sooner 
Britain got back to the state of Denmark which had no 
colonies the better it would be for everybody concerned*
The day of Empires founded on force was over and the only 
chance of preserving the British Empire as a great force 
for good was that it should be established on the principle 
of a federation of free people, united to advance the 
democracies of the world* The resolution was unanimously 
carried* The fact that it was passed so easily suggests 
that the Labour party conference might have been prepared 
to accept a stranger policy than that put forward by the 
A*C*I*Q*, whose policy had not been presented^to conference 
for approval* There was no idea of returning 'to the state 1
1 . Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1921,p.207*
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of Denmark* in the Advisory Committee's pamphlet* However» 
the A*C*I*Q.*s policy was there for those who wanted to find 
it and it remained the basis of the Labour party's pronounce- 
mentbon Africa during the interwar period* By the end of 
1921» the Labour party had a colonial policy despite the 1921 
resolution*
The party was strongly committed to the reform of the
empire rather than its abolition* Zn domestic policy» the
party was committed to reforming British society gradually
by passing acts through Parliament rather than making violent
revolution* The same gradualism was evident in colonial
policy* The party adopted a policy of reform rather than
abandonment of the empire* It was felt that some peoples
of the empire were nearer to being 'adult* than others*
The Indians were more highly regarded than the Africans who»
it was felt» would have to wait a long while for self-
government* Leys1 thought that the time scale should be
about twenty years* Most other people in the party thought
this was too optimistic. C.R. Buxton thought it was
'ridiculous* to pretend that self-determination could be
applied universally* A certain minimum of imperialism
2was inevitable* 1
1 . Memo on Tropical Africa N.Leys (Buxton Papers,Box5/3> 
2* Colonialism C*H* Buxton (ibid) *
CHAPTER 3.
KENYA AND THE FIRST LABOUR GOVERNMENT
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Kenya was to be a major subject of controversy during 
the interwar period. In 1921 there was a controversy over 
taxation. The settlers wished to raise the hut tax on the 
Africans but there were protests and the Colonial Office 
promised that hut tax would only be raised if an Income tax 
were introduced for the whites. Hut tax was raised but the 
idea of an income tax was waived after white protest 
This led to a revolt by some Africans under the leadership 
of Harry Thuku. The revolt was crushed and Thuku was 
imprisoned.
Another problem concerning Kenya involved the Indians 
who lived there. The Indians were demanding equal rights 
with the white settlers who were unwilling to concede this 
and were prepared to use force to prevent the political
advancement of the Indians. Speaking in the Commons in
oJuly 1922, in his 'best speech1, Colonel Wedgwood declared 
that the acid test of whether the British Empire was worth­
while was whether it set up a colour bar between Indian 
and European in Kenya. There should be a single, equal 
franchise; the alternative communal representation would 
lead to two social castes developing in a country with no 
common interest except fighting each other and struggling 
to get rival representation in the legislature.^
The General Election at the end of 1922 improved the 
Labour party*s position in the House of Commons. It won 
142 seats and became the official Opposition to the 
Conservatives. The manifesto had not devoted much space 
to colonial problemss * labour advocates the recognition of
1 . 'New Statesman1, l4 May 1921, p.15 1.
2. J.C. Wedgwood, 'Memoirs of a Fighting Life' (London, 
1941),p.179.
3. 156 H.C.Deb., 5s.* cols. 1137ff., 11 July 1922.
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the real independence of Egypt and self-government for 
India* Labour demands the prompt and cordial acceptance 
of the new constitution of the Irish Free State and supports 
every effort to make Ireland united, prosperous and 
contented'* There was no mention of Africa but the subject 
of Indians in Africa remained an important issue* There had 
been considerable discussion of the question in the Labour 
x*ess* Leonard Voolf wrote that the whites were in favour 
of absolute refusal of the franchise to the Indians* 'It 
was fantastic that the Europeans could govern autocratically 
and exploit economically an African population which 
outnumbered them by three or four to one* The Africans 
were beginning to protest and organise and form associations*
It was not Lenin, as the whites thought, who was responsible
ofor the unrest but the policies that the whites were following* 
Norman Leys wrote in the 'Socialist Review* that the 
Europeans were organising a rebellion if there was any 
surrender by the government to the Indians* Indians were 
to be murdered when the signal was given* Indians had 
expressed sympathy with certain African grievances and the 
result had been a movement in the Kikuyu tribe which had 
ended with the arrest of its chief organiser, Harry Thuku, 
and the massacre of some 20 men and women out of an unarmed 
crowd waiting outside the jail in which he was confined*
Leys thought that the Labour party should wholeheartedly 
support the Indian claims in Kenya*J His idea was that a 
policy of equal rights should be applied thoughout Africa*
In a subsequent article, Leys again stated that the 1
1 . Labour Party, 1922 General Election Manifesto*
2* 'New Statesman', 10 September 1921,p.6l5 
3# »Socialist Review', No.Il6,pp.205-212, May 1923*
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Europeans were threatening armed rebellion if the govern­
ment gave way over the Indian claims to land, the franchise 
and unrestricted immigration. Labour H.P.s, said Leys, 
should support the Indian claims and urge that the electoral 
roll in Kenya should include all Africans who on application 
were found to satisfy a strict educational test.3' (Leys 
and Wedgwood were in agreement on this question.) In the
O•New Leader* Leys urged that the Europeans or the Indians 
should not be entrusted with the protection'of the Africans.
The latter should remain the responsibility of the Colonial 
Office until they could look after their own interests.
In July 1923, the Conservative Colonial Secretary,the Duke of 
Devonshire, published a White Paper on the subject of 
•Indians in Kenya* .3 This discussed the status of the 
Indians in Kenya and also made an important declaration of 
policy towards the Africans: "Primarily, Kenya is an 
African territory and H.M.G. think it necessary definitely 
to record their considered opinion that the interests of the 
African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when, 
those interests and the interests of the immigrant races 
should conflict, the former should prevail....In the 
administration of Kenya H.M.G. regard themselves as 
exercising a trust on behalf of the African population, and 
they are unable to delegate or share this trust the object 
of which may be defined as the protection and advancement 
of the native races.••.there can be no room for doubt that 
it is the mission of Great Britain to work continuously for 
the training and education of the Africans towards a higher 
intellectual, moral and economic level than that which they
1 . »Socialist Review*, No.120, Sept.1923, d d .129-133
2. »New Leader* 25 Hay 1923 *
3 . <Indians in Kenya1, Cmd. 1922, July 1923.
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had reached when the Crown assumed the responsibility for 
the administration of this territory. At present special 
consideration is being given to economic development in the 
native reserves, and within the limits imposed by the 
finances of the colonies all that is possible for the advance­
ment of the Africans, both inside and outside the reserves, 
will be done.1**
This was a statement that many in the Labour party would 
have agreed with. Both parties officially adopted the policy 
of 'trusteeship*. The differences were over how the 
•trusteeship« would be exercised. There was disagreement 
over the question of the treatment of the Indians. One of 
the points at issue was whether Indian representation on the 
Legislative Council should be on a common electoral roll or 
by a communal franchise. The Conservative government decided 
in favour of the communal franchise because it meant that 
every elector would have the opportunity of being represented 
by a member with sympathies similar to his own and, as far as 
the Africans were concerned, it provided a framework into 
which African representation could be fitted *in due season*. 
The White Paper stated that the government was going to 
continue the policy of reserving land in the Highlands to 
Europeans (a policy which the Indians had protested about) 
but an area of land would be temporarily set aside to 
ascertain what demand for land there was by the Indians. 
Concerning the subject of Indians* immigration into Kenya, 
the White Paper declared that it was «evident to H.M.G. that 
some further control over immigration in the interests of 
the natives of Kenya is required. The primary duty of the 
colonial government is the advancement of the African, and
It is incumbent upon them to protect him from an influx of
Immigrants from any country that might tend to retard his 
f. ibid, p.10.
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economic development.
Colonel Wedgwood, speaking as Labour's spokesman in 
the Commons on colonial questions, attacked the policies 
that the White Paper had put forward concerning the 
Indians* He thought that the policies proposed might 
satisfy the European settlers because they were a surrender 
to them, but they would never satisfy the Indiana so long as 
the Indians were expected to be members of the British 
Empire* He thought that the re-opening of the immigration 
question would exacerbate the racial struggle which had 
done so much to harm Kenya* However, his main disagreement 
with the Government was over the question of the franchise*
It was a point which vitally interested every Indian, not 
only the Indians in Kenya. The Government had given way 
to pressure from the white community to place the Indians 
on a separate communal franchise. The white settlers had 
threatened to secede from the Empire; planned to kidnap the 
Governor, and appealed to South Africa. The Government 
had been effectively brought to their knees by 9,000 
settlers. The Indians did not want a separate roll under 
which they would be considered C3 citizens and be placed in 
a permanently inferior position. Wedgwood thought that 
the repercussion of the decision on India would be tragic 
and that it was the most disastrous step which had been 
taken since Lord North drove the American colonists out of 
the British Empire. He pledged the Labour party to do their 
best to reverse the decision. *It is not easy, when a step 
like this has been taken, ever to put it right, but I am 
certain that the party I speak for tonight, when their turn *2
1 » ibid, p.l8.
2. 167 H.C.Deb.,5s., cols.54l-544, 25 July 1923.
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comes will do their best. I cannot say more than that« 
because heaven knows what the repercussion of this will be 
before that time. But we will do our best to re-establish 
justice and fair play throughout the British Empire and put 
an end to what is ruining our real chance of peace and 
development.• In the meantime« Wedgwood advised the 
Indians to accept the settlement. Wedgwood made a firm 
commitment with the backing of MacDonald« that the Labour 
party would try to re-establish justice for the Indians 
if it achieved power.
The I.L.P. held stronger views about the Empire than 
the Labour party. Fenner Brockway wrote a pamphlet for 
the I.L.P. on »How to End War*1 2 « giving the I.L.P. view 
on imperialism and internationalism* Capitalism had 
gained the Empire by means of treaties with ignorant chiefs. 
«The native chief made a mark on a sheet of paper presented 
to him« and thereby proclaimed to the world that he had 
received a little cloth« some bottles of gin« and a 
promise of protection, in return for which he handed over 
the complete sovereignty of his land and peoples to the 
company concerned. * 2 Capitalist rivalries for Empire 
led to war. Socialists should boldly challenge the 
exploitation of the natural resources of subject peoples 
by capitalist groups and help the workers in the countries 
concerned to organise themselves to win their own economic 
freedom. The Socialist Commonwealth would be world-wide.
It was only by international co-operation and international 
organisation of the workers that the production and 
distribution of the world's goods to meet the world's 
requirements could be carried out. Summing up, he stated
1 . A. Fenner Brockway, *How to Bnd W ar* (I.L.P. 1923)
2. ibid, p.5. * J
that the I.L.P. believed that modern wars were caused mainly 
by capitalism and imperialism and that Socialism was the 
best guarantee against war. The l.L.P. advocated the return 
to subject peoples of the natural resources which alien 
capitalists had grabbed and urged that all peoples should 
co-operate in the production and distribution of the world*s 
goods« thus establishing an international Socialist 
Commonwealth. There should be total« univeral disarmament 
and arbitration to settle all disputes. The I.L.P. pressed 
the Labour party to make its colonial policy more radical.
The Labour party was soon given an opportunity to put 
its policies into action. In the General Election of 1923 
the party gained 191 seats« the Liberals 159 and the 
Conservatives 258. The Liberals supported the Labour 
party's motion declaring lack of confidence in the Conserva­
tive Government on 17 January 1924 and the Labour party was 
then faced with the task of governing the British Empire. 
Although the party had not mentioned colonial affairs in 
its election manifesto 'Labour's Appeal to the Nation'« 
the International Advisory Committee had worked out a policy 
for the Empire in Africa« Vedgwood had made declarations 
in the Commons concerning policy towards the Indians in 
Kenya and the party conference had passed anti-imperialist 
motions which had been supported by IoL.P. pamphlets.
Whether the new minority government put any of these 
policies and pledges into effect depended largely on who 
was to be the Colonial Secretary. The Labour party did 
not change the method of making ministerial appointments 
and the task of choosing the government fell to the Prime 
Minister« Ramsay MacDonald. D. Marquand writes that in 
MacDonald's provisional list Henderson was the first choice
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for Colonial Secretary, 1 This appears a slightly odd choice 
for Henderson had not shown much previous interest in the 
problems of the colonies. It indicates that MacDonald was 
not planning to give posts to those who knew most about 
the subject concerned. However, MacDonald seems to have 
changed his mind about Henderson considering him for the 
posts of Chairman of Ways and Means, the War Office, the 
Ministry of Health, and even thinking that Henderson should 
remain outside the government in charge of party organisation. 
Henderson finally became Home Secretary but a great deal of 
ill-feeling between him and MacDonald had been caused by 
then. 2 3
On merit, the most likely candidates for the post of 
Colonial Secretary appeared to be Colonel Josiah Wedgwood, 
who had been the leading spokesman on colonial policy in 
the Commons or E.D. Morel, the founder of the U.D.C. and 
joint writer of the party's pamphlet ‘The Empire in Africa: 
Labour's policy* who had been elected to Parliament in 1922. 
Another possibility was the Fabian, Sydney Olivier, who had 
been a civil servant at the Colonial Office and Governor of 
Jamaica. However, he was 65 in 1924, and, although he 
preferred the Colonial Office, was »prepared as a veteran of 
the movement to be used up anywhere».^ He was given a 
peerage and became Secretary of State for India. Both 
Morel and Wedgwood were ex-Liberals but they had slightly 
different ideas on the best policy for Africa. Wedgwood 
wanted direct rule by the Colonial Office until the Africans 
were‘fit’for liberty, whereas Morel favoured indirect rule
1 . D. Marquand, »Ramsay MacDonald» (London. 1977) « 102
2. ibid, pp.301-303. * P#3°2#
3. quoted, D. Marquand, op.cit., p.300.
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through the African chiefs» Wedgwood wanted to 'train the 
poor natives up to self-government, to teach them English, 
to start some political franchise, however limited, for 
Europeans, for Indians and for Africans on a common electoral 
roll.'*"
C.V. Wedgwood writes in her autobiography of her uncle, 
Josiah Wedgwood, that 'it would be absurd to deny that he 
had cherished, until the early 1920s, a not unreasonable hope 
that he might set his mark on history, and especially on the 
development of the Empire as a progressive statesman at the 
Colonial or Dominions Office.' Dalton confirms that 
Wedgwood wanted the Colonial Office; as they were travelling 
back by 'bus from the Webbs', Wedgwood told Dalton that he 
hoped for the Colonial Office.^ Sidney Webb thought that 
Wedgwood was a 'difficulty' in the last few days of forming 
the Cabinet. Wedgwood insisted in being included and
'fought hard to be Secrdary of State for India or the
\ L
Colonies. However, Wedgwood was passed over for both 
these offices and given the dull post of Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster. The reason seems to be that he and 
MacDonald disliked each other intensely. Wedgwood thought 
that MacDonald was jealous of his ability in Parliament and 
regarded him as a rival for the leadership. He had written 
articles in 'Reynolds News' mocking MacDonald for spending 
his time with Duchesses and titled ladies.^ Malcolm 
MacDonald thinks that Wedgwood was 'more left wing* 
than his father and this was the cause of their disagreement.^ *S.
1 .
2.
3*4.
5-6.
J.C. Wedgwood, 'My Fighting Life' (London. 194l)o.l85.
C.V. Wedgwood, »The Last of the Radicals' (London,1951) 
p«15w.
H. Dalton, 'Call Back Yesterday' (London,1953) p.l44.
S. Webb, 'Labour Government of 1924(, Political Quarterly, vol.32, No.l (Jan-March 196l)#p.i5#
C.V. Wedgwood, op.cit.,p.l52
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MacDonald may have been worried that Wedgwood would have 
caused too much trouble with the white settlers in Kenya« 
if he had been Colonial Secretary* It is impossible to 
say exactly why Wedgwood was not chosen* It seems that he 
and MacDonald were not on good terms and that MacDonald may 
have felt that Wedgwood would have caused too much of a stir 
at the Colonial Office* Wedgwood was very disappointed 
when he was not chosen for the Colonies or India* According 
to Webb« whose opinion is not completely objective« Wedgwood 
became 'a sullen and discontented colleague« who contributed 
next to nothing in the way of service either in the House or 
out of it« and was the cause of trouble« occasionally« in 
the Cabinet itself by his persistence in carping at Oliider's 
policy about India• *^
£*D* Morel was less forceful than Wedgwood and of less 
importance in the Labour party* He found himself left out 
altogether* Morel's first choice was probably the Foreign 
Office* However« his hopes were unfulfilled« Arthur 
Ponsonby wrote to himiin December 1923 to tell him that 
MacDonald had chosen Thomas to be Foreign Secretary*
Ponsonby was dismayed for he thought that Morel had every­
thing that was wanted« knowledge« a full grasp of the facts« 
personality«manner• However, the proposal that Thomas
would be Foreign Secretary leaked out to the 'Manchester
3Guardian* and was killed by scorn, and the protests of the
X.L*P*^ Thomas was offered the Colonial Office instead
and,after initial doubts about the prestige of the office,
accepted when he found that it outranked the service
ministries in order of precedence* Beatrice Webb wrote 
1 * S* Webb, op*cit*,p*15
2* Ponsonby to Morel, December 1923, E*D* Morel Papers*
C.L* Mowat, 'Britain Between the Wars' (London,1955)p*172*
4. D* Marquand, op.cit., pp.299-300*
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in her diary that Henderson reported to Sidney at a dinner 
at Haldane's that Thomas was to be 'Colonies and he is 
quite pleased with himself•'^ Webb states that MacDonald 
suggested to Thomas that Morel should be an Under-Secretary 
at the Colonial Office but 'Thomas flatly refused to have 
him' because of *his extreme views on Africa', which shows 
the priority the Labour leaders attached to their African 
policy* Morel was 'bitterly disappointed at getting no 
place', and he wrote to Lord Parmoor, who was responsible 
for Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords, proposing that he. 
Morel, should be made a special Under-Secretary for the 
League of Nations*J However, this proposal was not followed
up* MacDonald wrote to Morel to express his 'deep regret 
that though I have tried hard to get you into something as 
an Under-Secretary', he had 'completely failed** He was 
not in complete control of the matter but had to count heads*
ZlHe would try to get Morel in if an opportunity arose*
Snowden wrote to Morel that they preferred not to muzzle 
him with office; he could continue to be a critic outside
5and keep the government up to the mark* Dorothy Ponsonby 
thought that 'Thomas is made Colonial Secretary because he 
has to be rewarded with one of the best offices but everyone 
admits that E*D* Morel would be much better at the Job*
But simply because he represents no special section of the 
Labour party and is not forceful he is left out*'**
MacDonald was unable to place the colleague with whom he 1
1 . B* Webb, 'Diaries, 1919-24', ed. M.Cole (London,1952)p.262.
2* S. Webb, op.cit., p*17
3. EoDo Morel to Lord Parmoor, 2 Feb*1924, E.D. Morel Papers*
4* MacDonald to E*D* Morel, 1924, E*D* Morel Papers*
5, P* Snowden to E*D. Morel, 4 February, 1924, E 0D* Morel Papers. 
6* D* Ponsonby to E.D* Morel, 28 January 1924, E.Do Morel Papers*
103
had worked over the agitation for Congo Reform and on the
U.D.C. Executive Committee during the war. Morel had to be 
content with a letter to the Nobel Committee recommending 
him for the Peace prize by the Cabinet and members of the 
Labour p a r t y A  factor* which was common to both Wedgwood 
and Morel* was that they were both committed to the Labour 
party's policy* which had been worked out by the Advisozy 
Committee. Morel and Woolf were responsible for drawing 
up the policy* Wedgwood had outlined it in the House of 
Commons. It appears that a decision was made not to appoint 
someone as Colonial Secretary who was likely to make a 
determined attempt to implement the policy and confront the
settler lobby. It seems that MacDonald was determined to
2preserve continuity and consensus at the Colonial Office.
When the appointments were announced* the 'New Leader* 
wrote that MacDonald evidently expected versatility in his 
ministers. People were given offices about which they 
knew nothing. Olivier went to the India Office* rather 
than the Colonies* about which he knew something. Thomas 
went to the Colonial Office* about which he knew nothing* 
rather than a domestic office* which he might have known 
something about. However* this did not seem to worry the 
paper. It felt the Labour ministers 'experience of life* 
would make up for their lack of experience in office. 'Even 
in he field of foreign and colonial affairs they need not 
fear comparison. Sidney Webb thought that the Cabinet 
erred on the side of respectability with too many peers 
and outsiders; if he had been composing the Cabinet* it
1 . «The Times',31 January 1924.
2. E.A. Brett* 'Colonialism and Unverdevelopment in East 
Africa1 (London* 1973) p«62. As D. Marquand writes the 
evidence concerning MacDonald's choice of ministers is
•tantalizingly incomplete'. D. Marquand* op.cit.*p.299*
3. «New Leader', 25 January 1924*p.2.
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would have been more working class and more to the 'left' of 
the Labour party*1 However, a 'working class' minister was 
not necessarily going to pursue very 'leftwing* policies*
On arriving at the Colonial Office Thomas is supposed
to have announced that he had come 'to see that there was no
■ omucking about with the British Empire** His civil servants 
appear/&dto like him* Dalton writes that a Private Secretary, 
inherited from his predecessor, when asked how he liked his new 
chief replied: "Very much indeed. It's much more intimate*
My old chief used to ring the bell for me* My new chief 
puts his head round the door of my room, and says, 'Come 'ere
you b----- -  J " Apart from the language, Thomas did not seem
intent on changing very much at the Colonial Office* His 
main aim seemed to be to show that a working class man who 
had begun life as an engine cleaner could look after the 
British Empire as well as any Lord*
Conservatives had made political capital out of the 
fact that under a Labour Government the Empire would collapse 
in ruins* Jack Jones, a Labour M*P* interested in colonial 
questions, wrote that 'one thing has impressed me more 
than another in the objections of our opponents to a possible 
Labour Government, and that is their almost unanimous opinion
that under Labour the Empire is bound to come to a sticky
4end*' Thomas ensured that this did not happen; on leaving 
office he won praise from the 'Daily Express' and 'The 
Times'* However, he did not win the approval <f the Advisory 
Committee on Imperial Questions which was set up in February 
1924 when the Labour Government was formed* Thomas ignored
1 . B. Webb, 'Diaries, 1912-24',ed* M.I.Cole(London,1952)p.263. 
2* R* Lyman, 'The First Labour Government* (London,1957)p*106*
3. H. Dalton, «Call Back Yesterday«, (London,1953>P*147*
4. J. Jones, 'My Lively Life' p.l8l.
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most of its memoranda and did not make much attempt to put 
the party's policy into effect. The policy had been 
published in the pamphlet 'The Empire in Africa: Labour's 
Policy' and Thomas had himself expounded it in his book 
ironically entitled 'When Labour Rules ' . 1
George Lansbury gave Thomas some advice in an article 
in the 'Daily Herald'. He stated that the government had 
inherited many problems from its predecessors aninone was 
more difficult or more menacing to the British Empire than 
the question: of India. He went on to discuss the problem 
of the Indians in Kenya where the Indians were treated as 
outsiders and placed in subjection to the white settlers.
The lands in the Eastern hemisphere were being annexed 
by white men and the original inhabitants were driven to 
live in compounds and reserves which were situated on the 
most barren and inhospitable portions of the land. This 
process could not bring peace and concord to the world. 
Lansbury ended with a quotation from • the Bible 'For God 
hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell 
on all the face of the earth,and hath determinedthe times 
before appointed and the bounds of their habitation.'
Lansbury was an example of the Christian element in the 
Labour party which viewed the black man as the brother of 
the white man. He continued to say that'the Labour Movement 
had always declared itself in &vour of a British Commonwealth 
composed of sister nations, bound together in the bonds of 
fraternity and comradeship. We have declared again and 
again our abhorrence of the Imperialist doctrine of
1 . Mower states, op.cit., that the reason a positive policy 
was not pursued by Thomas was that the party had not 
worked one out. But the policy had existed since 1920 
and Thomas had outlined it himself in his book.
2. 'Daily Herald', 2 February 1924,p.4.
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domination, and oir faith in the principle of self- 
determination ' •
Jimmy Thomas was more concerned to quieten the fears 
of the establishment that Labour would try to put into 
effect the doctrine of self-determination. The Prince of 
Wales was the chief guest when Thomas made his first speech 
as Colonial Secretary. Thomas declared that those people 
who were apprehensive about the advent of the Labour 
Government should follow the example of the Prince of Wales 
and 'his illustrious and distinguished father. They were 
the least disturbed of people.••.because they were the most 
wise...they knew their people better than the others, 
because they long recognised that patriotism, love of Empire, 
service and duty were not the gift or monopoly of a class 
or creed. • Thomas accepted 'the seals of office with 
pride and gratitude - pride because I can look back to the 
day when X was a little errand boy nine years of age, 
gratitude to the constitution that enables the engine 
cleaner of yesterday to be the Minister of today. That 
constitution, so broad, so wide,so democratic must be 
preserved, and the Empire which provides it must be 
maintained. ' 1 The 'Daily Express' was well pleased with 
the new Colonial Secretary: in a leader on 5 February 1924 
it declared that in his recent speeches, Thomas had »paid 
eloquent tribute to the monarchy, reaffirmed his position 
as a constitutionalist, and revealed himself as a banner 
bearer of Empire.» These speeches had done 'perhaps more 
than anything else to establish confidence both in the 
Government of which he is a member and in the great imperial 
work with which he, as Secretary of State for the Colonies,
1 . 'Financial Times', 29 January, 1924.
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is charged*1 On his accession to Office, Thomas had. received 
a letter from Lord Beaverbrook: »»My heartiest congratulations 
on your accession to the Colonial Office. I naturally feel 
the greatest interest in this appointment belonging as I do 
to one of your subject races of the Empire and in fact I now 
consider that X owe you allegiance as my feudal chief. I 
always hoped that the biggest office in the stall would fall 
to you. Next to the Premiership I would wish for your 
control of the Colonial Office.*»2
Thomas wanted to maintain continuity of policy at the 
Colonial Office. He put the emphasis on the policy that the 
UukeofDevonshire had outlined in his White Paper. Thomas 
wrote a memo stating that he did not want the working classes 
to think of the colonial countries mainly as markets to which 
they could sell anything they made from motors to matchboxes 
and also as areas from which they could get everything they 
needed from corn to gold. He wanted the working classes of 
Great Britain to think cf these countries as belonging not to 
themselves but to the 70 million people who live in them.
•Just as Great Britain has got to be ruled for the sake of 
the British and Australia for the sake of the Australian, 
mo Kenya and the Gold Coast have got to be ruled for the 
sake of the people who live there. How to give them a life 
better worth living is the one question to which all others 
must be brought to the test.» 3 4 It was easy to state these 
aims but much more difficult to put them into practice.
The new Colonial Secretary made his first statement i„ 
the House of Commons on 25 February 1924.^ In this he
1 . »Daily Express', 5 February, 1924.
2° Ul625rbC25^ t O T h °maS* 23 January 1924, Thomas Papers,
3« Thomas Papers, Ul625* Cl8.
4. 170 H.C.Deb., 5s**col«195ff., 25 February 1924.
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stated that the question of Kenya was one of the first 
problems which he had to deal with. It was the policy of
the Labour Government that the first obligation in Kenya 
was its trust for the »natives*. This involved more than 
talking about the franchise and immigration questions; 
the problem was to ensure that the »native* was fairly 
protected and* above all, educated. »In other words, I 
believe that, instead of following past practice, I would 
quite frankly like to develop the ground of making him a
tpeasant. Thomas did not elaborate on this idea, which 
had been put forward before by Morel and Wedgwood, but 
continued to ask for a vote on a scheme prepared by his 
predecessor for the development of cotton-growing and the 
building of railways in Kenya. »As Lancashire is dependent 
upon cotton and as we can grow the cotton within our Empire, 
it is to our obvious advantage to do what we can In this 
way.» The railway development would mean immediate orders 
at home and so would help to cure the unemployment problem 
as well as facilitating cotton-growing in Kenya. The main 
reason for these developments was to benefit the home 
country. Thomas did not go into detail concerning the 
question of the Indians in Kenya merely stating that 
•without going into the merits of Europeans or Indians... 
our first obligation in Kenya is our trust for the natives.* 
Thomas was pursuing the policy of the 1923 White Paper.
He did not say anything about Wedgwood's pledge to see if 
the policies of the Devonshire White Paper concerning the 
Indians could be changed in the direction of granting a 
common franchise for all races.
E.D. Morel was sceptical about the scheme for building 
railways. He did not think the branch lines proposed would
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tap the cotton-growing areas and he thought very great 
caution was needed in examining railway schemes in Kenya 
in view of the scandals of the former railway development* 
He hoped that the railways would not be used to serve the 
•interests of the white population as against the interests 
of the native population* as they had often done in the 
past.^
The discussion was continued in the Commons on 3 March 
1924 when L.S. Amery moved a reduction in the vote *for 
form's sake in order to keep the debate on Kenya*• He was 
actually glad to think that Thomas was going to continue the 
policy initiated by the previous Government and that he aimed 
at seeing it effectually carried out. 2 However« Thomas was 
•astounded* at the reduction in the vote, when he had made 
his general statement on policy a few days previously there 
had not been a hostile word of criticism. The trend of the 
debate had demonstrated that the question was a non-party 
one. He had *no hesitation in saying that the main work 
of the Colonial Office could be treated in the same spirit.
We have differences of opinion and there are cleavages on 
certain matters but the general sense of the parties is 
that Dominion questions and Empire problems should be kept 
out of the arena of party politics.« Thomas was determined 
to try to preserve all-party unity on colonial questions.
He went on to announce that in order to see that justice was 
done to the «native* and to ensure his general protection, 
training and education, he was favourably disposed to the 
appointment of a small committee to enquire into the 
application of the principle of trusteeship on behalf of 
the 'natives'.^
1 .
2.
3*
170 H.C.Deb.,5s.,cols 
170 H.C.Deb.,5so,col. 
170 H.C.Deb.,5s.,cols
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E.D. Morel continued his discussion in this debate. 1 
He expressed 'satisfaction* at the idea of instituting a 
Committee of investigation into the whole question. The 
questions of the railways and cotton could not be dealt with 
without going into the question of British 'native policy' in 
Kenya. The only way to get the cotton was to treat the 
'native* decently. The policy that had been pursued in the 
last 20 years in Kenya had been entirely different from that 
pursued in Uganda and Nigeria and was leading to the 
destruction of the 'native* population. If the present 
policy continued the 'native* population would continually 
dwindle and the Government would be left 'Whistling* for its 
cotton. The inquiry should deal with the whole of 'native 
policy' for the previous 20 years. 'There is no doubt that 
between the taxation imposed, the whittling away of the 
native "reserves", the Masters* andServants* Ordinance and 
the Labourers' Ordinance, you have a condition of affairs in 
Kenya which approximates to forced labour of a very bad kind.* 
Keny had become the centre where two entirely different 
schools of thought were contending in regard to the develop» 
ment of Britain's imperial policy in Africa. In order to 
follow the policy laid down in the 1923 White Paper of 
ensuring that the 'natives* interests' were paramount there 
would have to be a fundamental change of process and policy 
in Kenya. The 'natives' would have to have real security 
of tenure, at the moment they did not know from one day to 
the next whether they would be shifted from their reserves 
to another part of the country. Britain¿would not get 
supplies of cotton unless there was a happy, contented 
•native* population producing in their own right and for
1* 170 H.C.Deb.,5s.,cols. 1090—1092, 3 March 1924.
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their own profit. The policy pursued in Kenya should be 
the policy that had been so successfully followed in Uganda 
and Nigeria.
Colonel Vedgwood tried to do something to make Thomas 
honour the pledge about the Indians in Kenya, which he had 
made on behalf of the Labour party. On 3 March 1924, he 
wrote to Sir Ronald Waterhouse of the Cabinet Office 
suggesting that the issue should be brought before the 
Cabinet. "In view of the situation in Kenya today, the 
refusal of Indians to co-operate in the constitution, their 
refusal to pay poll tax, and their imprisonment, I think that 
this question of the pledge I gave and the White Paper should 
be brought before the Cabinet in order that we may come to 
some conclusion. Mr. Thomas has already made a declaration 
on the question which was taken as the view of H.M.G. and has 
created the impression that the declaration of 25 duly has 
been, or can be, repudiated. The declaration, I need hardly 
aay, was made on the express direction of Mr. MacDonald.
The subject was discussed by the Cabinet on 12 March 
1924. Thomas wrote a memo for the Cabinet on 11 March
o1924 setting out his opinion on the situation. His civil 
servants had advised him to preserve his freedom until he 
had received the Indian Committee and also to wait until he 
had received further information on the question of immigra- 
tion from the Governor. Thomas wrote in his memo that 
shortly after taking office, he had, as advised, mentioned 
publicly that he proposed to be guided by the Devonshire 
White Paper which had discussed the various points which
1 .
2.
3.
Colonel Wedgwood to Sir Ronald Waterhou 
C.O. 533* file 12262 (00/533/3x9)
C.P.171(24)
C.O. 533 file 12262,p330, (CO/533/319)
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were at Issue between the Europeans and the Indian community. 
On the question of «land in the highlands* it had decided 
in favour of the Europeans and on the question of 'segrega­
tion in the townships* had found in favour of the Indians; 
a compromise had been laid down on the franchise question 
end on the question of immigration a general principle of 
controlling immigration (irrespective of race) in the 
economic interests of the 'natives* had been recognised.
The Franchise Bill for the election of two Indian members 
to the Legislative Council on a special franchise had been 
passed but the Indians had not taken advantage of it by 
registering as voters. They had decided on a policy of 
non-co-operation and had refused to pay taxes. Some had 
been sent to prison. Thomas expected to see the Committee 
from India early in the next month to discuss matters 
affecting Indians in the colonies.
The questions that Thomas put to the Cabinet were:
Was Colonel Wedgwood*s statement a formal pledge on behalf 
of the Labour party? Did it bind a Labour Government which 
did not have a formal majority in the House of Commons?
Did it bind the Labour party to take action without 
consulting the Governor? Was it not rather a general 
pledge to establish justice and fair play? Did the non- 
co-operation of the Indians make the fulfilment of the 
pledge more immediate?
Thomas continued to point out that in the case of 
India itself the Prime Minister and Lord Olivier had 
deprecated giving in to the demands of Indians who pursued 
a policy of non-co-operation. He quoted a letter from 
Lord Olivier to the Secretary of the Indian Overseas 
Association, in which Lord Olivier had stated that
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'constitutional changes have been accepted, it is quite 
impossible and entirely contrary to the whole methods and 
traditions of British constitutional development towards 
free and equal institutions immediately to reverse and upset 
arrangements which have been made, not for the purpose of 
establishing an ideal form of democratic constitution, but 
for the essential purpose of Government, namely of carrying 
on the business of Government in the interests of the 
greatest happiness aid greatest possible freedom of the 
greatest number«* Thomas was convinced that 'the only 
possible attitude* was that he should be guided by the 
White Paper decisions 'as at present advised.* However, 
he would wait until he had heard from the Committee from 
India and taken up the matter with the Governor. On the 
question of immigration he would wait to see whether the 
figures which the Governor was going to send him indicated 
that control was needed. In the meantime, he was looking 
into the question of how far the economic interest of the 
'natives* required that immigration should be controlled.
If he found that control was necessary he would exercise 
it, and if not, he would hold the power in reserve. He 
thought that the franchise should be given a chance; the 
fact that the Indians did not accept it did not mean that 
it was proving impossible. It was clear that Thomas was 
following the advice of his civil servants rather than 
trying to implement a more positive policy.
After considering Thomas's memo the Cabinet agreed:
»»To approve the general proposals of the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, namely, that for the moment, pending the 
arrival of the Committee to be sent from India, his only 
possible attitude was, as announced in Parliament, to be
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guided by the decisions published in the White Paper».1
The Governor of Kenya, Sir Robert Coryndon, wrote to 
J.H. Thomas on 27 March 1924. 2 He reported that the
Europeans were loyally carrying out their share of the White 
Paper decisions and were confident that the Government would 
carry them out in full. The Elected members of the Council 
had voted for the Franchise Bill in January without opposition. 
The Indians, who were determined to fight the White Paper, 
were on the whole quiet and not unfriendly; they were 
awaiting the outcome of the Conference in London with the 
Committee from India. The European community was also 
awaiting the outcome of that conference with trepidation.
On the question of immigration, the Governor stated that 
the aim of the draft bill prepared by his government was to 
apply the principle of an 'economic quota* of immigrants of 
any race to restrict immigration where it was likely to be 
detrimental to the interests of the »natives* of the colony.
The whole intention was to safeguard the interest of the 
Africans. Sir Richard Coryndon did not see how the principle 
of the 'economic quota* could be knocked down. He firmly 
believed that concessions on the Kenya question would not 
turn Indian hostility into a wiser or easier direction.
•It is my duty to tell you quite plainly that if the 
principles of the draft bill are modified or weakened to a 
degree that is even likely to upset the clear intention of 
the White Paper and the definite pledges that belong thereto, 
there will follow grave disturbances and it is possible that 
such disturbances will not be confined to the colony.*
The letter went on to point out that since March 1923
1 . Cabinet Conclusion, 12 March 1924, 19(24)6
2. Sir R. Coryndon to J.H. Thom«,, 27 M»r<=h 1924, Thom..
Papers, Ul625,019/3«
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the colonists had established, close touch with many 
influential people in South Africa and believed they had 
a friend in Smuts« They also had many influential friends 
in England. If the immigration point was abandoned the fire 
that would follow would be as *hot as it would have been a 
year ago.* The colonists would put up the most determined 
fight, for they were absolutely unanimous behind the White 
Paper« The Governor concluded by asking the Colonial 
Secretary to visit the colony« *This colony stands quite 
by itself in many ways and no one in England can understand 
how fine it is, or the spirit of its people without seeing 
it for himself.' The Governor was threatening a 'white 
backlash* if anything was done to improve the position of 
the Indians« Thomas replied on 2 May 1924,1 stating that 
he was only too well aware of the 'dangers and difficulties' 
connected with the Indian question« The pre'^ious 
Conservative Government had made the undertaking to consult 
the Indian Committee and to submit the draft immigration 
bill to the India Office and the Indian Government before 
any decisions were taken with regard to it, which was what 
he was going to do. If any modifications were to be made 
he would not fail to consult the Governor before any steps 
were taken. Thomas said that he would like to visit Kenya 
but there was little prospect of finding the time. Thomas 
did not suggest to the Governor that the Labour Party meant 
to pursue a stronger policy to emphasise African rights 
than had been pursued by the Conservatives«
Thomas wrote again to the Governor on 22 May 1924, 2 '
1U Ul625/019/3tO Slr ** Coryndont 2 May 1924, Thomas Papers,
2 * 24608^ ( CO/533/319)R * C°ryndon' 22 ^ y  1924, C.0.533 file
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saying that he was most anxious to protect the interests 
of Kenya and the economic position of the 'natives*. 
Considering his possible attitudev he declared that he 
adhered to the view held by the Secretary of State at the 
time of the Wood-Winterton proposals that the power of 
control was essential, and the tendency of increased 
immigration as shown by the latest figures indicated that 
it might be necessary to use that power soon. The 
proposals put forward by the Governor provided the machinery 
not only for control but also to investigate how far 
immigration was necessary for various purposes. An 
Immigration Ordinance should be passed so that the latter 
machinery could be set up to secure the power to introduce 
actual control of immigration when Thomas was satisfied that 
it was needed.
Another point of view was expressed by the Labour 
party's Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions which was 
also considering the position of the Indians in Kenya.
The first memo of the newly constituted Advisory Committee 
was a statement on the economic position of the Indians in 
Kenya by Leonard Woolf. 1 In this, Woolf stated that the 
white settlers of Kenya were maintaining that the immigra­
tion of the Indians into Kenya should be stopped because 
the Indians were competing with or in some way retarding 
the economic development of the 'natives'. This view had 
been taken by the White Paper of 1923. 2 Woolf thought 
that there was no evidence to show that the Indians 
competed economically with the 'natives' or retarded their 
development. The most valuable economic commodity in Kenya 
was land, which the Indian was debarred from owning where
it was most valuable. Woolf believed that there was prima 
facie evidence that it was the Europeans who were competing
C.C.1.Q7'Indians
u w v - ----- --------- r---
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with and retarding the economic development of the ♦natives* 
by expropriating them from the land, by exploiting their 
labour, and by monopolising the revenue for their own 
interests so that nothing was available for promoting 
•native* interests or for the education of the ’natives*.
The real economic competition was between the Indians and 
the white settlers who were demanding that Indian immigra­
tion should be stopped. The Europeans feared the competi­
tion of the Indians for land, particularly in the Highlands. 
The demand for control on immigration and the demand for 
excluding the Indians from the Highlands both stemmed from 
white fear of economic competition from the Indians. The 
policy of the Govenanent should be that defined in the White 
Paper as the ’protection and advancement of the natives 
races*but there should be no racial discrimination in the 
Government’s policy of protecting the ’native’. An 
impartial inquiry should be held into the economic effect 
upon the ’natives* of immigration in general which should 
include theeffect of the European immigrants on the ’native* 
economic activities as well as those of the Indian immigrants.
E.Do Morel also wrote a memo on Kenya for the A.C.I.Q. 
which discussed the *fundamental necessities of policy in 
Kenya as elsewhere in the African Tropics’.* It stated 
that the mod: urgent and immediate needs were the passing of 
an Order in Council forbidding the further alienation of land, 
pending the result of an inquiry. A Commission should be 
appointed to survey and demarcate on the spot the existing 
’native* reserves. Another Committee should be appointed 
with the task of setting out the nature, character, and 
extent of the land alienated to the Europeans. It should
1 A.C.I.4TMemo No. 2, April 192^.
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also examine the incidence of direct and indirect taxation 
on the •natives* and the effect upon •native* social and 
economic life of the Registration of Labourers* Act and the 
Masters* and Servants* Ordinance* Statistics should be 
collected for the past 20 years and all available evidence 
presented as to the best methods of encouraging the ’native* 
population in the cultivation of specific products of 
economic value for export - especially cotton*
Both these experts called for Committees of investiga­
tion* E*D* Morel welcomed Thomas's announcement in the 
House of Commons in March that he was in favour of a small 
committee of inquiry into the application of the principle 
of trusteeship* However, the white settlers in Kenya did 
not welcome the announcement. In a leading article on 8 
March 1924 the ‘East African Standard*1 declared that so 
much had been heard of the 'trusteeship of the.natives' that 
there was a real danger that inexperienced theorists would 
lead the British Government so far astray that Kenya would 
be saddled with an impossible policy which endeavoured to 
ignore the permanent fact of European settlement. 'The 
members of the British Government were the Trustees of the 
Native races in theory only: the real executive is the 
administration and white community in Kenya*' They knew 
from practical experience and daily contact what the 
definition of »Native Trusteeship* was - it was the develop­
ment of the African so that he could become a useful citizen 
in his own country and a loyal and industrious asset to the 
British Empire* Kenya did not deal in theory and any 
policy that was founded on theory alone would fail when it 
came up against practical realities. There was little
1 . 'East African Standard*, 8 March 1924.
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reason to expect that anything useful would come of a small 
committee conducting a ‘hole and corner* inquiry in the 
Colonial Office, It would merely prove a magnet to attract 
all the cranks and unsound critics of Kenya who were engaged 
in pulling the wool over M r . Thomas %  eyes by persuading him 
that he has a duty to the African that even his most 
distinguished predecessor failed to recognise and carry out* 
Unless the committee came to Kenya and became literally 
'soaked* in the atmosphere which surrounds the problem the 
report would be of no practical value to Kenya or the tribes ' 
which inhabit it. The white settlers were of the opinion 
that only they knew how «trusteeship* should be implemented. 
They thought that the »men on the spot* were best able to 
deal with the question.
On 4 April Thomas received a deputation at the Colonial 
Office led by C.R. Buxton and composed of members of all 
political parties, including Conservative M.P.s such as 
Ormsby-Gore and Sidney Henn, on the question of the economic 
development of the East African territories. 1 (Missionary 
societies and commercial bodies were also represented on the 
delegation.) The deputation explained that they recognised 
the necessity of developing cotton production and industry 
in general within the East African colonies from Uganda to 
Southern Rhodesia, but they desired to safeguard the 
principle of the trusteeship of the Natives'. The
Conservatives were more in favour of ensuring industrial 
and railway development, whereas the Labour and Liberal 
members were more in favour of safeguarding the Africans* 
interests. C.R. Buxton said: »The real reason why we are 
here today, is that there is a general feeling amongst us 
who are speaking for the East African Colonies that there
1. »Westminster Gazette*, 5 April 1924.
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should be a great development in the cotton growing 
industry there - that is the main idea at the present 
moment - in order to assist with raw materials one of our 
greatest industries, and the mere fact of it being very 
largely developed does raise the very difficult question 
of the natives in these Crown Colonies. " 1 Buxton thought 
that a special committee should be appointed which would 
enquire,into the matter in order to see that the interests 
of the Africans were protected when the development took 
place.
J.H. Thomas said in reply to the delegation that he 
was strongly impressed by its representative nature and 
would welcome their co-operation in the solution of what 
was a large and important matter. He would give a fuller 
reply in the Hotse of Commons after he had given fuller 
consideration to what had been said. The occasion of 
Thomas* statement was a debate in the House of Commons 
on 8 April 1924. A motion was put down by Sir Sydney 
Henn urging the Colonial Secretary to send out a special 
commission to East Africa *to report to him on the 
practicality of co-ordinating policy and services through­
out the territories, and to advise on the programme of
future economic development, especially cotton-growing
■ 2and railway construction.* Ormsby-Gore, the former 
Conservative Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, 
seconded the motion. Sir Robert Hamilton proposed an 
amendment to instruct the commission to consider the 
desirability of creating a separate administrative area 
for the Highlands of Kenya, which he thought would enable
1 . C.O. 533 file 17103 Po439, (CO/533/319)
2. 172 H.C.Deb.,cols. 351ff., 8 April 1924.
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the 8,000 whites in the Highlands to form a separate colony 
and this would remove the danger of a small white community 
exercising a dominant influence over the 10,000,000 blacks 
surrounding them«'*'
Replying to the debate, J«H. Thomas said that he had 
been impressed by the calm atmosphere of the debate.
Parties had been forgotten aid the House was approaching the 
matter free from any party prejudice, free from party 
considerations and with the single desire to see that justice 
was done to those whom they were entrusted with the 
responsibility of looking after. They were dealing with 
35,000,000 people in East and West Africa and an area of 
1 i635,000 square miles. The first and paramount considera­
tion was to give effect, not only to the White Paper, but to 
the principles underlying the White Paper. The motion 
asked for a commission of investigation and he had also 
had representations made to him to appoint a committee to 
examine every aspect of the situation and advise the 
Minister responsible« He had come to the conclusion that 
a committee should be appointed but it should not be a mass 
meeting and it should not be composed of a group of people 
with *fads*. (By this Thomas probably meant that he did 
not want the committee to be full of pro-African 
humanitarians.) *It is to be a real committee, not only 
with knowledge of the subject, non-party in character, 
representative of this House and all sections outside, but 
whose function is limited to giving advice to the Minister 
who alone must be responsible«* He was also disposed to 
recommend the appointment of a Commission, as the motion 12
1 . 172 H«C«Deb«,cols« 373-375, 8 April 1924
2. 172 H«C.Deb.,5s«t cols.380-384, 8 April 1924.
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requested, to investigate on the spot, subject to the 
concurrence of the Treasury* Although Thomas thought 
that East Africa should be developed along the lines on 
which West Africa was already developing, it was positively 
dangerous to send people and convey the impression that they 
were going there because of maladministration. He had 
nothing but admiration for those who were administering 
East and West Africa because they were doing a difficult 
job well. He had come to the decision very quickly that 
one could not sit in Downing Street and give instructions 
on every point. Although he had written about governing 
the colonies, he did not tell his 'very efficient* staff 
to turn to his chapter in 'When Labour Rules' about the 
Colonies when presented with a problem. It was far more 
difficult than that. The Colonial Secretary could see a 
thousand reasons against the suggestion of Sir Robert 
Hamilton for a separate white administration of the 
Highlands of Kenya but none in favour of it. The motion 
was accepted on behalf of the Government. Thomas was, 
in effect, saying that he was not going to carry out the 
Labour party's policy but was relying on the advice of his 
civil servants. The way he announced his decision to set 
up a committee suggested that the menbership would not be 
radical.
J.H. Harris, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Anti- 
Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society and a Liberal 
M.P»» welcomed the Colonial Secretary's announcement that 
he was going to send out a Commission. 1 He wanted to 
discuss the terms of reference which the Colonial Secretary 
had not expanded upon. The countries that they were
1. 172 H.C.Deb.,5a.tCol«o 387-390, 8 April 1924.
considering were at least six times the size of France and 
were occupied by 12,000,000 to 15,000,000 people in all 
stages of advancement towards civilisation. One of the 
outstanding factors of the countries was their lack of 
uniformity. There were various systems of land tenure, 
taxation, administration of justice as well as many different 
interpretations of the educational needs of the people.
Harris hoped that the terms of reference would include all 
these subjects on which there was variation so that they 
could arrive at some uniformity of treatment.
The Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions also 
produced some advice on the terms of reference. In May, it 
produced a memo containing a resolution on East Africa** 
which was sent to the Colonial Office. This stated that in 
view of the Colonial Secretary's decision to appoint a 
Committee to enquire into the questions of cotton growing 
and 'native* policy in East Africa* the A.C.I.Q. believed 
that the interests of the «natives* should be paramount in 
the considerations of the Committee and that the number 
appointed who definitely represented the interests of the 
African inhabitants dould be at least equal to the number 
appointed who represented the imperial interests of cotton 
growing and European economic interests. The Committee 
should inquire into the best methods of assisting the 
•natives* to become producers of cotton and the other 
agricultural products required by European industry. This 
would include education, experimental stations and expert 
advice. The position of the «native* in regard to land 
should also be studied and the methods required for assuring 
to the 'native* full and adequate rights in land sufficient 1
1 . A.C.I.Q., Memo No. 3, May 1924.
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for his maintenance as an independent producer» The third 
major point of inquiry should be the effect of the system 
of taxation upon the position of the »native* as a prospect­
ive producer of cotton and other industrial products.
The terms of reference of the East Africa Committee were
announced on 23 June 1924 in answer to a written question by
Sir W. de Frede. Thomas stated that he was appointing a
Committee to inquire into and report on various matters
concerned with East Africa, and also a small Commission,
drawn from the members of the Committee, which would visit
East Africa in order to inquire into certain questions locally.
He also announced that he would be soon setting up a separate
Committee to inquire into land questions in East and Vest 
2Africa* Apart from fie land Committee, he did not propose 
to take any action on West Africa. The Committee on East 
Africa would deal with land questions only in so far as they 
were connected with other questions with which it was 
dealing. »Native» education would also be excluded from 
this Committee in view of the fact that Thomas* predecessor 
had set up a »Standing Committee on Native Eduation*. The 
amalgamation or federation of the East African territories 
would also be excluded from consideration by the East 
African Committee. Its terms of reference would be to 
consider and report on the measures to be taken to 
accelerate the general economic development of the British 
East African Dependencies and the means of securing closer 
co-ordination of policy on such important matters as 
transportation, cotton-growing, and the control of human, 
animal and plant diseases, the steps necessary to ameliorate 
1« 175 H.C.Deb.,5s.,cols. 70-71, 23 June 1924 
2 - ^ 53V ^ 37^ Se”ted thl” t0 Th°"”  “  4 April Z924.
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the social condition of the ‘natives* of East Africa, 
including improvement of health and economic development, 
the economic relations of •natives* and*non-natives* with 
special Reference to labour contracts, care of labourers, 
certification of identification, employment of women and 
children, the taxation of ‘natives* and the provision of 
services directed to their moral and material improvement. 
The Committee would be representative of all parties and 
interests and would be chaired by Lord Southborough.
Of the nineteen members only six were supporters of the 
rights of Africans, E.D. Morel, J.H. Harris, C.R. Buxton, 
J.H. Oldham, H. Snell and A. Balfour. Thomas ignored 
the A.C.I.Q.*s suggestion that at least half the members 
of the committee should be sympathetic to the Africans.
The members of the Parliamentary Commission to visit 
East Africa were unlikely to write a report which put 
African interests uppermost. It consisted of W. Ormsby- 
Gore as Chairman, A.G. Church, the Labour member and
F.C. Linfield, the Liberal member. J. Calder was the 
secretary. Its terms of reference were to visit Northern 
Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Uganda and Kenya and obtain as much 
information as possible on the subjects considered by the 
East African Committee. 1 2 It was to exert *a decisive 
influence on moderate British opinion in the * settlers * 
favour*• The most radical members turned out to be 
Linfield, the Liberal, and, Calder, the secretary, who was 
removed from the Colonial Office on his return for his 
•unsympathetic manner* towards the settlers. 3 Jack Jones 
protested that Church was not a very suitable choice for
1 . 176 H.C.Deb.,5s.,c o 1 s .1736-1737
2. E.A. Brett, op.cit., p.l8l. *
3. ibid.
28 July 1924.
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the Labour representative. Major Church was the secretary 
of the National Union of Scientific Workers. He had shown 
no previous interest in the problems of the Africans. It 
appears that Thomas chose him rather than a member of the 
pre-African group because he did not wish to cause trouble 
with the settlers. He wanted to maintain continuity with 
Conservative policy. Prom this point of view the visit was 
a success, Church, Ormsby-Gore and the settlers became very 
friendly.
The committee that the A.C.I.Q. placed the most hope 
in was the Land Committee.^* C.R. Buxton, the chairman of 
the A.C.I.Q.,wrote to Lord Arnold, the Under-Secretary at 
the Colonial Office, that he was ‘extremely glad to note 
the announcement of Ji Land Committee*.•.When I mentioned 
this to you first, I thought it was a utopian idea....I
believe it may lead to one of the biggest achievements of
2the Labour Government. 1
Woolf had sent Lord Arnold a rough draft of terms of 
reference for the Committee. These were to enquire into 
and report upon the systems of land tenure and of Govern­
ment policy with regard to ownership, leasing and disposal 
of land in the British Crown Colonies, Protectorates and 
Mandated Territories in Africa and of their effect upon 
the economic life, well-being, progress and education of the 
natives, in particular with respect to the following:
(l) what legal rights, if any,have native communities and 
individual natives in land? (2) Is there sufficient for the
1 .
2.
The membership was Lord Islington, J.S. Wardlaw-Milne,
A. Wigglesworth, E. Fletcher, SirvW. Napier, E.D. Morel, L. Woolf and C. Strachey.
C.R. Buxton to Lord Arnold, 30 June 1924. C.O.533 file 3^378, (C.O./533/320)
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support of* every native family? (3) What has been the policy 
of administrations with regard to 'native reserves'?
(4) What has been the policy with regard to the alienstion, 
leasing and concession of land to the Europeans? (5 ) What 
steps have been taken to make the most economic use of the 
land? (6) What has been the policy with regard to mineral 
and mining rights?1
Arnold wrote back to Woolf thanking him and stating
2that his terms of reference would be 'extremely useful*.
E.D. Morel also wrote to the Colonial Office concerning the 
Land Committee. Writing to J.H. Thomas, he thought that 
'the fact of having two committees ought to turn out to be 
the best possible course. You, of course, realise as well 
as X do, that all the other questions - economic production, 
development of resources, success of cotton-growing, success 
of railways, increase in trade and customs revenue, depend 
upon placing native rights in land upon an unassailable 
foundation. On such a foundation you can then build up 
a vigorous, increasing native population which, through 
technical instruction (primarily), technical assistance, 
sympathetic advice and so on, will become a valuable asset 
to the major national interest. But it is especially 
clear that if you want this in Kenya you will have to fight 
for it, and face a vested interest which is implacably 
determined to make the Kenya native a serf - which is to 
destroy him. And you will have to be prepared to see the 
men on your Committee who are known to be , opposed to this
1. L.S. Woolf to Lord Arnold, 31 May 1924, C.O.533 file 
34378, (C.O./533/32)
2. Arnold to Woolf, 30 June 1924, CO. 533 file 34378, 
(C.0./533/320)
3. E.D. Morel to J.H. Thomas, June 1924, CO. 533 file 34378 
(CO/533/320)
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view vilified.* He recommended the appointment of L.S.
Woolf to the Committee because he and Woolf had drawn up 
the Africa policy pamphlet for the Labour party.
E.D. Morel and Leonard Woolf were included on the 
Committee on land which was to be chaired by Lord 
Islington. Its terms of reference were to consider the 
system of »native* tenure and usage of land in West and 
East Africa, the laws in force and the effect of their 
application upon those systems, particularly in regard to 
the transfer of land to »non-natives*, and to report what 
amendments were desirable, if any, having regard to the 
present and future well-being of the »native* population 
and to the economic development of the dependencies 
concerned.^
Gupta writes that the Labour party*s »colonial 
experts managed to ensure that the Labour Government would 
live up to its ideals about a positive colonial policy. * 2 
He suggests that Morel and the A.C.I.Q. persuaded the 
Government to set up these committees which, he seems to 
suggest, would have led to a radical reassessment of 
colonial policy in line with African interests. However, 
it seems to the present writer that Thomas did not intend 
the Committees to come forward with any radical proposals.
As Brett suggests, Thomas set up these all-party Committees to find 
others to take his decisions for him*3 because he did not 
understand the problems. It was not only the A.C.I.Q 
which recommended the setting up of the committees but 
Conservative M.P.s such as Henn and Qrmsby-Gore, business­
men and the cotton lobby. Henn had put forward a motion
1. CO . 533 file 3^378 (CO/533/320)
2' ;i»P«r ioli»-n »nd the British Labour Movement,191^-1964* (London, 1975>,p.72.
3« E.A. Brett, op.cit., p.l8l.
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in the House of Commons urging that committees should be 
appointed for East Africa to advise on a programme of 
economic development« Lord Lugard had suggested that a 
separate land committee should be appointed. The member­
ship <f both East African committees clearly Indicates 
that Thomas was not aiming for a confrontation with the 
settlers. The only committee which did eventually report, 
the East African Commission, as will be shown in more detail 
above, far from supporting African interests, set them back 
by vigorously supporting white settlement in East Africa.
The only committee which appears! hopeful from the African 
point of view was the Land Committee but the A.C.I.Q.*s 
terms of reference were toned down by Thomas and the 
membership was not dominated by pro-Africans. All the 
committees were advisory and it appears that Thomas had no 
desire to implement a positive policy which would have led 
to confrontation with the settlers. His speeches clearly 
indicate that he had no desire to reform the empire 
according to the Advisory committees policies which he 
had outlined in the book which he wrote when he was in 
opposition. In an interview to «John Bull* he said that 
there was, of necessity, a change between ‘mere propagandist»! 
and the responsibilities of government. * 1 Thomas 
particularly mentioned East African policy as an example 
where he had found the policies worked out in opposition 
to be inappropriate. At a banquet on 15 July, he declared 
that the »Labour Government were anxious and determined 
that their successors should not be able to say that the
empire was less great or noble because of their administration.» 2
1 . »John Bull*, 31 May 1924.
2. »The Times*,15 July 1924.
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At another luncheon at the South Africa Club he declared 
that people should get rid of class feeling and class 
prjudice and try to establish confidence in each other*1 
The Labour press did not support Thomas *s opinions• The 
•New Leader* stated that 'we think it almost the gravest 
mistake which a Labour party could commit to ignore the fact 
that a process which is usually called the class struggle 
is the most vital factor of our lives** However the 
•Daily Sketch* was rejoicing in the fact that J.H. Thomas 
was a *great Imperialist*. *No one will be surprised if 
one of these days J*H* Thomas comes to the House of Commons 
with a red, white and blue tie and a Union Jack pinned in 
his coat. Since he went to the Colonial Office Mr. Thomas 
has become a great Imperialist.* Labour had not shown a 
very lively interest in colonial affairs but J.H. Thomas 
was out to change all that, thought the ‘Daily Sketch*.
Thomas was proving a better 'imperialist* than a Conservative 
Colonial Secretary. There was no likelihood as long as he 
remained at the Colonial Office that the A.C.I.Q.'s policy 
would be implemented.
Although most Labour M.P.s did not show any great 
interest in colonial affairs those that did formed the 
Labour Commonwealth Group during the first Labour Govern­
ment. It was formed on the initiative of Dr. Haden-Guest 
and was the first attempt by Labour members of the House of
Commons to formulate and advance constructive imperial policy
4but it met with 'no enthusiasm from the Government*.
It does not seem to have had much connection with the A.C.I.Q.
1 . «Westminster Gazette*, 30 July 1924
2. »New Leader*, 14 November 1924.
3. »Daily Sketch*, 5 May 1924.
4. R. Lyman »The First Labour Government* (London,1957>p.2l6.
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Lansbury writes in his memoirs that together with T.
Johnston« H. Snell and others, he formed the group. He 
became chairman after the death of W.S. Royce,* the first 
chairman. Lansbury believed that the Group was one of the 
most influential in the party and was destined to exercise 
'great influence on Colonial and Dominion policy.* It 
met every Monday during Parliamentary Sessions and discussed 
topics of mutual interest with representatives from India, 
the Dominions and the Colonies. According to Lansbury, all 
the members were strongly anti-imperialist: 'all agreed 
that the British Labour movement must lead the way in 
establishing a Commonwealth of Nations - that is a Federation 
of Nations coming together as free and equal partners in a 
Commonwealth representative of all the people at present 
living under the British flat.* They believed that India
could gain full and complete political and economic freedom
owithout bloodshed and violence.
Tom Johnston says in his memoirs that he and Lansbury 
shared some serious misgivings on the general attitude of 
the Labour party to the British Empire and they teamed up 
to get the Labour Commonwealth Group started.^ He thought 
that most members of the Labour party had inherited from 
the old Whigs via the radicals a curious, if undefined, 
prejudice of antagonism to the Empire which perhaps was 
a hangover from the Bper War. The assumption that all 
colonial development was imperialist and anti-socialist 
seemed to him »irrational and absurd*. The standard of 
trusteeship in the colonial parts of the Empire was
1 . Royce was an ex-Conservative who had a superiority 
complex about the Africans. Gupta, op.cit.,p.55.
2. G. Lansbury, *My Life', pp.269-70
3. T. Johnston, 'Memories* (London, 1952),pp.49-50.
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Improving# If It was impossible to get common purpose 
and action among peoples who had become accustomed to 
acknowledge one symbol of unity - the King - and who
settled their disputes by Privy Council arbitration, there 
was a poor chance of the League of Nations succeeding outside 
the Empire# Therevas no sense in leaving the Carlton Club 
to take all the interest in the Empire so the Labour 
Commonwealth Group had been formed# Although it was 
numerically small, never more than twenty or thirty , it 
acquired a knowledge of the facts and ‘gradually* effected 
a change in the outlook of the party towards the confedera­
tion of British peoples# But as these views indicate it 
was not putting forward any radical policies for the 
colonies# Its main aim seemed to be to support the Empire# 
Some in the group, particularly Haden-Guest, were interested
in the idea of an empire free trade area.
Tom Johnston used his position as editor of ‘Forward* 
to put forward his views. He attacked ‘Whig theories 
about the Colonies« and suggested that, properly reformed 
and run, the Empire might be made into ‘the greatest lever 
for human emancipation the world has ever known.«1 Harry 
Snell, another founder member of the Commonwealth Labour 
Group, became its secretary for seven years suceeding 
Haden-Guest. He was also convinced that the attitude 
that the Labour party had inherited from a generation of 
anti-colonial radicals and Liberals needed revision. 2 H e 
believed that the main intention of the empire-builders 
had been to open up opportunities for capital investment, 
to exploit the minerals to be found in Africa and elsewhere 
and to secure desirable areas for settlement. England
1 . ‘Forwards «,, 26 July 1924.
2 - H* f ? ' 1 ! '  ' Men* M° V<>n,ent3 « » d M y . e l f  ( W o n ,  1 9 3 6 ) ,p p .210-212. »
had not taken possession of the colonies for religious or 
philanthropic reasons; some people may have acted with 
these motives but the main driving force was the economic 
one* If the situation had not. been hopelessly prejudiced 
by irreversible fact, Snell would have asked himself whether 
any European power had any right to be in Africa at all. 
However, the process of economic exploitation and the 
political invasion of the tropical areas by the white men 
had gone far beyond the possibility of retreat. Therefore, 
the old policy of abandonment was out of date; the most 
helpful alternative was to try to develop the colonial 
possessions on lines which would enrich and ennoble the 
•native * peoples and prepare them gradually to take their 
place in the British Commonwealth of Nations. Snell 
thought that through attending the meetings of the Common­
wealth Labour Group, Labour members had a better knowledge 
of imperial problems than any ether section of the House.
The attendance grew until in the last session before the 
fall of the Second Labour Government it numbered an 
average of fifty members.
The Commonwealth Labour Group did not see the Empire 
in quite the flagwaving terms that J.H. Thomas saw it, nor 
as an evil to be abolished as some members of the X.L.PS 
and the Marxists saw it, but as an opportunity for 
economic co-operation. Lansbury worked on a policy for 
the bulk purchase by the state of food and other commodities 
from the Colonies and Dominions and Tom Johnston studied 
such problems as schemes to exchange Scottish salted herring 
for Jamaica citrus fruits. The Group kept Labour M.P.s 
informed of colonial and dominion developments but it did 
not make Labour colonial policy. it did not put forward
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a comprehensive colonial policy. The members of the group 
seemed to be more willing to discuss the idea of imperial 
preference than most members of the Labour party who remained 
committed to free trade. The group did not show much 
interest in the problems of the Afrfeans.
Thomas *s ’imperialist * outlook was again shown over his 
attitude to the continuing problem of the Indians in Kenya. 
The Committee arrived from India in June 1924 to put he 
Indian point of view to the Colonial Secretary, over the 
franchise, land in the highlands, and Indian immigration 
into Kenya, Thomas toldlhem that »the sole and exclusive 
ground on which he would decide the question was whether the 
immigration of outsiders interferes with the ultimate well­
being of the natives•*'1' The position was that he was
considering an application from Kenya for a new Immigration 
Bill and concurrently considering representation from the 
Committee that there was no justification for such a Bill,
Mr, Rangachariar asked him how the question would be decided 
and Thomas replied that the responsibility was his but he 
proposed to determine the matter in consultation with his 
colleagues. It was not a racial question, nor was the 
Bill aimed against Indians, The Indian Committee also 
asked Thomas to read a memo from them which criticised 
the decisions of the 1923 White Paper on the questions of 
the franchise and the Highlands, Thomas said that he was 
dead against the attitude of non-co-operation of the Indians 
and would make no change in the existing constitution until 
it had been given a fair trial. However, he promised to 
consider the Committee *s point of view and that, when a 
decision was taken, he would issue a reasoned statement,
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1 . C.0.533 Tile 30157 , (00/533/320)
explaining the grounds on which he had reached a decision.
The question of the Indians in Kenya came before the 
Cabinet on 9 July 1924. J.H. Thomas had prepared a memo 
for discussion1 and Lord Olivier, the Secretary of State 
for India, had made some comments on Thomas *s memo.^ In 
his memorandum, Thomas stated that he had seen the Committee 
from India, they had found it impossible to agree on any 
figures of past immigration and emigration of Indians.
The question was not whether there should be Indian artisans 
or trades in the country but whether there was a sufficient 
number of Indian traders and artisans already there. The 
policy that the Colonial Secretary proposed to endorse was 
that of Mr. W. Churchill at the time of the Wood-Winterton 
proposals when Churchill rsaid that if the danger of a 
large influx of Indians arose, he held himself entirely 
free to take any action which might be necessary. In order 
to judge when the necessity had arisen there should be a 
statistical department set up in Kenya whose main job would 
be to keep accurate information of the place or origin, 
occupation and destination of all races arriving in Kenya, 
with similar infoxm ation for those leaving Kenya. This 
department would also investigate the economic requirements 
of the country in the way of labour.
Thomas thought that this policy would remove the 
suspicion that the wholesale exclusion of Indians was 
contemplated and should also satisfy the large body of 
local opinion that was convinced that the Indian was 
retarding the African. They should indicate to those 
political elements in Kenya which were actively anti-Indian
1 . Cabinet Paper 375(24)
2. Cabinet Paper 383(24)
that while H.MG* were not prepared to meet their views, the 
principle embodied in the White Paper that •native* interests 
must be paramount would, if necessary, be applied as firmly 
to the limitation of immigration from India as to any other 
question«
It had been found that the immigration figures used by 
the settlers to justify the bill were inaccurate, and the 
Government of India had strongly declared that there was no 
case for imposing Settlespolicy* He feared that if a law 
was passed restricting immigration into Kenya, the Government 
of India might retaliate and pass a corresponding law in India*
In his notes on Thomas* proposals Lord Olivier expressed 
general agreement. However, he felt that the questions of 
the franchise and the reservation of the land in the High­
lands could not be ignored* He was concerned whether the 
land that had been offered to the Indians was good land*
He was not completely happy about Thomas's policy on these 
questions and he also felt that it should be made plain 
that the question of immigration should be considered 
generally and not only in relation to the Indians* He 
thought that Churchill*s words, which Thomas as proposing 
to endorse, were not unobjectionable and should be changed 
to read *If danger ever arises of such an influx of 
immigrants of whatever class, race, nationality or character 
as may be likely to be prejudicial to the economic interests 
of the natives,* the Colonial Secretary would be free *to 
take any action which may be necessary'* The Cabinet agreed 
to this modification proposed by Lord Olivier but 
accepted Thomas's main point that a ban on immigration could 
be imposed in the future if the Colonial Secretary felt it
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necessary in the»interests of the natives* .1 Thomas 
announced his policies for the Indians in Kenya in the House 
of Commons on 7 August 1924. Indian comment was unfavour­
able. Dr. T.B. Sapru, a moderate Indian leader, stated 
that »the present decision of the Colonial Office once again 
proves that in any conflict between the Government of India 
and even a Crown Colony, the former must go under. *^
Gandhi remarked that the »betrayal both of Africans and
Indians in Kenya makes the wrong almost too prodigious for
4poor India to deal with.' No progress had been made 
towards implementing a policy of equal rights in East Africa. 
Despite the rhetoric about African interests, in effect, the 
interests of the white settlers were paramount. The 
communal franchise was preserved and Wedgwood's pledge was 
ignored. The best land in Kenya was still reserved for 
the whites, Indians and Africans were left with less fertile 
land. Indian immigration was not to be stopped but a tight 
check was to be kept on the number of Indians in Kenya and 
a ban could be established if it was felt necessary.
After settling the Indian question, mainly in the 
settlers* favour, Thomas set sail for South Africa; the 
Dominion that preserved a rigid colour bar and where white 
interests were paramount to those of the Africans. The 
»Daily Express* praised Thomas for making the trip and hoped 
that he would educate the other members of the Cabinet into
5the full meaning of the empire.
1 . Cabinet Conclusions, 40(24)13 Gupta implies that Olivier 
prevented Thomas from re-establishing the ban. However, all 
that Olivier had changed was some of Churchill*s words to 
make them less offensive to the Indians. The policy that a 
ban could be imposed still stood.
2. H.C.Deb.,5s.,col.3111$ 7 August 1924.
3. Quoted, R.G. Gregory, »India and East Africa* (Oxford,197l)
p. 2 8 0 .
4. ibid.
5 . »Daily Express', 9 August 1924.
Before he set sail« Thomas made a speech at the British 
Empire Exhibition at Wembley. He declared that he was proud 
of the Exhibition and the Empire it represented. Nothing 
could be more mistaken than the idea that Labour was hostile 
towards the Empire. It was prompted wholly and solely by 
the desire that the British Empire should be worthy of the 
idea it embodied and the motherland which gave it birth. 
fLabour realises that it has good reasonto be proud of the 
British Empire. It knows the part that working men have 
played in the buildingof the imperial edifice. It realises 
that the foundations were laid« not only by traders and 
explorers in search of wealth or fame« but also by humble 
men and women of British stock who left these islands for 
distant parts of the world, seeking only to secure a liveli­
hood which was denied them at home. Labour knows how these 
men and women, toiling in the far places of the world brought 
prosperity to those lands as well as to themselves and made 
them part, as it were, of the homeland they had left.**'
Thomas got on well in South Africa and managed to 
persuade General Hertzog to send a representative to the 
Imperial Conference which was shortly to be held in London, 
(whereas previous to Thomas*s visit he had decided not to send 
a representative). The Colonial Secretary travelled from 
Cape Town to Basutoland and back in ten days making tactful 
speeches en route. The visit seems to have remained in 
Thomas *s memory for in his memoirs he does not discuss any 
of the policy decisions which he had to make as Colonial 
Secretary but devotes practically the whole chapter on his 
period at the Colonial Office to his trip to South Africa.^ 
XI fThe Times*, 9 August 1924.
2. G. Blaxland, *J.H. Thomas: A Life for Unity* (London,1964)
3. j.H. Thomas, *My Story* (London,1937)
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He arrived back in England on 29 September 1924, laden with 
spears, oranges, sugar and parrots. It is significant that 
Thomas never mentioned in his speeches the problems of the 
black Africans and came back having won the praise of the 
white South Africans.
One problem that Thomas did deal with in September was 
the question of the Government of Kenya and the exchange of 
land with Lord Deiamere who wanted to exchange 21,000 acres 
of farming land close to the Uganda railway for 63,000 acres 
of sheep-grazing country in a more remote area. The problem 
was whether any Africans would be alienated from their land. 
The Governor proposed acceptance of the exchange but in a 
letter on 24 September 1924, Thomas asked for more considera­
tion of the question. The matter of »natives* on unalienated 
Crown land required the most careful attention; he would not 
be able to defend removal of the land from the »natives* 
simply because they did not have a legal right to the land. 
However, the Labour Government fell before the matter was 
settled and Thomas *s successor, L.S. Araery, approved the 
scheme for the exchange of land soon after he came into 
office.*
Before the advent of the first Labour Government,
Leonard Woolf had written an article discussing the recep­
tion that a Labour Colonial Secretary would receive; »He 
must reckon on a storm in the capitalist press. He must 
expect the furious and dangerous hostility of Local 
Europeans. But he won»t do any good otherwise. His work 
cannot be done without large loss to a few hundred wealthy 
people who will fight like cats in a corner.» 2 Thomas had
1 . Cmd. 2,500, August 1925, p.9.
2. »Problems of East Africa», Leonard Woolf Papers. Miscsection, Africa. * *
created the opposite effect. When he left the Colonial
Office, the ‘capitalist* press praised him. ‘The Times* felt
that he need have no fear that anyone would be able to say
that the great British Commonwealth had lost prestige because
a working man had occupied the position of Colonial Secretary.
•The Sunday Times* also believed thst he was ‘one of the few
successes of the Labour Government.* The Labour press
tended to ignore Thomas *s period at the Colonial Office. The
'New Leader* was concerned at his lack of realisation of the
importance of the class struggle• *The New Statesman*
concluded from the experience of the Labour Government that
the party lacked any 'distinctive imperial policy* and that
4a clear Imperial policy should be formulated. John Scurr 
suggested in the ‘Socialist Review*, that a Labour policy 
for the Empire should include control leading to ownership 
of transport and communications, development of public works 
and utilities in Crown Colonies, education for the coloured 
people in agriculture and compulsory general education, the 
preservation of the lands for the ’natives*, control of all 
exports and imports between various parts of the Empire, an 
Imperial Economic Committee, co-operation between those 
engaged in industries not yet developed on a mass production 
basis, family migration, a 48 hour week and a factory code 
and, where white and coloured workers laboured side by side, 
the white r«te should prevail.^
Thomas had not striven to achieve these things. This
1 . ‘The Times* 6-November 1924.
2. 'Sunday Times', 9 September 1924.
3# »New Leader', l4 November 1924; 10 April 1925.
4. ‘New Statesman*, 11 October 1924.
5. ‘Socialist Review', No.130, August 1924,pp.6-l6
made people think that the Labour party did not have a
distinctive policy for Africa. However, the policy was there
(The Empire in Africa: Labour's Policy)'*' but Thomas had not
had the time or the inclination to put it into effect. As
R. Miliband writes, the Government had no thoughts of blazing
new trails in colonial policy; J.H. Thomas accepted
continuity of policy as a matter of conviction and not as
the inevitable consequence of the Government's minority 
oposition. Wedgwood's view that the slogan of the Govern-
ment was 'we must not annoy the Civil Service* seems to be
true for Thomas *s period at the Colonial Office. As Lyman
writes the Labour Government provided an amalgamation of
Conservative and Liberalimperial policy.^ It offered nothing
distinctively different from the other parties. However,
Snell thought that the Government had 'managed the business
of the country with dignity and efficiency and, in spite
of the campaign of slander to which they were subjected
immediately they assumed office, the country as a whole was
proud of the fact that a body of workmen from factory, mine
and office could with strong and capable hands govern the
greatest Empire that the world had k n o w n . H o w e v e r ,  as
Gregory writes, with one exception, Thomas left British
policy in Kenya essentially the same as Devonshire had left
it. His only concession to the Indians was his decision
that no immediate restriction was needed on Indian immigra-
6tion. On the other points ot issue concerning the Indians
** 'i920^mPlre ln AfrlCa! L<‘b°u r 'a Policy' (The Labour Party,
ï: r^ii^r^ovete^s^r^î;.6. R.G. Gregory, op.cit., p.282. ndon,1936)pp.214-219.
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In Kenya, the franchise and land in the highlands, Thomas 
had decided not to implement Wedgwood's pledges or the policy 
of tie A.C.I.Qo
Thomas was content to maintain general continuity with 
the work of his predecessors. This disappointed the experts 
of the Imperial Advisory Committee who had hoped for a policy 
of change, especially in Kenya. Leonard Woolf, the 
secretary of the Committee, wrote in his memoirs that 
although the time was too short, the programme too crowded, 
and the voting strength too small for the Government to take 
any major steps in carrying out Labour's colonial policy, 
'nevertheless, the record of Ramsay MacDonald's Government 
in Asia and Africa seemed to me and a good many other 
people very disappointing, by failing to carry out its 
promises in cases where it could and should have done so .»1
It could be said in extenuation of Thomas *s performance 
at the Colonial Office that the Labour party had no majority 
in the House of Commons, that the time available to him was 
very short and that his room for manoeuvre was severely 
impeded by the fact that he was a member of the first 
Labour Government of all time. A case could be made out 
that Thomas was successful in proving that the empire could 
be governed by a working-class Colonial Secretary without 
it suffering any major disasters. Ramsay MacDonald's 
first Labour Government, it could be argued, proved that 
the Labour party was capable of governing Britain and 
the empire. If the Labour party had tried more radical 
measures, it might have been defeated earlier and the people 
of the country may have felt that it was not »safe» to 
entrust the government of the country to the Labour party.
1 . L.S. Woolf, 'Downhill all the W ay* (London,1967),p.236.
The Liberal party may have been restored as the major 
opposition party to the Conservatives. The real signifi­
cance of the 1924 election was that, although the Labour 
party did badly, the Liberals did much worse. It could be 
said that the Labour Government of 1924 had proved that it 
was »safe* to entrust the government of Britain and the 
empire to the Labour party. Having proved itself, the 
Labour party could then wait until it achieved a full 
majority before it implemented its radical reforms.
However, this line of argument is not completely 
convincing. The main problem was that the Labour leaders 
did not seem to be particularly worried about their 
minority position. There vas no real indication that the 
Labour leaders had prepared radical reforms which they 
wanted to implement but which they were prevented from 
implementing by the Liberals. There was no real indication 
that the Labour leaders had plans for changing Britain and 
the empire to give more power to the working class of 
Britain and the indigenous peoples of the colonies. This 
particularly applied to Thomas. He did not give the 
impression that he would have behaved differently if the 
Labour party had had a majority of a hundred seats over the 
other parties. He did not appear irked by his party's 
minority position. He continually emphasised that a 
policy of continuity should be followed in colonial affairs 
which ever party was in power. In a number of ways,
Thomas could have taken decisions which were more in line 
with the policy that he had outlined in his book 'When 
Labour Rules' but he deliberately chose not to do so. If 
he had meant to follow a pro-African colonial policy, he 
could have taken up MacDondd's suggestion that Morel should
be his Under-Secretary but, as has been shown, he rejected 
him, precisely because of his views on Africa. Thomas could 
have honoured Wedgwood«s pledge about trying to abolish 
communal franchises. Thomas could also have ended the 
reservation of the best land in Kenya, the land in the 
Highlands, to the white settlers. These two points were 
Labour party policy before Thomas became Colonial Secretary 
but he did nothing to implement them. He followed the 
advice of his civil servants on these questions and not the 
advice of the Labour party*s A.C.I.Q. it could be argued 
that, since Thomas was not very knowledgeable about colonial 
affairs, he did the right thin* in setting up committees to 
provide him with advice. However, Thomas chose to staff 
the committees, not with a bias towards people who were 
sympathetic to the Labour party*s declared policy but with 
a bias towards people who were recommended by the civil 
service as likely to provide «sensible*, moderate advice 
and, in Thoraas'sown phrase, «people who had not got 
particular «fads« about Africa». The Labour member chosen 
for the East Africa Commission was Major Church, a right 
winger, who had shown no interest in African affairs. The 
land committee was the only one which appeared at all hopeful 
from the point of view of Labour«s policy but there was no 
indication that if it had produced a radical report Thomas 
would have followed it. When the East Africa Commission 
produced a pro-settler report, Thomas endorsed it. 1 In his 
speeches, Thomas gave the impression that the Labour party 
was in favour of the empire. It seems that Thomas followed 
the policy that he thought was best, not the policy that he 
felt he was forced to follow by the circumstances.
If Thomas had followed a more positive pro-African
1 ^
1 . See pp.156-157*
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colonial policy there is no evidence to show that the 
Liberal party would have voted against him. Host Liberal 
M.P.s who showed an interest in Africa supported a pro- 
African policy. J.H. Harris, the secretary of the A.S.A.P.S., 
was a Liberal M.P. at this time, and J. Hope Simpson, another 
Liberal M.P. was very active in trying to safeguard Indian 
interests in Kenya against those of the settlers. During 
the next Parliament, the two Liberals who showed an interest 
in Africa, asked 55 questions which were hostile to the 
Kenyan Administration and only 2 which were supportive. 1 
As Brett writes, over Africa, the Liberals appear to have 
identified with the Labour party activists whose principal 
concern was to protect the Africans from settler pressures. 2
Thomas followed a policy of continuity from conviction, 
not as a result of the Government's minority position. As 
Woolf writes, he failed to carry out Labour's promise in 
cases where he 'could and should have done so*. In 1936 
Thomas became Colonial Secretary again in a Conservative- 
dominated National Government. This was the logical outcome 
to his emphasis on following policies which maintained 
continuity with Conservative policy.
After Thomas's period of 'imperialist' colonial policy, 
the experts of the A.C.I.Q. became determined to give their 
policy more publicity so that next time there was a Labour 
Government the policy would not be ignored. They were also 
concerned that Thomas had given the impression that the 
Labour party was 'imperialist*. Many of the other leaders 
such as MacDonald and Clynes, as Fischer3shows, also g ave the
1 . E.A. Brett,
2. ibid.
3» 6» Fischer, 
de 1 'Inde',
op.cit•,pp60-6l.
»Le Parti Travailliste et 
(Paris, 1966) ppl33-154. la Decolonisation
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impression that the Labour party was pro-imperial. Gupta*" 
thinks that it is incorrect to paint a picttore, as Fischer 
does« of the Labour party as pro-imperial and anti-European 
in the 'twenties and 'thirties. Gupta states that Leys and 
Brockway were 'educating the party on the need to maintain 
an imperial standard in favour of equal rights. However«
Brockway devoted most of his attention to India during the
2interwar period and« as far as Africa was concerned. Leys 
was not having much success in converting the leadership to 
the policy of equal rights, as was shown by Thomas's period 
at the Colonial Office. He was not to have much more 
success with Passfield later. The problem was that there 
were many different view points within the Labor party 
about the empire. The party conference seemed to show a 
strong negative reaction to the idea of empire. The 
A.C.I.Q. was trying to work out a policy of reforming the 
empire. However, the leadership and most members of the 
P.L.P. did not give the impression that they regarded the 
reform of the empire as urgent. Those M.P.s who were 
interested in the empire, and belonged to the Labour 
Commonwealth Group, seemed to be mainly concerned with 
schemes for economic co-operation and trade with the 
Dominions rather than attaching priority to African rights.^ 
When MacDonald became Prime Minister, he seemed less keen
on enforcing the idea of an 'imperial standard of equal 
rights' than he had been in 1907. The low priority he 
attached to enforcing African rights is shown by the fact
that he chose Thomas as Colonial Secretary rather than
1 . P.S. Gupta, op.cit•, p.132.
2. Interview with A.F. Brockway, 24 July 1973
3. See Chapter 6.
4. Haden Guest, a member of the Labour Commonwealth Group
»a i ! V ! !  V °  *d° P « “S empire free trade, 
returning to the Labour party In t L  thirties!
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Wedgwood, Morel or even Olivier, This decision indicated 
that MacDonald did not want too much trouble from the 
Colonial Office and did not want a direct confrontation with 
the settlers. The problem was that the A.C.I.Q. might make 
Labour policy for the African colonies but their labours 
were in vain, unless they could secure the appointment of a 
Colonial Secretary who was likely to put their policy into 
effect. Theoretically, the Labour party believed in reform 
of the empire in Africa but, in practice, under Thomas, it 
had pursued a policy of continuity.
CHAPTER k
DEFINING THE POLICY
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The Labour Party Conference which took place in October 
1924 just before the General Election on 29 October 1924, 
passed a motion on Imperial Affairs. It was moved by 
Fenner Brockway of the I.L.P. and declared that *this 
conference considers that the time is long overdue for a 
determined stand by organised Labour against the crimes 
committed by the British ruling class in the furtherence 
of its Imperialism. It therefore demands that steps be 
taken forthwith: (l) to stop the persecution of workers for 
political or industrial reasons, particularly in India and 
Egypt and to secure the release of all who are suffering 
imprisonment for their opposition to British Imperialism.
(2) To provide adequate protection for the subject races of 
the Empire in their struggle for freedom. (3) To find ways 
and means of linking up British working class organisations, 
both industrial and political, with those of the wage-earning 
population of India, Egypt, South Africa etc., with a view 
to the speedy attainment of self-government throughout the 
British Empire. (4) The Conference is moreover of the 
opinion that *in order to hasten the grant of a full measure 
of Home Rule to India, steps should be taken to summon a 
Conference of Representatives of the various parties of 
India who shall be invited to prepare a scheme of self- 
government for discussion with the British Government•
The resolution was seconded by Mr. Hands and carried 
unanimously. It is highly unlikely that the Government 
would have put this resolution into effect if it had 
remained in power. The I.L.P.*s resolutions on Imperialism 
were usually passed unanimously but never acted upon. These 
type of resolutions bore no resemblance to what the Labour 1
1 . Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1924, p.179«
party did in office. The leadership was not as anti­
imperialist as the rank-and-file.
In East Africat the Labour Government had done very 
little to improve the position of the Africans. 'East 
Africa*, the pro-White journal, reported that 1924 had 
definitely been East Africa's best year. After a period 
of depression, the territories were coming into their own, 
railway building and harbour construction works were being 
pushed forward, subsidiary transport facilities were 
increasing, planters and farmers were getting better price 
for their crops, 'native* production was greatly augmenting 
spending power and, consequently, the demand for goods 
manufactured in Europe and the business world was confident 
and optimistic. 1 This is further proof that the A.C.I.Q,. 
were unsuccessful in ensuring that the Labour Govemnent 
lived up to its ideals about a positive colonial policy.
For the white settlers to be able to state that the year 
of the Labour Government was their most successful ever 
showed that the Labour Government had not been at all 
vigorous in ensuring that the interests of the Africans 
were paramount in East Africa.
Norman Leys showed how the Africans* rights were being 
ignored in East Africa. He had written a pamphlet on 'Land 
Law and Policy in Tropical Africa ' 2 in 1922, and, in 1924, 
he published a full length book on Kenya.^ This was an 
indictment of British rule in the Colony. It received 
favourable reviews in the Labour press. In the »New 
Leader', Leonard Woolf wrote that he had 'never read any
book on that subject which is as good, as illuminating and
1 . 'East Africa', 20 November 1924.
2. N. Leys, 'Land Law and Policy in Tropical Africa»(League of Nations Union, 1922)
3. N. Leys, 'Kenya' (London, 1924)
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moving as Dr. Leys*s. It was one of the most tremendous 
indictments of »imperialism* that had ever been written.
Leys was passionately opposed to the imperialist, capitalist, 
exploitation of the white man but he stated facts which 
showed both sides of the picture*.'*’ Woolf did not agree 
with all Leys *5 theories and opinions but he thought that 
no other book stated the facts so powerfully, so vividly, 
or so truthfully.
Leys believed that the black man was being exploited 
in Kenya under a system which deprived him of his land and 
then made him work for the white man for low wages in order 
to pay the taxes that were imposed upon him. The social 
effects of this were deplorable and dangerous leading to 
the break up of family life, disease and alcoholism.
Leys wanted the land to be restored to the Africans, a 
reform of the inequitable taxation system and a programme 
of African education which would eventually equip the 
Africans to rule themselves. Leys believed that education 
should not just train the Africans to be better producers 
and workers as Conservative policy emphasised but that 
education should be provided on an equal basis so that the 
Africans would be trained in law and administration as well 
as the basic skills necessary for efficient production.
Leys put the emphasis on a policy of equal rights for black
and white in the colonies. The »New Statesman* thought that
Leys*s book was too important to be ignored. The British
people should insist that what waswrong in Kenya should be
put right without delay by political and economic reforms.
Some of the points put by Leys might be answerable but the
paper doubted whether »we shall get satisfaction from anything 
11 »New Leader», 16 January, 1925, p.4.
2. Memorandum by the Advisory Committee on Native Education in 
the British Tropical African Dependencies (Cmd.2374) Parliamentary Papers, 1924-25.
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less than a searching inquiry by a Royal Commission.•1
However, Thomas 'r commissions were abolished by the new
Conservative Colonial Secretary, except for the East African
Commission which visited Kenya early in 1925 under the
chairmanship of W. Ormsby-Gore, the new Under-Seeretary of
State at the Colonial Office. It reported in 1925,^
stating that the 'ideal before government is not merely that
of holding the balance between a series of interests, native
or non-native, but of serving the highest welfare of the
communities as a whole. In fact, the development of the
community sense is one of its paramount tasks.* It was
the duty of European Administrators to take advantage of
the intelligence and capacities of such *natives* as have
risen in the scale of civilisation and *to educate a less
efficiently equipped people to become better and more
efficient.* The Commission believed that settler and
African interests were in harmony and advocated what
came to be known as the Dual policy, which had first been
defined by Sir Robert Coryndon, Governor of Kenya. It
declared that »the Dual Policy of increasing the quantity
and quality of production on native lands pari passu with
the development of European cultivation is accordingly
necessary, if only on financial grounds...We feel that the
sincere acceptance by officials, unofficials and natives
of the Dual Policy inaugurated by the late Sir Robert
Coryndon is the necessary first step to that stability of
economic conditions without which real progress cannot
be maintained.» The Commission called for a considerable
amount of economic development, including tte building of 
1 . 'New Statesman', 13 December 1924.
2 ' c£“ 2387r Cl925)!P°rt °f thB EaSt Afrlcan Commission',
3« ibid,p.22.
railways and supported white settlement, which had «added 
greatly to the productivity of the country«.1 The Report 
was not in favour of any schemes for federation in East 
Africa. The Government of Kenya and the white settlers 
were pleased with the report. However, Mr. Linfield, the 
Liberal representative, wrote a supplement which was critical 
of some parts of the main report. He suggested that the 
Africans could produce more for export, if they were working 
for themselves, than they could if they worked under the 
white settlers. Sir Ronald Cameron, the Governor of 
Tanganyika, thought that Linfield»s supplement was better 
than the main report which, he thought, had made some of 
it recommendations »on nothing more than station gossip. * 2 
Yet, despite the inadequacy of the report, it became the 
basis of a »comfortable consensus about Kenyan politics.*^ 
From then on, there was a tendency for the work of people 
like Leys and McGregor Ross to be regarded as »extremist* 
and ignored.
The »New Statesman»4 thought that the report had not 
given a clear answer to the crucial question of whether the 
aim of British policy in Kenya was to make African or 
European interests paramount. It was more in sympathy
with the ideas of Mr. Linfield than those of the Labour 
representative, Major Church. It appeared that Church had 
been won over to the settlers point of view as a result of 
the hospitality he had received in East Africa. He, 
Ormsby-Gore and the settlers all got on very well. They
made»themselves very popular in Kenya, and showed themselves
1 . ibid,p.149.
2. Quoted, E.A. Brett, op.cit•,p.l82.
3. ibid.
4. »New Statesman», 16 May 1925, p.127.
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genuinely anxious to get at the real truth», according to 
the Chairman of the settler organisation. 1 2
Norman Leys disagreed with the report. He wrote a
2memo for the A.C.I.Q., stating that he thought that 
there was a shortage of labour in Kenya. The labour did 
not exist to cultivate the land which the settlers had 
alienated. He was also sceptical about the development of 
railways. He thought that unless railway development 
served well-populated areas, it could only transfer labourers 
from imperfectly developed areas to undeveloped areas and 
would add to the number employed on useless railways. Kenya 
thought Leys, was like a cat choked with cream or an engine 
smothered with oil. There was already far more capital 
than there were workers to earn interest on it. The 
Europeans in Kenya wanted to see more people going out to 
Kenya and more economic development because land sales and 
railway contracts filled their pockets. The key to the 
situation was that many fortunes were made in Kenya by 
selling land and some by profiteering. Lord Delamerehad 
control, at one time or another, of at least 250,000 acres, 
most of which had been acquired by dodges. He had got 
rid of about 50,000 acres and hds great aim was to get men 
with money from England to go out from England and buy 
another 10,000 acres from him.
Leys stated that the Africans in Kenya were paid low 
wages of only 8 — 10 shillings a month and, because they 
were miserably poor, suffered from.undernourishment, scanty 
clothing and many preventable diseases. They also had to
1 . Quoted, E^A. Brett, op.cit.,p.l8l. When the Commission 
returned Ormsby-Gore became an hono rary member of
Church's union and. Church joined the Colonial Advisory Committee on Education. J
2. A.C.I.Q. Memo No.l4, March 1925.
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pay a high proportion - three tenths - of their earnings in 
direct taxation, whereas Europeans only paid thirty shillings 
per head per year. The three M.P.s had given a false picture 
of the situation, having been accompanied by official and non­
official Europeans chosen by the authorities. Although some 
thought that there was a new spirit of concern for the 
African among the Europeans, this was, in fact, not the case. 
All that had happened was that they were learning the need 
for caution in the face of the awakening public opinion in 
the United Kingdom. Leys thought that the true facts should 
be exposed in Parliament so that public opinion would put 
pressure on the Colonial Office and the Government in Nairobi 
to introduce reform.
Leys also wrote an article on the report for the *New 
Leader* in which he stated that Mr. Linfield had shown an 
independence of judgment which had prevented him from 
believing the fairy tales of the official apologists, as 
the Labour member, Major Church had done.'*' Major Church
owrote a memo for the A.C.I.Q. in which he defended himself.
He thought that Leys had a large capacity for exaggeration.
He disliked Leys* claim to infallibility and believed that 
•from the Labour party point of view* Leys *5 book and 
memoranda were dangerous because they pandered to preconcep­
tions about the African situation and therefore were not 
likely to be subject to the same critical examination as those 
of objective observers and writers*. Major Church believed 
that the Labour party should take credit for the character 
and positive results of the Commission. While being 
critical, it should make it clear that the constructive 
proposals in the report, which had been hailed with such
1 . »New Leader*, 15 May 1925, p.8.
2. A.C.I.Q,. Memo No.l6Bf May 1925.
enthusiasm in the press, were the results of Labour's first
essay in colonial affairs. However, the A.C.l.Q. recommended
to the N.E.C., a statement of policy based on Leys'stnemo
rather than Church*s report
The A.C.l.Q. thought that the £10 million projects
proposed by the report should wait until the reform of the
industrial system of East Africa. The result of capitalist
exploitation had been that the Africans of East Africa had
been robbed of both land and liberty with economic results
inferior to those parts of Africa which had not been
subjected to capitalist methods of production.
The Report was discussed in Parliament on 27 July 1925«
when Labour's main speakers were J.H. Thomas, Colonel Josiah
Wedgwood and Harry Snell. J.H. Thomas, the former Colonial
2Secretary spoke first, saying that he thought his successor, 
Leopold Amery, had made no greater mistake than to abolish 
the Southborough Committee which Thomas had appointed as an 
all-party committee to advise the Colonial Secretary on East 
Africa. The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies,
W. Ormsby-Gore had been a member of the deputation which 
had asked for such a committee. The ex-Colonial Secretary 
was also disappointed that the Land Committee on East and 
West Africa, which he had appointed, was to be abolished.
There was need for advice not only from the particular 
authoritythat happened to be in power but from all parties 
that were trying to find a solution independent of purely 
party considerations. Thomas thought that some of the 
criticism of the East African Commission was unfair. He 
believed that the suggestion that the Commission had only
1 . A.C.l.Q., Memo No.l6A, May 1925.
2. 187 H.C.Deb.,5s•,cols. 103-113» 27 July 1925.
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listened to official opinion which was partial and biased 
was not justified by a study of the report as a whole* He 
agreed with Major Church rather than with Norman Leys and 
the A.C.I.Q,. He thought that the Commission should be 
congratulated on the Report* He was also pleased that the 
Commission had drawn attention to the need for more education 
and steps to stop the spread of disease* He hoped that the 
recommendations of the Commission concerning economic develop­
ment would be taken up, but he 'thought that the Government 
should participate in railway building rather than leave it 
to private individuals who had urged that the railways 
should be built* This speech indicated that, if Thomas 
had been at the Colonial Office when the East African 
Commission reported, he would have been likely to accept 
its favourable picture of white settlement in East Africa*
The A*C*I.Q*'s policy would have been ignored*
Harry Snell was more critical of East Africa in his 
speech on the report*'1' He considered that 80 days was 
not a very long time in which to examine the whole question 
of East Africa* The report was essentially a polite 
document issued by three amiable gentlemen who hated to say 
rough or unpleasant things about anybody* It acknowledged 
the principle of trusteeship which was now, Snell hoped, 
the basic principle of Britain's government of her colonies. 
He believed that the 'natives' had no great desire to swap 
their heritage of leisure and simple fare for all the 
strange and questionable luxurtds which work for the white 
man might bring them. Unless Britain was going to develop 
the African's spiritual qualities it would have been better 
to have left them to live in their accustomed and ancient 
ways.
Concerning the conrete recommendations of the report,
1« 187 H*C*Deb*,5s**cols* 132-138, 27 July 1925»
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Snell hoped that the railways would not become mere conduit 
pipes which woulddrain away wealth from the locality without 
supplying the means of livelihood to those in residence.
The transport facilities should not be allowed to run 
ahead of the actual industrial situation. The Europeans 
had decided that railways should be built for their own 
benefit and, when a railway passed through a •native* 
reserve, the cry was immediately raised that the land 
contiguous to the railway was no good for »native* use, and 
the «native* was driven away from it or it was urged that he 
should be moved to a less accessible position. In such a 
way the Masai had been robbed of their country: plots of 
land, varying from 5*000 to 300,000 acres, had been given 
to Europeans for no other reason except that the Europeans 
coveted the land and it was close to the railways.
On the subject of taxation, Snell thought that the 
report had been remiss. The «native* suffered considerable 
difficulties in paying more than his fair share of taxation. 
He had to raise between ten and sixteen shillings per year 
for hut tax, which had to be paid almost entirely out of 
the material he was able to sell. In order to find markets 
for his material he often had to make journeys of 40 miles 
carrying loads of about 60 pounds. Some had to make as 
many as 5 journeys. The railways should be used to help 
the «natives* make these journeys. In contrast to the 
•natives*, the Europeans paid relatively little of their 
income in taxation. Income tax had been abolished owing 
to white pressure and the richest of the Europeans only 
paid thirty shillings a year in taxation. Snell was glad 
that the report had recommended that income tax should be 
reimposed. However, it was not only a question of how 
taxation was raised, it was also a question of how it was
spent. A very low proportion of the money raised went 
towards 'native* services and the social effects of this 
inequality of spending on services were in many respects 
appalling. The need to pay taxes resulted in the over­
selling of crops and consequent food shortages. Some 
Masai sent their young women to brothels in order to raise 
the money.
Turning to the question of land, Snell said that the 
land should be vested in the tribe and not the individual 
end that no futher alienation should take place until the 
tribes had all the land that they could use for present 
and future needs. The 'natives* should not be fobbed off 
with land of inferior quality which the whites would not 
have. On the subject of education, Snell thought that 
there was too much emphasis on imposing English ideas upon 
the African people. The education of the Africans should 
develop out of their own lives and experience and the 
illustrations provided should be African rather than British. 
However, he hoped that the education provided would be 
concerned with introducing the Africans into the heritage 
of the mind rather than just making them technically more 
efficient as producers. Snell had put forward the main 
criticisms of the A.C.X.Q. on land labour, taxation and 
education.
Colonel Wedgwood, the other main Labour speaker in the 
debate,* supported Snell*s criticisms. He emphasised the 
need to follow the *West African* policy in East Africa.
He thought that if the Colonial Office was going to develop 
cotton-growing in East Africa, it should be grown by the 
•natives* themselves working for their own profit and not
1 . 187 H.C.Deb.,5s.,cols. 148-155, 27 July 1925.
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working for the profit of Europeans. On the West coast of 
Africa the system of »native* production had been tried and 
it had succeeded. It was the Britian»s duty to allow the 
«natives* the freedom to cultivate what they liked without 
interference. They should be allowed to choose between 
cultivating cotton for themselves or working for the planters 
producing coffee, maize and other produce. Wedgwood wanted 
the Government to order the Governor of Kenya to send out 
instructions to the District Commissioners that they were 
not to bring pressure upon the chiefs to recruit labour for 
white planters outside the reserves.
There had been a general tendency to deprive the «native 
of land, partly to make it available for white setters and 
also to drive the «natives*, through lack of opportunity of 
cultivating for themselves, into the position of a landless 
exploited proletariat. Wedgwood feared that this practice 
was now developing in Tanganyika as well as Kenya. The 
only way to stop it was to allow the »natives» to develop 
as they had done on the West Coast where exports had gone 
up year by year, the population had increased and the country 
was pmepering. In contrast, the population on the East 
Coast was declining and there was evidence that there were 
not sufficient able-bodied people on the reserves to produce 
enough food for themselves, let alone produce for export.
Concerning railway development, Wedgwood thought that 
if such development were to take place, it should be where 
the population was and where the work was. The problem 
was that of finding the labour to build the railways and 
to develop the farms which would be set up as a result of 
the railway development. In conclusion, Wedgwood said 
that it was a frightful responsibility to try to impose a 
form of civilisation which suited English people best upon
a ‘savage* people. Wedgwood's policy would be to »leave 
them alone. Give them their freedom. Cease to try to 
press them into the labour market, whether by driving them 
off the land or by taxation. Give them the advantage of 
the taxes you take from them in the shape of improved 
education, improved sanitation and so on. If you do that, 
you will build up a real tribute to British rule such as no 
other Empire in the world has ever shown.* Wedgwood's 
ideal was an African with his own land, working for himself, 
free from the impact of Western capitalism. The members 
of the A.C.I.Q., such as Wedgwood, Snell and Leys were not 
very keen on the idea of the economic development of 
Africa because they feared it would lead to exploitation 
of the African. Others in the party, such as Thomas and 
the Labour Commonwealth Group, were not against economic 
development but they did not work out detailed plans for 
economic development. In general, the Labour party was 
not very interested in the economic development of the 
African colonies in the 1920s. 1
Lord Olivier, the Secretary of State for India in 
the Labour Government, discussed the report in the House 
of Lords. He thought that the thing to be done in Kenya 
was what the Labour party had demanded should be done in 
their programme and that was to provide land for permanent 
occupation, ownership and settlement for the ‘natives!
He also thought that no labour contract should be enforcible 
under the sanctions of criminal law and quoted from the 
Labour party's programme (The Empire in Africa: Labour's 
Policy) the demand that every «native* family should be 
given sufficient land for support and, if necessary, the
1 . E.A. Brett, op.cit., Chapter 2.
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Government should re-enter on alienated land. The Africans 
would work hard if they were treated decently but if they 
were hustled about simply in order to compel them to labour 
they would never work properly.^-
Lord Olivier also discussed the question of the exchange 
of land with Lord Delamere which «J.H. Thomas had been dealing 
with towards the end of his period as Colonial Secretary and 
>fcich Leys had criticised in a memo for the A.C.I.Q. 1 2 It 
appeared, said Lord Olivier, that Lord Delamere had tmerged* 
from the exchange with an additional 80,000 acres of land 
when it had been understood that no further land was going 
to be granted to Europeans. Lord Delamere owned 280 square 
miles of land in Kenya. The main charge against Lord 
Delamere was not that he had acted illegally but that he had 
evaded the law by »dummying* - putting in »dummies* whom 
he financed to acquire further land in their name. The 
charge had been made openly in Kenya and Lord Olivier wanted 
to know what the action of the Colonial Governnent had been 
in the matter. He moved for Papers for two things;
(1) Correspondence relating to the sanction of the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies of the employment of 4,000 forced 
labourers on railway construction now proceeding;
(2) a return of all present holdings of land in Kenya colony 
exceeding 5*000 acres in extent, and of all past grants or 
concessions of rights over lands exceeding 5,000 acres, 
showing in each case the character of the tenure, whether 
freehold, leasehold or other, and the consideration paid or 
payable to the Crown for such grants or concessions. 3
1 . 6l H.L.Deb.,cols. 363-385, 20 May 1925.
2. A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 14, March 1925.
3« 6l H.L.Deb.,5s*,cols• 383-384, 20 May 1925»
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As a result of these demands by Lord Olivier, the
Conservative Government issued a White Paper in August 1925
concerning the 'Correspondence with the Government of Kenya
relating to the exchange of land with Lord Delamere.
The concluding letter from L.S. Amery, the Colonial Secretary,
stated that he had approved the exchange because the land
vhich Lord Delamere had relinquished was far more suitable
for small holders than the land which he received which was
only suitable for sheepfarming on a large scale. The
publication of the correspondence did little to quieten the
suspicions of the Labour party that Lord Delamere was only
concerned with the accumulatbn of profit to the detriment
of the Africans' welfare. The reason for the Labour party's
suspicion was that Lord Delamere was the leader of the
settler community and had made it plain that he believed
strongly in the 'right' of the white settlers to govern in
East Africa. He said to Margery Perham, a few years later,
that he 'would take land from the Masai tomorrow for farms.
I would take it from any nomads. They don't use it.
They can't keep it from those who do.'....*Are we to be
held back for hundred of years while people not far from
" 2zero catch us up?' Delamere had a strong influence on 
Grigg, the new Governor of Kenya, and was regarded by the 
A.C.I.Q. as one of the main obstacles to African progress.
The A.C.I.Q. began the task of revising its pamphlet 
on Africa in 192$^ in order to try to give more publicity 
to its policy so that it would not be ignored in the future, 
as it had been by Thomas. The Committee decided that 123
1 . Cmd.2500, August 1925.
2. M. Perham, 'East African Journey' (London, 1976),pp.138-139.
3. A.C.I.Q. Minutes, 25 March 1925.
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Leonard Woolf, the secretary, should undertake the revision
and then re-submit the pamphlet to the full committee#*
Woolf completed this task by 8 July 1925, when the revised
version was considered by the committee and it was decided to
send it to the French Socialist party for comments, as Woolf
hoped that the British and French parties would issue a joint
2pamphlet on colonial policy# This attempt failed because
the French party did not respond to the invitation#
The revised draft did not differ in essential from the
earlier pamphlet. There was the same emphasis on the
difference between the policies pursued in West and East
Africa# The general aim of Latour policy, declared the
first pamphlet, should be ‘substituting a system based on
the common interests of the inhabitants for the existing
system based on the economic exploitation of the native by-the whites.
At the same time Labour must aim at substituting a political
system of responsible and representative government for the
3existing a u t o c r a c y . T h e  revised draft quoted the first
sentence verbatim but slightly altered the second to read -
•At the same time Labour must aim at ultimately developing
a political system of self-government for the existing 
4autocracy.* This was a slightly more definite statement 
that the ultimate aim was self-government but still no 
definite time period was given. The revision largely 
followed the original pamphlet withthe same headings and 
the same policies - Land and Labour, the Two Land policies 
in Africa - the European and African, Labour, Government and 
Self-Government, International Control and Education.
1. A.C.I.W. Minutes, 24 June 1925.
2. A.C.I.Q. Minutes, 8 July 1925.
3. ‘The Empire in Africa: Labour*s Policy (Labour Party,
1920) pp.2-5
4. »Labour and the Empire: Africa* (first draft) August 1925«
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In October, J.F.N. Green‘d produced a memo on the 
revised pamphlet in which he suggested some points on the 
exploitation of the labourer and peasant and on finance, 2 
On the first point Green thought that the pamphlet should 
attack hut tax which the »natives* were forced to pay.
He thought that, if the problem of taxes was solved, no 
whites would want to buy land. He believed that the 
peasants should be encouraged to form associations for co­
operative selling and buying in order to avoid exploitation.
He also thought that the question of finance had been avoided 
and something should be included on this subject. His main 
idea seemed to be that the Africans should be encouraged to 
produce to provide the resources and finance to improve their 
standard of living. Railways would be useful because they 
would provide a method of exchange. In a postscript, he 
wrote that the main difficulty he had encountered when 
speaking to co-operative and Labour party audiences on 
African affairs was that they wondered why the party did not 
advocate the immediate introduction of modern democracy.
Green had found it difficult to help them to grasp the 
conditions in Africa or to convey a notion of primitive 
life and ideas and he thought there should be some amplifica­
tion of the party's attitude. It is interesting that 
rank-and-file members of the party seemed to think that the 
party should move much more quickly towards independence in 
Africa.
Leys was not so sure about railway development as Green. 3 
He thought that the pamphlet should advocate that railways 
should only be built to thickly populated areas. Those
built in other areas were positively injurious unless
1 . Green was a civil servant at the Colonial Office who was 
sympathetic to the Labour Party. He was a member of the 
Fabian Society and the A.C.I.q. He was more interested
in economic development than most of Labour*s African expert..
2. A.C.I.Qo Memo No.loA,October 1925.
3. A.Col.Q. Memo No.l8B, November 1925.
1 6 6
accompanied by immigration and cultivation of the soil.
Leys also believed that the party should demand that the 
direct taxation of the poorest, which was the present case 
in East Africa, should be replaced by the direct taxation 
of the richest sections of the community. He believed that 
the events of the last 25 years had made it impossible to 
follow West African methods without modification. What the 
party should do was to demand that the non-African immigrants 
should be made to bear the cost to the countries they lived 
in, resulting fromtheir presence and demands. If they 
could not do so they proved themselves to be parasitic on 
the African population and that would prove that the 
plantation system was incapable of reform and should be 
abandoned in East Africa. Leys was one of the few people 
to realise that the West African system could not be 
automatically transferred to East Africa. One of the faults 
of Labour policy was the assumption that the experience of 
West Africa was automatically relevant to East Africa.
On 18 November 1925, the full Advisory Committee on 
Imperial Questions made some amendments to the draft African 
pamphlet to take account of Green«s and Leys* points about 
taxation and railway development. As no answer had been 
received from the French party, it was recommended that the 
revised pamphlet should be published. 1 The pamphlet was 
sent to the National Executive Committee which considered 
it at a Joint meeting of the N.E.C. and the General Council 
of the T.U.C. It was resolved «that the publication of 
the document be suspended pending an examination thereof 
by Messrs. J. Ramsay MacDonald M.P., J.h . Thomas M.P., 
and Arthur Henderson M.P., and that the result of such
1 . A.C.I.Q. Minutes, 18 November 1925.
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examination be reported to the next ¿oint Meeting. ' 1 
At the Joint Meeting on 25 March 1929 it was reported by 
W. Gillies that »Messrs. J. Ramsay MacDonald M.P., J.H. 
Thomas M.P., and Arthur Henderson M.P. had examined the memo 
on »Labour and the Empire: Africa* as requested and had 
agreed to its publication as a pamphlet; it was then 
resolved »that the publication be proceeded with. *2 The 
•Big Three» did not make any revisions in the pamphlet, 
accepting the work of the Advisory Committee. The policy 
now had the definite approval of the leadership.
»Labour and the Empire: Africa* was published in 1926, 
with the full approval of both the National Executive 
Committee of the Labour Party and the General Council of 
the T.U.C. Thomas, the ex-secretary of state for the 
Colonies^ wrote a preface to the policy statement. He 
declared that the pamphlet contained the Labour Movement's 
official policy with »regard to the Native races of Africa 
and the territories, inhabited by them, for which the 
British Government is responsible.» The keynote of the 
policy was that the Empire, in the words of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, should be»a ’trustee for the well­
being of the natives.' The principle of trusteeship was 
not something that the Labour Movement had discovered with 
the establishment of the League of Nations. It had 
always been maintained by the movement as »springing 
immediately from the broad principles and ideals of labour.» 
The pamphlet worked out in detail how the principle should 
and could be applied in the administration of the African 
territories. Thomas summarised the main points: first,
1 . Joint Meeting of General Council and N.E.C. Minutes. 28 January 1926. •
2* Ï926ÎnS °f General Council and N.E.C. Minutes, 25
•the natives must be assured sufficient supply of land for
their support, and therefore the land must be treated as
the property of the native communities.» Second, »the
native must, as a worker, be afree man, and hence there
must be no slavery, no forced labour and no pressure upon
him to work for settlers.» Third, the administration must
make itself responsible for educating the 'native* to take
his place, both economically and politically, as a free man
in the conditions which Western civilisation has imposed
upon Africa. The carrying out of this policy would not
be a simple task, warned Thomas; Labour would find powerful
classes and parties openly or secretly opposed to it.
Nevertheless, he considered that it would be one of the
most important tasks that the next Labour Government would
have to carry through. The fact tht Thomas had made so
little attempt to put the policies into effect during his
own period of office was tactfully ignored. As Thomas
was divorced from the civil servants, he was more inclined
to accept the advice of the A.C.I.Q. However, his speech
on the Colonial Office Vote of 1925 and his acceptance of
the 'Report of the East African Commission» had shown
that his opinions were well to the right of people like Leys.
The Labour party pamphlet was incompatible with the »Report
of the East African Commission* but Thomas ambiguously
endorsed both. The Labour party's pamphlet showed how
the white settlers were exploiting the Africans in East
Africa, which according to the Commission, was not happening.
•Labour and the Empires Africa* went into more detail about
the methods of exploitation than the earlier pamphlet had
done. The African population was deprived of its land,
and pressure was exerted by government officials to work
for the white settlers. »Forcprf* i ..urcea labour was sometimes
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reverted to and the position of squatter on »white land' 
was only granted to theAfricans on condition of a certain 
amount of wage labour. Breach of labour contract was a 
criminal offence, and the African was so heavily taxed that 
he could only obtain the necessary cash by wage labour. 
Agricultural production by the African on his own land was 
discouraged. The results of this policy were that labour 
was bad and discontented. Sanitary and moral conditions 
were abysmal and, because labour was withdrawn from 
cultivation in the reserves, there were periodical shortages 
of food."*"
The policy advocated in the two pamphlets was the same
concerning land and labour. The land should be treated as
the property of the African community and labour should be
free and not 'forced*. The second pamphlet, on Green's
suggestion, inserted a paragraph on taxation which stated
that hut tax was too high and should be reduced. Africans
who were not fully capable of work should be exempt from
direct taxation. The revenue derived from taxation of the
Africans ought to be spent on African requirements. Any
deficit, that might be caused by the reduction of the hut
tax should be made up by increased taxation of the white
community which was very lightly taxed in comparison with 
othe Africans.
The new pamphlet also incorporated Leys* point about 
railway development: »in view of the inadequacy of the labour 
supply, new railways, while desirable when constructed to 
thickly populated area* are positively injurious when 
constructed to other districts unless accompanied by
immigration of cultivators of the soil. 3 The passages
1 . »Labour and the Empire: Africa* (The Labour Party,1926)
p p .1 5 - 1 6
2. ibid., p.l8.
3. .Labour and tha Empire! Africa* (The Labour Party, 1926)p.21-
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on central and local government were more or less identical* 
in both the 1920 and 1926 versions of the Labour party*s 
policy. On international control the principles were the 
same. The new pamphlet quoted Devonshire's White
Paper to show that Britain had pledged herself to accept 
in non-mandated territories the same obligations that were 
accepted under mandates: "in the administration of Kenya 
H.M.G. regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of 
the African population and they are unable to delegate or 
share this trust* the object of which may be defined as 
the protectionmd advancement of the native races
On education the pamphlets outlined the same programme 
of action, the revised pamphlet updating the figures for 
spending on African education. Both pamphlets pointed out 
that no European Governments in any part of Africa had made 
a serious attempt to give the African the knowledge which
alone would make him 'capable of understanding and controlling
2the circumstances which those governments impose upon him . 1 
The spending on education was still too low to redeem the 
pledge that Britain was exercising a trust on behalf of 
the Africans. The Labour party believed that primary 
education should be accessible to all children, training 
colleges should be provided for teachers, technical colleges 
should be set up, and on African university should be 
established which *probably should noftelike American or 
European universities but more suited to African needs.
Norman Leys wrote a review of the pamphlet which he had 
helped to draft in the *New Leader', in which he declared
1 . Cmd.1922 (1923) p.10.
2 .
p.25; 'The Empire in Afr 
Labour Party,1920) p.10.
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that it was the business of socialists to make sure that 
when there was a Labour majority in Parliament, the Cabinet 
and, especially, the Colonial Secretary, would know exactly 
what things ought to be done in the various imperial 
dependencies and do them. This was a difficult task 
because the lands were far away and there were no votes to 
catch. However, unless something were done, the colonial 
peoples might turn to rebellion as the only kind of utterance 
possible to them. The party’s special dangers were two? 
one had been abundantly illustrated by Mr. Thomas’s record 
at the Colonial Office and the other was the kind of socialist 
policy which consisted in producing policies for Uganda or 
Hong Kong out of a hat without a knowledge of the facts of 
life in those places. The Labour party’s pamphlet showed 
how much there was to do and although it painted a black 
picture, the worst had to be known.*
Withthe publication, of »Labour and the Empire: Africa*, 
the Labour party had a revised and up-to-date colonial policy 
which had been drafted by experts on Africa such as Leonard 
Woolf, C.R. Buxton,J.P.N. Green and Norman Leys. It had 
the official approval of the National Executive Committee 
of the Labour party, which was responsible for Labour 
party policy - making, and the General Council of the T.U.C. 
The leaders of the party had also read and approved the 
document. Future Labour Governments would not be able to 
plead ignorance of the party»s policy.
A more radical proposal on colonial policy had been 
discussed at the T.U.C. Conference at Scarborough in 
September 1925. At this conference a strong motion on 
Imperialism was moved by Mr. A.A. Purcell M.P. of the 
Furnishing Trades Association. This stated: "This T.U.C. 1
1 . »New Leader» 27 August 1926, p.4.
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believes that the domination of non-British peoples by the 
British Government is a form of capitalist exploitation 
having for its object the securing for British capitalists 
of (l) cheap sources of raw materials; (2) the right to 
exploit cheap unorganised labour and to use the competition 
of that labour to degrade the workers* standards in Great 
Britain. It declares its complete opposition to Imperialism 
and resolves: (l) to support the workers in all parts of the 
British Empire to organise the Trade Unions and political 
parties in order to further their interests, and (2) to 
support the right of all peoples in the British Empire to 
self-determination, including the right to choose complete 
separation from the Empire•
Supporting the resolution, Mr. Purcell stated that 
Imperialism was the»deceased wife*s sister of capitalism* 
and it had come to be »somewhat of a boomerang* so far as 
the industrial conditions were concerned in various parts 
of the world. Imperialism was the worst enemy of the 
working classes. Its worst crime was that of supplying 
arms to all belligerents throughout the world, just as 
during the war it had supplied arms to France and Germany.
The horrible condition of India was part of Imperialist 
policy. The British capitalist class and the capitalist 
class of every country were one and the same. The second 
part of the resolution, said Purcell, pointed the way out 
of the difficulties to the working class of the world.
It was the duty of the British trade union movement to 
assist in the formation of trade unions representing all 
industries wherever industry was being promoted and to 
build up an international organisation that would have as
1 . Fifty-Seventh Trade Union Conference Report 1925,pp.553-5.
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its base equal wages and working conditions of employment 
in every sense* The British trade union movement had a 
great duty to associate themselves with every effort being
made in every country to resist Imperialism**
_ 2 Not surprisingly, Thomas spoke against the resolution,
pleading for moderation. He was prepared to say 'Yes* to 
everything that Mr* Purcell had said about Imperialism and 
had taken his stand in saying that not one yard of territory 
should have been added to the British Empire as a result of 
the war* However, concerning Kenya, Thomas wondered whether 
the resolution meant that Mr. Purcell wanted self-determina­
tion for Kenya. If he thought that, Thomas could only 
suppose that he knew nothing about the situation* Let the 
movers of the resolution go to the South African Labour 
party and tell them what they were talking about. Let them 
go to Canada and Australia and find out what the workers 
thought there. Thomas thought that some phrases in the 
resolution were good and the trade unions should endeavour 
to stop every form of capitalist exploitation, but he 
asked Congress not to make itself ridiculous by passing 
such an absurd resolution for it was absurd and rkiiculous 
to pretend that they were speaking in the interests of the 
movement when they used such phrases as those used by Purcell. 
Thomas was replying to the implicit criticism that was made 
by the motion of his period at the Colonial Office.
However, Harry Poliitt, a communist of the Boilermakers 
Union, hoped that the argument of Thomas was not going to 
count. The resolution was simply a clear definition of
1 . Purcell was an M.P. from 1923-24 and 1925-9 and this 
strong motion indicates that some MoP.s took a stronger 
line than the A.C.I.Q.
2. Fifty-Seventh T.U.C. Conference Report, 1925,p.554.
3. ibid., pp.554-555-
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what the policy of the working class movement should be towards 
the subject peoples of the Empire. British Imperialism 
meant appalling conditions amongst the textile workers of 
Bombay and Calcutta, it meant women going down mines and 
doing 36 hours at a stretch, and it meant that the people in 
the colonies had no right of combination and no legal redress. 
It also meant the slavery that existed in Kenya. To the 
exploited peoples of the world, Empire simply meant exploita­
tion by capitalists. If Congress passed the resolution, 
they would give a message of hope and encouragement to their 
fellow workers all over the world who did not look upon the 
Union Jack as the last word in economic equity and political 
freedom. They were not talking about a Wembley Empire1 but 
an Empire in which every single yard of territory was 
drenched in the blood of British soldiers and native warriors 
who had tried to keep the British soldiers out of their 
country. Empire simply meant tyranny and exploitation. 
Pollitt hoped that the T.U.C. would give the answer to the 
Empire propaganda which the right wing of the movement had 
been putting out for the last twelve months.
Congress approved of Pollitt's sentiments and, despite 
Thomas' pleas, the resolution was passed on a card vote by 
3,082,000 votes to 79,000. In passing the resolution, the
T.U.C. showed that it was not satisfied with Thomas's 
moderate approach to colonial questions when in office.
The resolution went further than the official statements of 
the Labour party, declaring its complete opposition to 
Imperialism and supporting the right of all peoples in the 
British Empire to self-determination. It was another 
indication that there was a strong anti-imperialist feeling
1 . Thomas had praised the Empire at the Wembltfy Exhibition, 
see above p. 138
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among a large number of the rank-and-file of the trade unions.
However, the General Council ignored the motion, preferring
*
to support the A.C.I.Q. policy statement *Labour and the 
Empire: Africa*, which was not as forceful as Purcell*s 
motion.
The militant,anti-imperialists suffered a setback at 
the following Labour Party Conference of 1925 when a less 
radical, official, resolution on Commonwealth and Colonial 
policy was passed after a vigorous debate. Clynes moved 
the motion*1, calling for political and economic relation­
ships between Great Britain, India, the self-governing 
dominions and the constituent states of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations. It called on the Government to 
hold a conference to survey the natural resources of the 
British Commonwealth of Nations as a whole with a view to 
the scientific direction of the use of those resources and 
to prevent their exploitation in the interests of private 
capitalists. Concerning the tropics, the resolution 
stated that:"This Conference is of the opinion that the 
evils of capitalist exploitation of the tropical and sub­
tropical regions of the British Commonwealth of Nations 
and especially the use of primitive tribes as reservoirs 
of low grade or sweated labour without either regard to 
their social or moral well being, or to the political and 
economic dangers involved both to the natives themselves 
and to the whole of the white workers in the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, is to be strongly condemned on 
moral, political, and economic grounds. This Conference 
is further of the opinion that it is essential in all 
tropical and sub-tropical Dependencies: (a) To safeguard 
the native*s right to the land and to preserve to him the
1. Labour Party Annual Conference Report 1925, pp.2 2 8-3 6 .
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possibility of its use according to tribal and communal 
custom; (b) to supervise the recruitment and conditions of 
labour so as to prevent industrial slavery and the economic 
dislocation of the life of native communities; (c) To control 
the use of capital to prevent violations of the rights of 
native communities or the creation of social conditions 
leading to their social and economic demoralisation; and 
(d) To invite the League of Nations to elaborate a code for 
the protection of native rights and "appoint" an "Observer" 
to the governing body of each Dependency and Mandated 
Territory, whereby all such Dependencies and Mandated 
Territories of the British and other Governments may 
benefit from the impartial supervision of the League of 
Nations, pending full self-government, 1,1
Seconding the resolution was Charles Roden Buxton, 
chairman of the A.C.I.Q. and a member of the I.L.P. He 
put the argument for reforming the empire, rather than 
abandoning it* The Labour party, declared Buxton,did not 
believe in Imperialism but in internationalism. However, 
this did not mean fiat the party1 was committed to immediate 
liquidation of the empire, even the Russiam communist 
government had not adopted the policy of evacuation and 
repudiation of its colonies. The fact of Empire had to 
be accepted in one form or another. The aim of Lahour*s 
policy was to prevent the capitalist exploitation which 
was going on in considerable portions of the British 
Empire. Self-government was no remedy because it was 
out of the question for many years to come.
However, CoJ. Moody (Richmond Labour Party) did not 
accept this argument, and moved an amendment which declared 
that it was "contrary to the best interests of the working
class of this country and the whole world to attempt to
1 . Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1925,pp.228-229
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cloak the imperial rapacity of British capitalism, 
expressing itself in the forcible exploitation and 
repression of hundreds of millions of coloured workers and 
peasants, by falsely describing the Empire as a «Commonwealth 
of Nations«." His resolution stated that the Empire meant 
cheap raw materials and opportunities for investing capital 
for capitalists, while for the working class it meant low 
wages, competition and unemployment. It condemned all 
proposals for harnessing the Labour Movement of the country 
to capitalist brigandage by means of collaboration in 
imperialist schemes of Empire development and emigration 
which were plans for fastening the fetters of capitalist 
exploitation more firmly upon'the workers. The purpose 
of socialism, which was the object of the Labour party, 
was not served by sending the masses away from the country 
by emigration schemes but by winning the country for the 
masses. The principle of self-determination should be 
applied in an unqualified manner throughout the Empire.
The Labour party should assist in the formation and 
development of workers« and peasants« organisations, 
trade unions and political parties throughout the Empire, 
which would hold periodical congresses to work out the 
application of socialist programmes to the special 
conditions and the stage of struggle reached in the 
respective countries of the Empire. The evils of capitalist 
exploitation of the tropical and sub-tropical peoples as low 
grade sweated labour should be strongly fought. It was 
essential that in all the tropical and sub-tropical 
dependencies the «native*s rights* to lands and to self- 
government should be restored by according them complete 
independence. Industrial slavery and conscription in 
form should be prevented by offering the «native«
any
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communities fraternal aid in their struggle for freedom 
and independence. A future Labour Government should be 
pledged to the policy of self-determination and also to 
providing material, economic and educational aid. It 
should institute a complete state monopoly of foreign trade 
and all transport should be cheapened by the nationalisation 
of shipping. The resolution concluded by declaring that 
the Conference should instruct the Executive Committee to 
establish the closest alliance between peasants and workers 
throughout the Empire, should take all possible steps to 
secure the release of political prisoners and to secure 
full political rights for the working masses and the 
speediest possible realisation of the principles of self- 
government and complete independence. The resolution was 
a declaration of opposition to the existence of the British 
Empire and recommended a policy of speedy abandonment.
Moody thought if the workers were to improve their position 
the British Empire would have to be smashed. The seconder, 
Mr. W.T. Colyer (Holborn L.P.), stated that the Empire, by 
its very nature, must be a military machine for the purpose 
of forcing the will of the owners of the Empire upon the 
subject races to the detriment of the British workiiç 
classes.
James Sexton M.P. (Transport and General Workers Union) 
did not think that capitalism could be so easily abolished# 
He believed that the first consideration of the Labour 
Movement should be to get the «natives» out of the present 
•slough of despond*. Jack Jones M.P. (National Union of 
General Workers) also thought that it was useless to go to 
people and say »we want to wipe out all the past and start 
with a new Empire, self-determination right and left.* The 
Executive *s resolution provided the opportunity of showing
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that the Labour party had an Imperial policy for administer­
ing the Empire.
However, J.D. Mack (Central Leeds L.P.) supported the 
amendment. He thought that the Labour Government should 
have done something about' the 2(X)000 political prisoners in 
India. There were a very large number of people in the
I.L.P. who had very strong views on the subject of imperialism 
and thought that the palliatives that the official policy was 
offering were of no use and would only make the position worse.
Dr. Haden Guest M.P. sunmed up in support of the 
Executive’s resolution. He believed that to take the point 
of view that the Empire should be smashed was one that might 
be consistent with Communist philosophy but would be very 
foolish for the Labour party to adopt. The alternative 
which the Labour party proposed to smashing the Empire was 
to socialise it. This was a much more constructive policy 
and the Executive in its resolution had laid the foundation 
of a great socialist policy which could be expanded year by 
year. It was perfectly obvious from the point of view 
of economic organisation that the best place for the Indian 
worker was as a constituent member of the Commonwealth.
Some members of the Labour party did not appear to realise 
that many of the peoples oti the equator were still cannibal 
tribes. The real keynote of Labour policy should be 
co-operation with other Labour governments and greater 
unity with Labour within the Commonwealth, thereby laying 
the foundation of a great Socialist advance which would be 
an advance into reality and not into Communist chimeras.
The question was put to a vote - the resolution was carried 
and the .amendment lost. Despite the strong anti-imperialist 
feeling in the party, which had been shown at the 1921 party
conference, and, the 1925 trade union conference, when 
presented with a stark choice between abandoning or
reforming the empire, the party chose reform.
The »Daily Herald» believed that the Conference had 
supported the right policy. Discussing the debate, it 
reported that it »proved how very difficult it is to say 
anything about the Empire without talking nonsense. The 
mover and seconder of the resolutinn Mr. J.R. Clynes and 
Mr. Charles Buxton avoided this; some of the others did 
not. The choice offered was, as Dr. Haden Guest neatly 
put it, between smashing the Empire and Socialising it.
How the smashers would proceed they did not explain. The 
Conference showed plainly that it hated Imperialism but 
had no intention of pouring the baby away with the bath 
water.fl
The I.L.P. paper, the »New Leader*, took a different 
line. Its editor, H.N. Brailsford, was not enthusiastic 
about the programme outlined by the party at the 
Conference. He thought that it lacked a driving purpose 
and was just a new brand of Imperialism in disguise. The 
idea that the workers of Britain should emirate to the 
colonies in order to cure employment at home was a cry of 
despair. 2
The I.L.P. included many people who thought that the 
Empire should be abandoned as quickly as possible but it 
also included many of the members of the Labour party*s 
A.C.I.Q. who believed that the Empire should be reformed 
rather than abandoned. C.R. Buxton, the chairman of the 
A.C.I.Q., published a pamphlet »The Black Man's Rights 
under the auspices of the I.L.P., advocating policies 
similar to those he had helped to formulate for the Labour
i8o
1 . »Daily Herald*, 1 October 1925.
2. »New Leader*, 25 September 1925.
3. C.R. Buxton, 'The Black Man's Rights» (I.L.P., 1925),
l8l
party. He also published ‘The Exploitation of the Coloured 
Man*, expanding the points for the Anti-Slavery and 
Aborigines Protection Society.'*’ These pamphlets were 
published as part of the plan to try to awaken the electorate 
to its colonial responsibilities. (Leys and Woolf wrote to 
him congratulating him on a *first class pamphlet*. )
The I.L.P. also published a pamphlet more critical of
the empire than Buxton*sj *The Crime of Empire* by C.A.
3
Smith. It stated that the essence of the empire was the
subjugation of one people by another. The real thrust
behind Imperialist expansion was simply the desire of certain
groups of industrialists and financiers to secure profitable
investments. Empires were motivated by greed and acquired
by theft and murder. The aims of those who dictated
imperialist policy were not disinterestedly patriotic but
sordidly selfish. While in some cases the subject peoples*
had benefited materially from British rule, for the most
part they had suffered many grievous hardships as a result
of it. The possession of an empire meant *that there is
no point in time at which the earth does not in its diurnal
rotation, present to the sun some example of greed of gold
having developed into wanton aggression against a people
with whom we have no quarrel, into unprovoked attack upon
fdLlow human beings, guilty only of possessing something
our capitalist coveted and of being militarily weaker than
4
ourselves.* This assessment was not accepted byaLl 
members of the I.L.P. *1234
In March 1926 the I.L.P. published its considered policy
1 . C.R. Buxton, *The Exploitation of the Coloured Man* (A.S.A.P.S. 1925).
2. Woolf to Buxton, Leys to Buxton, 11 June 1925, Buxton Papers Box 5/3,
3. C.A. Smith, *The Crime of Empire* (I.L.P. 1926)
4. ibid, p.15•
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for the Empire which was to be submitted to the I.L.P. party-
conference in April. It was accepted at the Conference and
became the official I.L.P. policy. Socialism and Empire*1
was drafted by an Empire Policy Committee consisting of
C.R. Buxton, Norman Leys, Leonard Woolf, W, M,cGregor Ross,
Harold Laski, Ben Riley M.P0, T.P. Scriha, Rennie Smith M.P.,
James C. Welsh M.P. and the secretary was Ernest E. Hunter.
Buxton, Leys, Woolf and Ross also belonged to the Labour
party*s A.C.I.Q., which meant that there were similarities
between the policy of the I.L.P. and the Labour party, but
the I.L.P. policy showed a greater sense of urgency than
the Labour party*s policy.
The main idea of the I.L.P.*s policy was that a
»Socialist Empire* involved a complete break with past
traditions. Its policy should be based upon a recognition
•that the interests of the workers of the world of whatever
race, colour or creed are one, and that war, imperialism
and the exploitation of the native races are caused mainly
2by the greed of competing capitalist groups.* This basic 
principle was laid down in the I.L.P. consitution. The 
I.L.P. would seek to prevent these evils by the establish­
ment of a world organisation of free peoples, co-operating 
in the production and distribution of the world’s goods. 
»Socialist Empire* policy should aim at creating the 
conditions which would make the establishment of a world 
organisation of free peoples possible. With regard to 
the non-self-governing parts of the empire, the primary aim 
should be to introduce democratic institutions. Where 
self-government was not immediately practicable, the policy 
should be the public acknowledgment by Great Britain, as was 12
1 . «Socialism and Empire' (I.L.P., 1926X
2. »Socialism and Empire ' (I.L.P., 1926),p.3.
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done in the case of India in 1917» that self-government in 
all imperial dependencies was Britain*s aim. In order to 
prepare for that, there should be a programme of educational 
and legislative policy which would enable self-government 
to be achiared as quickly as possible. No scheme of empire 
organisation should have as its aim the injury of any other 
nation or be in any way prejudicial to the development of 
international socialism.
The I.L.P. Empire Policy Group recognised that in the 
Crown Colonies and Protectorates self-government was an 
ideal which could not be realised for some years. The only 
alternatives in the immediate future were paternal govern­
ment by imperial agents or the rule of the resident minority. 
The former policy should be pursued.until the indigenous 
peoples were ready for self-government. To achieve self- 
government two things would be required: first, a scheme 
that would give every child the opportunity of knowledge and, 
second, in the interim stage before complete self-government, 
a large measure of supervision by the agents of an all- 
inclusive League of Nations of the administration of the 
dependencies by the Western powers. To prepare for 
responsibility, genuine representation should be given 
to »natives» on Legislative Councils in an increasing degree. 
It was important to prevent legislation in the interests of 
the settlers while the »natives» did not have a voice 
corresponding to their numbers. This should be the task 
of the international supervisor. There should also be an 
international organisation for the control and distribution 
of raw materials and the principle of the »open door* shoiM 
be enforced. A code of »native* rights for all colonies 
should be drawn up with particular attention given to land, 
labour and taxation. International Labour Legislation to
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raise the working conditions of the coloured workers should 
be enforced and there should be liberty for the coloured 
workers to form trade unions. Control should be exercised 
by the Government over investments in the colonial areas and, 
where costly machinery and experts werB required, the 
Government should supply the necessary capital and educate 
the Africans, through co-operation or other methods, in the 
use of it.
The pamphlet stated that education was of the utmost 
importance as it was only through education that the African 
would ever be able to control his own destiny. Primary 
education should be made accesable to every child; ideally, 
this should be provided by the state. The African should 
be educated in technical skills but this did not mean that 
commercial and literary education should be neglected.
In order to give effect to this policy, it was necessary 
that there should be international supervision. The 
Mandates Commission should be given full powers of inspection 
and inquiry, and a Commissioner should be accredited to each 
Mandated Territory to act as the League's ambassador. He 
should belong to a different state from that of the mandatory 
power and it would be his job to keep watch upon the work of 
the Mandatory power and independently to report on it to the 
League. (No person should be appointed to ihe colonial 
service dealing with indigenous peoples without an adequate 
training in ethnology and anthropology.)
The 1926 I.L.P. Conference was virtually unanimous on 
the resolution on Imperial policy,^- which was based on the 
work of the Empire Policy Group. A.F. Fenner Brockway 
stated that neither the Labour and Socialist International 
nor the International Federation of Trade Unions would ever
1 . I.L.P. Conference Report, 1926.
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become truly international until the coloured workers of 
Africa« Asia and elsewhere were included in the working class
movement
The policy put forward by the I.L.P. was similar to 
that put forward by the Labour party in ‘Labour and the 
Empire: Africa'. The I.L.P. pamphlet devoted more space 
to working out how a policy of international supervision 
would take effect. The importance of developing trade 
unions was also given more emphasis in the I.L.P. policy.
The I.L.P. also put slightly more emphasis on '.socialism' 
but did not go into very great detail about what it meant 
by 'socialism*• Both party statements emphasised the 
paramount importance of education« but the I.L.P. placed 
more emphads on ensuring that there was no 'colour bar' in 
eduoation. The I.L.P. believed that the African should 
not be given a different education from that which was 
given to the white man. In this, the I.L.P. pamphlet 
reflected the views of Norman Leys. Another favourite 
idea of Leys', which was included in the I.L.P. pamphlet, 
was that the next Labour Colonial Secretary should publicly 
state that self-government was the aim in all Britain's 
colonies. The I.L.P. pamphlet gave the impression that 
the writers believed that progress should be made to give 
independence as soon as possible, whereas the Labour policy 
statement did not give the same impression of the need for 
urgent action.
The Labour party discussed Imperialism again at the 
1926 Party Conference at Margate. Miss Freda Utley (London 
University L.P.) moved "that this conference declares that 
the Labour party (whether in office or opposition) shall do *11 
in its power to help the native peoples to obtain control 1
1 . 'New Leader*, 9 April 1926.
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of their own land. It holds it to be essential that in 
all non-self-governing parts of the Empire we should:- 
(l) Restore the Natives* right to land. (2) See that they 
are educated for self-government. (3) Prevent industrial 
slavery and conscription in any form, and the consequent 
dislocation of the life of the Native community and of the 
workers of this country."1
In her speech, Miss Utley declared that the action 
needed to be taken by the Labour party could not be summari­
sed in a brief resolution owing to the varying problems 
which had to be dealt with in the different parts of the 
Empire. The effect on the working class of Great Britain 
of the exploitation of the *natives* was unemployment.
The fact that capitalists employed ‘native* labour at 
ridiculously low wages meant that» while they built their 
mills abroad, the industry at home would be in an ever- 
increasing state of depression. F. Kenyon (Brass and 
Metal Workers) thought that if the exploitation of the 
‘savage races* continued, it would lead to greater 
exploitation of the workers in Britain. After a short 
debate the resolution was agreed to.
A second, more extreme resolution was also put to the 
party conference. It was moved by John Gibbons (Wimbledon, 
Merton and Morden L.P.) and declared that"the Labour party 
conference believes that it is only possible to maintain 
the British Empire by the forcible domination and exploitation 
of hundreds of millions of coloured workers. It therefore 
sends greetings to our coloured brothers struggling to be 
free, and declares it is with them in their opposition to 
Imperialism and supports their demand for self-determination
1 . Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1926, pp.2 5 2 - 3
187
even to the point of seceding from the Empire.'»1
Mr. Gibbons thought that it was essential that the 
conference should realise that Great Britain maintained 
her hold over these people by force before they could in 
any way set out to help them. Joseph Southall (Edgbaston 
L.P.), seconding the resolution thought that there was no 
middle course: they either had to be full-blooded 
imperialists or give the whole thing up.
J.R. Clynes replied on behalf of the Executive. He 
hoped that conference would content itself with the London 
University resolution. This second motion, thought Clynes, 
was foolish and extravagant. Clynes believed that it was 
possible to maintain the British Empire - or, as he would 
call it, the British Commonwealth - without the forcible 
domination and exploitation of hundred of millions of native 
workers. The job of the party at the moment was to watch 
over the interests of their fellow subjects in all parts of 
the Empire. They had done that by parliamentary action and 
in other ways. Their policy had been declared at Liverpool 
the previous year. The party could not afford to throw 
away such popularity as it had got by passing unnecessarily 
provocative resolutions denouncing their own country. The 
issue was then avoided by moving the previous question, which 
was carried. The leadership of the party did not accept 
that the empire could not be reformed. Conference seemed 
willing to accept the policy of reform but, by passing 
motions, such as that proposed by Miss Utley, indicated 
that it expected more from a Labour Colonial Secretary than 
had been achieved by Thomas. Conference*s anti-imperialism 
was further shown by passing a resolution by H.S. Redgrove
1. ibid
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(Teachers* Labour League) which urged the Conference to 
condemn 'the imperialistic teaching in the schools, 
particularly with regard to Empire Day celebrations and the 
use of history and other textbooks with an anti-working class 
bias' and called on Labour teachers 'to take steps to prevent 
the further celebration of Empire Day and to investigate the 
school books in use with a view to eliminating those written 
from an anti-working class point of view . ' 1
By 1926, the Labour party had revised its policy 
pamphlet of 1920* The new pamphlet had been studied and 
approved by the National Executive Committee and the T.U.C* 
General Council. Colonial policy had also been discussed 
at the 1925 conference and the official policy, which was 
based on the advice of the A.C.I.Q., had been approved. 
However, both the T.U.C. and the Labour party conferences 
had made it clear that they disliked imperialism and 
expected a more positive policy of reform than Thomas had 
appeared to favour when he was at the Colonial Office. 
Thomas' arguments had been overwhelmingly voted down at 
the 1925 Trade Union Congress. However, the trade unions 
did not appear very interested in the problems of the 
African colonies. The 1925 motion had shown that trade 
union movement was strongly against imperialism and was 
concerned that cheap labour might provide competition for 
British workers, but the trade unions were not to show a 
concerted interest in the problems of the African colonies 
until the late 1930s when the threat of competition became 
more obvious as the economic development of the African 
colonies became more pronounced.
The I.L.P* had discussed colonial policy and worked 
out a policy which was based on the, same principle as the
1 . ibid.
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Labour party*s policy: the empire was to be reformed 
rather than abandoned. The only difference was that the 
I.L.P, pamphlet seemed to reflect Norman Leys* views and 
show a greater sense of urgency than the Labour party 
pamphlet, which was strongly influenced by Leonard Woolf*s 
Fabian ideas of gradual reform.
Despite the acceptance of the A.C.I.Q.'s policy, there 
was a wide variety of opinion in the Labour party and the 
trade unions concerning the empire. Some, such as C.A. 
Smith, H. Pollitt, J. Gibbons, C.J. Moody and A. Purcell, 
still seemed to think that the best policy was one of 
abandonment: and discussions at T.U.C. and Labour party 
conferences seemed to indicate that there was some measure 
of support for this attitude among the rank-and-file, but 
never enough to defeat the official policy. Others, such 
as Thomas and Clynes, gave the impression that the empire 
was not in need of drastic reform and that a policy of a 
large measure of continuity with Conservative policy should 
be pursued. The Labor Commonwealth Group in parliament 
did not produce a clear policy for the empire but some of 
their members considered the idea of empire free trade. 
However, the Labour Party, as a whole, remained firmly 
committed to the idea of free trade. The A.C.IoQ.'s 
policy for Africa was based on the idea of free trade and 
international supervision of the African colonies. Even 
the AoC.l.Qo was not completely united. The committee 
was generally not very favourable to the idea of economic 
development in the African colonies, apart from Green, 
who emphasised the need for economic development to provide 
resources to increase the standard of living of the Africans. 
Wedgwood, however, seemed to think that the best policy was
to ensure that the Africans all had enough land to live on
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and then leave them alone and try and avoid the problems 
of industrialisation« Buxton and Woolf supported the policy 
of trusteeship but Leys was trying to emphasise the ‘equal 
rights* policy instead of that of trusteeship« Leys and 
Wedgwood were also more sceptical of the policy of ‘indirect 
rule*» which most members of the A«C«I«Q. thought had some 
merit« The differences between the members of the party 
came out more clearly as the party tried to clarify its 
colonial policy in order to win the approval of the British 
Commonwealth Labour Conference and the Labour and Socialist 
International.
CHAPTER 5
INTERNATIONAL APPROVAL
192
The British Commonwealth Labour Conference met in 1925
and a motion was proposed by George Lansbury which stated:
"The Conference desires to obtain the views of the various
Labour parties on the question whether it is desirable that
the aim of Labour policy should be to develop the subject
peoples so that they may ultimately be fitted to elect and
control their own government!’'*’ After discussion it was
agreed to refer the resolution back because, as Ramsay
MacDonald said, the only thing that the resolution did was
to cast doubt as to ‘whether these people were ready for
self-government or not*. The Conference agreed that the
question was ill-framed and referred it back. However, a
questionnaire was sert out to the Labour parties in the
British Commonwealth for the next British Commonwealth
3Labour Conference.''
The questionnaire asked concerning subject peoples:
(1 ) Whether these peoples should be granted self-govern­
ment immediately?
(2) If not, how to apply our principle of political self- 
determination to these peoples?
(3) How to prevent their economic exploitation, including 
the safeguards necessary to protect natives in the ownership 
and use of their land, and the measures to be adopted to 
prevent slave labour or forced or indentured labour?
ik) How to secure the surplus products for the consumption 
and use of other natives and maintain a satisfactory 
exchange of goods between them and the rest of the world?
(5 ) Where different races inhabit the same country, how 
all sections can live in peaceful existence and on terms of
1 * Report of the British Commonwealth 1 .Kn.™ r _<• .
!L;.ir:\.Y92S- ?-22- î^ï^ hb^on"ef:ïtesc£!boïïyÇoniGrcnco wss d coniGrcnc© n-f* + v_ , , _ .
ted Labour within th. British Co»L£w«a»h.
2. ibid, p.23.
3. Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1925 p.6o.
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equality and how the Labour Movement can assist to that end?
(6) How the education of* these people may be best promoted?
The A.C.I.Q. was given the task of finding the answers 
to these questions. Leonard Woolf wrote a memo on the 
questionnaire in January 1926. 1 He thought that Britain*s
different dependencies should be treated differently. The 
Africans were not in a position to govern themselves. In 
many places, for example Kenya, the grant of self-government 
would merely mean that the inhabitants would fall into the 
hands of the white settlers who would usurp all political 
power. The grant of self-government in this case would 
be disastrous. In answer to the second question, Woolf 
thought that the principle of self-determination could not 
be applied immediately. The only thing which could be done 
immediately was to do everything possible to prepare the 
peoples for self-government. This could only be done by 
preventing political power falling into the hands of 
minorities who would use it for their own political and 
economic ends* The central legislative and executive 
powers should remain completely in the hands of the Imperial 
Government - the Colonial Office which was responsible to 
the two Houses of Parliament. Responsible Government* 
should not be granted until it was certain that the 
government would be controlled by the African inhabitants. 
Education of the Africans should be undertaken in two ways - 
general and political. Political education should be 
achieved by training the inhabitants in local self- 
government. The aim should be the gradual extension of the 
area and powers of these self-governing areas. The Labour 
party*s programme was to maintain Colonial Office control 
at the centre, while trying to develop local African self-
1. AoC.I.Q. Memo No. 22, January 1926.
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government with the eventual aim of letting the Africans 
take over the central government. However no time scale 
was given by Woolf.
Harry Snell dealt specifically with education in a memo 
that he wrote in answer to question six . 1 He thought that 
the Labour party*s education policy for the Africans need 
not be all that different from that described in the 
Government's White Paper 'Education Policy in British 
Tropical Africa. * 2 Snell believed that the essentials of 
a sound education policy should include the development of 
a self-reliant character, knowledge of personal health and 
social hygiene, a recognition of the importance of scientific 
agriculture, including the breeding and care of live stock, 
industrial skill, improvement of family life, knowledge of 
the effect of alcohol and drugs upon the body and the 
facility for healthy recreation »such as would provide an 
alternative to the moonlight revels and physical excesses 
to which native peoples sometimes resort.' Snell's 
policy was paternalistic and did not put as much emphasis 
on training Africans for self-government as others such as 
Leys and the I.L.P. pamphlet did.
Snell put forward his thoughts on »British Labour and 
Kenya* in an article in the »New Leader».3 He believed 
that the British Labour Movement's hands were clean over 
Kenya; it had never ceased to demand generous treatment 
for the humblest black »native». He thought that the 
Labour attitude towards backward peoples in Africa or else­
where should be based upon a recognition of the essential
1 . A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 23, January 1926.
2. Cmd. 2374, March 1925.
3. »New Leader', 29 October 1926, p.5.
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manhood of the»native*• The British Labour Movement could
never consent to erect a barrier against the development of 
lowly people and say to them ‘You may do manual work on 
white men’s farms, take indentured service in his mines, and 
do the menial duties of his household, but beyond that you' 
shall not go.* The black man, like men of other races, 
must be free to give, or to withhold his labour as other 
nen are, and he must have freedom to undertake whatever duties 
his capacities enable him to perform. If he can do work of 
a higher kind than his father did, he ought to be free to do 
thatwork and he ought never to consent to be used as a semi- 
intelligent tool for the benefit of more highly organised 
white communities. Snell’s attitude to the Africans was 
fatherly and condescending.
H.S.L. Polak wrote a memo for the A.C.I.Q. dealing with 
the relations of different races in the same country in 
answer to question five.^ He thought that it was essential 
that in the territories with populations of various peoples 
the elective principle should be eliminated and that of 
nomination from a panel substituted. He believed that this 
would have prevented many of the lamentable results which 
had culminated in the fierce controversies in Kenya. Where 
a franchise was adopted, it was essential that it should be 
exercised in general mixed electorates and upon a common 
electoral roll. Communal franchises were divisive. No 
man should be excluded from office, place, occupation or 
activity by virtue of his race or colour. In order to give 
effect to its colonial policy, Polak thought that the Labour 
party should hold Commonwealth Conference^ set up imperial 
committees within the P.L.P., study the methods applied by
1. A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 2k, January 1926.
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foreign governments and the literature published by the I.L.O. 
and the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations• 
affiliate wherever possible to League of Nations unions, 
issue simple leaflets and pamphlets to local Labour parties 
and trade unions, encourage lectures, require parliamentary 
candidates to become conversant with the policy andrefer 
to it during election campaigns, have contributions from 
qualified writers in the party and general press, promote 
the principles underlying policy in adult schools, W.E.A. 
and women's organisations, collaborate with all societies 
or organisations having like objects and conduct frequent 
visits to the countries to which the policy is applied 
and report on progress. This long list indicates that 
the A.C.I.Q. were concerned at the ignorance of the subject 
within the Labour party and among the public in general.
J.F.N, Green wrote a memo concerning production and 
trade with the c o l o n i e s H e  thought that if the ‘native* 
knew that he was secure in the possession of his land, it 
would be impossible to induce him to labour on estates which 
had been appropriated by capitalists except on terms which 
were advantageous for the ‘native*. The usual form of 
compulsion used by the whites was the hut or poll tax 
which forced those who had no market for their goods - or 
in some cases men of military age precluded by tribal 
custom from field labour - to travel in search of employment 
by which to earn the money to pay the taxes on themselves 
and their relatives. All systems of driving the ‘natives* 
to work for the capitalists should be abolished and tribal 
co-operatives should be encouraged. To enable Africans 
to run co-operatives they should be educated in agriculture, 
industry, medicine and commerce. They should also
1. A.C.I.Q,. Memo No. 25, January 1926.
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participate in local government to train them for eventual 
self-government However, since foreign exploitation of some 
sort was inevitable it was important to insist on conditions; 
resources should only be released for a maximum of ten years, 
adequate wages should be paid to the 'natives', safeguards 
for life and health should be adopted at the place of work, 
the 'native' workers should not be separated from their 
families and there should be inspectors and representative 
bodies for the 'natives' which would eventually become trade 
unions*
Charles Roden Buxton wrote a memo on the questions of 
land, labour and taxation, 1 which stated that exploitation 
had taken place on such a vast scale that it would be 
difficult to diminish it, let alone abolish it. The aim 
of Labour's policy should be to give the 'native* the 
choice of working for wages or not. In order to do this 
there should be a code of 'native* rights. Land should 
be held by the African communities in East Africa as it was 
in West Africa. Compulsory wage labour should be 
prohibited, trade unions encouraged, I.L.O. legislation 
applied and all capital investments should b» subject to some 
degree of government control. Taxation should not be used 
as an instrument to force the 'natives' to work but should 
provide the revenue for 'native* services. The white 
population should be made to bear its fair share of taxes. 
Finally, Buxton thought that the Mandate system should be 
extended to all parts of the British Empire which were 
inhabited by weaker races. These points had been included 
in the Labour party policy statement 'Labour and the Empire: 
Africa.* .
1. A . C . I . Q .  Memo No. 26, January 1926.
All these memos on the questions posed for the British 
Commonwealth Labour Conference were compiled into a final 
draft answering all the questions from the point of view of 
the British Labour party. 1 The document provided a summary 
of the Labour party*s colonial policy towards Africa. The 
main points were that independence could not be granted in 
Africa immediately for the Africans were unprepared. The 
policy should be one of preparing the Africans for self- 
government by general education, local self-government and 
preventing political power falling into the hands of the 
white settler minorities. The exploitation of the Africans 
should stop, the tribes should hold the land and the Africans 
should not be forced to work but given the choice of working 
Cor the white settlers or capitalists or working on their 
own land for themselves.
These memos indicate that most of the Labour party»s 
experts did have a sense of superiority towards the Africans. 
They also failed to confront the complex question of 
economic development in any detail. There was no clear 
exposition of the steps which would be necessary before 
majority rule could result in Africa. The party*s 
attitude to the policy of »indirect rule» was also ambiguous, 
Leonard Wool/ appearing to support it,and, Leys opposing it. 
The policy concerning the franchise was also uncertain; 
Wedgwood and Leys thought that an equal franchise with an 
educational test on the common roll should be adopted 
everywhere. However, Polak, although favouring the common 
roll, if there were elections, thought that it was better 
to secure representation by nominated panels, rather, than 
by election. He argued that in Kenya the elective principle 
should be eliminated in favour of nominated panels. The
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1. A.C.I.Q. Memo Noo 27, February 1926.
education policy was also uncertain: Snell favoured a 
paternalist education which would enable the African to 
work and look after himself more efficiently, but Leys 
emphasised that higher education was necessary to train an 
educated elite which would be able to take over from the 
British Colonial administration when independence came.
The completed questionnaire was sent by the A.C.I.Q. 
to the N.E.C. which considered it at the meeting on 28 
April 19281 and it was decided to appoint a sub-committee 
of MacDonald M.P., J.H. Thomas M.P., G. Lansbury M.P., 
and Arthur Henderson M.P. to examine the draft reply and 
report their approval or otherwise to the Committee.
It was later decided to report to the Joint Committee of 
the N.E.C. and the General Council of the TU.C. 2 34 The 
policy was approved as the pamphlet on Africa had been 
approved. The leadership seemed to have nothing to add 
to the A.C.I.Q.*s policy, despite its ambiguities. At a 
meeting of the N.E.C. and the General Council on 29 July 
1926 it was suggested that the International Labour and 
Socialist Conference should be held in the same year as 
the British Commonwealth Labour Conference. This 
suggestion was approved and the two conferences were 
scheduled for 1928.^
E.F. Wise, the I.L.P. leader, wrote an article 
discussing the *Socialist Commonwealth of Nations*.^
This stated that the impending Imperial Conference of the 
trade unions and Labour parties of the British Commonwealth 
made it urgent for the party to turn it s mind towards
1 . N.E.C» Minutes 28 April 1928.
2. Joint Meeting of N.E.C. and General Council Minutes. 29July 1926. *
3. Joint Meeting Minutes, 29 July 1926.
4. *New Leader* 5 November 1926.
these problems. Labour policy should clearly not be to 
smash the Empire but to use it, asfhr as was possible, as 
a great instrument of democratic socialism. It was obvious 
that the old type of imperialism was ill at ease by the 
virtual abandonment of imperial preference. The new 
conception of empire should emphasise co-operation on a 
world wide scale and this would lead to increased consump­
tion and prosperity. The people of Britain should work 
with the peoples of the empire to achieve a better world.
In order to do this, the I.L.P., initially, gave support 
to an organisation of the colonial peoples, the League 
Against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism. 1 23 However, 
the British Labour party decided that it already possessed 
machinery for dealing with these problems in the Labour and 
Socialist International and so ignored the League Against 
Imperialism. The I.L.P. sent Fenner Brockway to the 
conference called by the League Against Imperialism in 
February 1927. H e thought that the conference was 
'extraordinarily significant in drawing together the subject 
peoples of every race and colour to take common action 
against imperialism.* The Conference was criticised by 
the L.S.I. on-die grounds that it was of Communist origin. 
However, the I.L.P. thought that it was 'assertively anti­
communist' and it would be'a great mistake for Socialists 
to boycott a development of such enormous potentialities 
as the collaboration of the subject peoples of the world 
againt their oppressors.*^
Fenner Brockway wrote enthusiastic articles about the 
Conference in the 'New Leader».4 He thought that the
1 . International Committee of N.E.C. Minutes, 3 Februarv 10272. I.L.P. Conference Report, 1927, p.io * y 9 7.
3. ibid.
j »New Leader', 26 August 1927,p.5«,
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League against Imperialism might be an important bridge 
to reunite the International Socialist Movement. It aimed 
at uniting all sincere anti-imperialists in Europe with the 
rising Liberation Movement of the Subject races of the world. 
Brockway thought that it would be »suicidal if socialists 
refrained from association with this movement, even if it had 
been initiated by Communists'. It had done what the 
Socialist international haL failed to do - seriously begun 
the task of uniting the proletarian movements among the 
coloured races. It would be short-sighted and stupid for 
the L.S.I. to permit the coloured races to gain the 
impression-that the Communists were their only friends.
Brockway had to report., however, in another article1 
that the Executive of the L.S.I. had failed to take he advice. 
W. Gillies, for the Labour party, insisted that the League 
was another Communist manoeuvre. The L.S.I. Executive 
adopted a resolution expressing support for the coloured 
workers in their struggle and declaring a desire for close 
contacts but decided against joining the League.
This decision by the L.S.I. meant that affiliated 
bodies could not join the L.A.I. The National Administra­
tive Council of the I.L.P . accepted that decision but held 
that it was within the right of individual members of the 
National Administrative Council to participate actively in 
the League. The N.A.C. was of the opinion that the work 
of the League in securing united efforts against imperialism 
throughout the world was of the greatest importance and 
regretted that the L.S.I. stood apart from it . 2
The third British Commonwealth Labour Conference was 
held between 2 - 6  July 1928. However, the question of the
r. «New Leader«, l6 September 1927, p.7 
2I I.L.P. Conference Report, 1928, p.6.
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colonies and the subject peoples was not discussed. 1 The 
Conference ended in some disarray owing to the withdrawal of 
the Indian delegation in protest against the fact that two 
members of the Labour party were serving on the Simon 
Commission. The answers to the Questionnaire on subject 
peoples were circulated.
Although the British Commonwealth Labour Conference 
did not discuss the question of subject peoples, the Labour 
and Socialist International, which met the same year,;, did.
In 1926 the Executive Committee of the L.S.I. appointed a 
commission to report on the colonial problem to the Congress. 2 *
This Commission drew up a questionnaire which was sent to 
the various Labour parties. It dealt with many problems 
concerning the colonies and India. The A.C.I.Q. prepared 
answers for the British Labour party as it had done for the 
British Commonwealth Labour Conference.^ The Labour 
party's reply to the questionnaire integrated the answers 
prepared for the B.C.L.C. which had been approved by the 
ToU.C. and the Labour party. 4 All the replj.es from the 
different socialist parties were published together with a 
draft resolution of the Colonial Commission under the 
title 'The Colonial Problem*.'* Under the heading 'The 
policy of the Labour party», it was stated that »British 
Labour has devoted a steadiy increasing amount of attention 
to the problem of native land and labour during recent 
years.» Then a list of, and quotations from, various 
Labour party statements was given, including the »Memo on
lm VI^°£T303rty A”nUal Conference Report, 1928, Appendix
g. ibid., Appendix VIII
3» A.C.I.Q. Minutes, 12 October 1927.
4. Labour Party Annual Conference Report. 1928 n t o*
5 . -The Colonial Problem- (The Labon? P a i t y ,  1928? 5 ‘
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War Aims* (1918), the resolutions of the 1925 and 1926 
Conferences, and the 1920 and 1926 pamphlets.^ The
answers to the questionnaire of the B.C.L.C. were also 
printed.^
At the L.S.I. Conference, the Colonial Commission, 
which considered the various statements by the socialist 
parties, drafted a resolution on the colonies which was 
passed by the Labour and Socialist Conference. The British 
delegates who served on the Colonial Commission were 
Lansbury, Olivier, Snell, Paton, Ammon and Gillies.-*
(John Paton of the I.L.P. was only a supplementary delegate 
who concentrated on India.) The Labour Party had sent 
a strong delegation, numbering 80, to the conference of 600 
and secured full representation on the Commissions. The
I.L.P. was handicapped because the Labour party insisted 
that the full British delegation on certain of the 
Commissions should be Labour party delegates.^
The policy passed bythe L.S.I. stated that colonial 
policy had been one of the means of capitalist expansion 
throughout the world. Socialism was opposed to the very 
principle of foreign domination of colonial races and 
considered the abolition of the colonial system as a 
preliminary condition for any international commonwealth.
For colonies which fulfilled the ‘basic conditions of 
modern independent civilisation' it called for complete 
liberation from the foreign yoke; for the other colonial 
peoples who had not yet reached this standard, it called 
for safeguards against exploitation and oppression and 1234
1 . ibid, p.23
2. ibid., pp.72-101
3. I.L.P. Conference Report 1929,p .15
4. I.L.P. Conference Report, 1929, pp.l4-l5.
2 0 k
insisted upon their systematic education with a view to 
independence and concurrently an extension of self-govern­
ment until they attained the right of full self-government.
In more detail, the resolution demanded that the land not 
already appropriated by the Europeans should be recognised 
as the inalienable property of the *native* community, 
every ‘native* family should have sufficieit land for its 
support, no taxes should be imposed except for the administra­
tion of public services which directly benefited the 
Africans, no taxes should be permitted which a ’native* could 
not pay without leaving home to work for the capitalist, all 
forced or indentured labour and taxation to force labour 
should be abolished, all labour contracts should be made 
according to models established by the Government and made 
public. Labour contracts should be made before a magistrate, 
a breach being remedied by civil process, all penal clauses 
being abolished. Contracts should be valid for no longer 
than a year. Recruitment and conditions of labour should 
be regulated and inspected, racial discrimination in 
industry should be abolished and a full measure of 
protective legislation should be enacted, especially in the 
interests of women and children. Foreign capitalists and 
planters should contribute a portion of their profits for 
»native* welfare and education, and wherever possible, 
natural resources should be exploited by state enterprises.
The Government should give assistance to »native* 
agriculture and encourage the establishment of Consumers* 
Co-operation among the »natives*. The statement also 
demanded that the system of education should aim at 
preparing the »natives* for the tasks of m o d e m  life - 
political, economic and social. The forms of this education
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should be adapted to the general cultural level of each 
colonial territory and should be provided out of public funds.
Where Councils of Government existed they should be fully 
representative in due proportion of 'native' as >*611 as 
European interests, with continued extension of popular 
control by the *native* inhabitants. Wherever electoral 
institutions existed, the franchise should be general and 
equal and the electoral roll a common one with mixed 
electorates; there should be no privileged franchises. Under 
the heading 'General Principles* the document dedhared that 
the principle of trusteeship under the League of Nations 
could not be arbitrarily restricted to particular territories 
but should be extended to cover the whole of Africa and 
similar colonies of primitive culture elsewhere. 1
Lord Olivier, one of the Labour party delegates on the 
Colonial Commission, thought that the policy was ‘moderate 
in its language and incontestable in its substance.' He 
thought that the document was the 'European workers* charter
out, was almost exclusively a European body. The I.L.P. 
wanted an all inclusive world international, but the
The Labour party also produced another statement which 
included sections dealing with the colonies in 1928. This 
was the party's policy statement 'Labour and the Nation*.
for coloured labour. 2 Ihe L.S.I., as the I.L.P. pointed
difficulties of its realisation were great. 3
It was written by R.Ho Tawney.^ Concerning the 'Protection
s adopted by 
onference
3* I.L.P. Conference ReDort 1020.«-! t;
of Indigenous Peoples*1 it stated that:- "The Labour party 
views with grave concern the appalling evils produced 
by capitalist exploitation in certain tropical and sub­
tropical parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations* It 
holds that the welfare of the indigenous races, their 
economic prosperity, and their advancement in culture and 
civilisation, must be the primary aim of colonial administra 
tion, to which all other objects must be rigorously 
subordinated. It notes with satisfaction that where that 
principle has been observed, primitive peoples have 
achieved, in a comparatively short space of time, results 
which decisively disprove the statement that they are 
incapable of social progress. It is determined that the 
fullest possible opportunities of similar progress shall 
be brought within their reach in all regions for whose 
government Great Britain is responsible".
"A Labour Government, therefore, will make no 
compromise with policies which aim at accelerating the 
economic development of backward areas by methods which 
undermine the independence, the social institutions and 
the morals of their inhabitants, and which thus are 
injurious both to them, and, ultimately, to the working 
classes of Europe. It will useevery means in its power 
to protect them in the occupation and enjoyment of their 
land, to prevent absolutely forced labour, whatever form 
it may assume, and to ensure that contracts between native 
workers and European employers are entered upon voluntarily 
and not under duress, that such contracts are subject to 
the approval of a public authority, and that they embody 
terms securing to the workers equitable conditions of life 
and employment. It will encourage the development of
" i j a u u u r
—  - ^arty
*  —  —  —  r
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services concerned with health and education. Its policy 
will be based upon the firm conviction that all dependencies 
of the Crown ought, as soon as possible, to become self- 
governing States, It will take steps, therefore, to 
transfer to the inhabitants of these countries, without 
distinction of race or colour, such measure of political 
responsibility as they are capable of exercising, while 
imperial responsibility for their government will be 
maintained during the period preceding the establishment of 
democratic institutions. It will instruct the Governments 
of these countries to extend to their inhabitants such 
rights as may already, as a result either of legislative 
or administrative measures, have been acquired by Europeans, 
and to make it their chief aim, by education and otherwise, 
to prepare the whole body of their inhabitants for self- 
government. It will co-operate cordially with the 
Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, and will make 
every effort to strengthen and extend its authority. 1,1
Norman Leys discussed this statement in an article in 
2the »New Leader*. He thought that the passage was widely 
different from the passage in the L.S.I. document »The 
Colonial Problem'. He dedared that the party had no right 
to profess one set of intentions to the Socialists of the 
world and another to the British electorate. The L.S.I. 
policy avowed by the party in Brussels was based upon the 
dogma that in every country the common people were right­
fully sovereign and it was the chief duty of the colonial 
powers to do everything they possibly could to prepare the 
common people for the exercise of sovereign authority. On 
the other hand, the draft electoral programme, while it 12
1 . «Labour and the Nation» (Revised edition,1928),pp.48-49.
2. «New Leader*, 21 September 1928,pll.
208
deplored the evils thet had resulted from imperialism, 
assumed the indefinite perpetuation of a state of tutelage 
and the inferiority of status which was the cause of these 
evils« Leys thought that the programme showed no sense 
of urgency but, on the other hand, he believed that the 
policy of the League Against Imperialism, which called for 
immediate self-government in every Dependency, was equally 
wrong« Leys felt that no honest man who knew the facts 
believed that the policy of immediate self-government in 
every Dependency was possible. The two policies were 
equally dishonest, that which would profess to render 
imperialism innocuous by safeguards, and that which would 
have the victims of imperialism convert themselves overnight 
into free and independent societies. Leys believed that 
no machine-gun would ever again be fired against Africans 
if the Colonial Secretary in the next Labour Government 
directed the Governors of the African Dependencies to make 
a public announcement to their inhabitants that self- 
government is theirs for the asking, and that every 
possible help will be given them to make them ready for 
its responsibilities. The bare announcement, thought 
Leys, would be enough.. Once made, the Africans themselves 
would see to the rest. Leys was trying to inject a sense 
of urgency into the Labour party's colonial policy but most
members of the party thought that the colonial problem was 
of no immediate importance.
The Labour Party Conference held at Birmingham in 1928 
discussed the policy statement 'Labour and the Nation ' 1 for 
three days but the passage on colonial policy was one of
those not discussed proving that the party did not consider 
it vital.
Conferenc1 . Labour Party Annual e Report, 1928.
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Jimmy Maxton, like Leys, thought that the section on 
colonial policy was not socialist enough and wrote an open 
letter to the members of the conference, criticising the 
sections 'which pledge the Labour party to maintain the 
Imperialist system and actually make it easier, by the 
changes proposed for capitalism to continue the exploitation 
of Colonial countries.'^ However, Maxton, unlike Leys, 
did not support the L.SoI. resolution on 'The Colonial 
Problem'. A major part of his letter was concerned with 
attacking the L.S.I. resolution which the Labour party had 
supported. Maxton thought that the 'League Against 
Imperialism, which had been founded in Brussels in 1927, 
provided for the first time an organisation through which 
the workers of the oppressed and oppressing nations can 
jointly carry on the struggle for freedom.' The fact that 
Maxton wrote his criticisms from the point of view of the 
League Against Imperialism, a communist organisation, made 
many delegates ignore the criticisms and protest against 
Maxton»s use of the Communist platform. However, Maxton 
was soon to be expelled from the League, ostensibly 
because he was lazy but mainly on ideological grounds 
because he was not a communist. 1 2 The 'New Leader» thought 
that the expulsion was the final proof of the impossibility 
of working with Communists. 3 The Labour party was firmly 
against the policy of working with communists. Its 
actions in avoiding the L.A.I. seemed vindicated when 
Maxton was expelled.
The I.L.P. did discuss colonial policy at its 1929 
Conference at Carlisle, when R. Bridgeman presented a
1 . 'The Times', 3 October 1928.
2. Interview with Lord Brockway, 2k July 1973.
3. 'New Leader', 27 September 1929,p.3.
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resolution, stating that the I.L.P. should dissociate itself 
from the policy of the Labour and Socialist International 
since, he thought, the L.S.I. report excluded the possibility 
of certain territories ever having self-government. (This 
was not the opinion of Norman Leys). John Paton, the 
I.L.P. representative on the L.S.I. Commission, replied 
that it was absurd to ask parties to dissociate themselves 
from the L.S.I. because they disagreed with certain small 
parts of policy. He pointed out that in some colonies 
there were not the conditions for self-government and the 
fact had to be faced that if the Imperial Government were 
withdrawn in Kenya the »natives* would be at the mercy of 
the white settlers. However bad Imperial Government was, 
government by the minority white settlers would be much
worse. On a show of hands, Bridgeman's resolution was 
lost.^
Fenner Brockway also moved a motion on Imperialism at 
the 1929 I.L.P. Conference which stated that a condition 
of control of subject peoples in Colonial Territories under 
the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations should be 
the adoption of a charter of labour for subject peoples 
prepared by the League of Nations. The resolution was 
carried. 2 (The League of Natinns had passed an Anti- 
Slavery Convention at the 1926 Assembly. At the time,
John Harris of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection 
Society wrote that if it could be carried out and loyally 
applied in the letter and the spirit, it would secure a 
greater advance than a c h i n g  attempted since the abolition 
of commercialised slavery. ) 123
1 . 'New Leader*, 5 April 1929,p.12.
2. -*New Leader*, 12 April 1929,p.12.
3. «New Statesman', 2 October 1926, p.698.
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The Labour party had decided in *Labour and the 
Nation* to prepare the African people for eventual self- 
government by education and extending equal rights to all 
people in the colonies. However, there was no clear 
indication of any timescale. There was certainly no 
intention of giving self-government in the near future.
Norman Leys thought that there should be a more definite 
statement that the Africans could have sfilf-government when 
they wanted it. Some in the I.L.P., such as J. Maxton 
and Bridgeman, thought that self-government should be given 
sooner rather than later, if not immediately. However, 
this point of view never gained ascendancy in the Labour 
party as a whole.
The main area of disagreement between the parties in 
Parliament on colonial policy concerned Kenya and the 
relationship between the white settlers and the black 
Africans. The Conservatives, following the ideas of the 
East African Commission, were trying to follow a policy of 
dual development for the white and black communities.
Leopold Amery put this point of view in the House of 
Commons in 1929» "The only right view often summarised 
as "the dual policy" was the belief that there was room 
in those countries for white men and black men to live 
side by side and that, although there were grave dangers 
involved in the presence side by side of the native 
populations and of a race so immensely superior in strength 
and ability, yet with reasonable safeguards those dangers 
could be reroved. During the initial period it was essential 
that control should remain in the House and not be entrusted 
to a mere handful of immigrant settlers who, naturally, in 
contact with the urgent problems of the pioneer, were apt
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to take a short-sighted view...(But) Nothing would be more 
disastrous than for Parliament to regard themselves as 
champions of the black man and of no other interest and, on 
the other hand, that the white settler should look upon 
Parliament as a hostile body, incapable of realising the 
actual needs of the local situation, and, by the reaction 
of opposition, should concentrate on a bitter, narrow and 
unfair attitude towards the native population*"1
The Labour party felt that, as the 1923 White Paper 
had stated, the interests of the Africans should be 
paramount. It feared that the 'dual policy* was an excuse 
for white development at the expense of the Africans.
Norman Leys wrote an article in the *New Leader ' , 2 in which 
he stated that the 'Dual policy' was being prevented from
working because the Government had given about half of the
/
best land to fewer that 2000 Europeans and then had done 
everything in its power to get the Africans to cultivate 
it for the profit of the new owners. The Labour party 
should insist that the Government and its agents in Kenya 
should be forbidden to use any means of inducing any 
African to leave home to work for wages rather than support 
himself and his family by working in his own fields. Leys 
thought that many Conservatives in Parliament would support 
this demand.
The East African Loans Bill came before Parliament in 
1926. This provided for loans to countries in East Africa 
in order to forward economic development, particularly the 
development of railways. The A.C.I.Cio thought that the 
general policy of the Bill should be supported only if 
certain conditions were fulfilled. 3 Concerning Kenya, the
1. 219 H.c.Debs.,5s.,c o 1s o2704-2706, 13 July 1928.
2. 'New Leader», 3 December 1926, p.18.
3. A.C.I.Q. Memo No.29, May 1926.
A.C.I.Q. thought that there should be no loan unless specific
abuses were removed, a percentage should be laid down for the
medical, sanitary, educational and veterinary services and
certain general conditions should be observed. There should
be no forced labour on construction work, a careful account
should be taken of the adequacy of the labour supply, the
money should not be given mainly for assisting white settle»,
and all schemes of expenditure should be approved by
Parliament. The A.C.I.Q. thought that only expenditure on
railways in densely populated areas, harbour facilities,
medical and veterinary services, education, infant welfare,
sanitation and the building of an agricultural college
could be justified. 1 The memos were circulated to the
2parliamentary party.
The East African Loans Bill was debated in Parliament 
on 21 July 1926.J William Graham, one of the Labour 
party*s financial experts, stated that the Labour party was 
not hostile to schemes of development but more infortra tion 
was needed. Harry Snell put some of the A.C.I.Q.«s points 
and said that the final attitude of the Labour party would 
depend upon whether the »native* was going to share in the 
benefits which the loan sought to confer. The Labour 
party wanted to be sure that the African was not going to 
be made a wage-slave in his own country.
When the money resolution for the Bill was presented 
in the House of Commons on 1 December 1926, the Labour 
party moved that Kenya be excluded from the benefits of the 
loan . 4 Hugh Dalton said that Kenya should be excluded
because of its policy of forced labour which was put into
1
2
3
4
A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 29A, June 1926. 
N.E.C. Minutes, 23 June 1926.
198 H.C.Debs.,5s.,cols.l321—1366, 
200 H.C.Deb.,5a*,cols.,1271~1334, 21 July 1926.1 December 1926.
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operation for the benefit of the white settlers. He agreed 
with Lord Delamere who had stated that he wanted to see 
Kenya excluded from the loan so that it could work out its 
own future free of Treasury control. The Labour party 
attached great importance to ‘native* welfare and they 
suspected that too much of the grant was going to the white 
planters.
Baker, the Labour M.P. for Bristol East, wanted to make 
sure that m  a result of the loan no labour would be forced 
on to public works and no labour would be forced to work 
on behalf of a public authortty when it was urgently needed 
for the development of holdings which were held by the 
»natives* themselves. W. Graham said that the Labour 
party was generally in favour of the proposals for the 
loans but it was worried about the financial policies 
adopted in the territories, particularly in Kenya.1
The House went into the Committee stage of the Palestine 
and East African Loans (Guarantee) Bill on 9 December 1926. 
Dalton again moved that Kenya be excluded from the loan.2 
He stated that the Labour party was not hostile to sound 
and equitable investments under British guarantee but it 
was hostile to the labour and land legislation in Kenya and 
still more to the ordinances that had been adopted for 
promoting the flow of labour from the native reserves on to 
the estates of the white planters. It seemed that the 
•native* was being pressed by a number of discreditable 
devices to work on the estates of the white planter. The 
•native* was forbidden to grow the most profitable source 
of coffee plant in his reserves. Another ordinance had 
laid down that breaches of contract between ‘native* *•
1 . 200 H.C.Deb.,5s.,cols. 1282-1284 1 i w  ^
*• ibid-  9 December 1926
215
employees and white employers was a criminal offence 
punishable by two months imprisonment or a fine amounting 
to seven months wages. These contracts had recently been 
extended to children of 12 years of age. The Labour party,
said Dalton, was not at all satisfied with the system of 
taxation and public finance in Kenya.
W. Baker, a trade union M.P., seconded the amendment.
He said that the influence of the Government in Kenya had
recently been thrown very heavily on the side of the white
settlers instead of holding the balance between the settlers
and the »natives* .1 Rennie Smith, the Labour M„P. for
Penistone, thought that the situation in Kenya was the key
one for the European population in East Africa. If things
went badly there, they were bound to go badly for the
•natives' throughout thenest of Africa. The Committee
should be given information as to the conditions of labour
which would govern the employment of »natives' under the 
2
loan schemes. Colonel Wedgwood pointed out that Kenya 
was occupied by settlers of a very high aristocratic caste 
and therefore criticism of the colony was not welcomed by 
the establishment in England. Wedgwood thought that the 
•native' of Kenya should be allowed to do as he liked, 
whether he worked on his own land or elsewhere. It 
not the duty of the state to make a man work if he did not 
want to. The Colonial Secretary was being beaten in Kenya 
by a feudal aristocracy *hich repeatedly threatened to seceded 
Ormsby-Gore, the Conservative Under-Secretary at the 
Colonial Office, said that to keep Kenya out of participation 
in the proposed loans would not do the slishtest harm to the
1 .
2.
3-
200 H.C.Deb.,5s.,cols. 2332-2333, 
ibid., 2333-2336, 9 December 1926. 
ibid., 2337-23^0, 9 December 1926.
9 December 1926
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gentlemen in Kenya to whom the Labour members objected, but 
would do great harm to the Natives' for whom they were so 
greatly concerned. The objection of the Labour party to 
the inclusion of Kenya in the loan scheme was almost entirety- 
due to the existence of Lord Delamere in the country. This 
was greeted with shouts of ‘No* by the Labour members. 
Ormsby-Gore concluded by saying that to imagine that the 
white settlers of Kenya were slave-drivers was really 
ridiculous. Government supporters were tired of being 
perpetually lectured by Labour members on the subject of 
Kenya
In reply, Morgan Jones said that Kenya had become the 
acid test of Britain's colonial policy for the Labour 
party .The Tukecf Devonshire had declared in 1923 that 'native* 
interests in East Africa should be paramount but this 
declaration had been departed from. The Labour party had 
no particular objection to Lord Delamere but he represented 
a certain VP® of mind. Ormsby-Gore could not deny that 
Lord Delamere and his friends were in possession of land 
from which the Masai had been thrown out. The Labour 
party knew that Lord Delamere was anxious to get up a 
moement for self-governmeit so that discussion of Kenyan 
affairs would be removed from the House of Commons and the 
criticism of the Labour party. Morgan Jones wondered 
whether it was fair that the proportion of taxation on 
the 'native*, having regard to hi earning capacity, was 
much greater than that borne by the white settlers.2
Mr. Gillett said that the Labour party had no animus 
against the white settlers; their policy was founded on 
disagreement with the policy favoured by these settlers.3
1 .2 .
3-
200 H.C.Deb ibid., cols, 
ibid., cols.
*5s., colsi 
2344-2351
2351-2353
2340-2344, 9 December 1926.
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Tom Johnston also declared that the Labour party was not
against the development of Kenya by British settlers. What
they did say was that the way to disrupt the Empire and
create misery and oppression was to follow Lord Delamere*s
policy. 1 23 The way to bring prosperity to the African
Empire was to follow the policy adopted in Nigeria and the
Gold Coast. Wedgwood pointed out that, although Ceylon
contained a greater number of planters than Kenya, the
Labour party did not criticise them because their methods
2did not require criticism from humane persons.
The Labour party’s amendment was negatived and Kenya 
was included in the loan. The debate showed the depth of 
Labour party feeling over Kenya and the growing irritation 
of the Conservatives at the Labour party*s attacks on the
policy of the white settlers in Kenya, particularly Lord
3Delamere. The Labour party was not opposed on principle 
to colonial development but it wanted to make sure that the 
development would benefit the African and that it was not 
speculative development to make profits for white 
capitalists. The party was also anxious to ensure that 
the Africans were not forced to work for the white man 
against their will. It wanted the African to have the 
choice of either working for wages or working for himself 
on his own plot of land.
During the 1920s the Labour party maintained an 
ambiguous attitude towards colonial development. It was
1 . 200 H.C.Deb.,5s.f cols. 2357-2359, 9 December 1926.
2. ibid., cols. 2359-2360
3. Lord Delamere*s attitude was shown in a conversation 
with M. Perham when he said »What has the Negro ever 
done anywhere? Other races, when you strike contact, 
respond and progress...Look at this country! Everything 
is done for them - what do they do for themselves?»
M. Perham East African Journey (London,1976)pp.l38-9.
not against it but neither was it definitely in favor of it. 
There were a number of factors which made the party wary of 
industrial development in the African colonies. As has been 
pointed out, the trade unions feared that industrial develop­
ment would lead to competition from low-wage labour. There 
was also the feeling that, if resources were available for 
investment, it was better to use them at home to reduce un­
employment and improve the position of the British workers.
It was felt, by some, that Britain should sort out her 
domestic difficulties before worrying about Africa. 'Home 
First* wrote to Buxton that he should stop worrying about 
Africa and look at the problems of England. 1 Another 
factor was that some Labour M.P.s and African experts, 
particularly Josiah Wedgwood and E.D. Morel, when he was 
alive, felt that the process of industrialisation and 
development might lead to greater hardship and suffering 
for the Africans. They feared that industrialisation would 
break up the African way of life and replace it by 
industrial squalor. Wedgwood*s solution was to give 
the Africans enough land to make a living and then leave
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them alone. The humanitarian lobby and the experts of 
the A.C.I.Q. put the emphasis on protecting the Africans 
from exploitation by white settlers. They were suspicious 
that if development was controlled by white settlers it 
would be to the detriment of the Africans. The A.C.I.Q. 
was primarily concerned with the social welfare of the 
Africans and not with industrial development. Leys put 
the emphasis on securing political rather than economic 
development. The A.C.I.Q.*s policy emphasised the need 
to provide the Africans with land and education so that 
they would eventually be able to gain political control.
l e Brighouse and Elland Echo, 2k December 1930.
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The A.C.I.Qo assumed that if Africans were given the land 
and assisted to develop the resources of the land, 
agricultural production would improve as in West Africa.
The experts were against development by European syndicates 
or settlers through »hired* or forced African labour.
The Labour party put the emphasis on the development of 
African agriculture. The members of the A.C.I.Q. apart 
from Green, were not convinced of the value of railway aid 
mining development. The party took little positive 
interest in the problems of industrial development in the 
1920s. The only group which did show some interest was 
the Labour Commonwealth Group, but they were mainly concerned 
with developing trade with the countries of the empire, 
particularly, the Dominions, rather than advocating the 
industrial development of the African colonies. The Labour 
Commonwealth Group never put forward a coherent policy for 
colonial trade or the colonies. It wasditfided between those 
who favoured empire tariffs and those devoted to free trade. 
The Labour party as a whole did not have anything 
constructive to say about the development of the African 
colonies in the 1920s. It was the Conservatives and white 
settlers who were most eager for colonial development in the 
1920s.
In 1927 the Conservative Government issued a White 
Paper on »Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa».1 
It stated that the presence of the Governors and senior 
officials of the East African Dependencies had provided 
an opportunity for discussion of future policy with regard 
to East Africa. The paper continued to point out that 
although only four years had elapsed since the Devonshire
1 . »Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa*. Cmd.2904 
(1927)
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White Paper, various developments had taken place which 
necessitated another declaration. There had been the 
report of the East African Commission. 1 Following this 
there had been a conference of governors of the East 
African Dependencies in Nairobi in 1926. The announcement 
of the conference started a new movement on the part of the 
European settlers for closer contact between the six 
territories, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Nyasaland 
and Northern Rhodesia. The main hope was for closer 
contact between Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. Two 
unofficial conferences were held by leading settlers of 
the various dependencies. Other developments also pointed 
to the necessity of some closer union between the 
territories: the East African Loans Act necessitated the 
proper co-ordination of railways and other transport 
facilities; there was a general move towards co-operation 
as regards research facilities; there were identical 
customs tariffs in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, and a 
customs and postal union between Kenya and Uganda.
The White Paper stdnd that as a result of these factors, 
there should be an investigation as to how closer union 
and co-operation between the territories could be most 
effectively secured and whether it was possible to provide 
for increasing association of the immigrant communities 
in the responsibilities of government and, at the same time, 
for a more effective machinery of native representation. 
H.M.G. could not make any final decision until a further 
Commission of Enquiry had reported from East and Central 
Africa. They were therefore sending out a Commission to 
consider the question of closer union andvork out how it 
could take effect. The Government considered that some
1 . Report of the East African Commission, Cmd.2387 (l925> 
see pp.113-12 1.
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form of closer union appeared desirable »More particularly 
in regard to the development of transport communications, 
customs tariffs and customs administration, scientific 
research and defence».1 The White Paper concluded by 
stating that H.M.G. wished to make it clear that it adhered 
to the principles of the White Paper »Indians in Kenya*, but 
»At the same time they wish to place on record their view 
that, while these responsibilities of trusteeship must for 
some considerable time rest mainly on the agents of the 
Imperial Government, they desire to associate more closely 
in this high and honourable task those who, as colonists 
or residents, have identified their interests with the 
prosperity of the country. ' 2 The Conservative Colonial 
Secretary, Leopold Amery, was keen on the idea of Closer 
Union. He wrote in his memoirs that »a project that I 
had very much at heart was to bring a greater measure of 
administrative and political unity in Eastern and Central 
Africa.*^ In this he had the support of the Governor of 
Kenya, Sir Edward Grigg.
The White Paper was debated in the House of Commons 
in July 1927» J.H. Thomas said that when he became 
Colonial Secretary, there were tremendous pressures upon 
him to change policy, but, after having looked at the 
papers, Thomas had decided that not only were the views of 
the Duke of Devonshire sound but the policy was an 
unanswerable one. He thought that whatever the differences 
the parties had in regard to domestic issues, nothing but 
harm could accrue if it became known in the colonial 
administration that the policy which governed these
1. Cmd.290^ (1927) p.6.
2. Cmd.2904, p.7.
3 ‘ Y o l ^ J e b  Polttical (Hutchinson, 1954)
It. 209 H.C.Deb.,5s . ,cols.257-265, 9 J m y 1927.
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territories and millions of lives could not only be changed 
but thrown into the melting pot with a change of political 
party at Westminster. Such a position would be ruinous
because no Governor or administration could act with 
confidence, and the result would be chaos and confusion.
Now, warned Thomas, a new situation had developed, which 
to the Labour side of the House was very disturbing. *We 
take the view that what we set out to achieve, and that 
for which the Government of the day were themselves 
responsible, is not only not likely to be achieved but has 
been deliberately upset by the changed policy that has been 
introduced. * * 1
Thomas was concerned lest the Government lit the 
settlers have more responsibility for governing the countries 
in which they lived. The White Paper had stated that the 
settlers* »claim to share progressively in the responsibili­
ties of government cannot be ignored. * 2 Thomas thought 
that the Colonial Secretary alone should be responsible for 
the duties of trusteeship and he could not delegate or 
share that trust with anyone. Thomas wanted to know the 
names of the Commission. 3 4 He also asked for an assurance 
that no changes in East Africa would be made until the
House had a full opportunity for discussing the whole 
situation.
Harry Snell was Labour*s other main speaker in the
debate, He declared that the Labour>party, on the whole,
1 . ibid., col . 261
2. Cmd.2904(1927)p.5.
3. Amery sent a Commission to East Africa to study the 
question of Closer Union between Kenya, Tanganyika and 
Uganda. The Commission was composed of Sir Hilton Young, 
Dr. Oldham, Sir George Schuster and Sir Reginald Mant. 
Its report on «Closer Union in East and Central Africa5 was presented in January 1929, Cmd.3234.
4. 209 H.C.Deb. , 5 s . , c o l s . 2 7 5 - 2 7 9 ,  19 July 1927 .
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had felt very secure concerning East African affairs under 
the general principles of the Devonshire White Paper but 
they could not help feeling a sense of uneasiness and 
insecurity if* the policy was changed in the direction 
proposed. It was necessary that East Africa should continue 
under the security of the trusteeship of the Colonial Office 
until such time as the «natives* in the area were able, in 
a greater degree than they were at present, to take care of 
themselves and pull their weight in any legislative boat 
that might be launched. The African problem was whether 
East Africa would develop along the successful lines of 
West Africa or whether it would develop into a huge planta­
tion system which would create a new set of problems.
Snell was afraid that the new White Paper would make the 
continuation of an all-party front on colonial affairs 
impossible.
Amery stated1 that the 1923 White Paper had said that 
responsible self-government was not in sight. The new 
White Paper had also rejected the idea of creating self- 
government for white men for their own affairs while 
reserving the control of everything affecting the 'native' 
to the Imperial authorities. That was not a practical 
form of dyarchy in a country like East Africa, where white 
and black lived indissolubly bound together and where there 
was no aspect of self-government which the white could 
exercise without touching at every moment on his relation­
ship with the black. There, too, the Government had 
adopted and carried on the principles laid down in tie White 
Paper of 1923. The government said explicitly in the new 
White Paper that while rejecting the idea of white and black 
dyarchy, the progress towards self-government on the part of
1. 209 H.C.Deb.,5s.,cols.284-296, 19 july 1927,
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the settleiswould mean the association of that community with 
Great Britain in the sense of trusteeship for the weaker and 
more numerous parts of the population.
In the Lords, Lord Olivier stated that the 1923 
declaration that ,native* interests should be paramount had 
never been put into practice. He wondered whether the 
Government was going to change that stated 1923 policy under 
the cover of the new White Paper. Olivier did not like 
talk about trusteeship. He had been brought up in the 
Colonial Office when they did not profess to exercise 
trusteeship but to maintain the principles of freedom and 
absolute justice in dealing with the*native>races. He 
thought that until Britain could maintain equality and 
give equal political rights in East Africa, she should 
not give any class a privileged position.3- Lord Olivier, 
like Leys, was putting forward the policy of equal rights 
rather than trusteeship.
Lord Arnold, Thomas's Under-Secretary at the Colonial
Office, also urged that the Government should not give in
to the demands of Lord Delamere and others for an elected
European majority over all parties in the Legislative
2Council of Kenya.
Discussing the White Paper and the debate, 'The Times* 
thought that the 1923 White Paper had not faithfully repres­
ented the facts. In Kenya, the settlers enjoyed in 
constitutional theory a certain share in the government and 
in actual practice a very considerable share. The idea 
that the political and economic development of the settlers 
and »natives* could only take place at the expense of each 
other should be avoided. The essence of the dual policy of 12
1 . 69 H.L.Deb.,5s., cols.551-574,
2. 66 H.L.Deb.,5s•, cols»133’“l46, 7 December 1927» 17 February 1927»
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»native* development and white settlement was that each 
half of the policy should make the other half easier. The 
task of the future was to ensure complementary economic and 
political development. It would not be easy since white 
settlement and white aspirations advanced much more rapidly 
than did native* political capacity. »The Times* thought 
that the main course of »native* development should lie 
through invigorated tribal authority and educated chiefs, 
but for many years to come trusteeship would continue to 
be a faithful description of the Government*s relationship 
to the bulk of the inhabitants of East Africa. There was 
everything to be said for Mr. Thomas*s plea that there 
should be the utmost continuity of policy and an agreed 
body of doctrines on colonial questions so that it was 
understood that nothing was to be feared from the 
vicissitudes of domestic politics in Britain. Colonial 
developments should be beyond the reach of party. There 
was hardly a more inflammable subject than »native* 
labour where trivial, ill-considered and hasty expressions, 
whether of suspicion or fanaticism at home or of impatience 
or acquisitiveness overseas, had more power to do harm . 1
The official Labour attitude was that the Labour party 
had preserved a policy of continuity with the Duke of DeTonshlra.„ 
declaration of 1923 that African interests should be 
paramount. The Labor party felt that Devonshire*s
declaration would be broken if power was given to the white 
settlers.
The A.CJ.Q. wrote memoranda on »The present position 
in East Africa»2 and »The federation of East Africa»,3 in
1 . »The Times», 22 July 1927, pl5.
2. A.C.I.Q. «The Present Position in East Africa», 1927.
3. A.C.I.Q. «The Federation of East Africa* 1927
which it warned that schemes for closer union or federation 
were probably aimed at achieving self-government for the 
whites at the expense of the African inhabitants of East 
Africa* Harry Snell also wrote a memo on the 'Problem of 
Forced Labour', in which he stated that the African should 
be free from compulsion to labour for another person* He 
believed that the Labour party should definitely set itself 
against forced labour and any system of taxation which forced 
the African to leave his own land and work for other people.'*' 
In the *New Statesman* Lord Olivier wrote that *Dual 
Policies* did not exist in civilised Christian states.
The Government's White Paper stated that Africans had
• orights but presumably different ones from the Europeans.
Olivier thought that 'Future Policy in Regard to East 
3
Africa* should be read alongside McGregor Ross's new book
4on Kenya - 'Kenya from Within* , which was a record of the
exploits of the 'settlerfe policy*. The settlers had
prevailed on Amery to tear up the Duke of Devonshire's
White Paper and promise to invite them to share with the
Imperial Government the trusteeship which it had repeatedly
promised should continue to be administered by Colonial
5Office agents alone.
Norman Leys also agreed that Ross'shook was the most 
overwhelming exposure of misgoverament that had been
g
written in modern times. Leys was worried that the 
Government would give constitutional as well as practical
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2.
3*4.
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6.
A.C.I.Q. 'The Labour Party and the Problem of forced Labour*, H. Snell, 1927*
•New Statesman*, 19 November 1927* p.175* 
op.cit.,Cmd.2904,1927•
McGregor Ross, 'Kenya from Within*, (London,1927) 
•New Statesman', 19 November 1927, p.175.
♦New Leader', 2 December 1927, p.l4.
control to the very people whose incompetence and dishonesty 
had been so lucidly exposed by McGregor Ross. If this 
happened, no future Labour Government would be able to 
ensure that justice was done without subduing a rebellion.
However, C.R. Buxton was not as despondent as Leys 
about the prospects for the black man. The British working 
class was waking up to the problem, numerous questions were 
asked in the House of Commons and debates such as that on 
the East African Loans Bill had shown that a large number 
of Labour M.P.»S were well-informed on colonial problems. 
Kenya was a storm centre where the whites were trying to 
rush something through before the Labour Government came 
back to power but articles and books by Leys and Ross 
were a healthy sign of the times, and the Labour party*s 
pamphlet, »Labour and the Empire: Africa* showed that 1h e 
Labour party was concerned with the problem. There had 
also been an international awakening, J.H. Harris had 
pointed out that there were three lines of advance in his 
book »Slavery or Sacred Trust?». These were the mandate 
system, the anti-slavery convention of the 1926 I.L.O. 
conference, and the decision to form a committee of 
experts in Geneva who would form, over a period of 2 or 
3 years, a convention covering the principal conditions 
for the employment of»native*workers throughout the world. 
C.R. Buxton thought that »gradualness» was inevitable in 
colonial questions where public opinion was not well- 
informed. Any forward movement was beset with additional 
obstacles unknown in matters of home politics. 1
The Colonial Office Vote for 1928 was largely ccerned 
with discussion of theNative Lands Trust Ordinance which
1 ' 1928,p?5?er* * ^  M °y 1927,P‘10i 'New Leader *, 6 January
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purported to give the natives security of tenure on the 
reserves. The A.C.I.Q. criticised the Bill because, while 
professing to create security of occupation, in fact it only 
put up a legal facade behind which the land in the African 
reserves could be leased to the settlers for any period up 
to 99 years. The A.C.I.Q. thought that no land in African 
reserves should be leased to white settlers. The Labour 
party should oppose the Bill unless it was amended.
In the debate, Harry Snell2 said that the measure was 
of fundamental importance and that the general principle of 
the Bill was good. It could provide a real charter on 
which everything could be built in the future. However, 
under the measure as it stood, it would appear that the 
'native1 was almost entirely at the mercy of the white 
settlers. Although the white settlers in Kenya were neither 
better nor worse than any other people in the world, the 
House of Commons had a very sacred obligation to look after 
the interests of the «natives* and had to look very carefully 
into what was proposed as regards their future. The 
proposal to lease land witiin the reserves to white settlers 
for periods up to 99 years could lead to the white settlers 
getting hold of the best land. Snell also thought that 
the Board which was to administer the scheme should be 
representative of the »natives». The Labour party feared 
that it would represent the views of the settlers and not 
the desires of the »natives*. By excluding the «natives*, 
a great opportunity was being lost to train them. J.H. 
Thomas put similar points in his speech, 3 and Josiah 
Wedgwood declared that the Native Land Trust Bill, coming 64
1 .
2-
3 -
A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 
219 H.C.Deb.,5s•, 
219 H.C.Deb.,5s. ,
64, June 1928.
cols. 2646-2653* June 1928.
cols.2693-2697.
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as it did, after all the hope of getting the reserves
demarcated permanently. , had destroyed not only hope but
1  ^  _confidence for ever. The Bill was not passed before 
there was a change of Government and it was altered by the 
Labour Government,
The Commission, which the Government had sent out to 
East Africa to investigate the question of closer union 
xinder Sir E, Hilton-Young, reported early in 1929, 2 It
proposed a central authority for the maintenance of proper 
principles in regard to dealing with the Africans. A High 
Commissioner or a Governor-General should be appointed with 
a council of three territorial governors supported by 
advisory committees. Responsible government could not be 
granted to Kenya in the near future. The settlers were 
not pleased with the report and the Colonial Secretary sent 
his permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Samuel Wilson, out to 
East Africa to consult the local governments and report 
whether the scheme for closer union, which the Commission 
had suggested, would be workable and acceptable to the three 
dependencies of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika.
Buxton and most members of the AoC.I.Q. thought that 
the report of the Commission was much more favourable to 
Labour's policies than had seemed probable.-* The demand 
for closer union had been supported by those who were 
demanding "responsible government" or a majority in the 
Legislative Council for the white elected members. The 
white settlers were disturbed by the possibility that a 
Labour Secretary of State might put into effect Labour*s 
declared policy as published in its pamphlets on the empire 
in Africa. 'It is not going too far to say that the demand 123
1 . 219 H.C.Deb.,5s., cols. 2666-2676.
2. Cmd. 3234 (1929)
3. A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 68A, February 1929.
230
for some form of responsible government was due to a wish on 
the part of the settlers to assure themselves of control 
over the Legislature before Labour came into office.*
Since the Conservative Colonial Secretary, L.S. Amery, had 
refused the demand for responsible government, the settlers 
had put their hope of gaining a revision of the constitution 
on some form of closer union. Although the report had 
recommended a form of closer union under a Governor-General 
for Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, it had treated the 
economic reasons advanced for federation as comparatively 
unimportant. The greater part of the report was devoted 
to laying down principles of African policy and suggesting 
means for putting them into practice. The A.C.I.Q. thought 
that the report*s proposals for a Governor-General and an 
unofficial majority in the Kenya Legislative Council should 
not be supported unless it was clearly laid down that the 
Governor-General was directly responsible to the Secretary 
of State and Parliament, and that the members of the Kenya 
Legislative Council nominated to represent African 
interests were persons in sympathy with the Government 
policy of trusteeship. The aim should be that eventually 
Africans would represent their own interests. The main 
concern of the A.C.X.Q. was that the proposed Governor- 
General and the new Legislative Council should not neglect 
the interests of the Africans and forget that the aim of 
trusteeship was that the Africans should eventually be able 
to govern themselves.
Lord Olivier wrote in the »New Statesman* that»Mr. 
Amery*s good-hearted desire to oblige the aspirations of 
the Kenya federationists has resulted in the issue of a 
report which recommends that, so far from giving the local
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Europeans greater power in the Government of East Africa, a 
more efficient Imperial agency should be established to keep 
them in order. ' 1 In the House of Lords, Olivier moved that 
any proposals for constitutional or administrative changes in 
East Africa should be submitted for consideration to a Joint 
Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament. The Labour 
party would not be bound by any kind of agreement or 
understanding made between an ambassador, Six* Samuel Wilson,
Oand persons in East Africa.
There was disagreement within the A.C.I.Q. about the 
Hilton Young Report. Generally it was well received by 
the Labour experts; Buxton and Olivier3 thought that the 
Report was much more favourable to African interests than 
they were expecting. However, Norman Leys and J.H. Harris, 
who had now joined the Labour party, felt that the report 
put too much emphasis on the policy of 'trusteeship*.
Leys wrote to Harris that he had »failed to get the Labour 
party Advisory Committee to stand by their guns and openly 
advocate the equal rights policy'. Even Wedgwood seemed 
to think it better to accept the report. Leys felt that 
•the trusteeship policy had never worked whereas the equal 
rights policy had prevented oppression. To my mind the
whole trusteeship policy besides being hopelessly vague 
and sentimental, is a putting of natives into splints when 
what they need is to be allowed freedom....This report is 
always drawing artificial distinctions between races and
deducting that in consequence people ought to behave quite
d iffe re n tly  to them........ I cannot understand why Olivier
t r  •New Statesman', 26 January 1929, p.489.
2 . 73 H.L.Deb. , 5s . , c o ls . 470—485, 13 March 19 2 9
3. Olivier had criticised the ‘trusteeship* nolicv in th*
Lords but he thought that the Hllton V o u n g r e p o r i  gave the
? ? « » e mT w £ V qUal rlgi ta- He believed a Jointboth Ho“ses °f Parliament should reach- all-part./ agree 
tb° r\P°r*; D” Pite Olivier's doubts about trustee-
rejected. reP°rt Sh°Uld not be completely
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and Buxton cannot see all that. I suppose the explanation 
is that they believe the proposals of the report would be 
an improvement on things as they are. But would they?*1
The main difference between Leys and the other members 
of the A.C.I.Q. was that Leys felt that it was vital that 
the African should be given equal status with the white man 
and that it was»heresy* to think that the »Africans ought to 
have a future different from other people.» 2 Gupta thinks 
that most of Labour*s colonial experts suffered from a 
•racial-cultural typology* apart from Leys. Gupta believes 
that this stifled serious analysis of African colnnial 
development. 3 Woolf4 divided the dependencies into three 
classifications, those of European, Oriental and primitive 
culture. In the first two self-government could be given 
when it was demanded by the inhabitants but in the last 
category a period of paternalist government from London 
was called for. The Labour party adopted this classifica­
tion. Gupta argues that the Labour party under-estimated 
the Africans because it suffered from a superiority complex 
vis-a-vis the Africans. He seems to imply that the 
Africans were as ready as the other colonies and dependencies 
of Asia and.Africa for self-government. This may or may 
not have been true, but very few people thought that the 
Africans should have responsible government or independence 
in the 1920s. There were a few on the extreme left of the 
Labour party who thought that the empire should be 
abandoned but the experts of the A.C.I.Q., lncluding Norman
Leys, believed that independence could not come immediately 
in Africa. The main worry was that if Britain withdrew
1.
2.
3-
4.
N. Leys to J.H
G.144.
Harris, 17 February 1929, A.S.A.P.A.Papers,
N. Leys to M.W. Holtby, W. Holtby 
Drawer 4 File 8.
P.S. Gupta, op.cit.,pp.126-132. 
A.C.I.Q. Memo, No . 22 January 1926.
Papers, 9 June 1932,
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from Africa the white settlers or other Europeans would 
gain control. It was also felt that the Africans were not 
educated enough to rule themselves. Norman Leys wrote in 
the 1920s that 'paternal government« would have to be 
pursued in Kenya and Tanganyika for 20 years. Leys thought 
that »education is the key to everything in Africa. It will 
require large expenditure* but «the money cannot be got under 
the «plantation» system. It can only be got if West African 
political and economic methods are followed.» Leys' 
solution was to extend »the national franchise to Africans 
pari passu with the spread of education. * 1 Buxton wrote 
in the 1920s that if the British withdrew from Africa there 
would be chaos. Imperialism was necessary so that the 
empire could be reformed for the benefit of the inhabitants. 2 
The majority of the Labour party was committed to reforming 
the empire rather than withdrawing to leave, as they thought, 
the Africans at the mercy of the settlers or the Communist 
International, which, according to Buxton, was stirring up 
subject peoples in the colonies to armed revolt. (The 
Labour party was very suspicious of communist organisations - 
the League Against Imperialism was boycotted.)
However, the party's policy of reform was not very 
clear. It did not give a clear answer to the question; 
S-houldthe Africans be educated to take their place in modern 
civilisation or should they be educated in a different way 
from white people so that they could use their own tribal 
institutions to better effect? The party was committed to 
education but was ambiguous about whether the education
1 . N. Leys, »Memo on Tropical Africa*. lQ2n« r n * Papers, Box 5/3. * 92°S* C,R* Buxton
2*Box^/3^Xt°n * ,C0l0^1allsra,« W20s, C.R. Buxton Papers
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provided should be the same as was provided for whites or 
a different, specifically •African*, education. Norman 
Leys put the emphasis on equal education. Snell appeared 
to suggest a very paternalist scheme of education for the 
Africans, and, MacGregor Ross hoped for a better education 
for the Africans than for Europeans.^ Leys believed thdt 
equal status should be given to whites and blacks and that 
the franchise should be equally available to all providing 
they passed an educational test.
Labour party colonial policy towards Africa during 
the 1920s was directed towards preparing the Africans for 
eventual independence rather than giving independence 
immediately. This was a logical policy as long as it was 
pursued forcefully. It would have been very difficult, 
if not impossible, for the Africans to rule themselves in 
the 1920s successfully. A number of factors made it 
difficult for the party to pursue a positive policy of 
reform; the leadership of the party was not very interested 
in the problems of the African colonies, they were more 
concerned with solving the problem of unemployment. The 
1929 General Election manifesto only mentioned the colonies 
as potential markets: "There is a great market at home 
which can be developed by increasing the purchasing power 
of the working classes. There is a greater market overseas, 
especially in India and the Crown Colonies, where there are 
eno xrnous populations with a very low standard of living 
and vast underdeveloped resources.» 2 Another problem was 
that the party's policy was ambiguous, and, for all the 
efforts of the A.C.I.Q., was not very well thought out.
There was too much preoccupation with Kenya and too great a
1 . N. i^eys xo W. Holtby, 15 November 1930, W. Holtby Papers, Drawer 4, File 8.
2. 1929 General Election Manifesto, (The Labour Party, 1929)
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readiness to accept the system in West Africa as almost 
perfect. MacDonald, Woolf and Green favoured indirect 
r u l e ^ ^ e y s  did not; Green favoured industrial development 
but others such as Wedgwood and Leys, did not; Snell 
favoured a paternalist education policy, but Leys did not; 
Webb and others thought the African was a different type 
of person to the European but Leys, Maxton and Brockway 
did not. Another factor was that the trade union movement 
was not very interested in the colonies and neither was 
the electorate. The party failed to educate the electorate 
into appreciating the problems of the African colonies.
This was shown by the absence of discussion of African 
colonial policy in Labour»s 1929 election manifesto.
The other major factor, which prevented Labour making much 
progress with its policy of reform, was, that for most of 
the interwar period, it was out of office. Therefore, 
when it was in office, it was essential to make as much 
effort as possible to pursue a policy of positive reform. 
The dependence of the Labour Governments on Liberal support 
was not as much a handicap over Africa as is sometimes 
made out ;1 for the Liberals also believed in reforming 
the African empire to further the interests of the Africans. 
Despite all the ambiguities and uncertainties, Labour policy 
was clear on some things; the white settlers should not be 
allowed to become more powerful in East Africa, the 
Africans should have enough land to live on, priority should 
be given to African education, the burden of taxation should 
be placed more heavily on the white settlers than the 
Africans, communal franchises should be abolished, racial 
discrimination should cease, and there should be no pressure
1 . R.G. Gregory op.cit., p.266.
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on the Africans to work for Europeans. The members of the 
A.C.I.Q. were hoping that the second Labour Colonial 
Secretary would be more successful in instituting reform 
in Africa than Thomas had been. Leys wrote to Harris:
"What a chance to make history the next Labour Colonial 
Secretary will have! Imagine the result if in all the 
African dependencies he required the governments to revise 
all Ordinances so as to eliminate all distinctions of race."*
1. N. Leys to J.H 
Papers G.l44.
H arris,
20 January 1929, A.S.A.P.S.
CHAPTER 6
THE SECOND LABOUR GOVERNMENT
EAST AFRICA
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The result of the General Election that took place on 
30 May 1929 was that Labour gained 8#360,000 votes and 287 
seats, the Conservatives 8,664,000 votes and only 26l seats and 
the Liberals 5,300,000 votes and the grossly disproportionate 
number of 59 seats In this election, the quirks of the 
British electoral system had benefited ttie Labour party at 
the expense of the other two parties. Labour needed less
votes to win a seat than the Conservative or Liberal parties.
Among the Labour M.P.s there was a large increase in the
total sponsored by divisional Labour parties - 128 as
against 25 in 1924, and, for the first time, trade-union
sponsored M.P.s numbered less than half of the total - 115.
The I.L.P. sponsored successes amounted to 36, nearly half
of them being in Scotland, and the Co~operative party won
9 seats. The Labour party had made the most progress in
London and in Lancashire where the cotton industry was
2going through a depression.
The uncertainty about which party or combination of 
parties would form the government was ended on 4 June when 
Baldwin resigned and the King sent for MacDonald and asked 
him to form a government. MacDonald again chose the 
Labour ministers, although he did consult with senior 
colleagues. MacDonald interviewed Sidney Webb on 6 June 
1929 and the conclusion of the interview was that Webb 
accepted a peerage in order to take over the Dominions 
and Colonial Office. However, Sidney Webb had not been
the first choice for Dominions and Colonial Secretary. 
Th. »ay the Cabinet »., cho.en depended on a number of 
involved factora, political and peraon.l, the least
1 . C.F. Brand, «The Dritish Labour P»r+vt tr ^ ___1965),p.133. «'arty• (London: OUP,
2. H. Palling, Short Historv oi* +1.» » ,
(London, 1 9 6 8 , 3rd Edition
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important seemed to be who was most suited for which post. 
Thomas and Henderson both wanted the Foreign Office. 
MacDonald seemed inclined to give the Foreign Office to 
Thomas; but Henderson was determined to be Foreign Secre­
tary, * and became ‘very angry* when it was suggested that 
Thomas should be given the post. MacDonald then tried to 
persuade Thomas to take the Dominions and Colonial Office, 
which Thomas was reluctant to do, if Henderson was going 
to be Foreign Secretary. The fact that the Dominions and 
Colonial Office was offered to Thomas suggests that 
MacDonald had no complaints about the way Thomas had handled 
the Colonial Office in 1924, and that MacDonald was not 
putting a priority on enforcing the rights of Africans 
against those of the settlers in East Africa. Thomas did, 
however, decide to accept the Dominions and Colonial Office 
because he «ought that MacDonald was going to be Foreign 
Secretary again. When Thomas found that this was not so, 
he was annoyed that he had been »tricked* by Henderson and 
refused to be Dominions and Colonial Secretary. In the 
end, Thomas decided to accept the post of Lord Privy Seal 
and Director-General of Employment Schemes. 2
The next person who was considered to be Dominions 
and Colonial Secretary was, according to Snowden,
AeV. Alexander. Initially, it seems that Sidney Webb 
was only going to be given a peerage. When the Webbs 
heard this from Parmoor, they were a *wee bit disconcerted* 
that MacDonald had intended to leave Sidney Webb out of the 
Cabinet, for the Webbs had decided that Sidney would not
1 .
2.
3.
D. Marquand, op.cit., pp.489-491
P. Snowden, »An Autobiography*, Vol. 2 (London.1934)pp.760-766.
A.V. Alexander had been a stoker in the navy and was an 
important figure in the co-operative movement.
accept a peerage unless he was given office*1 23 MacDonald 
then decided that, since the Labour Government had to have 
two Secretaries of State in the House of Lords to comply 
with constitutional convention, Sidney Webb should be given 
a peerage to become Secretary of State for the Dominions 
and the Colonies* Alexander became the First Lord of the 
Admiralty*
Beatrice records that *Sidney was delighted with the 
C.O.; it is his old office as a civil servant, one about
owhich he knows a good deal more than some others.' The 
appointment seemed more promising than that of J*H* Thomas 
in 1924. Webb had been a civil servant in the Colonial
Office, as Beatrice pointed out, and he was one of the 
leading 'Intellectuals' of the Labour party* (M. Perhatn 
referred to him as 'the leading expert on Labour practice 
and p h i l o s o p h y * . I t  was largely due to him that the 
advisory committees had been set up after the First World 
War. However, he was over 70 when he became Secretary 
of State and his main reforming impulses had always been 
directed towards domestic politics. Leonard Woolf wrote 
that 'Sidney was in politics curiously ambivalent; he 
must have been born half a little Conservative and half 
a little Liberal. He was a progressive, even a 
revolutionary, in some economic and social spheres; where 
the British Empire was concerned he was a common or garden
Limperialist conservative.' Drummond Shiels thought
that he was more interested in'investigating and devising 
the form and machinery of government and administration than
1 . M.I. Cole, ed. 'Beatrice Webb's Diaries. 1924-^2»
(London, 1956),pp.196-197.
2. Diaries, op.cit., p.197.
3 . M. Perham, East African 
k, L. Woolf, »Downhill All Journey (London,1 9 7 6 ).p.l6 . the Way' (London,1967)#P*236.
in considering how these could and should be applied to a 
world-wide variety of hitman beings by other human beings«*^ 
Sidney Webb could not understand why some people became so 
worked up about political issues and why there was always 
such a note of urgency in the demands of outside political 
and humanitarian organisations« Webb believed in 
evolutionary socialism but his progress in colonial affairs 
was so slow that to many it could hardly be detected. 
Beatrice contrasted his attitude to that of Wedgwood who 
was always demanding fervent partisanship. Wedgwood was 
angry at Sidney's lack of unqualified enthusiasm for the 
cause of the Jewish settlers and lack of unqualified 
hostility to the English settlers in Kenya. Sidney, wrote 
his wife, had no dislikes for a particular person or 
community; he only asked about a particular project 'how 
would it work, what state of af&Lrs would it bring about 
and would the persons concerned be likely to benefit or 
lose by it?' He was singularly indifferent to whether 
his way prevailed. If the Cabinet decided to listen to 
other voices he would carry out their wishes to the best 
of his ability. 'When he is acting in a responsible 
administration he is, in fact, an excellent civil servant - 
his instinct is to obey the orders of his chief and make 
the best of the business.* Fenner Brockway of the I.L.P. 
thinks that Webb made an ineffectual minister. He was 
not very good in Parliament; the Tories disliked him 
because he was a middle-class intellectual who had turned 
against his class and joined the socialists.^ One of 
Webb's achievements, while he was Colonial Secretary, was 123
1 . Drummond Shi&s, op.cit.,p.203
2 . B. Webb Diaries, op.cit.,p.230
3 . Interview, 24 July 1973.
242
that he did unify the Colonial service. This was a scheme 
which he prepared on his own initiative. He announced his 
intention of proceeding with the scheme for the unification 
of the Colonial Service at a dinner on 16 July 1930, when he 
said that he had secured the help of Sir Warren Fisher, the 
Permanent Secretary of the Treasury in the making of the 
plan. There were difficulties to be overcome because of the 
different conditions of entry into the Service in the
different Colonies.'*' 
scheme and the Service
However, Webb went ahead with his 
was unified. It seemed that Webb,
or Lord Passfield as he became, enjoyed devising administra­
tive reforms better than dealing with the political problems 
of the Colonial Office. However, the effects of this 
reform were that it made it more difficult for indigenous 
people to become colonial civil servants. 2
One of the earliest debates that the Colonial Office 
became engaged in during Passfield*s tenure was that over 
the Colonial Development Bill. The main reason that the 
Colonial Development Bill was introduced was to encourage 
employment at home in Britoira rather than to develop the 
colonies. J.H. Thomas, George Lansbury, Tom Johnston 
and Sir Oswald Mosley had been appointed as a sub-committee 
to prepare work schemes. Mosley asked the House to accept 
the scheme because the credits which it would provide would 
mean the purchase of steel and other articles from Britain.^ 
The idea was not primarily a Labour one, it had been first
1 .
2.
3*
4.
D. Shiels ‘Sidney Webb as a Minister* in M.I. Cole (ed.), 
•The Webbs and their Work*, (London,1949),p. 203
K. Robinson ‘Dilemmas of Trusteeship* (London,1 9 6 5 ),pp.43-5E. A. Brett, op.cit., p.133
Fenner Brockway, ‘Inside the Left* (London, 1947 ed.)p.200.
proposed by the Conservatives, 1 234and was basically designed 
to alleviate British unemployment. The act authorised 
grants of up to £ 1 ,000,000 a year for schemes in the colonies; 
one of the largest was a scheme for a bridge over the Zambezi. 
By March 1931, the Colonial Development schemes were thought
2to be providing 7,000 men with direct employment in Britain.
One of the main problems of the Bill from the point of
view of the Labour party's colonial experts was that it
permitted the use of forced labour and, even forced child
3labour, on jobs that it financed. Fenner Brockway and 
C.R. Buxton protested about this in the Second Reading 
Debate. Fenner Brockway, making his maiden speech, said 
that the Government should seek to prepare and bring before 
the International Labour Office a definite code, laying down 
the minimum of conditions for the workers in these countries. 
This should include the definite prohibition of forced labour 
and the prohibition of child labour, at least under the age 
of 12, on such schemes. He hoped that in carrying out 
the schemes a proportion of the expenditure would be spent 
in the reserves. Any increased value of land which 
resulted from the development of the schemes should go to 
the benefit of the public and not private individuals. 
Brockway also thought that the new developments should be 
under public auspices and not conducted by private 
enterprise.^
Amery, the former Colonial Secretary, thought that the 
Governments of the Colonies should be allowed to determine 
whether child labour should be employed on the schemes. 5
1 . D. Goldsworth, 'Colonial Issues in British Politics. 
1945-61 (Oxford,197l)*p.114.
2. R. Skidelsky, 'Politicians and the Slump* (London.1970 
ed.)p.337.
3. Fenner Brockway, op.cit.,p.200
4. 230 H.C. Deb.,5s., cols.505-509,17 July 1929.
5. ibid, 739-740.
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However, Charles Buxton strongly disagreed: forced labour 
and child labour were likely under the work and enterprises
stimulated and encouraged by the Bill unless there was a 
definite restriction against them«1 Lunn, the Under­
secretary of State at the Colonial Office, stated that all 
possible precautions would be taken to ensure that recourse 
would not be had to forced labour of any kind and that 
the amount of labour drawn from any one tribe was not so 
large as to have a detrimental effect on tribal life. 2
However, Brockway was not satisfied that child labour 
would not result unless a definite provision was inserted 
to exclude it. At the Committee stage of the Bill,
Brockway stated that “unless a provision is inserted 
definitely excluding child labour, 1 and my friends will 
vote against the Bill,'»3 The Government reconsidered, 
after Brockway had met Mosley and Colonial Office officials, 
and an amendment was accepted to prohibit child labour on 
Government schemes of work . 4 This is an example of the 
humanitarian lobby achieving some success in persuading 
the Labour Government not to completely follow civil 
servant advice.
Lord Passfield was not very closely involved with the 
Colonial Development Bill. He left his Under-Secretary 
for the Colonies, Lunn, to handle the Colonial Office side 
of the Bill. Lunn moved from the Colonial Office in a 
Government reshuffle at the end of the year and was 
replaced by Drummond Shiels for whom Passfield had originally
aakad. 5 Mr». Webb, who r.fua.d to be called Lady P.aart.ld,
1 . ibid., 740-743
2. ibid., 471-478
3. Brockway, op.cit., p.201.
4. ibid, p.202.
5. Diaries, op.cit.,p.198.
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thought that Drummond Shiela was conceited and regarded 
himself and his opinions and his future as important to the 
world*s history. She thought he had an equal contempt for 
the revolutionary folly of the Clyde and the reactionary 
conservatism of government officials. Mrs. Webb suspected 
that Shiels regarded himself as Sidney*s guardian rather 
than Sidney*s subordinate. He said to her: WI hope I 
shall be able to agree with your husband's policy. I want 
to be loyal to him in the House of Commons" . 1 Drummond 
Shiels was to exert pressure on Lord Passfield to try to
persuade him not to always follow the advice of his senior 
civil servants.
One of the major problems of the Colonial Office, with 
which Lord Passfield was very closely connected, was that 
of East Africa. East Africa's main territories were Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanganyika. Uganda was a protectorate and with 
its small number of white settlers, escaped the main 
pressures of the Closer Union controversy. Tanganyika 
was a League of Nations Mandate and its Governor, Sir Donald 
Cameron was strongly committed to the policy of trusteeship. 
He believed in using 'indirect rule' to train the Africans 
in local self-government. Cameron, according to M. Parham, 
was completely opposed to the Governor of Kenya, Sir 
Edward Grigg2, in temperament and political ideals. Cameron 
was very keen on putting the interests of the Africans 
first and was sympathetic to Labour policy. Therefore, the 
main area of controversy was Kenya where the Governor and the 
settlers wanted to extend the power of the settlers so that 
the colony would be controlled by the white settlers for the 
foreseeable future, if not for ever. In a memorandum written
1 . ibid., p.232.
2. M. Perham, East African Journey (London,1976),pp.l4-l8.
for the Cabinet in November 1929, Passfield wrote that no 
subject had given him so much cause for consideration as the 
changes to be made in Bast Africa. *1 think that Kenya has 
been in my thoughts every day since we took office. * 1 
Beatrice wrote in her diary that Sidney was spending long 
days at the Colonial Office interviewing endless people.
His attention was concentrated on Kenya, where the Permanent 
Head of the Colonial Office, Sir Samuel Wilson, had been 
enquiring on the spot to test the conclusions of Hilton 
Young’s Report. Mrs. Webb enjoyed watching her husband 
in the role of an administrator again. He was intent, she 
thought, on discovering what was practicable in the direction 
of racial equality and preventing oppressive policy on the
part of the white settlers. Kenya was the dominant problem
oof Colonial administration outside the Dominions.
Passfield issued the report of his Permanent Secretary,
3Sir Samuel Wilson, as a White Paper,J although he emphasised 
in the foreword that this did not mean that the Government 
accepted it but would be issuing its own conclusions later 
on. The Wilson Report was more favourable to the settlers 
than the Hilton Young Report. Wilson drew up a scheme of 
economic co-ordination and provided for a High Commissioner 
to put this into effect. The High Commissioner would be 
assisted by a federal council with an officidL majority on 
which the three territories, Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, 
would be represented. The Kenya Legislative Council was 
to be reconstituted with the four groups - officials, elected 
members, nominated members to represent general African 
interests and Indians - balancing each other so that none *23
C . F . 308 (29), November 1929*
2. Diaries, op.cit., p.204.
3. »Report of Sir Samuel Wilson on his visit to East Africa, 
1929*, Cmd.3378.
had a clear majority. However, there would be an unofficial 
although not an elected, majority. Wilson had persuaded 
the settlers to accept this and drop their claim for an 
elected majority on the Council. This, and the shelving 
of the question of the common roll, led to Wilson's report 
being favourably received among the settlers. Wilson also 
managed to win the approval of the Governors of Uganda and 
Kenya, but the Governor of Tanganyika, Sir Donald Cameron, 
thought that it would be better to postpone any action until 
it was possible to formulate a 'native' policy for East 
Africa. In his memoirs, Cameron wrote that the attitude 
of the European settlers was obstructing a solution. They 
were seeking to obtain a settlement which would secure to 
them the political control exercised by the Home Government. 1 
Sir Donald Cameron suggested that a 'highly authoritative 
Committee or Commission' should be set up in London which 
would examine witnesses and give those who were not in 
favour of the principles advocated in the Hilton Young report 
an opportunity to state their views. The members of the 
A.C.I.Q. were more strongly against the Wilson Report than 
Cameron. McGregor Ross thought that it was a 'poisonous 
and foolish productinn'? The A.C.I.Q., the A.S.A.P.S., 
and Cameron, Lugard and Oldham started a campaign to ensure 
that it was not put into effect.
Sir Donald Cameron, with Lord Lugard and Oldham, the 
secretary of the International Missionary Society, had been 
waging a fight to stop the Conservative ministers, Amery and 
Grigg, from imposing a pro-settler constitution In East 
Africa. They viewed the change of Government as a great
x * Service *nd
2. McGregor Ross to Northey 26 December 1929 Papers. * McGregor Ross
opportunity and, writes Margery Perham, »turned to the new 
ministers like flowers to the sun. Lugard did not agree
with those in the Labour party who thought that the British 
Empire was based upon exploitation but he did take the duty 
of trusteeship seriously. He did not wish to see the white 
settlers maintaining white supremacy for all time. With 
Cameron and Oldham, he wished to reach all-party agreement 
on East Africa especially since the new ministry was not in 
a very secure position. In order to try to bring this 
about Lord Lugard went to see Passfield early in September. 
After dinner, the two of them went on talking until midnight, 
Passfield taking notes. Lugard thought that Passfield was 
•most grateful for my advice. He was really entirely in 
agreement with me, but could only do what was practicable.
The Colonial Office naturally wanted the line of the least 
resistance. He could not bind himself to do nothing 
without previously consulting me but would do hia best to 
do so .» 2
Passfield*s attitude to the problem of change in East 
Africa seems to have been that «we cannot get improvements 
in these places faster than our officials can be persuaded 
to go. Theirs are the hands that must carry out the 
reforms; and we have to carry them with us in each success­
ive change, which must be mainly a change of spirit.•
However, Drummond Shiels thought that Passfield had not 
realised that many of the younger men in the Colonial field, 
as well as in the Colonial Office itself, had already got 
this change of spirit and were expecting a vigorous lead 
in applying it from the xiew Labour Government . 3
** Y6arS °f «»8-1*43
2. ibid.,pp.686-687
3« Shiels, op.cit•,p.207.
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According to the ’New Leader*1 the fate of 10 million 
Africans hung in the balance as a result of the Wilson 
Report; should the country be ruled in the Africans' 
interests or in the interests of the 20v000 European 
settlers? Both parties had stated that 'native interests 
must be paramount*' The point had now been reached when 
it was necessary to decide by what means effect would be 
given to these declarations* The African wast however, 
totally unfitted to exercise the franchise, he had not 
long 'emerged from barbarism' and his condition was still 
backward* Immediate self-government was out of the question 
and Hilton Young had recommended a High Commissioner to look 
after 'native* interests* The Wilson report had agreed that 
there should be a High Commissioner to co-ordinate the
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policies of the three territories but had recommended that 
•native* affairs be entrusted to the local legislatures.
The writer of the article, Chiigwin, thought that the utmost 
opposition should be given to this recommendation* History 
showed that once a class had complete political power, it 
used it for its own advantage* A disinterested authority 
was clearly needed which could hold the scales evenly 
between white and black, until such time as the African 
people attained political manhood*
A sign that the Africans were becoming more aware of 
their political rights and might be able to represent 
themselves on Legislative Councils was the development of 
African political associations such as the Kikuyu Centrd. 
Association* In 1929, the K*C*A* sent I* Kenyatta to 
London to present Kikuyu grievances, demand the recognition 
of the K.CoA. and African representation on the Legislative 
Council* He arrived in London in February 1929, with
1 . 'New Leader*, 
Chirgwin• 7 February 1930,p.6., article by A*M*
an
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Indian lawyer* Isher Dass* to 'interview the Secretary of 
State on problems affecting the Kikuyu tribe* especially 
the land q u e s t i o n . K e n y a t t a  was not permitted to see 
the Conservative Colonial Secretary* Leopold Amery* neither 
was he permitted to see his successor* Lord Passfield* 
although he was allowed to see the Under-Secretary* Drummond 
Shiels* McGregor Ross took Kenyatta to the House of 
Commons to meet Dr. Shiels on 23 January 1930. Shiels told 
him that the propaganda of the Kikuyu Central Association 
should be on strictly constitutional lines; Britain could 
command great forces if it became necessary to deal with 
any unconstitutional action. Kenyatta* said Shiels* would 
do well to consider the experience of the Labour party in 
Britain from the time when it had only three M.P.a up to 
the present time when there was a Labour Government.
Kenyatta requested the release of Harry Thuku* who had led 
the unsuccessful African uprising in 1922.5 Kenyatta was 
disappointed by his reception by the official Labour party 
and turned to the I.L.P. and the League Against Imperiiism• 
The Governor of Kenya wrote to Shiels very much regretting 
that he had interviewed Kenyatta and saying that he thought 
that Kenyatta was a communist.^ Although Kenyatta visited 
Russia, he was not a communist, 5 and Drummond Shiels wrote 
back to Grigg, the Governor, that Kenyatta and the K.C.A. 
should be sympathetically handled by the administration and, 
if possible, kept on the right lines. 6 Kenyatta wrote to
1 .
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
meeting Shiels and
•The Times'* 21 February 1929.
G. Delf* •Jorao Kenyatta' (London,196l),p.69,
C.O. 533/395* Filo No. l6010/A*Report meetii Kenyatta* 23 January 1930.
C.O. 5J3'395, File No.16010/A,Grigg to Shiels,12 March 1930. Interview with Brockway, 24 July 1973.
C.O. 533/395, File No. 16010/A, Shiels to Grigg*l4 May 1930.
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Passfield expressing Kikuyu grievances and Passfield passed 
the letter on to Grigg,* who did not pay any attention to the 
grievancesv and( ignored Shiels* request to handle Kenyatta 
and the K.C.A. sympathetically*. Kenyatta's demands became
more extreme as he became more and more disappointed with the 
way he had been treated by the Labour Government* He had 
not come to England demanding independence for the Africans 
in Kenya but by the time he left, he was making this demand.
Grigg, himself, had visited England early in 1929 to 
discuss the proposals for closer union* He agreed with the 
Vilson report and left London with the impression that
Passfield was also prepared to accept the main outlines of 
the Wilson plan. However, the A*C*I.Q. were trying to 
make sure that the Wilson plan was not implemented* At 
a meeting on 30 October 1929* it considered memoranda on 
the WiLmn Report and on the practical steps which should be 
taken by the Labour Government to carry out the Labour 
party*s colonial policy. The practical steps that the 
committee felt should be taken were that there should be 
a declaration of the elimination of inequality before the 
law in Africa, an extension of the franchise on a civilisa­
tion test to all communities, taxation proposals to make 
the settlers pay more tax in proportion to their income, 
the creation of a Board to invite applications for land 
from landless Africans and proposals concerning coffee­
growing and the abolition of forced labour. 3 The members
of the A.C.I.Q. were against the Wilson proposals because 
they felt that they would allow the white settlers to gain
1* 0*0*533/395* File No.l6010/A,Kenyatta to Passfield*
15 April 1930, Passfield to Grigg, 6 May 1930.
2. E. Huxley, 'White Man's Country'- Vol* 2 19l4-i<m(London,1935),pp.233-4. *
3. A.C.I.Q. Minutes, 30 October, 1929.
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political independence eventually* Despite the arguments
of Leys» C.R* Buxton and most of the A.C.I.Q. were strongly
in favour of the Hilton Young proposals for a High
Commissioner who would have overall responsibility for
African policy*^ The A.C.I.Q. sent its memoranda on these
questions to the National Executive Committee and Lord 
2Passfield but it did not exert very much influence on the
party's colonial policy when it was in office* Lord
Passfield preferred to listen to the advice of his civil
servants rather than that of the Labour Party's Advisory
Committee on Imperial Questions, although he had helped
to set up the latter body* C.R. Buxton wrote to him
reminding him of 'the strong feelings on native policy*
and that it was 'absolutely necessary t>take a firm line*
against Wilson which was inconsistent with party policy."*
The A.S.A.P.S. also wrote to Passfield, urging him to
Lenforce 'native rights'. However, Passfield's civil 
servants, not unexpectedly, tended to support the report 
of the Permanent Secretary, Sir Samuel Wilson. By 
November 192$ Lord Passfield had prepared his memorandum 
for the Cabinet on proposals for closer union in East 
Africa. It seemed to be a combination of the Wilson 
proposals and Lord Lugard's call for an all-party
committee* Ps.sfi.ld wee more influenced by his Permenent 
Secretary and Lord Lugard than the A.C.I.Q. Beatrice 
reported that he had prepared a memo setting forth what he *26
1 . A.C.I.Q. Minutes, 13 November 1929.
2a International Sub-Committee of the N.E.C.
26 November 1929*
3. C.R. Buxton to Passfield, 8 October 1929. 
Box 5/3
4. A.S.A.P.S. to Passfield, 31 October 1929,
Papers Gl45. *
, Minutes, 
Buxton Papers
A.S.A.P.S.
believed to be a wise compromise between the Hilton Young 
and Wilson reports. He thought that his report should be 
submitted to a Joint Committee of both Houses, which, 
considering all three reports, would be able to work out a
plan which would be acceptable to all parties.^*
2Passfield's memo began by stating that whatever the 
Cabinet decided to do they would be sure to be subjected to 
a hurricane of criticism, campaigns of letter writing and 
newspaper articles but they should ignore aH this and take 
the decision which would promise the best results.
Passfield hoped to allay the apprehensions of those 
interested in the welfare of the 'natives* by an authorita­
tive pronouncement on 'native' policy which would be 
published as a White Paper in continuation of those of 1923 
and 1927« He thought that he could largely silence others 
who might be vocal by declaring that the Government would 
submit its proposals to a Joint Committee of both Houses 
which would give lasting authority to any decision 
concerning constitutional change.
The outstanding issues which had to be considered 
were whether a new officer should be appointed whose duty 
would be to supervise Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. If 
it was decided to appoint such an officer, it would have 
to be decided what his functions and powers should be in 
relation to the three governments which, between them, 
exercised jurisdiction over an area not far short of 
that of British India and secondly, what alteration, if 
any, there should be in the composition of the Kenya 
Legislative Council. Passfield stated that most people
1 . B. Webb, 'Diaries', op.cit.,p.229
2. C.P.308 (29)»November 1929
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thought that such an officer should be appointed but there 
was debate about what his powers should be* The Hilton 
Young Commission had thought that he should be expressly in 
control of •native* policy in which he would not only 
dictate administration to all three Governors, but would 
also largely relieve the Secretary of State of his duties 
of •trusteeship*v Passfield had come to the conclusion
tfiat this was both impracticable and undesirable* 'Native* 
policy touched so many questions that to take all 
responsibility for it out of the hands of the Governors 
would be a severe reduction of their powers* There was 
also the impracticality of transferring 'native* policy 
to the Governor-General or High Commissioner because H.H.G. 
was responsible for 'native* policy, as had been emphasised 
by the League of Nations Covenant and, more specifically, 
insisted upon in the mandate for Tanganyika* Sir Samuel 
Wilson's mission, which, said Passfield, he had discharged 
with ability, tact and discretion, had been most hefeful in 
discovering what the people of the territories thought and 
what could be put into operation*
In Passfield's opinion the case had been made out for 
the closer union of the economic services, together with 
defence.and central research* There was also some need 
for centralised supervision to ensure that there were no 
departures from H*M*G*<s declaration on 'native* policy, 
the obligations under the League of Nations Covenant and, 
as regards Tanganyika, the observance of the conditions of 
the mandate. Passfield thought that a High Commissioner 
should be appointed who would exercise effective control 
over economic services through a joint council with 
legislative powers. The High Commissioner would also be
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the permanent Chairman of the Conference of Governors, which 
should be summoned regularly for consultation on all important 
matters* In this way, the High Commissioner would exercise 
influence on »native' policy which would be compatible with 
the continued existence of separate governments. He would 
be in a position to advise directly the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies* However, this would not imply any
devolution; on all matters the High Commissioner would 
carry out the instructions of the Secretary of State* In 
Kenya, the High Commissioner would be responsible for »native* 
lands to ensure that they were not 'nibbled away'*
Concerning the Kenya Legislative Council, Passfield 
thought that the Council of 11 elected European members,
5 elected Indian members, 1 elected Arab member and 20 
officials, 11 ex-offitio and 9 nominated by the Governor and 
1 nominated unofficial missionary to represent 'native* 
interests, had not proved satisfactory in carrying out the 
requirements of H.H.G. in 1923 for the 'protection and 
advancement of the natives.' The Colonial Secretary 
believed that the interests of the 'natives' had not been 
sufficiently promoted* Direct taxation on the 'natives' 
was in excess of the expenditure on services especially 
provided for them. The special requirements of the 
European population had been disproportionately regarded. 
However, it was not practical to withdraw from the Europeans 
the right to elect their own members, and Passfield proposed 
to increase their respreseatation from 11 to 13* lt was no 
less impractical to enfranchise the two million 'natived 
'even if we could find any Governor ready to admit that 
there is, at present, a single East African educated and, 
at the same time, of sufficient standing and influence to
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keep his end up in the Council.^ Passfield came to the 
conclusion that a nominated majority should be substituted 
for an official majority. There should be 5 ex-officio 
members and the Governor should be required to nominate up 
to 15 other members. The Colonial Secretary thought thd 
this was the only way to get missionary and other philanthro­
pic defenders of 'native * interests into the Kenya Legislative 
Council. He was aware that some might object that the 
substitution of a nominated for an official majority was a 
triumph for the white settlers; but this was not the case; 
it was merely proposed to substitute a nominated majority 
for an official one and there was no instance in Colonial 
history indicating that this would lead to responsible 
government for the white settlers.
On the Indian question, Passfield wrote that the Indian 
population regarded their separate register as a badge of 
inferiority, and the Indians in Kenya, mainly at the 
instigation of Indian nationalists, were vehemently 
demanding inclusion with the Europeans on a common register. 
Passfield thought that this might result in no Indians being 
elected. Although the Indians had withdrawn from their 
seats in the Kenya Legislative Council in order to enforce 
this demand, Lord Passfield felt that any immediate merging 
of the two communal registers was quite impractical2 and
he proposed to raise the number of Indians on the Council 
from 5 to 6.
1.
2.
This type of statement indicates that Passfield did not 
have a very high regard for the Africans.
Shiels disagreed with Passfield over this point. Shiels 
told Leys that he supported Labour party policy which 
was that, wherever there were elections, a common 
franchise should be adopted. Leys to W. Holtby. 29 Mav 
1 9 3 0 , Holtby Papers, File 8 . V
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Lord Passfield's memo was circulated to the Cabinet* 
Wedgwood Bonn, 1 2the Secretary of State for India« disagreed 
with some of Passfield's proposals and wrote a memo in which
ohe put forward his views* Wedgwood Benn wrote that the 
main purpose of the Hilton Young Commission had been to 
devise changes which would give effect to what they condeived 
to be the true lines of 'native* policy in East Africa* By 
far the most important recommendation of the Hilton Young 
Commission was the proposal that the central authority 
should be responsible not only for economic services but
also for the co-ordination of 'native* policy and the 
protection of minorities* The scheme of the Colonial 
Secretary would invest the central authority with control 
over the economic services and 'native* lands in Kenya only, 
while with regard to 'native* policy he would be little more 
than a watchdog. These proposals were radically different 
from those of Hilton Young* Wedgwood Benn would not have 
felt forced to write a memo if the proposals of Lord
Passfield had not prejudicially affected the position of 
the Indians in Kenya* He thought that the decision to end 
the official majority on the Kenya Legislative Council was
not in the interests of the 'natives'and the minorities* 
•It is notorious that in the past the Kenya Government, 
even with an official majority in the Council, has failed 
to protect either native or Indian Interests, Lord 
Passfield admitted this. How, then, can it be expected 
that those interests will be adequately protected if the 
official majority is surrendered, and if the central
1 . Wedgwood Benn (1887-1960) had been a Liberal M*P. from 
1906-27 and joined the Labour party in 1927* He was 
created a peer in 1941 becoming Lord Stanagate. He was 
not directly related to Josiah Wedgwood.
2. C*P* 319 (29) November 1929*
258
authority has no powers of effective control?» The view 
would be held in India that the surrender of the official 
majority was the price paid for the consent of the settlers 
to the scheme of economic federation*
Turning to the question of the common roll, Wedgwood 
Benn emphasised the extraordinary unity of Indian politic«!, 
opinion on the matter* All Indian classes and all shades 
of political opinion were behind the Government of India on 
this question. Communal franchise was regarded as a 
debased form of citizenship, political segregation and a 
badge of racial inferiority. More serious still, the treat­
ment of Indians in Kenya was regarded as a test of British 
sincerity* Although Wedgwood Benn agreed that the 
compulsory introduction of the common roll was not 
practicable, he was grievously disappointed by the recommen­
dations and thought them likely to worsen the situation in 
India just when the recent announcement by Lord Irwin, the 
Viceroy, that dominion status was the natural issue of 
India's constitutional progress had done somethixg to revive 
a spirit of trust, mutual co-operation and understanting.
Wedgwood Benn hoped that the Government would announce 
that it accepted the recommendation of the Hilton Young 
Commission that the common roll was the ideal to be aimed 
at and would do everything possible to achieve that object, 
initiating, as a first step, inquiries preliminary to the 
adoption of a civilisation test. Until the Government 
could give the Indians some tangible proof that this policy 
was being adopted, Wedgwood Benn felt that the official 
majority on the Kenya Legislative Council should not be 
abolished. He also hoped that the Government would make it 
clear that the common roll, when adopted, would admit not
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only Europeans and Indians but all classes who could satisfy 
the education and property qualifications ultimately 
adopted, including Africans*
Wedgwood Benn also circulated a telegram from the 
Viceroy dated 16 November 1929^ which stated that Passfield's 
proposals closely resembled Sir Samuel Wilson's*
Concerning closer union, the Viceroy felt that the scheme of 
joint councils with legislative powers to aid.the High 
Commissioner was repugnant to the terms of the Tanganyika 
mandate and far more likely to promote foreign criticism 
than the administrative union proposed by the Hilton Young 
Commission* If European opposition ruled out the idea of 
merging the communal registers, Indian opposition ought to 
rule out the idea of diverging from the status quo over the 
composition of the Legislative Council* Viewed collectively, 
Lord Passfield's proposals amounted to a complete defeat for 
the Indian point of view on all three major points - 
federation, common electoral roll and composition of the 
Kenya Legislative Council* The Viceroy felt that should 
Lord Passfield's views prevail, the Secretary of State for 
India should press the Cabinet to reach no conclusions on 
contentious points but refer them to a Joint Select 
Committee of Parliament, before which the Indian Government 
should be allowed, as a special case, to present the Indian 
view*
Passfield's policy on Closer Union was discussed at the 
Cabinet on 27 November 1929* At this meeting, it was 
decided that Lord Passfield should lay some more papers 12
1 . C.P.325 (29) November 1929*
2. Lord Passfield, like Thomas, favoured policies which 
were more acceptable to the settlers than the Indians 
or Africans.
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before the Cabinet. He should write a statement of ‘native* 
policy for the guidance of the Governors in East and Central 
Africa, this could be published as a White Paper. He should 
also write a commentary, preceded by a foreword in his name, 
on the position arising out of the Reports of the Hilton 
Young Commission and Sir Samuel Wilson, which, with the 
approval of the Cabinet, should be published and put before 
the proposed Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament 
as a basis for discussion.^
The A.C.I.Q. was worried when the members heard of 
Passfield*s proposals. Leys wrote to Harris that »the 
awful thing is that Passfield is surrounded in the Colonial 
Office with people who hate our policy and so also do the 
Governors and high officials in East Africa* .2 He was 
trying to make sure that Passfield was bombarded with 
protests. C.R. Buxton wrote to MacDonald to tell him that 
a sharp break with the past was expected from the Labour 
party. He was worried that Passfield was not carrying 
out the party policy which also had the support of the 
Liberals. 3 Buxton, Wedgwood, and Scurr, went to see 
MacDonald to ask for a common electoral roll in East 
Africa and a refusal to give the white settlers the 
dominating voice in the Kenya Legislative Council.
MacDonald listened to them, while reading his correspondence, 
and then passed them on to Lord Passfield, 4 who listened 
to their arguments but pointed out the difficulty of moving 
quickly in East Africa.
1. c .p . 360(29)
2 . Leys to Harris, 8 November 1929 A.S.A.P.S. Papers G U 5 .
3 . Buxton to MacDonald, 1 1  November 1929, C.R. Buxton 
Pap©rBj oox 5/3#
4. (Diaries*, op.cit.,p.227.
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Beatrice wrote in her diary for 28 November 1929 that 
*the Left-wing is in revolt - determined to have the blood 
of the settlers - to make them feel that they are beaten.
So the Cabinet decided that the document submitted to the 
Joint Committee should not be a scheme for reform but a memo 
discussing different proposals and that the Joint Committee 
is to be left to decide which proposals it will agree to.*- 
Sidney, says Beatrice, admired the way in which MacDonald 
handled the situation, whether discussing it with 
enthusiasts, or with him or with the Cabinet. He was very 
considerate to Sidney and appreciative of his efforts to 
find a solution to an almost insoluble problem. The 
difference between the Colonial Office and the ‘pro-native* 
enthusiasts was not in aim but in nethods. Beatrice 
reported that Lord Fassfield had said to MacDonald that he 
should not worry about him and his views. ‘I have done my 
best to get a workable scheme of reform - but it is so 
uncertain how things will work that I»m quite ready to leave 
the final decision to the Joint Committee. ' 2 Beatrice
Webb-' thought that this would mean that the eventual 
decision would be taken by another Colonial Secretary since 
the Committee was going to be a large one and was going to 
call witnesses. She thought that Josiah Wedgwood was the 
prime mover of the revolt on the left, ‘partly because he 
is a fanatical believer in crude political democracy on a 
strictly numerical basis.« Wedgwood had always been 
foremost in the campaign to abolish the communal voting 
system whether in India or Africa. Mrs. Webb also thought
1 . ibid., p.227
2. ibid., p.229
3. M. Cole ‘B. Webb«, (London, 1945),p.158-9.
2 6 2
that his opposition was based upon a desire to upset 
MacDonald»s governments there had been continual antagonism 
between the two men; after Wedgwood had failed to obtain the 
position that he wanted in the first Labour Government, he 
had done his best to affect a change of leadership«1 In 
his memoirs, Wedgwood does not say much about the second 
Labour Government: «Over MacDonald's second Labour Government 
I prefer to draw a veil« It was not a success and ended 
unpleasantly•«•«Webb was deplorable at the Colonial Office.»^ 
However, the protests against Passfield«s policy were not 
confined to Wedgwood« The feeling covered the A.S.A.P.S., 
many Liberals, Oldham, Lugard and the A«C.I0Q.
As Drummond Shiels, Passfield's Under-Secretary, wrote 
the policies of the Colonial Office were subjected to close 
scrutiny by the Labour party's A.C.I.Q. The Committee 
was stimulated into great activity over the question of 
Kenya particularly by Dr. Norman Leys, McGregor Ross 
and Archdeacon Owen. 3 Shiels attended the Committee in 
May 1931 to discuss African policy, 4 but Lord Passfield 
preferred to follow the advice of the senior men in the 
Colonial Office and, writes Shiels, was »perhaps, inclined 
to accept their judgements without always applying the same 
critical examination which he gave to other matters.«5 
However, Mrs. Webb thought that Drummond Shiels was too
convinced of his own importance; his views changed: »from
insisting on a High Commissioner with the powers of an 
Indian Viceroy over the Governors of the three East African 
territories, he jumped to a High Commissioner who should be
strictly limited to the management of the
1 .
2.
3.
4.
5 «
Wedgwood, op.cit., p.l&7 . 
Wedgwood, op.cit., p.205. 
s, op.cit«, p.203f•
:.Q. Minutes, 13 May 1931. Ls, ibid.
technical services
under the direction of the said Governors, and ended by 
falling back on the status quo. * 1 Leonard Woolf, the 
Secretary of the A*C*X*Q*, had a more favourable opinion 
of Shiels, whom he thought a 'hard-headed, liberal-minded, 
unsentimental Scot, and he was a convinced believer in the 
necessity of putting into practice the colonial policies 
worked out by the Advisory Committee and adopted by the 
party*' Woolf believed that Shiels was dismayed by 
Passfield's conservatism and his 'masterly inactivity* 
whenever an opportunity arose to do something different from 
what Conservative governments and Colonial civil servants 
had endorsed as safe and sound and 'progressive* for the 
last half-century*
The A.C.I.Q. tried to influence Drummond Shiels to
put their policies into practice* They bombarded him with
material concerning injustices to Africans. On 11 February
1930, he wrote a memo for his civil servants asking them
to inquire whether the policy in Kenya ensured that 'native'
interests were paramount* He had had a great many
representations made to him from M*P*s and others in regard
to the alleged injustices under which the 'native' people
of Kenya were labouring under the present administration -
alienation of land, forced labour, excessive taxation,
lack of social services, communications and education*
C*Ro Buxton had given him some material (which Shiels
thought he had got from flcGregor Ross) and he had also had
direct statements from McGregor Ross. While Shiels
regarded Leys' criticisms as exaggerated and out of date,
he put Ross in a different category and thought his views
should be treated with respect*^
1 . Diaries, op.cit.,p.233*
2* L. Woofl, op.cit*, pp.2 3 6-7 .
3' l6010, T‘ Dru"»«<> Shiel. Mnut.,
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ShielsV request for an investigation by his civil 
servants was stimulated by a question C.R* Buxton had put 
down for 12 February 1930 asking whether direct ‘native* 
taxation was spent on direct 'native* services in the 
reserves« as the Governor had stated* Drummond Shiels 
asked Buxton to postpone the question while they made 
enquiries of the Governor* As a result of the enquiries« 
it was found that the Governor's assertion that every penny 
of direct 'native' taxation was spent on services in the 
'native* reserves was incorrect* This discovery was a 
result of Shiels' insistence* At first Cosmo Parkinson 
had stated that the 'upshot is the natives are receiving 
in direct services of direct concern and benefit to them 
considerably more than they pay by way of taxation* '1 
The other civil servants agreed with Parkinson but Shiels 
considered« after examining the figures« that the case was 
that there was relative unfairness of taxation in Kenya*2 
Passfield, however« minuted that much harm has been done 
by uncritical repetition of old stories of errors and 
offences committed in past years, leading to the suspicion 
that the same attitude among the settlers prevails today*
«He thought that the settlers should be judged by their 
present deedsl^ Shiels spoke to Buxton about the question 
and it was agreed not to press it but the Under-Secretary 
stated that he and Lord Passfield were concerned to vet the 
estimates for the following year to ensure that they showed 
that 'native' taxation was being spent on the 'natives* and 
that the 'natives' were not being taxed proportionately more 
that the whites*
1 . ibid.. Memo A.C.C* Parkinson, 5.March 1930«
2. ibid*, Minute by Drummond Shiels, 15 March 1930.
3. ibid*, Minute by Passfield, 20 May 1930.
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Passfield received some letters from Governor Grigg 
emphasising that disaster would follow if •pro-native* 
policies were put into effect. Grigg was anxious about 
the effect of unrest on the Kikuyu province, believing that 
it was being stirred up by the Indians and communists. 1 
He was also seriously concerned about correspondence which 
was reaching the Kikuyu Central Association from various 
quarters in England. He was not sure whether it was from 
Norman Leys or definitely seditious organisations. Grigg 
acknowledged that Leys was a conscientious man who believed 
that he was acting in the interests of the *natives* but 
Grigg thought that, in reality, Leys was their most dangerous 
enemy »for the suggestions he makes to them will inevitably 
end some day in violence of some kind and the natives will 
be the greatest sufferers.» 2 Passive resistance to 
government always led to violence of some kind. Grigg 
pointed to the example of India where the population was much 
less virile and primitive than the African population. 3 
Heims making arrangements for prompt action through motor 
patrols by the King's African Rifles if any serious trouble 
threatened. He was worried about the reception given to 
Kenyatta when he returned to the colony.
Passfield tried to steer a middle course between the
policies advocated by Grigg and those advocated by the
Labour party's A.C.I.Q. In December 1929* he wrote a long 
memorandum for the Cabinet, as requested, containing a 
statement on 'native' policy and a report on the Hilton
Young and Vilaon r.porta uhlch it no. int.nded to lay 
before the Joint Committee of Parliament.^
1 .
2 • 
3-
k.
Passfield Papers, correspondence with Grigg, Grigg toPassfield, 11 September 1929.
ibid., Grigg to Passfield, 7 December 1929«
Passfield and many in the Labour party also thought that
the African was far more 'primitive' than the Indian at this time.
C.P*360(29) December 1929»
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•The Statement on Native Policy* began by quoting the 
1923 White Paper that African'native interests should be 
paramount•* Passfield expressed complete concurrence with
this declaration and went on to consider the development of 
•native* resources in the areas of land, labour, production 
and taxation* The Colonial Secretary reiterated the 
criticisms of the Kenyan administration that had been put 
forward by the A.C.I.Q* In conclusion, he stated that the 
principles that he put forward were not new and it was not 
intended to imply that they had never been applied, but
H.M.G* had judged it important to state in a clear and 
comprehensive form their attitude towards the question of 
native policy* *They are the first to recognise that no 
statement of policy or principles can by itself achieve 
results, and that progress must throughout be dependent 
upon the spirit in.which the policy and principles are 
interpreted by those whose duty it is to give effect to 
them* *
In the second part of the memorandum, Lord Passfield 
discussed the schemes for Closer Union* This included a 
summary of the Hilton Young proposals and Sir Samuel 
Wilson*s Report. In conclusion, this part of the 
memorandum stated that although the ultimate goal in Kei^ya 
might be a civilisation test irrespective of colour, it 
was not to be expected that the 'natives* would be able to 
play an effective role in the Government of Kenya at an 
early date as members of a common electorate embracing all 
the separate communities. Therefore, in the first stage, 
the communal framework should be maintained* Passfield 
was still putting forward a pro-settler point of view.
The Cabinet considered Passfield*s proposals at a
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meeting on 17 December 1929, 1 when it was decided that a 
Cabinet Committee should be set up to examine the documents 
circulated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and 
advise the Cabinet as to the policy they should adopt* The 
Committee was composed of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Sankey, 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Passfield, the 
Secretary of State for India, Wedgwood Benn, and the 
Secretary of State for Air, Lord Thomson* It was to 
consider particularly whether there should be a new officer 
appointed whose duties would be to supervise Kenya, 
Tanganyika and Uganda and what his functions and powers 
should be in relation to the three governments which 
exercised jurisdiction over the area; and, secondly,
assuming that such an officer was appointed, what alteration, 
if any, should be made in the composition of the Kenya 
Legislative Council*
While the Cabinet Committee was working on the policy 
for East Africa, the humanitarian lobby was trying to 
organise pressure to make the Colonial Office pursue a 
more positive policy of enforcing African interests in 
East Africa. A Memorial was sent to the Labour Government, 2 
expressing dissatisfaction at «the non-fulfilment of Labour's 
policy with regard to native races, particularly, in 
connection with East Africa.» It was signed by 100 
signatories, including P. Noel-Baker, A.P. Brockway,
J. Horrabin, J.C. Wedgwood, C.R. Buxton, M. Hamilton,
E. Wilkinson, A. Salter, G. Strauss, P.W. Jowett, J.Strachey,
F. Lee, J. Lee, Rennie Smith, W. Paling, R. Sorensen and 
D*G* Pole* As well as Labour supporters, some Liberal
1 * Cabinet Minutes 53(29) Conclusion 2*
2. Memorial on African Policy, 15 April loin c n n, + Papers, Box 5/3* 1930, C.R. Buxton
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M.P.s and supporters also signed. The Memorial pointed 
out that the Labour Government had taken no steps to secure 
the land rights of the Africans, to alter the restrictive 
labour conditions, to revise the unjust systemof taxation, 
to increase the proportion of public expenditure on African 
areas or to establish equal rights before the law in all 
African colonies. It urged that the Labour Government 
should publish a statement of principles, and send
instructions to the Colonial Governors to establish these 
things.
The 'Memorialists* were to be reassured by the 
proposals of the Cabinet Committee on Closer Union. The 
Committee reported to the Cabinet in April with a different 
scheme1 from the one whic h Pasafield had proposed the 
previous November. It pointed out that the three territories 
each had different forms of government, Uganda was a 
protectorate where the British Government was, more or less, 
at liberty to do as it liked. Tanganyika was a mandated 
territory which had to be administered in terms of the 
Mandate and a small sea-coast strip of Kenya was a 
Protectorate but the larger part of the territory was a 
Colony.
The Committee thertfore decided that . High Commissioner 
should be appointed and he should be assisted by a 
Legislative Council, of which he should be the chairman, 
consisting of 3 officers on the High Commissioner's staff 
and 21 member., 7 from each of Kenya, Uganda ad Tanganyika.
The High Commia.loner could require that any measure passed 
by the Council could be referred to the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies «ho could quash the measure or alter it.
The duties of the High Co„»i.,ion.r would be that he „ „ I d
1 . C.P.65(30),April 1930.
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be the chief adviser on »native* and other policy to the 
Secretary of State and he should administer the railways, 
air and motor services, ports and harbours, customs, defence, 
post, telegraph and telephone, extradition, central research, 
the trade and information office in London and any other 
matter which was placed under his authority.
Concerning the second part of their work; the 
constitution of the Kenya Legislative Council, the Committee 
stated that the »goal of constitutional evolution in Kenya, 
as elsewhere, is admittedly responsible government by a 
ministry representing an electorate in which every section 
of the population finds an effective and adequate voice.
But that goal cannot be reached at an early date in a 
community where it has so far been practicable to enfranchise 
less than 1 per cent of the population and where the idea of 
any substantial extension of the franchise finds little 
general support. For the native African population, indeed, 
in so far as tribal organisation is still the basis of its 
social organisation, the most promising line of development 
for the near future may well lie, not in any direct 
participation in the Legislative Council but in the 
increasing importance given to Native Councils.* The 
Committee decided that the constitution of the Kenya 
Legislative Council should be substantially unchanged 
and that the official majority should be maintained. It 
also thought that with regard to the franchise, the aim 
should be the establishment of a common roll with an equal 
franchise of a civilisation or education character open to 
all* However, there was not sufficient evidence available 
to say how this could be attained and the Committee 
recommended that the Cabinet should ask the High Commissioner
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to institute an inquiry as soon as he was appointed. The 
Committee recommended that the Cabinet should give approval 
to their scheme and the statement on *native* policy that 
had been prepared by the Colonial Secretary. The Cabinet 
discussed the Committee's proposals on 9 April* when 
Passfield spoke against a common franchise and received 
backing from Thomas who thought that democracy should not 
be carried 'too far*. Labour's two Colonial Secretaries 
argued against the implementation of the party's colonial 
policy. The constitution of the Kenya Legislative Council 
was referred back to the Committee which reported to the 
Cabinet on 30 April 1930 9 and it was agreed that the 
common roll was a long term aim not something for the 
immediate future. It was decided to approve the report 
of the Cabinet Committee, subject to certain conditions: 
they should consult with M.P.s who had made a special study 
of the subject, the Secretary of State for India should 
communicate with the Viceroy to ascertain his opinion and 
it should be stated in the White Paper that the High 
Commissioner's Council must . be of a legislative character 
for constitutional reasons to avoid giving the impression 
that the Government had decided the point. The proposals 
which the Cabinet had endorsed were substantially different 
from those put forward originally by Lord Passfield and 
more in line with the criticisms of those proposals which 
had been put by Wedgwood Benn. Passfield had proposed 
that the High Commissioner should not be responsible for 
•native' policy, that there should be a nominated rather 
than an official majority on the Kenya Legislative Council
and that there should not be
Cabinet Minutes 21(30)2a, 
2 * Cabinet Minutes 24(30) 5*
a common electoral roll as the
9 April 1930.
30 April 1930.
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Indians were demanding. These proposals were similar to 
those put forward by Sir Samuel Wilson and might have 
satisfied the white settlers* As amended by the Cabinet 
committee, the proposals were that the High Commissioner 
should be responsible for 'native* affairs, the official 
majority should remain on the Kenya Legislative Council and 
the aim should be to establish a common electoral roll but 
it would not come immediately* These proposals were not 
likely to find support among the white settlers. The 
Cabinet Committee had produced a plan more acceptable to 
those who supported the Africans* interests in Kenya than 
the plan originally proposed by Lord Passfield with the 
advice of his civil servants. This plan was to be referred 
for consideration to the Joint Committee but the 'Memo on 
Native Policy* was supposed to come into effect immediately.
The Government issued its two White Papers on Africa 
in June 1930*1 The 'Memorandum on Native Policy in East 
Africa', which had been mainly written by Lord Passfield 
emphasised that the Government thought that African 
interests should be paramount in East Africa. Concerning 
the Africans' political development, the White Paper stated 
that maximum use should be made of the opportunities of 
self-government provided in tribal and local institutions. 
The 'natives* should be increasingly associated with 
government through local Native Councils. On the social 
side, the Government regarded the objective to be achieved 
as a general improvement in the standard of 'native' life 
in economic conditions, in home circumstances and in the 
physical health of men, women and children, together with
1« 'Memorandum ^ ^ P o l i c y  in East Africa*, Cmd.3573, 
June 1 93°• «f*®*®™®?* of the Conclusions of H.M.G. in
the U.K. as egards Closer Union in East Africa*, Cmd. 
3574, June 1930«
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the spread of education in the widest sense»
On the question of land, the White Paper stated that it 
was the view of H.M.G. that any feeling of insecurity in the 
'native* mind in regard to his tribal lands should be finally 
removed. Land should be available for all the tribes, of 
such an extent and character, that it would fully suffice 
for their actual and future seeds. Concerning labour, the 
White Paper declared that H.M.G. attached great importance 
to the principle that the 'native* should be effectively 
and economically free to work, in accordance with his own 
wish, either in production in the Reserves, or as an 
individual producer upon his own plot of land, or in 
employment for wages which were freely contracted for.
On taxation, the paper ' stated that H.MG. considered 
that the principle to be followed was that the levy of 
direct taxation on the 'native* should be definitely limited 
by his capacity to pay such imposts without hardship and 
without upsetting his customary method of life. On the 
other side of the picture, it was incumbent upon the 
Government to ensure that Government expenditure on 'native* 
services in the annual budget should bear a proper relation 
to the revenue raised from the 'natives'. In order to 
ensure this, H.M.Go wanted a statement at the end of each 
financial year showing 'native' revenue and the amount spent 
on 'native* services area by area.
Throughout the White Paper, the Colonial Secretary 
referred to the white settlers as immigrants. This was not 
the first time that White Papers had described the white 
settlers in such a way but combined with Passfield's 
continued emphasis that the interests of the Africans should 
be paramount, it annoyed the settlers, who regarded themselves
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as much more entitled to rule Kenya than the Africans and 
did not like the implication that the Africans would 
eventually« although a long time in the future, rule 
themselves*
The second White Paper, 'The Statement of the 
Conclusions of H.M*G* in the U.K* as regards Closer Union 
in East Africa* put forward the policy that had been worked 
out by the Cabinet Committee* The High Commissioner was 
to be the chief adviser to the Secretary of State on 'native* 
policy and, as such, he would receive drafts of bills to be 
introduced in the Legislative Councils, drafts of each 
year's budget with full particulars of proposed changes in 
'native* taxation and in all forms of welfare work, 
outlines of all proposed changes in administration affecting 
the 'natives', copies of all important despatches to or 
from the Secretary of State, and generally oversee all the 
Governors' decisions on 'native' policy*
Gupta states that as a result of the Labour Government's 
policy 'bureaucratic paternalism was reaffirmed against 
both the settlers and the champions of equal rights'* 
However, at the time, it appeared that the champions of 
African rights had won . 1
The reception which greeted the two White Papers 
varied from praise from the Labour party and press to 
outright hostility by the white settlers* The A*C*I*Q* 
was satisfied with the two papers. Passfield had 
consulted C.R. Buxton with regard to the White Paper and 
its proposals seemed in line with those that had been put 
forward by the Labour party in its pamphlets on the Empire 
In Africa* The A.C.I.Q* was concerned that the budget of
1 . Gupta, op.cit•,p.l86*
Kenya should be carefully considered to see that it was in
conformity with the White Paper on Native policy«1
Fenner Brockway« who had also been consulted by Lord
Passfield, wrote in the 'New Leader* that the Government*s
statement on East African policy was a welcome advance on
the proposals that the Government was understood to have had
in mind the previous November• He was disappointed that
there was no common roll immediately which would have meant
real equality of status« However« he thought that C«R«
Buxton had been splendidly active on the question and Frank
Horrabin« the I«L«P«*s expert, had missed no opportunity for
2pressure in Parliament«
Norman Leys wrote in the same paper that thousands of 
people had known that for nearly a year a battle had been 
going on in the Colonial Office over the fate of the 
Hellions of voteless« and therefore helpless« people in 
East Africa« He had thought that the white settler lobby 
would win but he had to admit that he had been wrong«
He congratulated Lord Passfield and Dr. Shiels ontheir 
courage« He thought that the plan for a High Commissioner 
was sound« although there was a danger in putting so much 
on one man's shoulders. The paper on 'native* policy was 
a definite improvement on anything that had gone before and 
if its directions were acted upon« East Africa would« in a 
few years« no longer be the reproach to the Empire that it 
was« The only complaint he had was to point out that in 
Kenya the 'native* institutions were of European manufacture 
and would not be a secure basis on which to build for
eventual 'native' self-government. The need was deliberately
1« A«C«I.Q. Minutes 17 December 1930«
2, »New Leader', 27 June 1930, p«8.
3« ibid«, p d l .
to educate the younger generation to defend themselves in 
the world of modern industry that the Europeans had forced 
them to enter* To invite them to be content with 
traditional institutions suitable to social conditions 
irrevocably abandoned was like sending a lad to his first 
job with the toys of his childhood in his hands* 
Nevertheless« socialists ought to be grateful that if the 
British agents in Africa did what the White Papers directed 
a real start would be made with long overdue reforms.
In another article in the *New Statesman*1  2, Leys 
declared that the Labour Government had faced up to the 
minority in Kenya. The only problem was would it Insist 
on its policy* The Governor was on the side of the 
settlers but there would eventually be volcanic disturbances 
by the Africans if the policies of the White Papers were 
not acted upon* Hie Colonial Office had awakened just in 
time, and, if it was vigorously supported by public opinion, 
Kenya might still be made a free country like Jamaica*
Leys tried to ensure that the policy of the White Papers 
was put into effect* He wrote to Buxton to point out that 
there was no need to worry that the reforms would be 
annulled by the next government* If the reforms were 
introduced, the Africans would ensure that they were not 
revoked* He wrote to Harris-* to say that they should 
persuade as many H.P.s as possible to ask questions about 
the measures being taken to carry out the policy of the 
•White Paper on Native Policy*. He thought that the battle 
in Kenya was only just beginning and would not be finally 
won until the Colonial Office sent men to Africa who
believed in the policy of the White Paper. Leys* main
1 . ’Sew Statesman*, 27 September 1930,pp.754-5.
2. N* Leys to C.R.Buxton,17 June 1931, C.R. Buxton Papers,
Box 6, Pile 2.
3* N. Leys to J.H. Harris, 4 September 1930 A.S.A.P.S.
Papers, G.195*
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fear was that the other members of the A.C.I.Q. would relax 
now that the »right policy* had been outlined by the govern­
ment but he thought that more effort than ever was needed to 
ensure that the policy was made effective. He wrote to 
Ross : 1 "so now we are at this pass. As so often happened 
in the past* a British Government has laid down the right 
policy. What reason have we for believing that, this time, 
for once, it will be acted upon?....Our opponents are 
confident that they will repeat the victories won in the 
Union (of South Africa) and Rhodesia. They have unlimited 
funds, and the instinctive sympathy of all who admire 
pioneers struggling to introduce sweet and light in darkest 
Africa. Practically the whole upper and middle classes 
naturally assume that the English gentlemen who live in 
Kenya must be the best judges of what ought to be done 
there...And you propose, and allege that Laski does, to 
meet this emergency by the cessation of what we have
hitherto been doing!.....I certainly don't understand a
cease fin> when the enemy has every gun in action. My 
answer is more peas and stronger peashooters."
•The Times' did not view the White Papers in the same 
light as Norman Leys. It welcomed the decision to appoint 
a High Commissioner as this would end uncertainty which had 
been bad for business enterprise. However, it felt that 
there was 'a certain want of perspective in the emphasis 
laid upon the paramountcy of native interests.' It felt 
that the original statement in the 1923 White Paper had 
been unhappily worded as it gave the impression that a 
European interest, however important, would always yield 
to a »native» interest, however trivial. This was naturally
* •  5 : p X :  £ . " : r G4 : s m e or 21 o c t ° b-
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resented by the Europeans who had ventured their capital and 
energies in the colony. The editorial thought that it was 
•unfortunate* that the White Papers implied that representa­
tive government was the ideal in a country which had three 
entirely different groups of people. It also felt that 
talk of a common roll did more harm than good. The paper 
thought that the idea of a Joint Committee was a good one, 
for a settlement should secure the support of all three 
parties. 1 2The worst that can happen is a series of
partisan decisions by successive governments. ' 1
In Africa, the publication of the White Papers provoked, 
according to Margery Perham, 'an outcry which rang from Kenya 
to the Cape*. The settlers named the papers the *Black 
Papers* and were unanimous in regarding the proposals as 
unacceptable. The settlers, saysElspeth Huxley, particularly 
disliked the tone of the White Papers. They thought that 
the impression was given that, for the first time, 'native* 
welfare was being considered by a high-minded Imperial 
Government intent on seeing justice done in a colony hitherto 
insensible to 'native* rights. No mention was made of the 
part played by white settlement in the development of East 
Africa.^ Sir Philip Mitchell, the Assistant Secretary for 
Native Affairs in Tanganyika, at the time, wrote in his 
memoirs that the White Paper on Native policy was a naive 
document, which contained little that had not been said 
ad nauseam for 5 or 6 years, but it did disclose that those 
who wrote it had no knowledge at all of how Africans lived.
He thought that the paper implied that those on the spot
1 , 'The Times', 20 June 1930*
2. M. Perham, 'Lugard, The Years of Authority, 1898-1945* 
(London, i960),p.687*
3# E. Huxley, op.cit•,p.277.
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could not be entrusted to do their job honestly and 
effectively. 1 Sir Edward Grigg, confided to M. Perham, 
who was staying with him at the time, that the White Papers
' Q
•have undone finally all I have been striving to build up.*
M. Perham thought that the Governor was desperate and the
3settlers were angry.'
The East African press was very hostile to the White
Papers. The *Tanganyika Standard* criticised the doctrine
of paramountcy and said that the Imperial Government had
failed to realise that white settlement was bound up with,
and, was part of, the fabric of these countries and to
ignore that was to foredoom any scheme for the future of
East Africa to failure. The doubt cast on the settlers*
ability to deal justly with the 'natives* was bound to give 
4offence. The 'Mombasa Times* was particularly critical 
of the Imperial Government *s policies. It regarded the 
White Papers as a challenge which the settlers would have 
to take up or their position in East Africa would 
deteriorate.^
'The Times of EastAfrica*, which had previously been 
critical of settler policy, thought that with the publica­
tion of the White Papers all hope of agreement had 
disappeared. The Imperial Government had forgotten its 
own kith and kin who had their homes in East Africa, and 
gone beyond the realm of wise and practical politics.**
The only East African paper to support the White Papers 
was the Indian-owned 'Kenya Daily Mail* which wholeheartedly
1 . Sir Philip Mitchell, 'African Afterthoughts* (London.
195^)*PP»117-H8.
2. M. Perham, »East African Journey* (London,1976),p.136.
3. ibid., p.l6.
4. 'The Times*, 3 July 1930JwMoh quoted these examples from the
5. 'The Times*, 3 July 1930.African press).
6. ibid.
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welcomed the declaration of 'native* policy but criticised 
the Imperial Government for not setting up the common 
electoral roll immediately.^
The Governor of Kenya* Sir Edward Grigg, wrote to the
oColonial Secretary on 23 June 1930 that *your party is by 
its very nature a party of zealous and militant reformers; 
and many of them have to learn that there is a very wide and 
difficult debatable land between the enunciation of 
political principles and the practical application of those 
principles to the circumstances of the times. I am sure 
you will agree that the leaders of the party have had to 
show much steady and practical statesmanship in picking 
their way through that debatable land.* »This may seem 
a heaven sent moment to extremists and doctrinaires in 
East African affairs; but they too must learn that 
European political ideas cannot be applied in a rapid and 
roughshod manner to Africa without tindermining the govern­
ment and development of complex and difficult territories 
like this.* Grigg thought that the Labour party was 
guided on African affairs *by some such motto as "Africa for 
the Africans* representative government by rapid stages 
for the African population and so much the worse for all 
the other communities." He thought that some of the 
Labour party's criticisms would be modified by closer 
knowledge of the colony* Grigg was worried by communica­
tions from the Secretary of State which he thought could 
only be explained by the fact thatPassfield found him 
untrustworthy on the question of «native* welfare, thinking 
only of European interests and ignoring the rest* Passfield 
Yl »The Times*, 3 July 1930.
2. Passfield lost the Dominions Office in June 1930, but
remained as Colonial Secretary * Thomas gave up-Employment 
to take over the Dominions*
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had given him no indications in their conversations the 
previous year that he shared the suspicions concerning the 
administration of Kenya that had been voiced by certain 
sections in Parliament and a group of able extremists who 
had always been violently hostile to the Government of Kenya* 
Grigg ended his letter to Passfield by quoting letters that 
he had received praising his administration and indicating 
his fairness to Africans*^
After Grigg received the two White Papers, he wrote
oanother letter to Passfield on 30 June 1930* In this he 
stated that he was very busy and would not be able to 
produce a detailed memorandum on the papers which could be 
laid before the Joint Select Committee for some time* His 
initial comments on the Papers were that they had caused 
considerable controversy 'not so much because of what they 
actually contain (although there are points of major 
importance in them to which the unofficial community will 
never willingly agree) but because of the manner and the 
method of their presentation*• The point which had aroused 
the strongest feeling was the impression that had been given 
that there was no need to obtain local agreement to any 
decisions of the Imperial Government* The worst example 
of this was the Common Roll which could apparently be put 
into force by the High Commissioner, acting on the 
instructions of the Secretary of State without agreement of 
any kind* The 1927 White Paper and the Hilton Young 
Report had both stressed the necessity of reaching agreement 
with the local population* The attitude of the Labour 
government had caused widespread alarm and indignation*
X. Passfield Papers, Correspondence with Sir Edward Grigg, 
Grigg to Passfield, 23 June 1930*
2. ibid., Grigg to Passfield, 30 June 1930.
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There was also, wrote Grigg, very strong feeling regarding the 
absence of any reference in the Papers to the desirability of 
associating the Europeans in Kenya with the trusteeship for 
the »native* interests. This had also been emphasised in 
the 1927 White Paper and the Hilton Young Report. The case 
had not been argued by the Labour Government, but had just 
been ignored. Concerning the *White Paper on Native Policy», 
Grigg stated that there was universal agreement as to the 
general principles contained in the document but there was 
strong exception to broadcasting Papers which would make the 
'native* think the Government was called upon to pursue his 
interests to the exclusion of all others; that was the 
impression that the Paper gave and it was a very unfortunate 
one. Grigg also thought that many of the Papers' phrases 
could not be taken literally as they would mean very wide­
spread amendments of existing legislation1 and this would 
not be in the »native' interest. There was a danger in 
making far—ranging declarations in general terms which could 
be interpreted practically, in a number of different ways. 
Grigg thought it essential that these statements should be 
agreed between the parties in England and their meaning made 
absolutely clear.
In his letters to Grigg, Lord Passfield emphasised 
that people in England were worried that the principle of 
trusteeship was not being carried out in Kenya. On 1 May 
1930, he wrote that »native* administration was attracting 
an increasing amount of attention in England and,*to be 
quite frank, in the case of Kenya, suspicion - particularly 
in regard to the relations between the natives and the 
immigrant communities; and the principle of trusteeship makes 
1 . This was precisely what Leys wanted to happen.
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a tremendous appeal to people here. There is nothing new in 
this> But the change of government which came about a year 
ago makes a very real difference, and it is reflected at 
once in the closer supervision which we give to native 
affairs - not merely in Kenya, but in all the African 
Dependencies, although Kenya comes in for an exceptional 
amount of supervision#11 Lord Passfield thought that Sir 
Edward Grigg would be the ‘first to agree* that it was the 
duty of the Secretary of State to ensure that ‘native• policy 
in East Africa was in accordance with the views of the 
Government which was in power in London# In his reply,
Grigg declared that he would ‘not be the first, but the 
last, to agree to any principle of the kind, for, so long 
as the native peoples of East Africa are concerned, it can 
only mean changes of method, and even of policy with 
varying Secretaries of State, and sometimes even violent
wrenches of the steering-wheel on which this vast shipload
2of trusting people depends#*
Lord Passfield discussed the White Papers with Sir 
Edward Grigg in a letter dated 9 July 1930. 3 The Colonial
Secretary stated that the Joint Committee would not be set 
up until the Autumn Session and there was therefore no need 
to produce a report for it immediately. While Lord 
Passfield did not expect the settlers to welcome the White 
Papers, he was surprised at the exception that was taken 
to the settlers being called immigrants, because, after all, 
that is what they were and the phrase had been used
repeatedly in official documents. As to the general
principles of the Paper on Native Policy, there was nothing
1 . Passfield Papers, op#cit#,
2. ibid., Grigg to Passfield,
3. ibid., Passfield to Grigg,
Passfield to Grigg 
30 May 1930.
9 July 1930.
1 May 1930.
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revolutionary in it* If there was the will to deal with 
the practical issues in the spirit that informed the 
statement« there would not be any serious difficulties* 
Concerning« Grigg's point that he was continually stressing 
the 'native' side« the Colonial Secretary wrote that he 
had done this deliberately because it was essential that 
the 'natives' should be kept to the fore; if« in any matter« 
the 'natives' should receive less consideration than the 
Europeans the Colonial Secretary would feel that he had 
not done his duty as guardian of the interests of the whole 
community.
Passfield replied to Grigg's letters of 23 and 30 June 
on 29 July 1 9 3 0 He thought that the Governor had over­
estimated the extent to which his despatches were influenced 
by zeal for reform* There were a good many« wrote the 
Colonial Secretary« who were not likely to let theory get 
in front of the daily task and who would not under-rate 
practical difficulties in the Labour party* They had had 
a long training in administration of one kind or another.
The policy that he was putting forward was not the result 
of extremist pressure; each sugge&ion was a practical 
improvement capable of immediate or early adoption« or a 
step towards a working policy in the future. On the 
point that the Labour Party was only concerned about the 
welfare of the African population« Lord Passfield wrote 
that the uneasiness felt about African questions was not 
confined to one party and the implication that the Labour 
party had no regard for the other communities was entirely 
without foundation. 'As regards the rate at which democratic 
institutions can be introduced among the African populations«
1# 1930f±Old PaperS* °P,cit-* Passfield to Grigg, 29 July
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not only in Kenya but elsewhere, there is room for, and 
actually is, a wide range of opinion* But the governing 
point is that even if we wish to move slowly we must move, 
or be pushed** The Colonial Secretary thought that Sir 
Edward Grigg had over-rated the objections to what the 
Government had said as regards the common roll, as it actually 
asked no more than that what action was practicable in the
near future should be explored by the new High Commissioner, 
if and when, he was appointed. Pasafield emphasised the 
Fabian policy of gradual reform*
There was a difference of opinion between the Governor 
and the Colonial Secretary. Whereas Grigg felt that *if 
the British settler were to fail and degenerate', European 
civilisation would be brought down with him in his fall, 1 
Passfield was trying to explain that both Labour and
Conservative Governments had declared that the interests 
of the Africans should be paramount and that he was only 
filling in some details. Neville Chamberlain wrote to 
Grigg telling him to advise the settlers to »keep a stout 
heart* and not to think that their case had been lost 
»because the old nanny-goat has issued these two White 
Papers—soon /this inane government would be kicked out*»**
As a result of Leys* efforts the A.C.I.Q.*s main 
concern was to ensure that the principles that had been 
declared would be put into practice. As Margaret Cole 
writes, »the policy had to be implemented by thousands of 
small decisions in hundreds of different area; and here 
Sidney's innate trust in the «expert* served him ill. * 3 
The A.C.I.Q. tried to put pressure on the Colonial Office
to ensure that the policy was being enforced. At meetings
1 . Grigg to Passfield, 30 May 1930.
2. M. Perham, «Lugard*, op.cit.,p .688
3° pllll^6* ed#* 'B ’ Webb* Dlariea'» op.cit., introduction,
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in December 1930 and January 1931* it decided to recommend 
that the draft budget of the Kenya government should be 
carefully considered to make sure that it was in conformity 
with the White Papers .■*"
The AoC.I.Q. was aided by Archdeacon Owen who returned 
to England from Kenya at the end of 1930 with a copy of the 
Kenya Estimates for 1931« Owen pointed out that the 
allocation of funds took no account of the principles of 
the White Paper* He wrote to Norman«Leys that »the White 
Paper will die if not freely watered with help at this end.* 
He suggested that he, Leys and others should go to the 
Colonial Secretary to point out the discrepancies between 
the Kenyan budget and the White Paper proposals. 2 The 
A.C.I.Q. took up Owen's suggestion and decided that Leonard 
Woolf should try to arrange that a sub-committee of
M  cGregor Ross* Norman Leys and Archdeacon Owen should see
3Lord Passfield. After a detailed examination of the 
Kenyan budget, the A.C.I.Q. found that the proposed 
expenditure on education and communications was grossly 
unfair to the Africans. The amount to be voted for the 
education of white children was enormously higher than 
that provided for the education of the African children 
and the proposed expenditure on roads to serve the settlers' 
estates was far higher than that proposed for roads serving 
the African reserves. On the other hand, the taxation of 
Africans was proportionately much more severe than that of 
the white settlers.
Leonard Woolf and C.R. Buxton eventually went to see 
Lord Passfield to put these points and ask for a revision
1 . A.C.I.Q. Minutes, 17 December 1930} 21 January 1931«
2. Archdeacon Owen to N. Leys, 18 November 1930, W. Holtby 
Papers Drawer 4, Pile 9.
. A.C.I.Q. Minutes, 4 February 1931.3
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of the budget. The Colonial Secretary met the chairman and 
secretary of the A.C.I.Q. in the House of Lords. Leonard 
Voolf wrote in his memoirs that 'we had an absurd meeting 
with Sidney in the red and gold Chamber of the House of Lords, 
which was, of course, completely empty except for the tiny 
Secretary of State and the humble chairman and secretary of 
the Advisory Committee sitting one on either side of him.
We got, as 1 expected, nothing out of Sidney, who was an 
expert negotiator and had at his fingers* ends all the 
arguments of all men of action for always doing nothing. ' 1
The meeting was reported to the A.C.I.Q. on l8 February
O1931, The Committee was disappointed especially since
in February of the previous year Drummond Shieb had informed
C.R. Buxton that he and Lord Passfield were going to keep a
special watch on the next year's budget in order to ensure
that the Africans were not unfairly taxed.J Norman Leys
thought that Passfield was being 'fooled' by the settlers.
He thought that land was still being taken from the Kikuyu
in Kenya and that Passfield had also been 'humbugged* about
4forced labour in Uganda the previous year. Leys had 
always been doubtful about whether the A.C.I.Q. would be 
able to persuade Passfield to follow Labour policy. In 
September 1930, he wrote to Harris that 'if we don't make 
the Jamaican policy safe in Kenya before the next election, 
Kenya will go the way of all South Africa.' The failure of 
Woolf and Buxton to persuade Passfield to revise the Kenyan
1 . L. woolf, op.cit*,p.238.
2 . A.C.I.Q. Minutes, 18 February 1931*
3 . Colonial Office 533/595, 16019.
4. N. Leys to J.H. Harris, 2 August 1930, A.S.A.P.S. Papers
G.145. N. Leys to J.H. Harris, 19 December 1929«ibid.
5. N. Leys to J.H. Harris, 21 September 1930, ibid.
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budget in favour of the Africans and *grasp the Kenyan 
nettle1, led to leys' resignation from the A.CoI.Q,*1 He 
decided to write another book on Kenya to force the public 
to awareness about what was happening in Kenya. Gupta 
writes that Leys had some success in persuading his 
colleagues to accept the equal rights policy* However,
Leys did not think that he had achieved enough success in 
persuading his colleagues to take African affairs seriously* 
He wrote to Harris in 1931 that ‘the Labour party as a whole 
never seriously addressed itself to the problems of colonial 
Africa.*^ He had written to Buxton in December 1930 to 
beg him to make time to ensure that action was taken on the 
Kenyan budget - *if not it will be quite impossible to have 
the principles of the *White Paper on Native Policy* given
Lactuality* Leys felt that Buxton, Ross and the other 
members of the A.C.I.Q. had not made enough effort to ensure 
that the policies of the White Papers were carried out* Leys 
thought that they should! have put more pressure on Pasfield 
but they tended to assume that since the ’right policies* 
had been outlined, they would be put into effect. Leys 
wrote to Winifred Holtby, in 1931, that he was exasperated 
because of ’these two wasted years, not only with Passfield 
but with Buxton, Ross and the rest of the Advisory Committee
who thought that the White Paper would put itself into
eaction - a puerile notion I always thought it** Leys* 
criticism of the other members may have been harsh but Leys 
was right on the main point that if nothing was done to
X, fi, beys to J.H. Harris, 16 July 1931, ibid*
2, PoS„ Gupta, op.cit*, p.194.
3, N* Leys to J.H. Harris, ibid*
4. N. Leys to C.R. Buxton, 7 December 1930, N. Leys to 
C«R* Buxton, 26 December 1930, W. Holtby Papers, Drawer 
4, Pile 9.
5. N. Leys to W. Holtby, 5 September 1931, W„ Holtby Papers, 
Drawer 4, File 8.
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enforce Labour policy, the ‘White Paper on Native Policy* 
would make no difference to the actual situation in Africa* 
Leys felt that a confrontation with the settlers could not 
be avoided; Passfield,on the other hand, was trying to avoid 
confrontation, if possible*
Passfield stated in the House of Lords1 *3that the
Government wanted to get the fullest measure of unity on
the complicated matter of Closer Union* It believed that
the settlers had a part to play in the trusteeship of the
Africans, for the settlers were part of the Kenyan Legislative
Council and they would be involved in the new Federal
Council* He pointed out that the common roll would not be
instituted immediately, all the Government wanted was for
the High Commissioner to inquire what was the most practicable
action that could be taken in this direction* Passfield
managed to persuade Lord Lugard to second the motion that ’
*a Joint Committee of both Houses be appointed to
consider the Reports on Closer Union in Africa together
with the statement of the conclusions of H.M.G*, and to
report thereon* 1 Passfield said that the Government felt
that this was the ‘best way of getting whatever light and
leading can be got on the subject in correction, or
supplement, or alteration of the conclusions* which the
Government had come to*
•xLord Lugard thought that the Joint Committee would
prevent the issue becoming the ‘shuttlecock of party
politics*. It would provide a policy with a sanction
•higher than that of the present Government and, perhaps,
higher than that of any Government confined to one party**
1 . 78 H*L*Debs*,5s.,cols*308-312, 3 July 1930*
2* 79 H.L.Deb*,5s•, cols* 73~76, 12 November 1930»
3, ibid*, cols*7&-79
289
The Joint Committee should attempt to find institutions 
which were suited to the government of largeAfrican 
dependencies where parliamentary institutions were not 
suited* The Archbishop of Canterbury also spoke in support 
of the motion, 1 saying that he agreed with General Smuts 
that the 'question of white and black on the Continent of
Africa was going to be the most interesting and enthralling 
problem of the twentieth century**
Lord Delamere, the leader of the white settlers in 
Kenya, was visiting London at the time,especially 'to put 
forward every argument against the subordination of European 
interests in East Africa1* He spoke*' in the debate and 
broke the consensus with a rambling and disjointed speech*
He was sorry that the Joint Committee was going to be
appointed because he believed that the only possible correct 
form of government for East Africa was that which had been 
adopted throughout the South African and East African 
countries which were governing themselves by a means of 
self-government. Lord Delamere thought that the settlers 
should be given control in East Africa*
In the Commons, African policy was discussed on 9 
December 1930, when Earl Winterton,^ a Conservative M.P., 
moved an adjournment motion* His main concern was to
exclude Northern Rhodesia from the principles outlined in 
the 'White Paper on Native Policy*. He argued that the
White Paper had been written with Kenya in mind, therefore 
it should not apply to Northern Rhodesia which was different
from Kenya because it was more industrial and had an
1
2
3
4
ibid*, cols*84-87 
E. Huxley, op.cit*, p.28l*
79 H.L*Deb.,5s.,cols.93-95, 12 November 1930. 
246 H.C.Deb.,5s.,cols.320-332, 9 December 1930.
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increasing population instead of a static population as 
Kenya had* He wondered whether Northern Rhodesia could be 
amalgamated with Southern Rhodesia* Winterton believed that 
the Government's 'White Paper on Native Policy' was too 
authoritarian* It should realise €iat it could not carry 
out a policy of trusteeship without the support of the 
settlers in East Africa*
Horrabin, however, did not believe that the settlers 
in Africa could be trusted to look after the welfare of the 
Africans* He quoted from a document which had been issued 
by the settlers of Northern Rhodesia which stated "The 
British colonists there hold that the British Empdr e is 
primarily concerned with the furtherance of the interests 
of British subjects of British race, and only thereafter 
with other British subjects, protected races, and the 
nationals of other countries, in that order*"1 Horrabin 
thought that this rather than the Government's White Paper 
was an example of an authoritarian document* He defended 
the Government's Paper and its use of the word 'Paramountcy*• 
Common justice demanded that the interests of the enormous 
majority of the people should be paramount and that the 
interests of 99*5 per cent of the people of Northern
Rhodesia should prevail over the interests of the minority*
2Charles Buxton quoted the Government's White Paper 
to show that it did envisage the settlers sharing the 
responsibility for native welfare: "In short both the 
Governors and the Councils are regarded by H*H.G. as 
sharing in the responsibilities for native welfare."^ He 
also thought that the document that had been issued by the
1 , 24b H.C.Deb*,5s*, col*340, 9 December 1930*
2, 246 H.C.Deb.,5s., cols* 348-352, 9 December 1930*
3, Cmd.3573* p»5*
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Northern Rhodesian settlers was much more insulting tothe 
Africans than the Government’s WhitePaper was to the 
European settlers* The Africans had been described as 
'alien and barbarous natives* in the settlers* document. 
Buxton thought that Judging by the document they had 
produced they were not the type of people who could under­
take the tremendous responsibility of looking after the 
welfare of the Africans.
Dr. Drummond Shiels said*- that he was not in a position 
to give any information to Earl Winterton about the 
amalgamation of North and South Rhodesia. There had been 
a request from the Government of Southern Rhodesia for a 
conference between the Governments to consider the question 
but the Government had not yet made up its mind on the
o
subject. Concerning the 'White Paper on Native Policy*, 
Dr. Shiels said that the Paper had been criticised not
only in the House but also in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia. 
It was criticised in Kenya mainly because of its use of 
the word *paramountcy* and in Northern Rhodesia and
elsewhere on more general grounds. The doctrine of 
•paramountcy* had first been declared in the 1923 
Devonshire White Paper which had stated that "the primary 
duty of the Colonial Government is the advancement of the
African, and it is incumbent upon them to protect him from
an influx of immigrants from any country which might tend 
to retard his economic development."^ Drummond Shiels
1 .
2.
3-
2^6 H.C.Deb.,5s., cols.356-365, 9 December 1930.
It later decided against the idea, partly because
J.F.N. Green pointed out that the African policy of 
Southern Rhodesia was not in line with the 'White Paper 
on Native Policy* Gupta,op.cit.,p.187-189. The desire 
to retain direct British control over the copper deposits 
was the other major factor. The announcement was made in 
the House of Commons on 2 July 1931, 25k H.C.Deb.c.1471-3» Cmd•1922,p.18.
could not understand why the Labour Government's 'White 
Paper on Native Policy' had met with such a hostile 
reception when other White Papers using similar language 
aid outlining the same policy of 'native* paramountcy had 
not been accompanied by such hostile criticism. It had 
been necessary to issue a 'White Paper on Native Policy' 
because, when the Labour Government came into office in 
1929* a doubt existed about the scope and application of 
the general principles laid down in 1923. Moreover, 
the Hilton Young Commission had gone into the question of 
•native' rights and it was not possible for any Government 
to avoid making a pronouncement on the issues that Hilton 
Young had raised. The White Paper applied the principle 
of paramountcy to the subjects of land, labour and taxation 
The 1923 White Paper had only related the principle to the 
subject of immigration. The relation of the principle 
to the new subjects had not been criticised in the House; 
that was the main point. All the criticism had been 
extremely vague. Dr. Shiels concluded from this that the 
response of some people was that anything that the Labour 
Governmeit did, was, ipso facto, designed to ruin the Empire 
However, Shiels thought that the Paper was not 
universally unpopular in East Africa. Those who knew 
the Africans best and had no time to take an interest in 
politics would sympathise with the principles of the White 
Paper. There were those who held that the African was 
not capable of sharing the highest civilisation but the 
Labour party and the Labour Government thought that the 
African should be given the opportunity of rising to the 
full height of his possible stature. «We do not believe 
that such opportunities are a menace to the true interest 
of white settlers in our colonies. We are anxious for the
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welfare and prosperity of the white settlers. We believe 
further, that the dual interests of those settlers and the 
African natives are fundamentally complementary, or if they 
are not they should be.1*
That the Labour Government was not hostile to the
concept of Empire was shown in the speeches of Ramsay
MacDonald. To delegates of the Imperial Press Conference
in London, he said that Empire was a 'lovely word*. He
wanted the Empire to embody 'the illumination and aspiration
of the human mind. The problem was how to merge the
Imperial spirit of rule into the commonwealth spirit of
counsel and yet hold out the hand of family helpfulness
2to the rest of the world.•
The Joint Committee was chosen by Webb and held its
first meeting on 4 December 1930. Passfield had changed
his mind in response to Conservative criticism, and allowed
the Committee to consider the 'Memorandum on Native Policy'
as well as the three reports on Closer Union. 'There will
certainly be no attempt on my part to prevent the Joint
Committee taking the 'Memorandum on Native Policy* into
account as fully as it chooses in relation to the powers
which are proposed to be given to the High Commissioner,
to which it is exactly relevant.'^ R.G. Gregory^ sees
this decision as the frustration of Passfield's design
to exclude the 'Memorandum on Native Policy' from
consideration by the Joint Committee. However, in reality,
it was another example of Passfield's weakness and
vacillation. He was unwilling to insist on the policy
1 # 24b HoU.Deb.,5s., col.364, 9 December 1930.
2. 'Daily Herald', 4 June 1930, p.3.
3* 79 H.L.Deb.,5s., col.92, 12 November 1930.
4. R.G. Gregory, 'Sidney Webb and East Africa* (University of California, 1962),p.115.
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of the •Memo* because of the protests of the European
community in East Africa and the Conservatives in Britain*
The decision to refer the 'Memo* to the Joint Committee
meant that »the doctrine of native paramountcy, as well
as trusteeship and dual policy, would be subject on» more
to review and alteration.»1 Passfield did not seem
determined to carry out Labour*s policy. The members of
the A.C.I.Q. thought that the »Memo* should not be discussed
by the Joint Committee, Leys thought that the chairman of
the Committee should rule »out of order* decisions which
were specified in the »White Paper on Native Policy* and
that the defenders of »native interests* ought to insist on
the retention of the official majority in the Kenya
legislature. Leys wrote to Wellock, a Labour member of
the Committee, that the »equal rights* policy should be
supported by the Committee rather than the »indirect rule*
policy of Lugard. Leys believed that the Africans were
capable of using democratic methods of government. It
was no longer possible to satisfy their political
aspirations with tribal institutions. The Africans had
to have the chance of equal opportunities and status with 
3the whites.
Passfield*s choice of members for the Joint Committee
made it unlikely that Leys* policies would be adopted. 
Passfield again demonstrated his lack of determination to 
insist on Labour policy and ensure it was carried out.
Its twenty members were to be selected in equal proportion 
from the two Houses of Parliament and from the two leading
political parties. Ten were selected from the Lords and
ten from the Commons. The members from the Commons
1
2
3
ibid.
N. Leys to J.H. Harris 
Papers, G.145.
N. Leys to W 0 Wellock, Drawer 4, File 9.
, 15 September 1930, A.S.A.P.S. 
27 June 1931, W. Holtby Papers,
represented a balance between the two parties but those from 
the Lords were predominantly Conservative« and as a result 
the tone of the Commission was Conservative* The Committee 
refused to hear the African representatives of the Kikuyu 
Central Association« J. Kenyatta and P*G* Mockerie, telling 
them that they had arrived too late« even though the 
examination of witnesses continued for many weeks after they 
arrived.* However« it did listen to the ’official' native' 
witnesses* Lord Olivier was impressed by the quality of 
these witnesses and thought that they had emerged with 
credit from the proceedings and shown that Africans were 
able to speak for themselves* He felt that the Committee 
had not emerged with the same credit because some of the
Oquestions put to the Africans had been silly*
The Committee reported on 12 October 1931, after the
3fall of the Labour Government.-' It devised a form of words 
to satisfy everyone over paramountcy and upheld the status 
quo by deciding against any form of Closer Union* On the 
question of paramountcy the Report stated that ’the
principle of paramountcy was intended in 1930 as in 1923 
to meet those particular cases which might arise, 
especially in connection with land and labour questions, 
in which there might be a definite conflict between the
interests of a non-native community and those of the native 
population.’ It meant »no more than that the interests of
the overwhelming majority of the population should not be
subordinated to those of a minority belonging to another 
1 * ,A” Afrlcan Speaks for his People*
Kenya^n (London^PX938)^p.it7.K<myatta' * " “ *
2. ’New Statesman', 16 May 1931, p.417.
3. Joint Select Committee Report, H.C.*Paper 156 (1931).
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race,however important in itself.*'1' Concerning trusteeship the 
Committee decided that * trusteeship of natives must remain the 
function of E.M.G. hut that the assistance of the non-native 
communities in carrying out this obligation should he encouraged 
to an increasing extent.* The Committee endorsed the policy of 
trusteeship rather than Leys* ideas of »equal righta* .It also 
decided that the time was inopportune for giving effect to any 
far-reaching scheme for Closer Uhion.The issue was shelved and
i
the situation was left as it was.The settlers had originally 
hoped that Closer Union would he a means of gaining more political 
control over the colonies.However,by 1931 they had turned against 
the idea and were not disappointed with the Seport.They had been 
afraid that the Labour party’s scheme for Closer Union would he 
put into effect with a High Commissioner for ‘native policy* who 
would he determined to enforce »native paramountcy* over the 
settlers.They were relieved that this type of scheme was not to 
he implemented.
Lord Passfield,however,wrote to his wife on completion of
the Report*'We finished our African Report today,leaving it to
the Chairman finally to tidy up. It has been really a triumphant
success for the »pro-natives' as against the settlers...This is a very
2satisfactory outcome for the past two years.* Drummond Shiels 
thought that the Report and the working out of its recommendations 
would provide a breathing-space.He believed that the Report showed 
a progressive spirit and provided an opportunity to build up an 
enlightened political and administrative system in Africa.^ The Report didnot
1. Joint Select Committee Report,op.cit.,p.31.2. Quoted Gregory,op.cit.,p.136.
3. Political Quarterly,Vol.3 No.I,Jan- March,1932,pp.71-87.
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recommend anything very concrete except that there should be 
more investigations into the loss of 'native' land, taxation 
and the administration of justice in Kenya*
Lord Olivier thought that the Report closed the chapters 
of the »East African comedy*• The plan for Closer Union 
had been inspired by the settlers* ambitions to establish 
in East Africa the paramountcy of British interests, enhance 
the importance of the Governor of Kenya, install a self- 
governing white community of Kenya as the dominant authority 
for general policies throughout the territories and preclude 
the Labour Government from restoring’Tanganyika to Germany. 
The Report of the Join£ Committee had ended the idea of 
Closer Union and was a sufficient basis for a more loyal 
administration of Britain's trust for East Africa. It 
rested with the Colonial Office to make good this declara­
tion of parliamentary will.*
In his book, *A Last Chance in Kenya', Norman Leys 
wrote that he was disappointed with the performance of the 
Labour Government and *the deplorable decision of the 
Select Committee to refuse to hear the delegates chosen 
and sent, at the cost of great sacrifices by the Africans 
themselves', though it had listened to delegates chosen by 
the Government. This must have added many to the number 
of those in Kenya who suspected that British promises were 
not intended to be fulfilled. More than all else, it 
was the knowledge that the Kenya Government had been 
directed in the 'White Paper on Native Policy' to do some 
of the things that the Africans had most ardently wished 
for, and yet had done nothing to fulfil these directions, 
that had done so much to silence those who had advocated 1
1. 'New Statesman*, 14 November 1931, p.6l4.
298
patience and encourage those who advocated resistance.^
Leys wrote to Shiels to say that readers of his book would 
realise that Muring these two years the C.O. made no real 
effort to fulfill any of these promises' but the blame lay 
with Lord Passfield not Shiels. He wrote 'I believe, 
knowing what your public record is, that you would have 
fallowed a very different course if you had been Secretary 
of State
The demands of Jomo Kenyatta and P.G. Mockerie were 
published in the 'New Leader'• They felt that unless 
Africans were on the Legislative Council in adequate 
numbers there was no safeguard for them. Owing to the 
lack of direct African representation the social, hedth 
and educational services were neglected. There were no 
facilities for marketing African produce - very few roads 
and no railways served the African reserves - and African 
produce was decreasing. The roads which were made were 
constructed by forced labour and the K.C.A. strongly 
protested against this. They were prepared to approve 
the appointment of a High Commissioner to supervise 
economic services only if the principles of the paramountcy 
of African interests and undivided trusteeship were upheld, 
uniformity was maintained with the general principles of 
labour policy, expenses of Closer Union were defrayed by 
the Government, representation of African interest was 
granted to Africans themselves and the High Commissioner 
put 'British Imperial Native policy' into force and in the 
event of failure reported his reasons to the British
, N. Leys, »A Last Chance in Kenya' (London,1931),pp.12-13
. N. Leys to Dr. Shiels, 25 September 1931, Winifred Holtby 
Papers Drawer 4, Pile 9«
1
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Imperial Government."*" The Labour Government had failed to 
satisfy these African demands. Despite the rhetoric of the 
White Papers, African services were not improved.
Drummond Shiels defended the Ministry, of which he was 
a part, in a review of Leys* book . 2 He thought that Leys 
had forgotten that Lord Passfield was ‘personally and almost 
entirely* responsible for the famous 1930 'White Paper on 
Native Policy*• The real difference between the Labour 
ministers and Leys was that the ministers had thought it 
wise to try to get the sympathy and interests of the settlers, 
while Leys considered this unnecessary or impossible. The 
ministers believed that some common ground could be 
discovered and Shiels thought that they had not been 
disappointed as the unanimous report of the Joint Committee 
showed.
The main point of Leys * criticism was that the declared 
policy was the correct one but that the Colonial Office had 
not been ready to force the Colonial Government^ especially 
in Kenya, to put it into effect. Norman Leys felt that 
Shiels review of his book was *childish in its refusal to 
see that the Labour Government's two years had left things 
there (East Africa) worse than it had found them'.^
Passfield had difficulty in getting Grigg to carry 
out his orders. They had clashed on a number of occasions 
before the issue of the White Papers - the release of Harry 
Thuku, the controversy over the K.C.A., the Native Lands 
Trust Bill, the Maragua-Tana power scheme development, 
and the Kenya Defence Ordinance. Passfield had thought
1 . »New Leader*, 31 July 1931* p*5*
2. Political Quarterly, Vol.3, No. 3, July-September 1932, 
pp.44(i-8»
3. N. Leys to Winifred Holtby, Holtby Papers, 24 January 
1933, Drawer 4, File 8.
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that Harry Thuku should be released but Grigg was not 
prepared to do this, 1 Over the K.C.A., the Governor was 
alarmed at Its development and wanted to take action to 
restrict it, but the Colonial Secretary had written that 
the Governor should refrain from oppressive action until 
sedition had been brought out into the open. Grigg had 
drafted a bill banning fund collection by the K.C.A. 
but Passfield would not let him introduce
it. Passfield wrote to Grigg that 'we cannot possibly
agree to anything which can be interpreted as repression•. 2 
Shiels, however, was not sure that Grigg was carrying out 
the Labour Government's instructions concerning the K.C.A. 
and wanted Passfield to recall Grigg but Passfield was 
unwilling to take this action.
Concerning the Native Lands Trust Bill, which provided 
security of tenure of the land of the natives in the 
reserves and defined how reserve land could be appropriated 
by the government or leased to private individuals, Grigg 
was forced by Passfield to make amendments which were 
objectionable to the settlers - the duration of a leasehold 
to private individuals was limited to 33 years rather than 
the 99 Grigg had proposed and whenever the Government 
appropriated land from the natives, it was required to 
give in return a piece of land similar in area and 
fertility. The Native Lands Trust Bill had been heavily 
criticised by the Labour party when in opposition, an3 
Passfield was therefore under a strong obligation to amend 
it. The 'Daily Herald' reported that Passfield's amend­
ments had created a storm in the Legislative Council. It
1 . Grigg to Passfield, 15 March 1930.
2# l*May i9304*Sflel<I* 11 September 1929, Passfield to Grigg,
stated that ‘all who had the welfare of the East African 
tribesman at heart were looking with keen interest for the 
next move on the part of the Imperial Government, There 
were dangers of the voortrekker South African policy being 
pursued in Kenya*• * The Bill, as.amended, encountered
strong opposition in the Legislative Council from the
unofficial members and the Governor, on Passfield*s
2instructions, reluctantly had to use the official majority 
to secure its passage. M. Perham who was staying with 
Grigg at the time, writes that Grigg was on the side of
the settlers and thought that ’distrust from home was
Apoisoning the whole atmosphere in Kenya*. Passfield had 
put him in a ridiculous position and Grigg had been very 
near to resigning.
On the question of the power scheme, Passfield demanded 
that the Government make concessions to the Africans who 
were going to be dispossessed of their land and asked for 
the appointment of a special tribunal of investigation.
5This irritated the Governor. Finally, the Kenya Defence 
Force Ordinance called for compulsory military service 
for young Europeans. In the Colonial Estimates for 1930, 
Passfield, to Grigg»s annoyance, disallowed the provision 
that allocated funds for the maintenance of the force . 6
The difficulties Passfield experienced in trying to 
persuade Grigg to follow Labour's policy in these instances 
showed that it would be even more difficult to put the White
1. 'Daily Herald', 16 January 1930.
2. Passfield to Grigg, 1 May 1930} Grigg to Passfield. 23
June 1930. *
3 . G. Bennett, 'Kenya* (London,1963),pp.69-70.
4. M. Perham »East African Journey* (London,1977),p.29.
5. Grigg to Passfield, 13 September 1929.
6. Grigg to Passfield, 15 March 1930.
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Paper into effect. Grigg did not frame the many amendments 
which would have had to be made if the ‘White Paper on 
Native Policy' was to be put into effect. He procrastinated 
about providing considered comments on the Papers for the 
Joint Committee and Passfield's and Grigg's correspondence 
was reduced in the end to quibbling about rumours that the 
Governor had opened the sealed package containing the White 
Papers before the day appointed for opening. 1
Drummond Shiels wrote that Passfield lacked 'a certain 
potential ruthlessness' which hast to be within the capacity 
of those with the highest responsibilities. 'A certain 
Governor - a man of experience and distinction - committed 
two serious breaches of discipline, one of them openly and 
the other - more serious in its consequences - only known 
to a very small circle. These were matters concerning 
Government policy. Although it was urged on Webb that 
this vey individualistic and almost defiant Governor should 
be recalled, he refused to do it.' However, Grigg was 
due to retire at the end of 1930 anyway, so Passfield 
probably did not think that a few months would make much 
difference.
Grigg*s successor, Sir Joseph Byrne, had beei Governor 
of Sierra Leone and a policeman in the troubles in Ireland.
It was thought that he would not be as keen to look after 
the settlers' interests as Grigg had been. C.R. Buxton 
wrote to Byrne to point out that the Kenyan administration 
needed to be brought more into harmony with the 'Memorandum 
on Native Policy' and that the degree of control secured by
4the white community was 'somewhat greater than it should be.'
1 . Grigg to Passfield, 19 November 1930; Passfield to Grigg,
21 November 1930.
2. Shiels op.cit•,p.2l8
3# G. Bennett, op.cit•,p.73*
C.R. Buxton to Sir J. Byrne, 21 May 1931, C.R. Buxton 
Papers Box 5/3»
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Byrne's reply was disappointing to Buxton and the A.C.I.Q.: 
he wrote that Kenya was dominated by the 'appalling 
financial depression'and this hampered any endeavour'to 
tackle, as one would like« the many problems affecting 
the native population. 11 Leys thought that conclusive 
proof that Byrne belonged to the Grigg school was that 
Byrne had stated that he hoped that Kenya would be kept out 
of the limelight in the future. Leys felt that this
indicated that Byrne was not keen to implement the 'Memoran­
dum on Native Policy', for, if it were implemented, Kenya 
would definitely have to be kept in the limelight. 2 It 
seems that Byrne was not as determined to uphold the 
settlers* interests as Grigg had been, but, on the other 
hand, he was not prepared to confront the settlers and 
enforce the principles of the 'Memo*.
Passfield was also not willing enough to confront the 
settlers in Africa and make it plain to them that the 
interests of the Africans would be paramount. He failed 
to point out clearly that the Africans would eventually 
be responsible for their countries. When he was Dominions 
Secretary, he approved an act from the Southern Rhodesian 
Legislature which made the situation of the Africans
worse. He approved a segregation policy which divided 
Southern Rhodesian land between white settlers and the 
Africans. The act withdrew the right of Africans in 
Southern Rhodesia to purchase land in any part of the 
country, as they had previously been entitled to do, and 
imposed a segregation policy. Passfield had followed 
the advice of his civil servants without thinking through
1. Sir J.Byrne to C.R. Buxton, 22 June 1931, ibid.
2. N. Leys to Owen, 29 January 1931, w. Holtby Papers, Drawer k, File 9.
the implications of the measure. The A.C.X.Q. had not paid 
much attention to the matter, the only criticism of the 
decision coming from the A.S.A.P.S.^
Passfield's 'Memorandum on Native Policy* could have 
made a difference in Africa, particularly, East Africa, if 
he had been determined to enforce its principles. However, 
as the episode of the Kenyan budget showed, he lacked the 
necessary determination. Sir Edward Grigg and the settlers 
had been very worried when the White Papers appeared: they 
feared that they would be enforced, but as Passfield 
procrastinated and set up the Joint Committee, dominated 
by Conservatives, they realised that their position was 
not in danger. Passfield did not order the amendment of 
all legislation which broke the principles of the »Memo1 23.
He did not ensure that the budgets were altered so that 
the principles would be carried out. Instead, Passfield 
contented himself with setting up the Joint Committee, 
and considered making yet more inquiries into the 
situation in East Africa. The call for more enquiries 
was reinforced by the report of the Joint Committee, and 
enquiries were set up, as a result, into land, taxation, 
and the administration of justice in Kenya, by Passfield's
osuccessor as Colonial Secretary. Passfield's White 
Papers became, as Sir Edward Grigg said later, 'the 
obiter dicta of a minority Government without Parliamentary
3ratification.' Sir Donald Cameron, a Governor who 
thought differently to Grigg, considered that Passfield 
was 'utterly useless, vacillating and weak* as .Colonial
1 . Shiels, op.cit., p.204; Gupta, op.cit., ppl75-179.
2. J. Thomas followed Passfield as Colonial Secretary in 
August 1931 but was soon replaced by Sir P. Cunliffe- 
Lister in November 1931.
3. Quoted, R.G. Gregory, op.cit., p.137.
304
305
Secretary* Cameron called him 'Lord Passover1 23,'*' As a 
result of Passfield’s period of office, the situation in 
East Africa remained more or less the same as it had been 
before he came into office* The settlers had not achieved 
their aim of gaining increased control over the Kenyan 
Legislative Council but neither had the Labour Government’s 
stated policy, that the interests of the Africans should be 
paramount, been enforced* The fact that the settler 
scheme for Closer Union was not put into operation was 
not due to Passfield* He had been persuaded by his civil 
servants, when he came into office, to follow the essentials 
of the Closer Union scheme which had been worked out by his 
Permanent Secretary, Sir Samuel Wilson. This scheme would 
have been acceptable to Grigg and the settlers. After 
talking to Passfield, Grigg went back to Kenya convinced 
that Passfield would carry out Wilson’s plan. The hostility 
that the White Papers received from the settlers and Grigg 
was partly caused by the fact that they felt that Passfield 
had changed his mind. The change had been caused by the 
protests that Passfield had received when it was realised 
what he was proposing to do. It was not only the A.C.I.Q. 
which protested against his original plans, but the 
A.S.AoP.S., Lord Lugard, Oldham and many Labour and Liberal 
M.P.s• The protests were not confined to the left of the 
Labour party but included the humanitarian lobby and many 
Liberals. Passfield was defeated, in Cabinet,largely as 
a result of opposition from Wedgwood Benn, the Secretary
1 . M. Perham, ’East African Journey* (London, 1976),p.45.
2. J.C. Wedgwood, op.cit., p.205.
3 . A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 205, February 1939*
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of State for India. 1 However, the Cabinet Committee's 
alternative scheme for Closer Union, which emphasised 
African interests, was abandoned as a result of the report 
of the Conservative-dominated Joint Committee on Closer 
Union, which Passfield had appointed.
In East Africa, Passfield failed to ensure that 
African interests would be paramount. The Government's 
attitude to West Africa will now be considered to ascertain 
whether West Africa was the example of successful colonial 
administration that Labour policy statements made it out to 
be •
1 . R.G. Gregory, op.cit., over-estimates Passfield's zeal 
on behalf of the Africans and under-estimates Wedgwood 
Benn's influence. This is because he was unable to look 
at Cabinet and Colonial Office Papers which plainly show 
that Passfield was very willing to follow the advice of 
his civil servants and did not seem very keen on 
implementing Labour's declared African policy.
CHAPTER 7.
THE SECOND LABOUR GOVERNMENT
WEST AFRICA
3o8
West Africa did not take up as much of the Colonial Office's 
time as Bast Africa.At thin time the problems of the West Coast 
of Africa were less complex than those of the East.The problems of 
West Africa were not held important enough to come before the Cabinet. ‘ 
Since the climate of West Africa was unsuitable for European settlement 
the problem of reconciling the interests of the Africans and the 
resident Europeans did not arise in the acute form which it took 
in Bast Africa,particularly in Kenya. The Colonial Office was 
generally content to leave these Dependencies to their own devices 
unless a crisis arose.The situation did not change with the advent 
of a Labour Government. However,during the period of the Second 
Labour Government,when Lord Passfield was Colonial Secretary, 
there were some incidents involving the use of force against some 
Africans in West Africa. The way in which the Colonial Offioe 
handled these situations,when Lord Fassfield was Colonial Seoretary, 
shows that the Labour Government had no great desire to push 
through radical reforms in the interests of the Africans.
TIn its pamphlets dealing with the empire in Africa, the 
Labour Party continually pointed out the oontrast between the 
policies pursued by the administrations in East and West Africa.
The 'African*' policy pursued in West Africa favoured the preservation 
of African rights to land,and assisted the African population to 
develop the resources of the land T?y growing crops or gathering 
products for exports. In oontrast,the "capitalist* policy
I.- 'The Empire in AfricatLabour's Policy (1920) 
'Labour and the Empire»Africa (1926). *
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pursued in East Africa favoured the economic development of 
the country through syndicates and planters by the use of 
•hired* or forced labour. It confined that population to 
reserves and gave the African population no security of title 
even within the reserves. As Margery Perham writes, 1 »the 
sole credit for this position (in West Africa) cannot be 
attributed to official altruism or foresight. Governments 
staffed with the same material and directed by the same 
Colonial Office have in other parts of the continent 
facilitated the alienation of land to white colonists even 
where it was occupied by natives.* Colonisation in West 
Africa was never considered mainly because of the »dreadful 
climate* but also because, from the point of view of the 
government, the Treasury and the traders, it was a relatively sound 
economic proposition from the start. There was no need 
for settlement in order to make profits. Talking about 
the plantation system, the chairman of the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce said, concerning West Africa, *1 want 
to say that I know no responsible official or trader who 
advocates that system. We are all dead against it as well 
as the alienation of land from the natives. * 2
Some left-wing writers did not view the West African 
colonies in the same light as the Labour party. Ralph 
Fox, a Marxist, thought that the 'whole economic life of 
the West African colonies* was »under the control of the 
great oil and cocoa trusts of which Unilever and British 
Chemical Industries* were the most prominent. 3 It was 
these trusts which fixed the prices for pslm-oil and cocoa
1 . M. Perham, »Native Administration in Nigeria',(Oxford,1937)
2. 'West Africa', 2k April 1926, p.486.
2. R. Fox, »The Colonial Policy of British Imperialism», (London,1938),pp.88-89.
3 10
and they had an absolute monopoly over the whole internal 
trade of the colonies. In 1929 the African and Eastern 
Trade Corporation Limited and the Niger Company Limited, 
subsidiary of the larger British firms, merged. The result 
of this merger was that the four crown colonies of West 
Africa - Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Gambia and Sierra Leone - 
were virtually for all commercial purposes in the hands of 
a single combine named United Africa Company Limited. Fox 
also thought that the land system in West Africa was not as 
beneficial to the Africans as the Labour party thought. The 
land systems were extremely complicated but 'none resembled 
any known system of peasant proprietorship. In some cases 
local chiefs had been made into landlords, in others a whole 
class of new landlords had been created who either exploited 
the peasantry direct^- through the wage system or else on the 
share-cropping system. While in Northern Nigeria, native 
landlordism was growing very rapidly and with it money- 
lending*. 1
The incidents that occuned in West Africa, during the 
period of the Second Labour Government, indicated that the 
Labour party's idealistic picture of West Africa as a haven 
of peace and security for the Africans was not altogether 
accurate. The gravest crisis occurred in Nigeria in 1929. 
On 11 December 1929 rioting broke out at Aba, government 
offices were attacked, premises of European merchants, the 
Niger Company, were looted and the local branch of Barclays 
Bank was w r e c k e d . T h e  unusual factor about the riots was 
that they were mainly caused by women. The women were
Fo x , op.cit.,pp.91-92.
2. »West Africa', 28 December 1929, p.1772: «The Times',
25 August 1930«
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dissatisfied with the low prices obtained for their palm- 
oil produce from the Niger Company and they feared that 
they were going to be taxed. They had recently been 
counted and they feared that this was a prelude to their 
being taxed. They persisted in this belief despite 
repeated assurances to the contrary by the officials who 
said they were only being counted for census purposes. This 
was not believed because previously the men had been counted, 
the same reason being given at the time, and subsequently 
they were taxed. There was also dissatisfaction with the 
Native Court system, which was corrupt in many cases. The 
women had persuaded themselves that they were *not only the 
victims of outrageous oppression but were faced with absolute 
ruin.
Troops were brought in and there was firing on thirteen 
occasions. On 14 December at Aba three women were killed 
and one wounded. On 13 December at Utu Etam Ekpo a Lewis 
gun was used and 20 women were killed and 25 wounded. The 
following day, 16 December at Opobo 31 women were killed; 
one man was also killed and 29 women were wounded. In all
54 women and one man were killed and there were over 50
2wounded. The women seemed to have been convinced that no
harm would be done to them. Their aim was to destroy the
Native Courts and mob the Warrant Chiefs rather than carry
4out looting. One of the officers in charge of the troops, 
Ifeutenant Browning reported: »In my opinion firing was 
necessary and the only way of stopping the rushing crowd.
1 . M. Perham, op.cit.,p.2l6.
2. Report of the Aba Commission, Government of Nigeria, 
Sessional Paper No. 28 of 1930,p.6: »The Times», 25 
August 1930, p.5»
3# M. Perham, op.cit.,p.213»
4. ibid., p.208.
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It was controlled and, directly the crowd had stopped, the 
firing stopped**1 The District Officer for the Abakaliki 
Division, L.H* Shelton, thought that had action not been 
taken when it was there was little doubt that »the Ibeagus 
would have risen and been Joined by the other sections of 
the Ezzi clan. With them very possibly would have come in 
the Ekwo clan, and more than 150,000 people might have been 
involved and the government engaged in a major military 
operation* »^
Fines were imposed on the district of Aba, amounting in
all to £7 ,087, £1,000 of which was on the township of Aba 5
£850 of this amount was imposed on the Afrian township*
The rest of the fine, £6,087, was imposed on the outlying
African villages.^ These fines themselves were reduced
from the original amount so as »to preclude any possibility
4of their having a crippling amount on the taxpayer.*
What fines eventually were paid is open to some doubt; the 
Governor was asked to discriminate between the innocent and 
the guilty which he said he was doing.^ Questions were 
asked in tie House of Commons about the fines* Drummond 
Shiels emphasised that the fines were not crippling and not
unfair*
The Governor, Graeme Thomson, appointed a Commission 
under the chairmanship of W. Birrell Gray to apportion the 
responsibility for loss of life where firing had taken place.
1 . Report on the Shooting at Abak and Utu Etim Ekpo, 16 
December 1929, Lieutenant Browning in C.O* 583, File
7 0 6/2  ( c . o . 5 8 3 * 1 6 9 ) *
2. Report of District Officer, Abakaliki Division, 15 
January 1930 ibid.
3. Governor of Nigeria, G. Thomson to Passfield, 3 August 
1930, C.O.583, File 706/3 (C.O. 583:169)
4. ibid.
5. »The Times*, 11 June 1930: Thomson to Passfield ibid.
6. House of Commons Reports, 29 January 1930.
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The report was completed by February 1930 and stated that
♦we are quite satisfied that the firing was fully justified
1
in each instance*• The officers responsible for the 
firing were completely exonerated of all blame* The 
Governor wrote to Lord Passfield, saying that he was
2•personally not prepared to blame the officers concerned*• 
However, it was generally felt that the serious nature of 
the disturbances warranted a more representative Commission
3with wider terms of reference* . Thomson wrote to Passfield 
that he in no sense should be regarded as repudiating or 
setting aside the findings of the Birrell Gray Commission 
which he generally accepted* The new Commission, the 
Kingdon Commission, which he had appointed was of much 
wider scope and wouldcteal mainly with the origin and causes 
and prevention of a recurrence of the riots, though no 
subject connected with the riots would be beyond its 
purview.^
The Colonial Office seemed to think that the whole
affair had been handled in a * satisfactory manner*, and
the Colonial Secretary was urged to commend the officers
for the action they had taken.^ Drummond Shiels generally
agreed with this approach but hesitated to commend anybody
•in connection with this unfortunate affair until we have
the report of the larger enquiry*.^ Lord Passfield,
however, commented that we may say that *the officers
acted correctly in deferring the use of force until all
1 * Government of Nigeria, Sessional Paper 12 of 1930,p*13*
2* Governor Thomson to Passfield, 3 February 1930, C.0.583 
File 706/2 (C.O. 583:169).
3. M. Perham, op.cit*, p.2l4-215.
4. Thomson to Passfield, 3 February 1930,C.O.583,File 706/3.
5 . Minutes, 4 February 1930, 27 February 1930, C.O. 583 
File 706/2.
6. Minute 8 March 1930 ibid.
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peaceful means of restoring order had been exhausted. * 1
The Colonial Office seemed to be hoping that the affair
would die down. However, the Report of the Kingdon
Commission was not as the Colonial Office hoped it would be.
It was handed to the Governor on 3 August 1930 and published
on the 23 August. One of the civil servants wrote that
they were in for trouble as a result of the Report. The
main finding of the Kingdon Commission was that on two out
of the three occasions in which there was firing which led
to death, the firing was unjustified. Only on the third
occasion at Opobo was the firing justified, according to
the Commission, and then it was only justified at the moment
at which it took place but there was no justification for
3having allowed the situation to reach such a climax. The
Commission found that the Africans had been worried about
taxation and the falling prices they were receiving for
their produce. A contributory cause was discontent with
the Native Court members. Margery Perham thinks that
the 'presence of Africans on the Commission and in the
Legislative Council, and the need of satisfying a large
literate African public undoubtedly promoted* the
•sympathetic handling of the rioters' case'. She writes
that the Commission and its activities 'probably helped to
prevent a wedge of bitterness and distrust being driven
4between the government and the people'• The Commission 
suggested that there should be an enquiry into the Native 
Court system in the disturbed areas and administrative 
officers should be relieved of some of their judicial work . 5
1 . M i n u t e 10 March 1930 ibid.
2. Minute 23 March 1930 ibid.
3. Sessional Paper 28 of 1930, op.cit., p.6.
4. Mo Perham, op.cit., p.215*
5# Sessional Paper 28 of 1930, op.cit., p.125.
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The ’Morning Post* thought it was extraordinary that the 
Commission should have declared that any firing was 
unjustified. It put its findings down to its unsatisfac­
tory personnel and methods. It had not included any 
military expert and it had cross-examined ’native* 
witnesses in a most unsatisfactory manner. 1 A more 
considered view was that of ’West Africrf, which thought 
that the policy, not the individual officer, was at fault. 
’The real point of the whole matter is the broad question 
of policy laid down from Lagos and not of the responsibility 
or otherwise of individuals bound amid many difficulties 
to carry out that policy.’ There could be no artificial 
•northernisation* of the South EaSt Provinces. There 
could be no indirect rule through great rulers of groups, 
for none such existed, nor could they be created without 
serious harm to local society. ’West Africa* stated 
that the three main causes of the riots had been the 
head tax on males, the fear of taxation on women and the 
low price obtained for the produce of the country. To 
people who lived in the bush, a tax of 7 shillings a year 
for males constituted a hardship. ’Taxation has 
undoubtedly caused hardship, the great drop in the price 
paid for the produce has accentuated hardship, but the 
method of administration adopted has been an oppression.*
The system known as indirect rule had not worked in S.E. 
Nigeria. It required strong ’native* chiefs. An attempt 
had been made to adopt this system in the province over 
the previous two years, but it had been found wanting. The 
chiefs, who had been given the power to collect taxation, 
had often used it to ’get rich quick’. The administrators
1 . ’Morning Post', 26 August 1930.
2. ’West Africa', 8 November 1930, p.1589.
had become out of touch with the people« Europeans should
learn the ‘native* languages and devote more time to finding
out their grievances«1 A reply to this article was written
by M.D.W. Jeffreys, who wrote that, although there was
great population, there was also great wealth and it was
•nonsense* to say that it was a hardship to pay roughly
sixpence a month« The average annual wealth of the native
was 426/-, out of which they were only asked to pay 7 
2shillings.
The Colonial Office thought that the affair had shown
that it was more difficult to make indirect rule work in
the south East than in the North, Drummond Shiels minuted
that he was confirmed in his doubts about indirect rule
and native courts. ‘The search for the 'natural leaders'
of the people has something of pathos in it«' He hoped
that the new Governor, Sir Donald Cameron, could make
indirect rule work for he did seem to understand the
•native' mind, which, after all, was very like any other
mind and reacted to the same influences.^
It was decided that Lord Passfield would issue a
White Paper on 'the native unrest in Calabar and Owerri
Provinces in December 1929 and the correspondence arising
out of the report of the Commission*. This appeared in 
4February 1931« It took the form of a despatch to the 
Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria, Mr. S. 
Hemmant, who was in control until the new Governor, Sir 
Donald Cameron, arrived in Nigeria. Lord Passfield 
thought that it was unfortunate that two commissions should
XI 'West Africa*, 8 March 1930.
2. C.O. 5 8 3» Pile 70 6/3 , op.cit.,
3. C.O. 583* File 1003, Minute 12 January 1931 (C.O. 
583*176). Sir Donald Cameron was transferred from 
Tanganyika to Nigeria in 1931.
4. Cmd. 3784.
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have been appointed which» to some extent» covered the same 
ground and examined the same witnesses* 'So far as the 
personal responsibility of those officers and others 
directly concerned with the events of November and December 
1929 is involved, this second investigation conveys an 
unfortunate, but inevitable appearance of, so to speak, 
"trying'* them a second time#*'*' On the behaviour of the 
officers concerned, Lord Passfield thought that their task 
was not 'an easy or an enviable one* and that ‘having 
regard to all the circumstances, I am definitely unwilling 
to investigate further the actual measure of praise or 
blame which should attach to the officers who took the 
decision to send for troops, or to open fire.••and still
less am I prepared to say that on any given occasion
ofiring was unnecessary.* Here Lord Passfield was over­
ruling the Report of the Aba Commission which had said 
that firing was unnecessary on two out of the three 
occasions on which it led to loss of life.
On the wider causes of the riots, the Colonial 
Secretary thought that it was *probably premature and 
injudicious to introduce into these Provinces a system 
of direct taxation without first completing a more 
intensive survey of their social o r g a n i s a t i o n * I t  
was clear that comparatively little was known of large 
portions of the South East Provinces. In the circumstances 
it would probably have bean better if the introduction of 
direct taxation could have been started at lower rates and 
the people would have been more reconciled to the taxation 
if they had seen some improvement in the local services.
1 . Cmd. 3784 (February 193l)«p.3.
2. ibid., p.4.
3. ibid., p.4.
The government could not have foreseen the fall in the price 
of the local produce which, naturally, would increase the 
irksomeness of any tax in a population, living mainly by the 
sale of such produce, Howfhr discontent with the Native 
Courts and accusations of corruption and bribery against 
the Warrant Chiefs may have been definite factors was more 
obscure, thought Lord Passfield. However, one thing that 
was clear was that direct taxation had been introduced 
among a population of whom comparatively little was known, 
in contrast with the Northern and South West Provinces, and 
that the subsequent unhappy events depended on this first 
step. *It appears to me useless to pursue the subject 
further,
Lord Passfield decided against an enquiry into the 
Native Courts, as he had been recommended by the second 
Commission. Neither did he think it was necessary to 
organise the Royal West African Frontier Force, the 
Nigeria Regiment, in a different way (the Commission had 
recommended special training in crowd dispersal), *If 
soldiers are called upon, it must be to act as soldiers, 
and to enforce the maintenance of law and order by the 
threat and, if necessary, the use of lethal weapons. * 2 
The changes that Lord Passfield thought necessary were 
that early consideration should be given to the establish­
ment of local native councils, not necessarily formed by 
direct popular election, but constituted on as democratic 
a basis as may be found possible, and that steps should 
be taken to improve and increase the amount of instruction 
in anthropology imparted to newly-appointed administrative 
officers. It was of supreme importance for the District
1 . ibid., p.6.
2 . ibid., p.7.
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Officer to keep in direct personal touch with his people. 
This White Paper is a remarkable document for a Labour 
Colonial Secretary to have written. Lord Passfield takes 
his officials* views on almost every question and is not 
prepared to say that firing on women, armed only with 
sticks, was unnecessary in any circumstances, despite the 
findings of the Second Commission.
That the Africans did not see the affair in the same 
light is shown by a motion put forward by two African 
members of the Legislative Council of Nigeria. On January 
28th 1931 a motion was proposed by T.A. Doherty and 
seconded by C.C. Adeniyi-Jones, Members for Lagos, which 
stated "that this House expresses its profound regret 
which the Honourable members equally with your Excellency*s 
government feel for the loss of life which disturbances in 
the Caldbar and Owerri Province of Nigeria occasioned, and 
its deep sympathy with i. 1 those to whom these events have 
unfortunately brought personal bereavement, and views 
with considerable disfavour the conduct of those officers 
of the Nigerian government, civil or military, who were 
declared responsible for the various firings on unarmed 
women which were found to be 'not justified' according 
to the reports of the Aba Commission of Enquiry 1930, and 
recommends that Officers responsible should be brought to 
the Bar of Justice in the Courts of Law, or alternatively 
that they should be dismissed from the service of the 
British Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria with forfeiture 
of their pensions." 1 The motion was lost, an amendment 
moved by the Assistant Chief Secretary being carried with
1 . Motion Propped by T.A. Doherty, Nigerian Council, 28 
January 1931, C.O. 583 File 1056/A (C.O. 583/17 7)!
320
the help of the official majority. The guilt of the women 
was emphasised and the conclusions of the First Commission 
reasserted by those defending the officers.* Drummond 
Shiels thought that the Assistant Chief Secretary must have 
'handled the Council well and he is entitled to congratu­
lations',
A 'patriot* wrote to 'West Africa': 'one is staggered 
to observe that cold water was thrown on the report of the 
Kingdon Commission, comprising both officials and non-
tofficials. If the Government knew at the outset that it
was not going to entertain the findings of the Kingdon
2Commission why did it appoint it?*
Surprisingly, the Labour Party and press seems 
generally to have ignored the incident. It was not 
discussed by the Labour party conferences nor the executive 
nor by the T.U.C, The 'New Statesman' and 'New Leader' 
seem to have largely ignored it at the time. The usual 
band of experts seem to have had their attention focused 
on East Africa and Kenya during this period.^ It was 
left to individual M.P.s, such as Mr. Horrabin, to press 
the government for information and to ask about the amount
t
of the fines imposed.
However, people to the left of the Labour party seemed 
to take note. The »New Leader' mentioned the affair many 
years later after the I.L.P. had broken with the Labour 
party. It mentioned it in an 'Empire Special* under the
1 . M. Perham, op.cit., p.217.
2. 'West Africa', 21 March 1931
3. Even Leys seemed rather vague about the incident. He 
discussed it with Shiels: 'He told me sorrowfully that 
he and I were the only people who took some view or 
other - I think it was about that massacre of 20 women 
somewhere in Nigeria». Leys to Holtby, 29 May 1930, 
Holtby Papers, Drawer 4, File 8.
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heading •African Empire is a Slave Colony - revolting 
workers shot down*. ’In 1929* 30*000 women in the palm- 
oil district of SoE. Nigeria demonstrated against high 
taxation and exploitation by the Niger Company* They 
assembled outside the Company*s depot at Aba* They were 
asked to disperse. When they refused to do so the British 
troops were ordered to fire machine guns. 80 people in 
the crowd were killed and 87 wounded. As though this were 
not enough the Government imposed a collective fine of £850 
on the villages in which the women lived to reimburse the 
Company.*
This report was exaggerated and wrong in some details. 
Nevertheless, Lord Passfield's response to the incident was 
somewhat strange for a Colonial Secretary who had declared 
in his ‘Memorandum on Native Policy' that his main concern 
was to protect African interests. The women were not 
urging revolution and violence. They had genuine 
grievances which they were demonstrating about in a noisy, 
but not especially violent, manner. Margery Perham writes 
that 'it is surprising that very few people were mishandled 
by the women, and no one seriously injured either among 
those they singled out for special attack, or those who 
barred their way, though in numerous cases they had them
at their mercy. It is clear that the leaders, even at
otheir own risk, were counselling moderation*. Ralph 
Fox, a Marxist, writes that the 'story of this women's 
movement against imperialism.•.is so horrible in all its 
details and so typical of colonial development and policy'. 
The unbroken continuity of that policy is shown by the
1. 'New Leader», 25 February 1938, Empire supplement, p.iv.
2. M. Perham, op.cit., p.206~20/
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fact that 'it took place in a ‘model* colony, under a 
Labour government and that the massacre was justified by 
that government *•1 George Padmore, a writer associated
with the I.L.P., wrote that ‘the most significant feature 
of the revolt was that the women*s hatred was directed as 
much against the Chiefs as against the officials, the 
Chiefs in the affected areas were not respected by the 
people. They were arrogant, illiterate upstarts put into 
office by the British government as tax collectors. What 
happened was inevitable under the system of Indirect Rule*. 
The incident and the response to it of the Labour Colonial 
Secretary and his Under-Secretary shows that all was not 
as well in Nigeria as had been thought. It indicated 
that ‘indirect rule* was not as successful as had been 
suggesbed by Lugard and others. The Colonial Secretary 
seems to have hoped that the affair would blow ov^r as 
soon as possible and that Sir Donald Cameron, one of the 
foremost advocates of ‘indirect rule*, would be able to 
sort out any problems connected with ‘indirect rule* in 
the S.E. Provinces of Nigeria. Labour party policy 
seems to have had very few constructive ideas as far as 
Nigeria was concerned. The Colonial Secretary relied 
too much on the advice of his civil servants.
Another incident involving the use of force occurred 
in Gambia in November 1929. On l4 November 1929 a large 
mob surrounded the offices of Mr. Ogden, a representative 
of the United Africa Company. The employees of the 
company were on strike and there was very bad feeling 
against M r • Ogden. Police intervened using bayonets and
1 . R. Fox, op.cit., p.91.
2. G. Padmore »Africa: Britain s Third Empire* (London, 
1949),P-94.
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and that the men were back at work.*
Questions were asked in the House of Commons by Labour 
M.P.s about the incidents. On 20 November 1929 Mr. W. 
Brown asked the Under-Secret airy of State for the Colonies 
whether he was aware of the position of the workers in 
Gambia in the employment of the Palmine company; whether 
he was aware that the manager of the company gave three 
days notice to employees of the firm who were members of 
the Bathurst Trade Union to quit the union or be dismissed. 
Mr. Horrabin asked about the declaration of the state of 
martial law in the colony, and Mr. Gill asked whether the 
government of Gambia was giving any facilities allowing 
the workers to organise in trade unions. 2
The Labour party and press seemed interested in the 
matter because it involved trade union rights. The 
Abertillery and District Trades and Labour Council sent 
a letter to the Colonial Office on 19 November 1929, 
protesting against the action of Messrs. Palmine Limited 
in their issuing three days notice to their employees in 
Gambia, British West Africa, to leave their Trade Union 
or be dismissed. 'We call upon the Colonial Office to 
see to it that these workers have the elementary right 
to organise within trade unions.'^ Letters were also 
received from other trades councils, constituency Labour 
parties, co-operative societies, national unions and union 
branches.
The League Against Imperialism, a body which the 
Labour party had refused to join because it thought it
1 . Governor to Passfield, 16 November 1929, Governor to 
Passfield 18 November 1929» op.cit.
2. House of Commons Reports 20 November 1929 Vol 21?
cols. 4867. * J *
3. Letter from Abertillery and District Trades and Labour 
Council to C.O. 19 November 1929 C.O. 87 12167/29 
(C.O. 87/229).
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communist inspired and directed, also bombardeJ the
Colonial Office with complaints about the behaviour of thè
Palmine company in Gambia. R. Bridgeman, the secretary
of The League, wrote to the Colonial Office asking it
to investigate the affair and the behaviour of the company
in refusing to allow its members to belong to the Bathurst
Trade Union.* He had written to the Colonial office before
the situation had become violent and the civil servants
had advised that they did not see why the League Against
Imperialism should be allowed to waste their time and
stir up trouble. They decided to ask the Governor what
2the cause of the trouble was without telling Bridgeman.
After the incident involving the use of force, the 
civil servants prepared a despatch to the Governor praising 
the action of the police. Drummond Shiels minuted that 
he was not ‘altogether happy about this'. *1 think the 
draft despatch rather fulsome. I think the report of 
the Police Chief shows that he acted reasonably but I am 
more concerned with what led up to such a serious 
position.* He wanted the terms of reference for the 
Committee of Enquiry to include the whole question of 
labour restrictions and conditions which had led up to the 
strike. *1 would not like the impression given to the 
governor that we are indifferent to the causes of disorder
3so long as it is put down with a firm hand when it occurs.• 
The despatch which Lord Passfield sent to Sir Edward 
Denham on 18 December 1929 included these points. However, 
Lord Passfield stated that "on the information at present
1 . Letter from League Against Imperialism to C.O. 6 
November 1929« op.cit.
2. Minutes C.O. Gambia op.cit., 7 November 1929« 8 November 
1929.
3. Minute Drummond Shiels, op.cit., 10 November 1929.
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before me, I consider that the police were handled with skill 
and resolution, that the behaviour of the force as a whole 
in trying circumstances, was creditable to them as a 
disciplined body and that Captain Flint's actions were 
worthy of commendation."^ The Colonial Secretary also 
asked whether the allegations that the company had given 
notices to quit to members of the trade union were true.
He seemed more willing to commend police who attacked 
strikers than one would have expected from a Labour 
Colonial Secretary. This was another example of the 
influence the civil servants had over Lord Passfield.
The Enquiry was conducted by Mr. Manson, the chief 
judicial officer, and completed by January 1930. The 
enquiry exonerated the police but did not provide 
information on the point about whether the company had 
given notice to members of the trade union. Passfield 
wrote to the acting Governor, C.R. Workman, to ask him 
whether he could give him information on this point.
He also enquired what demands had been made by the trade
ounion and what the terms of the settlement were.
The civil servants at the Colonial Office were 
against making further enquiries and thought that to 
re-open the enquiry would defeat its own object. They 
thought that the whole incident had been exaggerated for 
propaganda purposes by the Labour Research department,^ 
M.P.s and associations which had been bombarding the
4Colonial Office with resolutions. Shiels agreed that 
they should not press for a further enquiry except on the
1 . Passfield to Governor Denham, 18 December 1929, op.cit.
2. Passfield to Acting Governor, Ik March 1930, C.0.87,
File 12182/30, (C.O. 87/23$.
3. A communist organisation which was not connected with 
the Labour party.
4. C.O. Minutes, Gambia 27 February 1930, op.cit.
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points that had been mentioned. He thought that the 
police had behaved well and were well handled. His interest 
was more in the causes of the dispute; he was surprised to 
find that the trade union was not registered as he had 
gathered it was from the file containing a copy of its 
elaborate rules. He thought it would be well if the 
class of trade union legislation was looked at generally 
in the colonies, 'as trade unions...are likely increasingly 
to arise and develop* in Africa. Although he hoped they 
would be under better guidance in the rest of the African 
colonies than they had been in Gambia. He did not trust 
Mr. Small, the secretaiyof the Bathurst trade union (who 
was friendly with communists) . 1 Dr. Shiels showed interest 
in the general question of trade union legislation in the 
colonies, but it had taken an incident to spur him into 
asking for an enquiry into the question. It had not been 
done, as one might have thought, as a matter of course on 
the Labour party taking office.
On 14 April 1930, the Acting Governor wrote to Lord 
Fassfield to say that Mr. Ogden had said that there was 
no foundation for the allegation that Palmine Limited had 
given notice to their men that they must leave the union 
within three day a or be dismissed. The settlement had led
to an increase of wages of over 20% over those of the
2previous year. The trade union had justified itself 
on the ground that, before the strike, the firm had 
decided to offer lower wages than those in force the 
previous year.
1 . Shield Minute, op.cit., 8 March 1930.
2, Workman to Passfield, 14 April 1930, op.cit.
3# C.O. Gambia, Minute 7 May 1930, op.cit.
Horrabin wrote to Lord Passfield on 22 September 1930
to say that he had learned that there had been victimisation
following the strike. He also had been informed that there
was a system of state exploitation of labour, owing to a
system of piece work and contract labour carried on in a
department of public works under non-trade union foremen.''’
The Colonial Secretary wrote to the Governor enquiring
about these points. The new Governor replied that there
was no ground for the allegation of victimisation, but
there had been some unemployment due to the high wages which
had been won by the strikers.
A civil servant wrote to Horrabin to inform him that
the Governor had sent replies on the two questions that he
had raised. The Chamber of Commerce had been referred to,
but no instances had been adduced except three alleged
instances which on investigation proved not to be examples
of victimisation. Concerning the labour employed in the
Public Works Department, at no time had the labour employed
exceeded 500 and there had been no cases of victimisation
2and no lockout.
Whatever the facts of the case the incident of the 
Bathurst strike went down in left-wing thought as an 
example of the imperialist nature of British colonialism.
The ‘New Leader* erroneously stated that after the strike 
•the Gambia Government instructed the police to raid union 
headquarters. Some kO natives were wounded. '■* This 
allegation is completely untrue. Fox relates the 
incident as follows. »Levers in Bathurst dismissed all
1 . Horrabin to Passfield, 22 September 1930, op.cit.
2. Letter to Horrabin, 26 November 1930, C.0. 87 File
1 2 1 8 2 / 3 0 ,  ( c . o .  8 7 /2 3 0 )
3. «New Leader*, 25 February 1938, Empire supplement,
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their workers who were members of trade unions, including
the sailors and engineers of the river and coastal traffic
steamers. The Governor of the colony refused to recognise
the legality of the trade unions and used the local
garrison against the strikers, as a result of which over
40 workers were wounded. Only an almost complete general
strike forced the Governor to recognise the trade union,
whilst the trust had to increase the wages of its workers.'*-
This again is a biased account.
The official report stated that the strike was ¿bout
wages, that on 14 November fifteen persons were injured
but only three - two police and one rioter - were detained
in hospital and that troops were brought up as a precaution
but were not needed martial law was not proclaimed and
2business was not suspended. The Governor later stated
that he and the firm had been willing to recognise the
trade union and that the firm did not issue notices that
3the men should leave the trade union within three days.
The idea that the firm was issuing notices to members of 
the trade union may have come about as a result of the 
manager giving verbal warning that all the employees should 
consider themselves under one month's formal notice to 
terminate their agreements because of the amalgamation of 
Palmine's and United Africa. The absorption by United 
Africa of all the British firms in Bathurst led to a 
reduction of overheads and staff.^
It would seem that the importance of the strike and
1 . R. Pox, op.cit., p.89.
2. House of Commons Debates, 5th series, 27 November 1929, 
Vol. 232,cols.1410-11, 28 November 1929, col.1657.
3. Governor to Passfield, 14 April 1930, op.cit.
4.ibid.
5. Governor Palmer to Passfield, 21 October 1930, op.cit.
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the use of police to quell a disturbance was exaggerated 
by the League Against Imperialism and others. The Labour 
Research Department was interested in the affair because 
the trade union had been granted affiliation to the L.R.d . 
Some trade unions were interested because they feared that 
the issue was one of trade union rights. The Colonial 
Office civil servants were generally against the idea of 
African trade unions and the ministers were not as vigorous 
in defending the Bathurst trade union as they might have 
been.
The Labour Research Department wrote that 1 the 
attitude of the Labour government seems to be one of
complete confidence in the Governor, in spite of the fact
that he was appointed under a Conservative Government and 
has shown hostility to trade unions. When the victimisa­
tion of the trade unions in Bathurst was first brought to 
his notice on JL October, he returned a very indifferent 
reply on 6 November to the effect that he had not
received any report of the Governor of Gambia, and even
after the further information sent, the official of the 
C.O. stated on l4 November that Lord Passfield saw no 
good reason to call for a report. It was only when 
reports of the events appeared in the press and it had 
been stated that the matter would be raised in the House 
of Commons that Lord Passfield tried to allay criticism 
by stating that he was receiving a report from the 
Governor. Both to the questions asked in the Rouse and 
in reply to letters, the Colonial Office tried to minimise 
the whole affair, and to hide the fact that there has been 
a serious industrial crisis in Bathurst from which the 
workers have emerged victorious.
1' J a n u S  °f the Lab0Ur Re»earch Department,
The significance of the incident was that it alerted 
Shiels to the fact that trade unions were developing in the 
African colonies. He persuaded Passfield to sent out a 
circular, in September, asking for the annulment of any law 
which made the formation of trade unions a criminal offence. 
Investigations were set up in the department to inquire 
into labour legislation in the colonies, to set standards and 
draft legislation and administrative orders. 1
Another incident involving a strike which led to violence 
occuired in the Gold Coast. There was a strike of African 
labourers at the Ariston Gold Mine at Prestea in the 
Western Province over non-payment of wages. The strike 
began on 15 September 1930, after many of the labourers 
had been left unpaid. It developed into a riotous 
disturbance and the Africans surrounded the house of Mr.
Best, the timekeeper responsible for the payment of wages.
A party of Europeans armed themselves with rifles and set 
out to rescue Mr. Best. In the resulting fracas, seven 
Africans were wounded by rifle fire and an eighth by a 
stone. Mr. Rennie Smith, the Labour M.P. for Penistone, 
asked a question about the incident. In reply, Dr. Shiels 
stated that at was understood that *a number of African 
employees attacking the quarters of a European timekeeper 
were fired upon by other European employees and eight were 
wounded. 1 An inquiry into the affair was being conducted 
by the District Commissioner in accordance with the law of 
the colony. 2
James Maxton wrote a letter to the Colonial Office
1 , C.O. 323/lll7/8004l/3, Colonial Labour Committee minutes 
of meetings.
2. House of Commons Reports, 5th series, Vol.246, col.
48-49, 8 December 1930.
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in which he included some correspondence from a Mr, Bankole 
whom he had recently met in London. Mr. Bankole stated 
that some Africans had been shot dead and that the affair 
had been hushed up after an investigation by a petty 
District O f f i c e r M r .  Maxton wrote that *if the account 
of the affair is as he alleges it is a shocking crime and 
even more shocking in that it would seem to have been 
hushed up. I would like your assurance that the matter
owill be fully investigated.* Lord Passfield replied to
Maxton on 10 December 1930 stating that none of the eight
workmen died from their wounds and 'certainly none were
shot dead at the time.' 'The reason for the firing on
them was that they were attacking the house and
threatening the life of a European employee: and whatever
their grievance against him may have been, it was
presumably necessary to take vigorous measures to save
his life. The suggestion that the affair is being
hushed up is difficult to understand. The law under
\«hich the enquiry was conducted by the District Commissioner
who is the proper official to conduct it, lays down
officially that every enquiry shall be conducted publicly.'
Lord Passfield expected to receive the report of the
3enquiry in the 'very near future'.
The Governor sent a copy of the report of the enquiry 
to Lord Passfield on 10 December 1930. The enquiry 
stated that the trouble was due to irregularity in the 
payment of wages by the mine. 'A large proportion of 
the labourers had not been paid for several weeks owing
1 . Letter to Maxton from Mr. K.A. Bankole, 11 November 1930, 
C.0. Gold Coast 96, File 6769/30, (C.0. 96/695)
2. Letter to Passfield from Maxton, 4 December 1930, ibid.
3. Passfield to Maxton, 10 December 1930, C.0. 96, File
6769/30 ( c . o .  9 6 / 6 9 5 ) .
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to lack of funds and their patience, severely tried by 
the behaviour of the European timekeeper, Mr. Best, finally 
gave way on the pay day of Saturday 13 September, when 
nany of them were left unpaid.* *Any member of the party 
(of Europeans) who could be identified as having fired at 
any member of the crowd would be liable to criminal 
proceedings for wounding or attempting to kill but there 
is no independent evidence to identify any particular 
member of the rescue party as having fired at any person 
in the crowd.* The Governor thought that an adequate 
enquiry had been made into the affair and he was 
satisfied that no further steps could be taken with a 
view to criminal prosecution of any of the parties concerned. 
He considered that the firing on the Africans was 
•unjustified* and that the company should have known that 
wages were overdue.^
The Colonial Office investigated the finances of the
Company concerned and found that it was in a very unstable
2financial position. The strike had been due to the bad 
management of the Company and its failure to keep up 
with its payments of wages. The Colonial Office made 
some investigations into the possibility of strengthening 
the law dealing with the employment of labour. Dr.
Shiels thought that there was *a reluctance on the part 
of Colonial governments to tackle the business of wages 
and labour conditions*. He was glad to see that the 
officials in the Colonial Office were alive to the 
necessity of putting some pressure on, in the form of a 
letter which they had drafted for Lord Passfield to send
1 , Governor of Gold Coast, A. Rillak to Lord Passfield,
10 December 1930,. ibid.
2. C.O. Gold Coast §6, File 6769/30, civil servants*
Minute 7 November 1930.
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to the Governor, who thought that there was no call for 
such legislation. Shiels added a clause which made the 
pressure slightly more definite. 1 2
Passfield's letter to the Governor noted that the 
Governor, the Attorney-General and the Assistant Secretary 
for Native Affairs were of the opinion that there was no 
call for any alteration of the law for the purposes of 
•further safeguarding the wages of native employees', 
but thought that perhaps it was desirable to enact some such
provisions »as I am not entirely satisfied that there is
2not a need for something being done*. The last line was
Shiels» addition. The Governor wrote back on 20 July 1931
that it was questionable whether such a form of agreement
would be acceptable either to the mining companies or the
mine labourer in the colony. He still thought that the
wages of »native» employees were adequately safeguarded
3by the existing law.
By the time that this communication had been received 
and considered there had been a change of government and 
it was decided to leave the matter as it stood. The 
civil servant who wrote the minute on the question stated 
that it had been »Dr. Shiels intention to go into the 
question of the actual arrangements for the payment of 
wages to native workers employed under contract, as part 
of an exhaustive review of native labour legislation which 
he had in mind», but as matters now stood the question 
could be put by. Xhe clvll servants did not seem very
1 . C.O. Gold Coast 9 6 ,  Pile 6 8 8 0 / 3 1  (C.O.9 6 /6 9 6 ) Dr.Shiels 
Minute, 1 7  March 1 9 3 1 .
2. Passfield to Governor, 23 March 1931, C.O.96. Pile 
6 8 8 0 / 3 1  (C.O. 9 6 / 6 9 6 ) .  The Colonial Office w «  tentatively 
trying to ensure that Africans' wages were protected.
3. Governor to Passfield, 20 July 1 9 u  ih-trf
4. Minute, 3 February 1932, ibid* 3 4 ’ 1 1 *
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keen on Shiels' idea of reviewing labour legislation in 
the African colonies and were slow to get started with 
the work. This indicated that a minister needed to be 
very determined to achieve reform if he was to overcome 
the reluctance of senior civil servants to alter previous 
departmental practice and policies. The National 
Government did not follow up Shiels' concern with labour 
legislation.
The incident also showed that some firms in Vest
Africa were not being run with a proper concern for
African interests. Lord Passfield again seemed more than
ready to accept the official version of the incident and
did not insist upon any attempt to try and find the
Europeans who fired on the Africans and charge them.
The 'New Leader* again, at a later date, printed an
inaccurate account of the incident. »The Europeans
organised an armed squad to terorise the miners and
marched throigi the villages in which they were holding
meetings. In one village they opened fire without
warning, wounding ten natives and killing five.''*’ In
fact, as has been stated, no-one was killed, and eight
was the total of wounded. A similar incorrect version
2is related by George Padmore. Although the versions 
of the incidents put out by some left-wing writers were 
exaggerated, the affair does show that in West Africa 
some capitalist companies were not very concerned with 
the welfare of their African employees. Lord Passfield 
was not very vigorous in ensuring that this situation was 
changed.
XI 'New Leader' Empire Special 25 February 1938, p.iv.
2. G. Padmore, 'The Awakening of Negro Toilers*
(London, 1931),p.98.
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The last African disturbance that occurred in West 
Africa during the period of the second Labour Government 
took place in Sierra Leone in February 1931» Haidara 
Kontofili, a Moslem leader, came to stay with the people 
of Kambia. He began preaching among them as a religious 
leader but then expanded his teaching to cover politics 
and urged them not to pay the hut tax which was proving 
particularly irksome to them since the palm kernel 
industry, their chief source of income, had collapsed 
due to overproduction* Haidara then incited the Africans 
against the government officials* A platoon was sent 
into the area* This was divided in two because transport 
was not available for the whole group of soldiers. While 
going to arrest Haidara, the first group of soldiers were 
ambushed by Haidara and a group of Africans. The 
commander of the soldiers, Lieutenant Holmes, was killed, 
but the second-in-command, Sergeant Culm, took over, shot 
Hiadara dead and retreated his men in good order. Four 
of Hiadara*s followers were also killed in the skirmish, 
which took place on 16 February 1931» After the death 
of Hiadara, Kambia was quiet and no further action 
involving the use of troops took place.
On 4 April 1931» Cookson, the acting Governor, wrote 
to Passfield, sending him copies of the official announce­
ment made to the Legislative Council on 25 March 1931 on 
the recent disturbances* Hiadara was an immigrant fnm 
French Guinea, an expulsion order had been issued against 
him on 9 February 1931 which he had declined to obey and 
threatened to kill the District Commissioner* The troops 
had been sent in to arrest him. In the skirmish, 
Lieutenant Holmes, Hiadara and four of his followers had
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been killed.^"
Further despatches were sent from the acting Governor.
A despatch sent before the official announcement stated
that the ’death of the fanatic had nipped the trouble in
the bud.* It had the makings of a serious insurrection
in the Protectorate. ’Though for many years past the
natives of the Protectorate have been ordinarily peaceful
and contented, there have recently been seeds of discontent
in the present low price of produce, and I have myself
received complaints as to the difficulty of finding money
for the payment of House tax.* 'The loyalty of a very
few chiefs during the crisis was certainly suspect -
but all in their heart of hearts prefer peace and
2associate peace with British rule.'
On 8 April 1931 the acting Governor, Captain Cookson, 
made a speech to a meeting of chiefs held at Kambia. He 
said that he was sure that the people had no cause for 
complaint. 'Of course, none of us like to pay tax; 
but government has to pay soldiers and court messengers 
and has many other expenses too; it is only foolish 
persons that think that government can go on successfully 
without taxes.' 'The killing of this officer is a very 
great wrong done to H.M.G. As for Tonko Limba chiefdom,
I cannot say yet that they are forgiven, and I am still 
considering the question of further punishment. Tonko 
chiefdom is very poor, otherwise I think that I should 
have been inclined to require them to pay a heavy fine 
but if so it would fall upon the poor and they would 
suffer.'^
X. A/Governor to Passfield, 4 April 1931, C.O. Sierra 
Leone, File 9569, (C.O. 267/633).
2. A/Governor to Passfield, 6 March 1931, ibid.
3. Speech of Acting GovernorCookson to meeting of Chiefs 
at Kambia, 8 April 1931, C.O. 267, File 9569
( c . o .  2 6 7 / 6 3 3 ) .
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On 17 April 1931» Cookson sent a despatch to Lord 
Passfield stating that Chief Alimami Bombo Lahai had 
forfeited the confidence of the government because he had 
harboured Haidara Kontofili in the town of Bubuya between 
October 1930 and February 1931 and permitted him to make 
seditious speeches and incite persons to resist the 
government. The Acting Governor thought that the Chief 
should be deposed and that the stipend paid to the next 
chief should be suspended. He regarded it as 'unfortunate * 
that there was no 'collective punishment' legislation for 
the protectorate.
The civil servants at the Colonial Office advised
Passfield that the Chief should be deposed, but they
disagreed with suspension of the payment of £10 p.a.
to his successors. They did not think it was necessary
to consider the enactment of any 'collective punishment
2legislation' in Sierrra Leone. Passfield followed this 
advice.
On l6 June 1931» he wrote to the new Governor Hodson 
that he agreed that the Chief had forfeited the confidence 
of the government and approved his deposition. He thought 
that to continue the stipend as an act of grace would 
have a good effect. With regard to the proposal to 
enact legislation on the lines of the Nigerian Collective 
Punishment Ordinance, the Colonial Secretaryheeitated to 
sanction the introduction of any such legislation 'at the 
present time except on the strongest grounds. Moreover,
X consider that there is no evidence to show that the 
existing organisation and the existing law were inadequate 
to deal withthe situation and even if the Ordinance had
1 . Cookson to Passfield, 17 April 1931, ibid.
2. Minute, 8 May 1931» ibid.
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been in force in Sierra Leone, it would not, in my opinion,
have been equitable to have used it in this particular
.1case. 1
After the receipt of the military report on the 
incident, which had been sent on 28 April 19312 but reached 
the Colonial Office later owing to the delay which 
correspondence took to arrive, Lord Passfield again wrote 
to the Governor stating that while he considered that the 
measures taken by the late Lieutenant Holmes for the 
security of his force could not be regarded as adequate, 
he realised that it was believed that Haidara would 
probably surrender without resistance and that the Millgi 
Bridge, where the ambush took place, was three miles from 
their ultimate destination, Bubuya. Passfield considered 
that the sending of a bare minimum of troops to arrest 
Haidara, should be condemned. Troops should have been 
sent in sufficient force to render resistance unthinkable
3in the minds of the people. Troops should not be used 
as police.
As with the other incidents, Lord Passfield and the 
Colonial Office seemed content that order had been 
restored and did not make an attempt to redress the
Africans* grievances. The 'New Leader* stated that
k
the trouble had broken out because of the depression 
in the palm-kernel industry which had brought the 
peasants to the point of starvation .^ 1 The 'West African 
Mail* thought that 'the contributory causes which may 
have influenced the poor and illiterate aborigines of
1 . Passfield to Governor, 16 June 1931, ibid.
2. Cookson to Passfield, 28 April 1931, ibid.
3. Passfield to Governor, 7 July 1931, ibid.
4. »New Leader', February 25, 1938, Empire Special, p.iv.
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the Protectorate to give heed to the foolish advice of 
non-payment of taxes, may have been the frightful collapse 
of trade in their principal products on which they depend 
for their livelihood and to liquidate their public and 
private liabilities, namely, the rotten prices offered 
for palm kernels, kola nuts and palm oil in the local 
markets* Palm kernel is said to be sold at 4d, per 
bushel, kola nuts at next to nothing and nobody requires 
palm oil* They have stopped production of these products 
and diverted their attention to rice cultivation which 
serves the useful purpose of staving the cravings of hunger 
although the crop is plentiful in the market and the price 
discouraging•*^
G. Padmore wrote that the Haidara affair was one of
the most serious rebellions which had broken out on the
2West coast for a number of years* Haidara had called 
upon the peasants to refuse to pay taxes and to demand 
that the Crown Lands in Sierra Leone should be confiscated 
and divided among the peasants. The government officials 
had been opposed to the idea of the peasants growing rice 
to prevent them from starvation. After the revolt had 
been stopped by the shooting of Haidara, Padmore writes 
that hundreds of huts of natives who took part in the 
uprising were burned to the ground and men and women were 
arrested. This does not appear to be true according to 
the official documents. An attempt .was made to try two 
men for the murder of Lieutenant Holmes, but after an 
extended hearing the Chief Justice found no evidence 
sufficient to convict them and they were set at liberty.
In reporting the trial, »West Africa* stated that »the
1 . West Airican Mai, February 1930.
2. G. Padmore, op.cit., pp.97-98.
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outcome at least leaves it impossible for anyone to accuse 
the government of a too willing acceptance of scapegoats•'* 
These incidents in West Africa showed that the 
position of the Africans in West Africa was not as enviable 
as the Labour party*s pamphlets made out. The A.C.I.Q. 
was mainly concerned with the situation in East Africa, 
particularly Kenya, and paid almost no attention at all to 
West Africa. However, the incidents which occurred during 
the second Labour Government highlighted the need for a 
more detailed study of the policies which were beitg 
pursued in West Africa. The Aba 'massacre* had indicated 
that indirect rule was a difficult policy to apply 
successfully unless honest and capable African chiefs 
existed to administer it. All the incidents had shown 
that the Africans in West Africa were particularly 
vulnerable to economic depression because of their 
dependence on a few crops. A depression in the prices 
of their crops led to great hardship and starvation.
The incidents in Gambia and the Gold Coast had indicated 
the necessity for African trade unions and legislation 
to protect African conditions of employment. In general, 
the incidents proved that the Africans in West Africa 
were likely to suffer hardship under corrupt African 
chiefs and European combines unless measures were taken 
to protect African interests. Passfield seemed too ready 
to accept the advice of his civil servants to commend 
troops and police for restoring order and not concerned 
enough to examine the underlying causes of the disturbances.
E.D. Morel wrote in 'The Black Man's Burden', which
owas published in 1920, that the administration of the
1 . West Africa, 6 June 1931.
2. E.D. Morel, 'The Black Man's Burden', (London,1920) 
p.vii.
•dark-skinned peoples* was the greatest moral responsibility 
which the New Democracy would have to face. It was its 
supreme test. In the book, Morel protested against the 
policy of the British government decreeing that 90 per 
cent of the palm kernel nuts exported from West Africa 
should be shipped to British ports. He thought that 
this policy was wrong because it would restrict output 
aid, to that extent, diminish the prosperity of the West 
African dependencies. It limited the *native* producers 
to a single market for the disposal of their produce, 
virtually creating a monopoly which could control prices.
It imposed 'upon our African protected subjects, who are 
powerless to resist it, a system which sacrifices their 
interests to a handful of capitalists11 in Britain.
Morel hoped that 'when Britain has once more an honest 
government in power not amenable to the pressures of 
vested interests, one of the first duties of that 
government should be the repeal of legislation which
omarks a lamentable decision in our West African policy.* 
Neither J.H. Thomasnor Lord Passfield did this.
Lord Passfield took the incidents involving the use of 
force against the Africans as minor disturbances which 
only required careful handling for peace to be re­
established. He did not make any attempt to change the 
system which left many African producers dependent upon 
British firms for the price of their produce. Surprisingly(
the British trade unions paid little attention to the 
problems of the Africans in West Africa and there was no 
mention of them in T.U.C. debates or reports. Although, 
some trade unions paid some attention to the incident in
1 . E.D. Morel, op.cit., p.x.
2. ibid.
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Gambia« there was no consistent trade union pressure on 
the Government to help set up trade unions in the African 
colonies.
Another instance of Lord Fassfield not taking the 
Africans*: point of view was his approval of the 
Appointments and Deposition of Chiefs Ordinance. The 
Ordinance allowed Governors to appoint and depose Chiefs. 
They were not required to consult the Secretary of State 
before exercising this power.^ The African members of 
the Legislative Council of Nigeria cabled to the 
Secretary of State, expressing their strong objection 
to the Bill. The African members believed that the 
Bill was dangerous because it gave the Governor a power 
which might lead to a serious curtailment of African 
initiative by the creation of a class of puppet chiefs.
The Nigerian Democratic Party met and asked the Secretary 
of State to withhold his consent to the Bill until he 
had met with representatives of the African community.
•West Africa* commented: *the unpopularity of the Bill 
with the Africans becomes the more understandable if it 
be kept in mind that it largely reduces his power to 
govern himself just as he is being asked to contribute 
directly to his own administration treasury - that is, 
just when he might logically have regarded his views
2as likely to receive greater, and not less, consideration.* 
Once again in West Africa Passfield took the civil 
servants* advice rather than trying to initiate policies 
which favoured the Africans. The study of Passfield*s 
West African policy confirms that, as in East Africa, he 
was not very vigorous in ensuring that the Africans' 
interests were energetically pursued.
1 . House of Commons reports, Fifth Series, Vol.244, cols.845-846, 5 November 1930.
2. West Africa, 22 February 1930, p.174.
Gupta1 concludes that during Passfield's period at the 
Colonial Office *in the tussle between principles and 
expediency, principles won.' However, to the present 
writer the position seems to be the opposite - in the 
tussle between principles and expediency, expediency 
won. It is true that Passfield did enunciate the Labour 
party’s principles in his ’Memorandum on Native Policy* 
but the way he introduced the document to the Cabinet 
indicated that he would not be determined to carry them 
out. He stated that he was outlining the principles 
to 'allay the apprehensions of those concerned with 
African welfare. There was no positive commitment to 
the policy he was introducing. This was further proved 
by the fact that he did not force the Colonial Governors 
to amend all legislation which went against the 
principles of the White Paper. As has been shown, 
Passfield was only prevented from introducing a pro­
settler solution to the problem of Closer Union by the 
intervention of the Cabinet and the pressure of the 
A.C.I.Q., A.S.A.P.S., Oldham and Lugard. The Bast 
African budgets were not amended to bring expenditure 
into line with the ’Memo*. Grigg was not recalled, 
despite the fact that he was against the Labour party’s 
policy. The Joint Committee's composition was biased 
in favour of the Conservatives rather than the Labour 
party. Kenyatta's evidence about African grievances
was not heard by the Joint Committee and Passfield
2refused to meet him. In Southern Rhodesia, Passfield 
X • P.S. Gupta, op.cit., p.200.
2. However, Shiels did see him. Passfield saw the
'official' African witnesses at the C.O. but 'more 
as a 'gesture' than anything else*. Gupta, p.195.
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approved the Land Apportionment Act which upheld a colour 
bar in the distribution of land* In West Africa, as has 
been shown, Passfield appeared too willing to commend the 
forces of law and order when they had subdued a distur­
bance and not willing enough to investigate the causes 
of the disturbances. In Nigeria, he approved the 
Appointment and Deposition of Chiefs Ordinance, despite 
the strong opposition of Africans.
It could be said in Passfield*s defence that he 
amended the Kenya Land Trust Ordinance to make it more 
favourable to Africans. However, 1his Ordinance had 
been strongly criticised by the Labour party in opposition 
and Passfield was under a strong moral obligation to amend 
it. It could also be said that Passfield did start 
investigations in the Colonial Office about some of the 
Africans1 grievances. However, investigations, 
commissions and committees of inquiry were often a device 
for delaying action, especially when the people conducting 
the investigations and inquiries were not committed to 
radical change. Labour policy had been to end the 
Africans* grievances, not spend more time studying them. 
Labour pamphlets had pointed out that more money was 
spent on white education per capita than African 
education but nothing concrete was done to reverse this 
trend. They also pointed out that the white settlers 
in Kenya preserved to themselves some of the best land 
in the Highlands but nothing was done to reverse this 
policy. The Labour party pamphlet on Africa had also 
shown that the Africans were more highly taxed than the 
Europeans in Kenya but, again, nothing was done by
Passfield to reverse this policy. *Forced labour* was 
not outlawed by Passfield in all African colonies and 
dependencies. Common; l franchises were not instituted. 
Passfield appeared too willing to accept civil service 
advice which tended to be in favour of the status quo. 
Shiels found that, after examining facts about expenditure 
on Africans in Kenya, the case that the Africans were 
unjustly treated was made out. The civil servants, 
however, had recommended exactly the opposite after 
studying the same data. The problem was that the senior 
civil servants were sympathetic to the white settlers and 
were willing to accept their point of view. There were 
exceptions, like Green, who ensured that Northern 
Rhodesia was not amalgamated with Southern Rhodesia, but 
on the whole, the senior civil servants were very 
unsympathetic to the views of the Labour party*s A.C.I.Q., 
particularly those of Norman Leys. Leys may have been 
a difficult man to work with, and he did seem to have a 
rather arrogant assumption that only he knew the *real 
truth* about East Africa, but, in retrospect, it appears 
that his views were nearer the truth than those of Lord 
Passfield or his Colonial Office civil servants. Leys* 
assessment, 1 that during the two years of Labour 
Government *the Colonial Office made no real effort to 
fulfil promises* that had been made in *The Colonial 
Problem* and ’Labour and the Nation*, seems largely 
correct. The crucial points were the failure to set up 
common franchises and the failure to revise the 1931 
Kenyan Budget.
The main reason for these failures was not dependence
1 . N. Leys to Dr. Drummond Shiels, 25 September 1931,
W. Holtby Papers, Drawer 4, File 9.
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on the Liberals but Passfield's timidity and dependence 
on his senior civil servants. The Liberals would 
probably have been willing to support a more positive 
colonial policy. Many Liberals such as L.J. Cadbury, 
Isaac Foot, Donald Maclean, G. Murray and C.P. Scott 
signed the »Memorial* which had urged the Labour Govern­
ment to pursue a more positive policy. Also, between 
1925-1929* the two Liberal M.P.s, who were interested 
in the Kenyan administration, asked 55 questions hostile 
to the policies being pursued in Kenya and only two 
supportive questions.'*' It is not possible to say exactly 
what the Liberals would have done if the Labour Government 
had pursued a positive colonial policy in Africa, but, 
what evidence there is, suggests that they would have 
supported it. It was not only Leys and the members of 
the A.C.I.Q. who were disappointed with Passfield*s 
record, Drummond Shiels, Passfield*s Under-Secretary, 
also thought that Passfield was too willing to accept 
the judgments of his senior civil servants »without 
always applying the same critical examination which he 
gave to other matters.* Margaret Cole, who was 
sympathetic to the Webbs, thought that Sidney was *a 
failure as a minister' because he failed to follow up 
his White Paper and ensure that it was carried out in 
detail. The conclusion seems to be that if MacDonald 
had wanted a more positive colonial policy to have been 
pursued, he would have appointed a Colonial Secretary 
who was prepared to criticise conventional Colonial Office 
assumptions and force his civil servants and Governors
1 . E.A. Brett, op.cit.,p.6l.
2. D. Shiels, op.cit. p.203f.
3. M. Cole, led.),B. Webb Diaries*, op.cit., p.XII.
to follow Labour policy. It would have been too much 
to expect a minority Government to reform the African 
empire in two years in the face of opposition from the 
civil servants, the Governors, the settlers, the 
•establishment* in England and English businessmen; but 
the point is that no determined effort was made to begin 
the task. However, the days when British Governments 
could move very slowly on African affairs were coming to 
an end. The educated Africans were beginning to become 
concerned about their own political and economic develop­
ment. Kenyatta took 200 copies of the White Paper back 
to Kenya with him. The educated Africans could see 
that there was a discrepancy between the policies 
outlined by the Colonial Office and the policies put into 
effect in Kenya.^
The leading Fabian had not been very successful in 
changing the colonial system by gradual means. The motto 
of the Fabian Society was: *For the right moment you must 
wait, as Fabius did most patiently, when warring against 
Hannibal, though many censured his delays; but when the
time comes you must strike hard, as Fabius did, or your
2waiting will be in vain and fruitless.* Lord Passfield 
was waiting for the right moment to strike but never 
actually ’struck hard*. Norman Leys believed that the 
time had come to ’strike hard’ but that Passfield had 
missed it. Leys outlined what he thought should have 
been done in his book, *A Last Chance in Kenya’• Full 
control should have been given to men who were committed 
to the policies of the White Paper and not entrusted to
1 . N. Leys, »Statement for Advisory Committee». 23 
November 1930, W.Holtby Papers, Drawer 4, File 8.
2. Quoted, M. Cole, »The Story of Fabian Socialism»,(London, 1963 ed.Jp.l. *
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people who were unsympathetic• A Governor should have 
been appointed who was determined to enforce the White 
Paper and he should have made a public pronouncement that 
he intended to carry it out* The burden of taxation 
should have been shifted from the Africans to the white 
settlers and land policy reformed to prevent the white 
settlers reserving the best land for themselves* Public 
funds should have been redistributed in favour of the 
Africans. A law should have been passed which would 
have enfranchised all, irrespective of race, colour or 
creed who had reached the 'civilised life's- an income 
of £25 a year, combined with the ability to write a simple 
English sentence. Schools should have been opened 
equally to all and Factory Acts and Workmen's Compensation 
Acts should have been passed.^- Leys*sprogramme does not
appear very radical today but it was too radical for 
Passfield in 1931-
I* N. Leys, 'A Last Chance in Kenya*, (London, 1931),
pp.151-160*
CHAPTER 8.
DEFEAT AND RECONSIDERATION
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The 1931 General Election held on 27 October after 
MacDonald's 'betray yal*^ of the party was disastrous for 
the Labour party* 52 Labour M*P*s were elected out of 
515 candidates* The National Government managed to gain 
the election of 554 M*P.s out of 696 candidates.^ The 
parliamentary party was devastated* Of the members of 
the Labour government, Lansbury was the only cabinet 
minister to survive on the opposition side} only two 
junior ministers survived the debacle, Attlee and Sir 
Stafford Cripps. Host of the members of the parliamen­
tary party were trade unionists* Half the party 
consisted of candidates sponsored by the Miners*
Federation* The prestige and authority that the
parliamentary party had built up inside the party in the
3previous decade collapsed* The organisation and the
trade unions increased in importance within the party*
The I*L*P* was disaffiliated from the party in July 1930.
The P.L.P. was unwilling to change its standing orders
so as to allow the I*L*P* to determine its M.P.s* voting
behaviour as a separate group in the House of Commons*^
The I.L*P. voted for disaffiliation at the 30 July
Conference in Bradford by 241 votes to 142* The
I.L.P.'s policies became more revolutionary and critical
of the Labour party*s policies*
The Labour party directed its attention to revising
its policies with a view to preparing a positive programme
for the next Labour government to avoid the mistakes of 1*3
1 . D. Marquand, op.cit., gives a sympathetic account of 
the reasons for MacDonald's decision.
2* British Political Facts 1900-1968, Butler and Freeman* 
(3rd ed. London 1969), p*l42* *
3. H. Polling, *A Short History of the Labour Partv** (London, 1968),p*74. . 7 *
4* R.E. Dowse, »Left in the Centre », (London.1966) 
pp.179-184. *
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the 1929-31 government. There was a great desire in the 
party not to make the same mistakes again and so it set 
about the task of working out 'better* policies. However, 
as Miliband'1' points out, most of the leaders'were the same 
men, who through the twenties, had found acceptable the 
particular version of socialism propagated by MacDonald, 
whatever reservations some of them might have had about 
MacDonald himself'. The party leadership was still 
firmly committed to parliamentary politics. Attempts 
were made to found a new society within the party which 
would put forward and propogate an advanced 'socialist* 
programme in the absence of the I.L.P. Two groups 
had already come into existence, the New Fabian Research 
Bureau and the Society for Socialist Inquiry and 
Propaganda. The N.F.R.B. continued its work and was 
reunited with the Fabian Society in 1930. The S.S.I.P. 
was amalgamated with a group which had left the I.L.P. 
on its disaffiliation from the Labour party and was 
reconstituted as the Socialist League with £.F. Vise 
from the I.L.P. as its first chairman. On Vise's 
death in 1933» Stafford Cripps took over the running 
of this body and it was soon in conflict with official 
party policy. It began to question the Fabian 
assumption that 'socialism* would inevitably come by 
constitutional means.
The National Executive,however, was dominated by 
men of moderate views and set about preparing moderate 
policy statements. In December 1931, the Executive 
appointed a policy committee under George Lathan, to 12
1 . R. Miliband, op.cit., p.193.
2. Polling, op.cit., p*76.
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embark on a series of policy reports on particular 
problems«^ Attlee and Cripps were members of this 
committee# Other leading Labour party figures outside 
parliament on the committee were Hugh Dalton« Herbert
oMorrison and Arthur Greenwood« The first four reports
prepared for the 1932 party conference were on "Currency,
Banking and Finance", "The National Planning of Transport",
"The Reorganisation of the Electricity Supply Industry",
and the "Land and Planning of Agriculture".
The report on banking recommended the Nationalisation
of the Bank of England and the creation of a National
Investment Board« Conference amended it to include the
nationalisation of the joint-stock banks« The other
three reports envisaged the public ownership of transport,
electricity generation and distribution and agricultural
land« The 1932 Conference was in a radical mood« It
passed a resolution declaring that 'the main object of the
Labour Party is the establishment of socialism* which it
took to mean 'the common ownership of the means of
production and distribution by the producers by hand
and brain*« It also passed a motion which stated that
*on assuming office, either with or without power,
definite Socialist legislation must be promulgated, and
that the Party shall stand or fall in the House of
4Commons on the principles in which it has faith«*
The rank and file of the party seemed to be in a radical 
mood«
On 20 April 1933 the National Executive Committee
i; f5îïÎAg!T&S.?ïtîÎsS.Î'9Ïour Party’ ttondonl965>p.l67.
3;* Labour Party Conference Report, 1932, p«202« 
ibid., p«204.
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approved a recommendation that a Report should be presented 
on Imperial and Colonial policy®*" The Advisory Committee 
on Imperial Questions had already decided to draft a 
pamphlet on Imperial Policy for the party. At a meeting 
on 8 February 1933 it had considered the future policy 
of a Labour government on taking office and decided to 
appoint a sub-committee consisting of Buxton, Ross and 
Woolf to do the work. The Executive used the Imperial 
Advisory Committee to prepare its Report on Imperial and 
Colonial policy. On 8 March 1933, the Advisory Committee 
decided to appoint Dr. Drummond Shiels to the sub­
committee which was drafting an imperial policy memo for 
the party. Buxton seems to have been the driving force 
behind this decision to rewrite the party*s policy. He 
had told Leys that the best way of getting the Labour 
party committed to definite measures in the Dependencies ^ 
was to rewrite the 'old tract that was published long ago 
with the imprimatur of the Party Executive*. Leys had 
been worried that after the Labour party had been in 
office for two years and »had so totally failed to act 
on its expressed intentions' that the Party Executive 
would consider that its original policy had proved 
impracticable but Buxton was sure that there would never 
be any watering down of the old statements. Buxton 
pointed out to Leys, on a visit to him, that *a man 
Dugdale, Major Attlee's parliamentary secretary, has been 
urging the policy of the nationalising of plantations, 
etc.' Buxton and Leys decided that Dugdale's ideas 
were completely chimerical since no one in East Africa
wanted any such measures. They agreed that Dugdale *8
1 .
2.
I
National Executive Committee Minute.. 20 Anvil Advisory Committee on Imperial o«««,+.?„ I *-933*
8 February 1933. P al Questions Minutes,
A.C.I.Q. Minutes, 8 March 1933.N. Leys to W. Holtby, l Julv u  w m  „Drawer 4, Fila 8. Ay W. Holtby Papers,
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•knew nothing at all’*^"
Dugdale had sent his memo on colonial policy to the
Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions* The Committee
considered it on 27 April 1932 and decided to invite
2 ~Dugdale to discuss the subject with them. Dugdale*s 
memo stated that the British Colonial empire was a ’vivid 
example of the evils of unrestricted capitalist development** 
He suggested that the socialisation and economic planning 
of British industry should be accompanied by similar action 
in the colonies* Concerning agriculture, each colonial 
government should take over all the land in its,*, own 
territory, all *natives* should be left on their reserves 
which should be increased to a suitable size, every white 
farmer should be bought out and their farms should then 
be divided into economic areas and farmed by the Colonial 
government* The Socialist plan for the colonies would 
include the establishment of Government Marketing Boards, 
which would take the produce from the ’natives* at a fair 
price and dispose of it in Great Britain and elsewhere* 
Agricultural factories would also grow up for the 
processing of ’native* produce before export. The 
government should run its land and factories on a non­
profit making basis* If any profit were made it should 
be used to improve ’native* conditions in the colony*
It should not be allowed to leave the colony* ’Natives’ 
should be encouraged to take responsible positions both 
in the factories and on government farms* There should 
also be an Investment Commission.
Concerning industry, Dugdale thought that the Labour 12
1 . N. Leys to W, Holtby, 5 May 1932, W. Holtby Papers,
Drawer 4, File 8»
2. A.C.I.Q* Minutes, 27 April 1932.
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party should go out for a bold policy of nationalisation 
of all colonial industries and their development in the 
interests of the ' n a t i v e s 5under the control of some form 
of planning commission which would see that each industry 
grew up along the best lines and in accordance with the 
economic interests of the whole colony. In conclusion, 
Dugdale stated that the people of Britain had not woken 
up to the importance of the colonies. The Tories had 
some sort of constructive colonial policy in the booklets 
of the Empire Economic Union but they were absorbed in 
getting trade agreements with the dominions and they were 
not likely to turn their attention to the colonies until 
they had finished this task. Dugdale contended that 
•now is the time for the Labour party to come forward 
with a bold constructive colonial policy, presented in 
such a way as to appeal to the imagination of the more 
thoughtful section of the electorate.• It was essential 
that the Labour party should formulate a colonial policy 
at the earliest possible moment and present it to the 
public in a clear-cut and readable form. 1 Dugdale wanted 
to place more emphasis on agricultural and industrial 
development than the Labour party's policy statements 
had done. The party did have a policy but it would 
appear from Dugdale*s memo that it had not been very 
well publicised. There was a lack of public interest 
in the subject. Only one day was given to the Colonial 
Office every year to discuss all the various colonies 
with their millions of inhabitants. Dugdak*s policy 
placed more emphasis on agricultural and industrial 
development than the Labour party had done in its two
1 . A.C.I.Q. Memo on Colonial Policy by J. Dugdale. No.97 April 1932. *
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policy statements on the colonies - particularly Africa 
- ‘The Empire in Africa: Labour’s policy* (1920) and 
’Labour and the Empire: Africa* (1926)* Neither of 
these statements had contemplated buying all the white 
farmers out or nationalising all the colonial 
industries*
The complacency of the A*C*X*Q* about its policy was 
illustrated by the fact that Buxton and Leys (whof 
although he had resigned from the committee, still kept 
in touch with its members) thought that Dugdale's 
suggestions were completely unrealistic. However« even 
Buxton and Leys were beginning to realise that the 
Africans could not avoid the process of industrial and 
agricultural development, as some, like Wedgwood and 
Morel, had originally hoped* C*R, Buxton wrote in the 
’Manchester Guardian* that 'the process of drawing the 
native into our Western economic system has begun* It 
cannot be arrested now.’* Leys thought that East 
Africa was 'inundated by the forces of Western industry*. 
The Africans could not be kept out of the Western 
political and economic system. ’They are in it now*
Up to the neck in it.* Nevertheless, the draft 
pamphlet on the party’s colonial policy did not take 
much account of these new developments*
The Imperial Advisory committee considered the draft
pamphlet prepared by its sub-committee on Imperial
Policy on 28 June 1933» It was resolved that members
of the Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions should
send suggested amendments to the secretary, Leonard Woolf,
1 * Manchester Guardian, 27 October 1932.
2. N. Leys to Wellock, 27 June 1931, W. Holtby Papers.
Drawer 4, File 9»
to be considered at a meeting of* the sub-committee on 3 
July and that the amended draft should be re-submitted 
to the committee on 12 July.* This would indicate that 
there was some disagreement on some parts of the pamphlet* 
On 12 July 1933* the amended draft was re-submitted to 
the A.C.I.Q. and it was decided to forward the draft to 
the N.E.C* (excluding the section on trade and commerce)
as amended and with alternative proposals on the mandatory
osystem. Xt would seem that the main areas of disagree­
ment were trade and commerce and proposals on the manda­
tory system* Dr. Drummond Shiels seems to have been at 
odds with the other members of the committee* Leys 
was horrified when he saw the first draft* He thought 
the style was atrocious and the matter jumbled.^
The National Executive Committee considered the 
draft proposals on 26 and 27 July 1933» e specially a 
paper on Colonial Policy - Trade and Commerce - the 
*Open Door1*^ (This was the additional section sent 
by the sub-committee after the main bulk of the pamphletJ 
It stated that the Labour party believed in the complete 
equality of trade for all nations in the markets of the 
non-self-governing Empire and was opposed to any 
administrative discrimination against foreigners in the 
disposal of property or the grant of concessions. Any 
policy that regarded a colony as a market or field of 
exploitation to be reserved for the benefit of British
1 * A.C.I.Q* Minutes* 28 June 1933*
2* A.C.I.Q. Minutes, 12 July 1933«
?• N. Leys to V. Holtby, 1 July 1933* W. Holtby Papers, 
Drawer 4, Pile 8.
4. N.E.C. Minutes, 26 July 1933* Colonial Policy, Trade 
and Commerce - the *Open Door*.
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or Dominion traders and capitalists regardless of 'native* 
interests was to be deprecated, both from the standpoint 
of 'native* interests and of international political 
considerations. The pre-war policy of free trade had 
been reversed after the war with the adoption of the 
principle of colonial preference. The Colonial Office 
encouraged preferential rates for British goods in the 
tariff schedules of the non-self-governing colonies. It 
was the Ottawa agreements that had completed the process. 
These gave to all parts of the Empire, and not only the
U.K., the benefit of the preferential regime in any 
colony; they also enlarged the area of discrimination 
against foreign traders by extending the Empire 
preferential schedules in most colonies and increased 
tariffs on non-Empire products. These agreements were 
not negotiated by or with the knowledge of the legislatures 
of the colonies, i.e., where Legislative Councils existed. 
The government was contemplating terminating the inter­
national treaties which prohibited the giving of preferences 
by certain colonies in Africa belonging to the U.K., 
Belgium, France, Italy and Portugal. The Colonial 
Secretary was hesitating because he was not sure what 
would be best for the interests of British trade, not 
out of concern for 'native* interests or any regard for 
international political considerations. The mandatory 
principle should be extended within the British Empire.
This would enlarge the area of equal opportunities for 
the trade and commerce of all nations. Where 
legislatures existed in the colonies and comprised 
elected members there should be no fiscal discrimination 
against foreigners without the consent of a majority of
t
the elected members. These Legislatures should be
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directly represented in any future trade delegation*
A Labour government would not seek to abrogate the 
African treaties, but would negotiate the removal of 
preferences given by Colonies and Protectorates in favour 
of other parts of the Empire, unless evidence was forth­
coming that colonial, including *native* opinion, was in 
favour of them*
The minutes of the A*C*X*Q* were circulated on 26 
July and a discussion took place on the alternative 
drafts regarding the application of the mandatory 
principle which had been sent by the A.C.I.Q*^ After a 
discussion in which the views of Dr* Drummond Shiels on 
the sub-committee were put forward by Mr* Dallas, a 
draft was adopted, which stated:- HXf the British 
government really acts as a trustee for non-self-governing 
territories, where the native population is not qualified 
effectually to control by democratic parliamentary 
institutions the intricate mechanism of a modern state, 
it will be applying to them the system of the mandate 
established in the Covenant* Xt seems, therefore, both 
right and logical that the mandatory system should be 
accepted for all colonies inhabited mainly by aborigines 
of primitive culture. The Labour party, when it is in 
power, will make such a declaration, and will accept the 
scrutiny of the Mandates Commission in such cases, if it 
can be arranged*” Xt would seem that Dr* Drummond 
Shiels was against the acceptance of the mandatory 
principle. It was well known that Woolf and C*R. Buxton 
accepted it* They had included it in their previous 
pamphlet: ‘Labour and the Empire: Africa*, which had
been published in 1926*
1 . N.E.C. Minutes, 26 July 1933*
2. ibid., 26 July 1933»
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The next day* 27 July 1933* the National Executive 
Committee considered and approved the policy report on 
*Colonial policy* and the section on the *open door**
Also circulated was a letter from Dr. Drummond Shiels in 
which he outlined at length his differences with the 
Advisory Committee on 'Colonial policy* respecting the 
application of the mandatory principle. After discussion* 
it was resolved not to follow Drummond Shiels ideas 
The policy report was then printed under the title 'The 
Colonies'. Leys was happier with this than he had been 
with the draft. He thought that Woolf must have rewritten 
the official pamphlet for it was *a vast improvement but 
still too vague and full of high flying good intentions'.
The policy advocated in the pamphlet was similar to 
that proposed in the Labour party's two earlier pamphlets* 
•The Empire in Africa: Labour's Policy' (1920) and 
'Labour and the Empire:Africa * (1926). This is not 
surprising since Leonard Woolf had a hand in writing all 
three pamphlets and C.R. Buxton worked on two. The first 
one was written by Woolf and E.D. Morel* the second one by 
Woolf and C.R. Buxton and the 1933 pamphlet* as has been 
seen* by Woolf* C.R. Buxton* McGregor Ross and Dr.Drummond 
Shiels. One could almost say that the Labour party's 
colonial policy was produced by a handful of middle class 
intellectuals - men such as Leonard Woolf* E.D. Morel*
C.R. Buxton* Norman Leys* McGregor Ross* Lord Olivier* 
and Josiah Wedgwood. Not one of them was connected with 
the working class.
1 . ibid., 27 July 1933«
2. 'The Colonies', Labour Party Policy Report No. 6 
(London* August 1933)
3. N. Leys to W. Holtby* 13 July 1933, W. Holtby Papers, 
Drawer kt File 8.
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The men who played the major part in formulating the 
Labour party's colonial policy in the interwar years were 
middle class humanitarians. Morel and Wedgwood had been 
connected with the Liberal party before the first world 
war but they had felt that the Liberal party was ill- 
equipped to deal with the rise of the working man in 
politics and had joined the l.L.P. However, they still 
preserved some Liberal principles, a belief in internation­
alism, huraanitarianistn, the appeal to reason and a dislike 
of violent revolution, as well as a belief in the gradual 
reform of abuses. None of these people were revolution­
aries or Marxists. They were all middle class 
professional men who were quite wealthy. Not one of 
them was intimately connected with the trade unions or 
the working class. They did not 'pull such power* 
within the party and therefore they did not exercise 
much influence when the party was in office.
It is not really surprising that these experts on 
Africa and colonial policy were middle class intellectuals. 
The problem of colonialism, although an important one, was 
not one that was of much immediate appeal to the 
electorate. It did not have an immediate impact on 
ordinary people whose main concern was the problem of 
unemployment. Hence colonial policy was not emphasised 
in general election campaigns and manifestoes. The 
main work on colonial policy was done by the intellectuals 
on the A.C.I.Q. It was they who drafted the policy 
statements which were approved by the N.E.C. and party 
conferences.
The new policy statement produced by Woolf, Buxton, 
Ross and Drummond Shiels was very similar to the other 
two pamphlets. There was the same emphasis on the
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difference between the systems in operation in East and
Vest Africa - the differentiation between the ‘African*
policy and the ‘capitalist* policy. The sections on
land, labour, taxation and education were very similar to
those in the earlier pamphlets. There was also the same
belief in international control and the same cautious
approach to self-government. In the African countries,
it was stated, the 'people are in a condition which would
make it impossible for them to take over the government
of their country on modern lines. In such cases, what
is required is education and preparation with the definite
object of training the population in self-government•'
‘The party will take the steps necessary to give self-
government and "responsible government" in Asiatic and
African territories only if, at the same time, the franchise
can be given to the Native inhabitants on the same terms
as to European minorities and only if it is assured that
the Native inhabitants will have an effective voice in
the government of the territory in question.*^
The new pamphlet expanded more on the question of
the ‘open door* than the others had done, owing to the
fact that the National Government had negotiated the
Ottawa Agreements the year before. The pamphlet stated
its opposition to the agreements and preferential trade
policies. Some mention was made of the work of the
1929-31 Labour Government in the pamphlet. It was stated
that the government had made a start on dealing with the
vested interests, which sought to make perpetual serfdom
the lot of millions of intelligent and decent people in
the colonies, by carrying through the Kenya Native Lands
1 # Labour Party Policy Report No. 6 ‘The Colonies*
(Transport House, August 1933)* p.6.
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Ordinance to prevent the expropriation of native landst 
in apite of the bitter opposition of the white immigrant 
c o m m u n i t y I t  is significant that this was all that 
could be shown for 2 years work* The Ordinance was soon 
to be overthrown when gold was discovered in Kenya in the 
Kavirondo reserve*
The objectives of the Colonial Policy of the Labour
Party, stated the pamphlet, could be summed up in two
owords - 'socialisation and self-government'* The
colonial administration should prepare the people for
self-government by education, local self-government and
the development of co-operative societies* The Labour
party was a Socialist Party, declared the policy statement,
and its aim was the establishment of socialism* There
was considerable opportunity for the application of
practical Socialism in the Colonies in State Railways,
Medical Services, Public Works, etc. 'The development
should be extended to the organisation of efforts to
securethe economic well-being and security of the
inhabitants along Socialist lines*' Conditions varied
enormously within colonies* 'The Labour Government will,
therefore, consider means for working out plans for
socialisation and for promoting the economic interests
of the Native inhabitants* In particular, consideration
will be given to the steps which can be taken to make the
local administrations both at the centre and in the
provinces and districts more efficient in promoting
these objects.»'' Although the pamphlet said plans would
be worked out for socialisation, the pamphlet itself did
not give much consideration to the problems of economic
1 * ibid*
2. ibid.
3# 'The Colonies', op.cit., p.6-7*
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development.
The policy report was disoussed at the Hastings Conference 
at the beginning of October 1933* Mr.Reorge Dallas moved the 
adoption of the Report on the Colonies for the Executive.He 
said that all the amendments had either been accepted or 
withdrawn so they had got a virtually unanimous Report.Hb paid 
tribute to Leonard Woolf who had been the Secretary of the Advisory 
Committee for fourteen years. *No man could have rendered greater 
service, or more devoted service,to the people we are concerned 
with in this Eeport than Mr. Leonard Woolfjand not only Mr. Woolf, 
but Mr. Charles Roden Buxton,who has been Chairman of the Committee.
We are very greatly indebted particularly to those two men,with 
their colleagues on the Committee,for the Eeport.• He hoped that 
the Report would be widely read when it was re-issued in a more 
attractive form by the trade unions and the constituency parties.1
In the Report they were dealing with the colonies- »people 
for whose government everyone of us in this Ball,and everyone in 
the country is directly responsible.* The Government governed these 
people as truly as it governed every constituent part of Great 
Britain and in some respects it governed them even more directly.
They were dealing with no less than 64 million people, nearly 
one and a half times the population of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland.The African living on his native soil constituted the 
major portion of Britain’s responsibilities.There were 42 million 
Africans-approximately the population of Great Britain. Over a *2
X.The Labour Party Conference Report,1933,Hastings,2-6 October 1933, 
p.I99.2. This figure does not include Tndia.Apart from the colonies and
protectorates in Africa,it includes those in Asia,Amerioa,Australasia 
and Europe.The figures are set out in »The Colonial Empire'(The 
- Labour Party,1933)»PP«21-22.
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large part of Africa the 'natives* had become landless« 
they had no title in law over the land that their fathers 
had lived in for many thousands of years. Even in the 
portions of Africa which were owned and possessed by the 
•natives1* called •native* reserves* the 'natives* had 
no guarantee that they were protected against eviction.
If gold was discovered* or any other?metals* they were 
liable to be turned out and lose all rights whatsoever.
The 'natives* were looking to the British people for 
some change in the capitalist policy that had been 
pursued for the last 50 years. The 'natives* were 
compelled to pay taxes. In order to pay the taxes they 
had to work for the people who had taken their land. The 
money raised by taxation was not spent for the benefit of 
the 'natives'.*
Dallas then went on to make the familiar distinction 
between tils policy and that which was pursued on the Vest 
Coast. 'In some of the Vest African Colonies no 
European can get any land whatever unless for the building 
of towns and town sites* and this policy has fundamentally 
different results. These results show the possibility of, 
culture and development thet the natives are capable of 
if they are given the chance.' The Report stated that 
Britain should look upon herself as the guardian of the 
'natives* in the Colonies. The principles of liberty 
and equality in the political* economic and social sense 
should be put into practice in Africa. *Ve must go 
with the principle of fraternity* and in that profound 
sense we must say that as far as we are concerned we
1 . ibid.* p .200
2. 1933 Conference Report, op.cit., p.200.
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believe in Africa for the Africans, just as we believe 
in Britain for the British, and that the well-being of 
the Africans and the other people in our Colonies is the 
keynote of the policy of the Brfcish Labour Party.*'*'
The next speaker in the debate was Mr. William Lunn 
who had been one of Passfield*s Under-Secretaries at the 
Colonial Office,for a brief period, during the Second 
Labour Government. He had been mainly concerned with the 
Dominions but, after the 1931 Election and the failure of 
many Labour M.P.s to return to Parliament, he had become 
the main spokesman on the Colonies. Sidney Webb, Lunn 
said, had been at the Colonial Office for two and a half 
years, during which time he had drafted and carried 
through a charter of freedom for the 'natives', the like 
of which had never been proposed in this country. Webb's 
'Memorandum on Native Affairs' had been for Africans, 
or was intended to be for Africans a charter of liberty, 
guaranteed for all time in the future regarding their 
possessions. The present Government had already 
violated this charter by giving way to the settlers in 
Kenya when gold was found. The Labour Party should 
stand determinedly against that sort of thing. The 
question of the Colonies was a big one but it was not 
one that would fire the imagination and enthusiasm of 
the British electors at a General Election. 'It is 
not a question that will win for us a majority, but it 
is our duty, as trustees for the many millions of 
peoples who live in these vast Colonies of the British
Empire to see that every right that there is should be
oassured and guaranteed to them.' 12
1 . ibid., p •201•
2. ibid. Lunn emphasised the lack of electoral interest 
in the subject but pointed out that it was a subject of great importance, particularly, for the future.
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Lunn hoped that when a Labour Government came to 
power, where land had been taken from the Natives' it 
would be restored to its rightful owners* He took 
Nigeria as an example of a socialised colony* There was 
no private ownership in land, the railways and the 
coastwise traffic were owned by the people and, with 
Donald Cameron as Governor, Lunn believed that there 
would be no giving way to capitalist policies* Turning 
to the general question of self-government, Ltun thought 
that there was a good way to go before self-government 
or self determination c ould be established in many 
Colonies* The first principle was to educate the 
•natives' and to see that educational facilities were 
provided for all ranks living in the British Empire* 
Whatever taxation the 'natives* pay ought to be spent 
in the interests of the 'natives'* There were educated 
'natives* who were in a position to take over the control 
and government of their countries; one such was Tshekedi, 
the Acting-Chief of Bechuanaland whom Lunn had met*
Lunn asked the conference to agree to the Report so 
that the Labour Party could take up the question of 
educating the 'natives', providing an adequate health 
service for them, restoring their land to them, ensuring 
that taxation should be fair, making labour conditions 
better and ending forced labour and slavery and 
ensuring that the 'natives' should have complete freedom* 
The adoption of the Report would show that the Labour 
Party was not a 'parish pump' party but was prepared 
to carry out its duty in all parts of the Empire and 
with all peoples with whose liberties Britain was 
entrusted*^
1. 1933 Conference Report, op.cit., p*201.
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C.R. Buxton said that the Report was a charter of 
black men’s rights. He thought that the Report was 
something more than the other reports. 'This is actually 
the third edition of Labour’s policy for black men’s 
rights. The first of our pamphlets was published, I 
think, in 1921, and I would like to mention the name of 
a great man who passed away, one who played a great part 
in that first edition of our policy - the late E.D.Horel. 
Then there was the second edition, which some of you 
know as "Labour and the Empire: Africa", which has been 
on sale for several years past, and on the first page 
of which some of the very finest observations on black 
men's rights are signed by the Rt. Hon.J.H. Thomas, M.P. 
After very careful consideration, extending over a long 
period of time, we have the third edition. This Policy 
Report has had very prolonged and careful consideration, 
m d  although some of us feel that things move slowly* yet 
I think we may congratulate ourselves that in our 
Movement this subject of black man's rights is obtaining 
more and more attention every year.* It was said that 
it was not a burning question in the sense that some 
others were, but Buxton prophesied that in ten years the 
problem of what is going to be done to secure the rights 
of our black and brown fellow citizens will be a burning 
question at Conference and all manner of questions would 
arise in connection with it. There had been singularly 
little trouble with regard to the primitive peoples of 
the Colonial Empire such as those in Africa because they 
had been docile and submissive to capitalistic exploita­
tion. The next fifty years were not going to be as easy
1. Buxton appeared-to be hinting at the disappointment that 
the A.C.I.Q. felt at Passfield's performance in office.
2. ibid., p.201-202.
3 ?o
as the last fifty had been. There were going to be all 
sorts of problems because there was a rising tide of 
national consciousness amongst these people and there was 
also industrial consciousness. It was a burning question 
not only for every citizen but for every worker because 
more and more the worker would be subjected to the 
competition of sweated black labour. That would lead to 
all manner of difficulties which only a socialist govern­
ment could solve. 'Our fellow workers are our black and 
brown and yellow fellow workerst just as much as our white 
fellow workers. All that sentiment of solidarity which 
counts for so much in the world today should come with 
full force, not only to the white workers of the world, 
but to our black, brown and yellow fellow workers as 
well . • 1
J.F. Horrabin, who had pressed Lord Passfield when 
in office on matters concerning the exploitation of 
Africans in Vest and East Africa, said that he was glad 
that the Executive had accepted the Report. He was 
particularly glad that an amendment had been accepted 
which added the words 'self-determination* to the short 
definition of the aims of the Labour party as regards 
the Colonies. After the sentence 'The objectives of 
the Colonial Policy of the Labour party may be summed
2up in two words - socialisation and self-government1, 
another sentence had been added: 'These are the 
preliminaries necessary to enable the exercise of that 
full self-determination which must be the basis of a 
true commonwealth.*^ Horrabin was pleased that the 
word'self-determination' had been used because it did
1. 1933 Conference Report, op.cit., p.202.
2. 'The Colonies', op.cit., p.*t.
3. 'The Colonial Empire» (Transport House, November 
1933),
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imply to the subject peoples of the Empire a recognition
of their rights as equals. Horrabin pointed out that
the Britain that the Africans knew was the Britain of
the exploiter. If they wanted the Africans to hear some
other voice from Britain it would have to come from the
Labour Movement. He hoped that the policy statement
would not be treated merely as a programme for a future
Labour government. He wanted the Labour Movement to make
its voice heard and let the African know that he had
friends and comrades in Great Britain. 1
A trade unionist - Mr. G. Mathers of the Railway
Clerks* Association - also spoke in the debate. He
criticised the assumption that education was needed before
people should l>e given the vote, he thought that what was
required was 'gumption*• However, he did not say
whether he considered that the Africans had 'gumption*•
He was also unhappy with the section on trade and commerce
entitled 'the Open Door*. He thought that complete free
trade would take away revenue and lead to higher taxes
on the 'natives'. He suggested that the policy should
2be altered, but this idea was not followed.
The Rt. Hon. George Lansbury, M.P. summed up for the 
Executive. He paid tribute to Sidney Webb and 'the 
testament he left behind for our guidance*. He stated 
that his views on these affairs had been gathered from 
having learned that 'Livingstone, Colenzo - both the 
Bishop and his daughter - Roger Casement, Nevinson and 
E.D. Morel, all walked through Africa without any 
machine guns to protect them, but only the goodwill they 
carried with them and the comradeship which they spread 
about them.
1. 1933 conference Report, ibid., p.202.
2. ibid., p.203»
3. ibid., p.203*
372
Hie debate has been outlined in detail because it 
illustrated the Labour party's approach to colonial 
problems* The speakers were aware that the issue was 
not going to win the party any votes at a General Election 
but they emphasised that it would become a question of 
increasing importance in the future* Passfield*s period 
of office was generally glossed over with occasional mention 
of the Kenya Land Ordinance and the 'Memorandum on 
Native Policy1 but no mention was made of the fact that 
the 'Memorandum' had not been enforced* The Ordinance 
was soon ignored when gold was discovered in Kenya*
The speeches, in general, were expository and self- 
congratulatory • However, the policy was still rather 
vague; there was no detailed discussion of the time 
period envisaged before independence could be given in 
the African colonies and dependencies, only Horrabin 
emphasised that self-determination was the aim of the 
Labour party's policy* The speakers reiterated the 
party's 'conventional wisdom* that everything was 
'almost perfect' in West Africa* They seem to have 
completely ignored the troubles that had occurred in 
West Africa during Ibcsfield's period at the Colonial 
Office and they did not appreciate the problems that 
had developed in West Africa, as a result of the world 
slump and the depression in the price of primary 
products* The speeches did not address themselves in 
any detail to the problems of economic development in 
Africa* The impression was given that all that needed 
to be done in Africa was to apply the 'West African' 
policy to 'East Africa* and the main problems would be 
solved. The debate highlighted the fact that Labour's
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colonial policy had not developed significantly from the 
pamphlet which had been written in 1920. Despite the 
rhetoric about *socialisation and self-government', there 
was little indication of how either would be achieved.
As far as colonial policy was concerned, the Labour 
party's rethink after the failure of 1929-1931 had come 
up with exactly the same policies which had been outlined 
a decade earlier. There was strikingly little develop­
ment in the Labour party*s colonial policy between 1920 
and 1933« The Party*s attitude towards economic develop­
ment and indirect rule was still ambiguous and there was 
still an assumption that the Africans could not be 
consulted about colonial policy. There was no suggestion 
that there should be consultations with African leaders, 
who were beginning to emerge, about the best policy for 
the Labour party to pursue in Africa. After the 
Conference, the policy Report was published as 'The 
Colonial Empire'^ which was then the official statement 
of the party's colonial policy.
The pamphlet was criticised by the l.L.P. At 
the X.L.P. Conference in Blackpool in March 1932, the 
I.L.P. had defined its interndional objectives. 'The 
l.L.P. will combat with all its power Imperialism and 
all its works. It stands for complete self-determina­
tion and self-government for all subject peoples 
recognising their inalienable right to complete 
independence. It seeks to further by every means in its 
power effective international co-operation between the 
workers organisations of all countries for common action 
on the militant socialist policies outlined in this 1
1 . 'The Colonial Empire* (Transport House, 1933)
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programme.'x Taking this point-of-view as its basis 
for considering colonial issues» ‘The New Leader* 
published an article by Reginald Reynolds on the Labour
2party's colonial policy» entitled 'Bossing the Empire»*
In this article» Reynolds stated that the imperialism 
of the Labour party had been under heavy fire in recent 
years» and the Party Bosses had found it impossible to 
ignore this criticism. The report on the colonies was 
a clumsy effort to disarm criticism» by admitting the 
more obvious evils of Empire» whilst seeking to justify 
a reformist 'remedy' which would consolidate and 
stabilise the whole Imperialist system» The real object 
of the Labour party was to meet the 'danger *> British 
occupation* by making Imperialism more efficient» To 
the Labour party Boss» Imperialism was evil not because 
of its injustice but because of its nakedness - because 
it aroused resentment and revolt in the minds of the 
workers» The Labour party plan varied from a continua­
tion of the dictatorship of the Crown in the African 
colonies to some vague and patronising proposals for 
*a large measure of self-government* in the case of the 
Vest Indies 'whose people are probably already capable 
of managing their own affairs*.
Reynolds continued that the Labour party had no 
proposal to give back the land stolen by capitalists; 
still less was there any hint at that racial equality 
which was the very life-blood of socialism» The British 
were to go on ruling» and the 'Negroes* to go on baing 
ruled» until some official in Transport House» in the
1 , I»L»P.Conference Report 1932» Blackpool» March
1932, pp.61-62.
2. 'The New Leader', 15 September 1933, p»8»
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distant future, announces that they are 'fit' for self- 
government, as if they were ‘pigs being fattened for the 
market«' This self-appointed 'trusteeship* was simply 
the White Man's Burden of Kipling's Empire, without so 
much as a new wrapper« Evidently, Transport House 
considered that Britain's European civilisation fitted 
her to assume a role superior to a race that was so simple- 
minded as to believe the land to be the property of the 
community« Reynolds said that there was little mention 
of the Labour party's record in office except a reference 
to the petty reformist Kenya Ordinance - a miserable 
concession to stave off revolt - in which the Report took 
great pride« There was much humbug about 'mandates' and 
the usual pretence, which had Been torn to shreds a dozen 
times, that the West African colonies were administered 
for the benefit of the 'natives'. 'The essential diff­
erence between the theory of Socialism and Fascism is 
that one organises from the bottom,the other imposes from 
the top« Labour's Empire policy is the theory of 
fascism disguised in Gladstonian rags . ' 1
The Labour party's policy was also attacked by
Ralph Fox, in 'The Colonial Policy of British
2*Imperialism'« Taking as his starting point Marx's
dictum that 'a people which enslaves another people
forges its own chains', he stated that 'it cannot be
too stongly emphasised that in so far as they have
participated in the plunder of the colonies, the English
working class have strengthened their oppressors and
weakened their own chances of f r e e d o m « T h e  Labour
TI 'New Leader*, 15 September 1933, p«8«
2. R. Fox, 'The Colonial Policy of British Imperialism* 
(London 1933) ,ppl08-ll8«
3« ibid«, p.108«
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party had never been a party of the working class, it 
was an alliance between the aristocracy of Labour and the 
petty bourgeoisie* It had remained more faithful to the 
ideals of the capitalist class in the colonial question 
than in any other* The reason for this was that the 
Empire was the real corner-stone of British capitalism*
By its failure to do anything about the Empire in its 
total of three and a half years of governmentt the Labour 
party showed itself to be wedded to the capitalist system. 
Its period of government had left forced labour untouched, 
and had failed to emancipate a single child slave, but 
instead had imprisoned many thousands, hanged scores, 
and shot down hundreds with bomb or machine gun, including 
women«
The 1933 Policy Report, according to Pox, had no 
complaint to make against colonial exploitation as such, 
only against certain phases of it mostly connected with 
the plantation system in East Africa* 'Extraordinary as 
it may seem, after the picture of conditions in Vest 
Africa given by the women’s movement in Nigeria, West 
Africa is held up as the ideal of "socialist" colonisa­
tion* Fox thought it was true that the West African
peasant was better off than the plantation skive of Kenya, 
but he was still not well off. 'The facts are that 
the peasants of West Africa are grossly exploited by the 
British imperialist monopolies who buy their produce 
and by the feudal land-owning system which British 
imperialism has developed* The peasant, though he is not 
taxed in such a way as to force him to abandon his land 
and work for a white plantation owner (as in East Africa), 
is nevertheless, as British officials themselves admit,
1* ibid*, p*112o
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grossly overtaxed. The fact that the native courts 
use flogging to enforce payment of taxes....is additional 
and overwhelming evidence of this. Native landlordism 
exists and is growing« even the plantation system exists 
to some extent. In every sense of the word the policy 
pursued by imperialism in Vest Africa is a capitalist 
policy and so long as capitalism exists in England and 
the existence of such giant monopolies as Unilever 
continues« it will remain a capitalist policy. * 1
Fox was unimpressed by the Labour party*s proposals 
on!land. In Vest and East Africa great tracts of land 
had been simply stolen by white settlers or syndicates. 
Nothing would happen in these cases« for all that the 
Labour party said was that no further land should be 
alienated; it was not going to do anything about land 
that had already been alienated. It had said that 
where *too much* land had been alienated« governments 
must be prepared to resume ownership but it was not 
stated what *too much* meant or who was to determine 
whether 'too much* land had been alienated. According 
to Fox« every inch of stolen land was too much and the 
blood and suffering of the 'natives* had paid the ‘price 
of civilisation* a million times over. He found it 
interesting that the next Labour Government would 
prohibit slavery since apparently the last two had 
overlooked it« and that forced and contract labour would 
not be abolished but allowed only on the best 'socialist* 
principles. Fox was also surprised to find that 'trade 
unions* questions such as the 8-hour day« factory 
conditions, and wages, were not mentioned in the code.
He was sceptical that the workers of the colonies were
1. Fox., op.cit., p.113.
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enjoying 'socialism* in some respects in the form of 
state railways, medical services, public works,etc«1 
These criticisms of Labour's policy, although 
exaggerated, did contain some truth. The Labour party 
was blind to the problems in West Africa« This was 
mainly due to Leonard Woolf but his opinions on West 
Africa were accepted and supported by the other members 
of the A.C«X«Q« He re-issued his book,'Imperialism 
and Civilisation* in 1933, again emphasising that 'only 
in the British possessions on the West coast have the 
material Interests of the natives been protected against 
the exploitation of the white man«* However, he did 
admit that 'nowhere had any real attempt been made to
fulfil the«••«obligation of education«* Woolf's 
conclusion was that 'a revolt of Africa will be far 
more terrible than that of Asia« The only way of 
avoiding that catastrophe is to refuse to follow the road 
taken by imperialism in South Africa and now pointed out 
for us in Kenya, and to choose the road already traced 
out for us in British West Africa«'^ The policy of 
reforming the African empire was a viable one, if a 
consistent and logical policy for reform was thought out; 
and if a determined attempt was made to implement it *15
1 .
2.
ibid«, pp«113-ll4.
L. Woolf, ’Imperialism and Civilisation*, (London, 1928 
revised ed« 1933),PP»82-92« Leys came back after a 
visit to the Gold Coast thinking that the people there 
were the 'most fortunate in Africa'. A.C.I.Q« Memo No«115, 'The Gold Coast', N. Leys« He agreed with Woolf 
that what was 'chiefly needed was the application to 
East Africa of the experience of West Africa'« 'New 
Statesman*, 15 April 1933, p«^71o Leys* visit to West 
Africa seems to have convinced him of the 'good 
fortune' of the Africans in West Africa compared to 
those in East Africa« C.R« Buxton was also full of 
praise for the Gold Coast after a visit« Manchester Guardian, 7 January 1935, p«9.
L. Woolf, ibid«, p.92.
379
when the party was in office. The problem was that the 
Labour party*s policy was rather ambiguous and did not 
make clear what policies would be taken immediately by 
a Labour Colonial Secretary to put the policy into effect.
A major difference between the Labour party and the I.L.P. 
in the thirties was that whereas the I.L.P. seemed willing 
to treat the Africans as equals« many Labour politicians 
seemed to regard the Africans as incapable of helping 
themselves. The impression was given that they would have 
to wait until 'London* deemed them 'ready* to be given a 
say in their future. This was why Reynolds thought that 
the Labour party's empire policy was *the theory of 
fiscism disguised in Gladstonian rags*. This was unfair 
but there was an element of truth in it. It was unfair 
because there were people in the Labour party such as 
Leys and Leonard Barnes« who did regard the African as 
a potential equal. This section of the Labour party had 
been weakened when the I.L.P. left the party because 
with it left people like Fenner Brockway who were 
dedicated to equal rights. The people remaining in 
the Labour party« like Leys and Leonard Barnes, were not, 
however, in the mainstream of Labour party politics 
and did tend to be ignored by the official leadership.
The element of truth in Reynold's quotation was that 
many Labour leaders did give the impression that the 
Africans could not do much for themselves and would be 
waiting for independence for many years, if not centuries. 
The Labour party's policy was 'paternalist*. There was 
nothing wrong with this but the impression
was given, by people like Passfield, that they did not 
envisage that the Africans would 'come of age* in the 
near future. The party did not seem to be taking
vigorous steps to ensure that the period of 'paternalist' 
rule would be as short as possible* The party had failed 
in the twenties to convey the impression,either in office 
or in opposition, that it was determined to reform the 
empire* In office, it seemed reluctant to differ from 
the advice of civil servants, and, in opposition, only a 
few MoP.s,-seemed concerned about the problems of Africa* 
The party's record in opposition in the thirties will 
now be studied to ascertain whether a more determined 
attempt was made to protect African interests than in the 
twenties*
In the early thirties, East Africa was again the main
point of contention in Parliament* The main issues were
those arising out of the Report of the Joint Committee*^
Drummond Shiels thought that the Report showed a
progressive spirit and could fbrm a basis on which an
enlightened political and administrative system could be
built up in East Africa* The Report and the working
out of its recommendations would provide a breathing
space to sort out the problems of Kenya* However,
Norman Leys was not so optimistic* He thought that
the decision of the Select Committee to refuse to hear
the delegates chosen and sent at great cost by the
Africans themselves was deplorable* The Report, with
. its shelving of the problem of closer union left things
more-or-less as they were* Leys thought that the fact
that nothing had been done in Kenya and East Africa to
put into effect the policies of 'The Memorandum on Native
1 * Joint Committee on Closer Union in East Africa,
Vol. 1, Report, H.C.156 (1931)
2. 'The East Africa Report' Drummond Shiels, Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 3* January - March 1933*
3. N. Leys, 'A Last Chance in Kenya* (London,193l),p-12.
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Policy* would drive the Africans to adopt more extreme 
policies in order to force the gpvernment to take some 
action* He wrote of the Labour period of office:
'It would be unjust to assume that these Labour Ministers 
(Passfield and Shiels) have turned their backs on what 
have been the principles of the party since its founda­
tion . But they have allowed themselves to be misunder­
stood* All over Africa the news has gone out that the 
Labour Government has recanted*
The main results of the work of the Joint Committee 
were that a number of Commissions were appointed to
investigate problems in East Africa. A financial
2commission under Lord Moyne was set up in early 1932* 
This travelled to and fro East Africa by air and its 
report was quickly concluded, being published in June 
1932*^ The second Royal Commission to be appointed by 
the new Colonial Secretary, Cunliffe-Lister, was the 
Morris Carter Commission on Land* It began work in 
England in the summer of 1932, spent eleven months in 
Kenya, and then returned to England to resume hearings 
in July 1933» The report was eventually published in 
May 1934 in a 6l8 page volume, with three additional 
volumes of evidence* The third Royal Commission,
the Bushe Commission, was relatively unimportant• It 
was appointed to 'inquire into the administration of 
the criminal law in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika 
1 * ibid.,p*l4l*
2* Lord Moyne, as Lt-Col* Guineas, had made a strong 
attack on the Indians in Kenya and stated that the 
interests of the Europeans and Africans were 
complementary •
3* Report by the Financial CommissionerCmd*4093(1932)•
4. Report of the Kenya Land Commission,Cmd*4556(1934)*
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Territory. 1 Its Report appeared in 1934. 1
Norman Leys wrote a memo for the A.C.I.Q. on the setting 
up of the Commissions. He thought that the Colonial Office 
had acted on the advice of the Joint Select Committee with 
apparent thoroughness. No fault could be found with the 
terms of reference but the personnel of the Commissions was 
likely to produce reports favourable to the settlers. The 
Land Commission included a settler and an ex-judge of 
Tanganyika - men who had ; vested interests - in East Africa. 
Leys thought that nothing would ever come of Commissions 
until there was a Labour government with the courage to 
appoint to Commissions men and women who were ready to 
make a break with the past. 2 This was the main point; 
Commissions would never change the system in Africa« if 
they were dominated by members sympathetic to the status 
quo. Both Thomas and Passfield had failed to appoint 
Commissions and Committees with a radical membership.
Leys' point of view was expressed in the House of 
Commons by Labour speakers. Hr. Lunn# Labour's main 
colonial spokesman in the House, stated on 1 July 1932,
•we are profoundly disappointed at the constitution of 
the Morris Carter Commission which is to enquire into the 
land question in Kenya. In my opinion, the Commission is 
overloaded in the interests of settlers, and we asked on 
the last occasion and we ask now that there should be
1 .
2.
Report of Commissioner of Inquiry into the Administration 
of Justice, etc., Cmd. 4623 (London,1932)
A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 99, May 1932, 'East Africa: Appointment 
of Commissions1 by N. Leys. N. Leys' resignation from the 
A.C.I•*.failed to force Passfield to take positive action 
in East Africa. When the Labour party was back in opposi­
tion, Leys was soon sending the A.C.I.Q. memos but he did 
not attend meetings again until after the 1935 Election.
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placed on it a representative of native interests.*^
The report of Lord Moyne had been received by 1 July 
1932» Lord Moyne had been asked to enquire into the 
contribution to taxation of each racial community, the 
amount of government expenditure in the interests of each 
community in Kenya« the effect of railway freight and 
import duties on each community« the degree to which 
financial responsibility should be conferred on the 
Native Councils and the Colony's general economic situation. 
The report showed that Kenya was suffering severely from 
the economic depression and for several years had been 
unable to balance her budget. It showed that the Africans 
had paid an ample contribution to revenue considering the 
services provided in return. Moyne stated that, in 
contrast, the settlers enjoyed 'all the amenities of 
civilisation in return for a relatively light scale of 
contribution'• The A.C.I.Q. had been proved correct, 
in pointing out that the Africans were unfairly treated.
There was a per capita expenditure of 15.8s on Asiatics,
2198.0s on Europeans and 0.2s on Africans.
Moyne recommended some changes in Kenya's financial 
policy towards all the communities. In order to 
improve the financial situation of the Africans, he 
recommended the establishment of a Native Betterment 
Committee to finance and co-ordinate direct African 
services of education, health, agriculture and roads.
He thought that railway rates should be reduced on 
cheap cotton cloth and blankets, hut tax should be 
replaced by a cultivation tax and there should be
1 . House of Commons Reports, Fifth Series, Vol.267, 
cols. 2135-2136, 1 July 1932.
2. Report by the Financial Commissioner, Cmd. *t093 (1932), p.24.
variation in the amount of tax falling on the African 
according to the taxable capacity of each district. Moyne 
thought that the Asians and the Europeans were not 
contributing a fair share of revenue. They were in the 
probably unparallelled position of bearing no direct 
taxation except a male poll tax of 30s., a male education 
tax of 20 or 30s •« and a comparatively light scale of 
death duties. Moyne's major recommendation was that a 
'non-native' income tax should be imposed. 1 This was what 
the Labour party advisory committee had been recommending 
for years.
In the Commons« Lunn said that he thought the report 
was a good one. 'He never fails to let you know that 
taxation is very unfairly levied on the natives and that« 
in all the economies« they have had to bear the lion's 
share« sometimes« he feared with possible danger to the
ohealth and well-being of the native community.*
Cunliffe-Lister, the National Government Colonial Secretary« 
also thought that the report was worth accepting. As a 
result« the Governor« Sir Joseph Byrne« announced soon 
after the publication of the report that Income tax would 
be introduced. This led to pressure from the Europeans. 
The European members on the Legislative Council protested« 
petitions were presented to the Governor« resolutions 
were passed« alternative forms of taxation were suggested. 
Lord Francis Scott« leader of the elected members« flew
to London to present a petition of the Convention of
3Associations to the Colonial Secretary and demand a 
statutory finance committee on which Europeans would have 
X. Report of the Financial Commissioner« Cmd.4093,
pp.29-30« 60-2.
2. House of Commons Reports« Fifth Series« Vol. 267, 
cols. 2136-2137, 1 July 1932.
3 , A settler organisation.
a majority. On 7 June 1933* the Secretary of State gave 
way and ordered the Governor to abandon the bill end give 
a trial to the Europeans' suggestion of an alternative 
tax. The settlers had won what they termed as 'the 
greatest constitutional victory in the history of the 
Colony.• This proved that the settlers' interests were 
still paramount in Kenya.
In Parliament, the Labour party was strongly critical 
of Cunliffe-Lister*s action. Lunn stated that 'those in 
the colony started on the warpath; they were determined 
that they would not pay. They were out to oppose any 
measures of taxation with determination and they 
succeeded.* The new proposals would not raise the same 
amount as Lord Moyne had recommended should be raised.
Lunn was astonished that Lord Moyne had agreed to the
2proposals. He 'had imagined that the Government would 
be consistent and would carry out the policy that they 
declared to the House, and that they would not change 
their opinion, and be influenced as they are, by rich 
men who happen to be able to dominate them and have 
dominated Governments before. Yet we find that the 
right hon. Gentleman lets down the Government, lets 
down all his agents, and that the Governor has to 
announce that he has received instructions from the 
Secretary of State which are new, and which provide 
for this alternative system of taxation, though there 
is no guarantee that it will raise the money required.
The right hon. Gentleman has surrendered weakly to 
the obstruction. No-one can be satisfied with his 
action, and no-one can admire his action in dealing
1 . Quoted, 'India and East Africa', R.G. Gregory,
(Oxford, 1971), p.428.
2. Lord Moyne was oonsulted by Cunliffe—Lister about the new proposals.-
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with this question of income tax in Kenya* I wonder 
what the millions of Africans feel regarding his nervous 
compliance with the resistance in K e n y a * S e t t l e r  
protest again prevented positive policies being put 
forward to improve the position of the Africans* The 
fear of protests from the settlers had been a major 
reason why Thomas and Passfield had not introduced a 
common electoral roll in Kenya*
The other major controversy between the parties in 
this period concerning the colonies in Africa was over 
land and the Morris Carter Report* As has been said, 
the Labour party took particular exception to the 
composition of the Committee* Carter, the chairman, was 
a former Chief Justice of Tanganyika and had investigated 
Rhodesian land problems* The second member, R*W0 Hemted, 
had been Kenya's Chief Commissioner for many years* The 
third and final member. Captain F*0*B. Wilson, was a 
prominent European settler* In an article discussing 
the appointment of the land commission, the 'New 
Statesman* particularly criticised Wilson* The Commi­
ssion had been set up to inquire into the needs of the 
African population for more land, to investigate and 
make recommendations for settling African claims for 
wrongful di8-possessions and to demarcate the white 
highlands within which Europeans •enjoyed a privileged 
position'* It was stated that Captain Wilson should 
not be a member* He might have to adjudicate claims 
to land on which he was living* He was a well-known 
supporter of the Delamere line that unalienated land
1 . House of Commons Reports, Fifth Series, Vol. 280, 
cols. 1446-1448, 14 July 1933.
2. 'New Statesman', 21 May 1932, p*653, 'Kenya Land 
Committee*•
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should be thrown open to European settlement* The article 
concluded that *it is a matter for keen regret that the 
natives of Kenya have no independent representatives, who 
cannot be officially silenced, to voice their interests and 
grievances. Today they are virtually unrepresented, muzzled, 
docketed and ticketed in their own country, and unable to 
find any channel for the transmission of their real wishes, 
hopes and fears* The greatest protection they could have 
would be an autonomous administrator able to fight for them 
without fear, negotiate for them on equal terms, and see 
Justice done** This point of criticism of Captain Wilson 
was put by Mr* Morgan Jones in the House of Commons
Between the announcement of the Land Commission and its 
report, the issue of the gold discovered on the Kavirondo 
native reserve developed* The land was taken by the 
Europeans in order to prospect for gold. This was contrary 
to the provisions of the Native Land Trust Ordinance which 
the Labour government had passed to prevent further ex­
propriation of native lands. In its policy statement, *The 
Colonial Empire*, the Labour party stated that this breach 
of the Native Land Trust Ordinance was evidence, *not only 
of the forces against which we have to work, but of the need
of a powerful and majority Labour government to secure
2justice for the African inhabitants of Kenya**
The A*C*X*Q* discussed the matter on 19 October 1932 
and decided that McGregor Ross and Leonard Woolf should 
prepare a memo on the gold prospecting in Kenya* The memo 
proposed that the government should reserve to itself all
1 . House of Commons Reports, Fifth Series, Vol*267, cols. 
2191-2192, 1 July 1932.
2. * The Colonial Empire*, The Labour Party 1933, p<4<
3. A.C.I.Q. Minutes, 19 October 1932.
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the mineral rights in the ‘Native Reserves* and then do the 
prospecting for itself if gold was discovered in paying 
quantities. This should be done with the minimum of 
disturbance to African land rights. Any profits should be 
used to make good the disturbance and, secondly, for the 
general good and development of the country and its people. 1 2
The memo was discussed by the A.C.I.Q. on 2 November 1932 and
it was decided that it was suitable for M.P.sand was forwarded
2to the National Executive Committee.
McGregor Ross later wrote to the Cardiff Trades and 
Labour Council that it was 'odious misrepresentation for 
the Colonial Office to maintain that the rights of the native 
population in the Kenya goldfields have been in no way 
infringed*. Africans had been deprived of portions of their
3farm lands, some large, some small, in thousands of cases.
N. Leys thought that Kenya was governed by men whose values 
were completely upside down and the man in charge had been 
appointed by a Labour Ministert *X don't mind knaves in a 
Labour Government. Some there must be. But why fools?*
The National government allowed European settlers to 
take over the land and prospect for the gold. The issue was 
discussed in both Houses of Parliament on 8 February 1933»
Turin, in the House of Commons, moved an amendment to a 
National government-inspired motion approving of the aliena­
tion of land. His amendment stated that "in Kenya, (the
1 , A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 110, November 1932, 'Gold in the Kavlrondo 
Reserve, Kenya*.
2. A.C.I.Q. Minutes, 2 November 1932.
3« McGregor Ross to Cardiff Trades and Labour Council, 26 June 
1933* McGregor Ross Papers.
k» N. Leys to ¥. Holtby, 16 October 1932, W. Holtby Papers 
Drawer 4, File 8.
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government) should develop the resources of that country for 
the benefit of the native races* and in so doing must ensure 
that any native* dispossessed of territory which has been 
solemnly reserved for native occupation in accordance with 
the pledged word of H*M*G*, has an equivalent area of land 
provided outside the native reserves* and that the whole of 
the profits derived from the minerals discovered shall accrue 
to the Government in the interests of the native population•"1 
Lord Passfield was speaking on the same day in the House
Oof Lords* He received some able help in attacking the 
National Government's policy over the goldfields from the 
Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Lugard* They regarded 
the Government's action as a definite breach of the solemn 
pledge that had been given in 1930 in the Native Lands 
Trust Ordinance* Lord Passfield observed that the pledge 
was not questioned during the whole proceedings of the 
Joint Committee which went into the whole question* As 
far as he remembered not one witness from Kenya or anywhere 
else ever suggested that the pledge ought not to have been 
given or in any way objected to the pledge* The inviolabil­
ity of the reserves was accepted*
There were three points in regard to which there had 
been a breach of faith* First* there was the abstraction 
from the reserves without equivalent land being added* 
Secondly* there was abstraction from the reserves for the 
private profit of individuals of another race. The White 
Paper of 1930 had said that on no account would any natives 
be ousted from the reserves for the private profit of any 
individual* It was only for public purposes that there
j.* House of Commons Reports, Fifth Series, Vol. 274, col*
198, 8 February 1933*
2. House of Lords Reports, Vol. 86, cols. 576-585, 8 
February 1933«
3* tod* 3573 (June, 1930), Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa, p*10*
was a probability that they might be ousted* and those public 
purposes were specified. 'Certainly the suggestion that a 
joint stock company should work the goldfields for profit is 
an absolute breach of that pledge. ' 1 There was also the 
breach of the pledge that if, for public purposes, land had 
to be taken then equivalent land should be given. He was 
sure that there was ample land available in the colony for 
an equivalent area to be added to the reserve. To say 
that there was no land available was untrue. However, the 
fact that Passfield's ordinance could be so easily over­
turned showed that Passfield had made no real change in the 
situation in East Africa when he was Colonial Secretary.
The subject was returned to in the House of Commons on 
the Colonial Office vote for 1933. Lunn again attacked 
the National Government's decision to allow private 
prospecting for gold. No Africans were allowed to prospect 
because a permit cost 20s. and, even if they could afford 
the permit, they still had to understand English sufficiently 
to translate the mining ordinance. There was a penalty 
for obstructing a miner of £ 300 or three years imprisonment. 
There were no regulations to protect the 'natives'. Lunn 
declared that if mining was carried on it should be under 
strict regulations and the interests of the 'natives' should 
be safeguarded. The Labour party would continue to expose 
the actions of the Colonial Secretary until they secured
for the 'natives' what they believed to be their rights in
2their own country.
The Labour party's opposition to the private mining of 
gold in the Kavirondo Reserve did not lead to a reversal of
1 . House of Lords, ibid., col. 578.
2. House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series V m  oftn1449-1450, 14 July 1933. ie*# Vol. 280,
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the National Government's policy. This is hardly surprising 
for an Opposition rarely changes government*s policies, 
especially when the Opposition is so numerically feeble as it 
was in the early 1930s. However, the Labour party had 
showed some concern about African interests. This may have 
made Africans view it in a more favourable light than had 
been the case after its period of office. Lunn and Morgan 
Jones were the main Labour speakers on Labour Colonial policy 
during this period. Colonel Wedgwood was still in Parliament 
and making speeches on the subject, but he seemed to get less 
and less official Labour party recognition. He was becoming 
very much a backbencher who had no hope of ever achieving 
office. He was 'persona non grata* with the National 
Executive Committee. His name had appeared on a list of 
prospective members of the A.C.I.Qo, but the N.E.C. had 
resolved 'that the list should be approved, with the excep­
tion of the deletion of the Rt. Hon. J.C. Wedgwood, M.P., 
from the A.C.I.Q.*^
Leys writes that Wedgwood was becoming 'a little deaf 
and difficult' because of his disappointments as a 
politician. 2 However, the N.E.C.•» decision to exclude him 
from the A.C.I.Q. was very unfair. Wedgwood was one of the 
most fearless fighters for African rights that the Labour 
party possessed. He was shabbily treated by the party.
Another issue concerning land rights which the Labour 
party thought was important was the issue of the North 
Charterland area of Northern Rhodesia. The Labour party's 
pamphlet on colonial policy, 'The Colonial Empire*, stated 
that the 'inhabitants of a country nearly as large as Belgium,
1 . National Executive Committee Minut.. -ic n ___
2. N. L.y. to W. Holtby, 22 O c t o b ^ ^ i l  ^  S o ^ V ” 1 *Drawer k9 Pile 8. Hol*by Papers,
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though officially certified to be the owners, have been 
deprived of nearly two-thirds of their land and are compelled 
to pay taxes which can only be earned by working for those 
who have taken their land from them.**-
2The A.C.I.Q« wrote a memorandum on the question* The 
North Charterland Exploration Company claimed areas in North 
East Rhodesia* On 22 March 1928 the Colonial Office Order- 
in-Council claimed that the Company's title to the land was 
invalid* This led to controversy and the setting up of an
Inquiry* The Inquiry found that the Company had got a good
title to the land, but this was subject to an obligation to 
8et aside Native Reserves* The memo stated that it appeared 
that the 35# allotted to the 'natives* might be further 
reduced* It also followed that the land in North East 
Rhodesia was not the property of the 'natives* but of the 
administering body, to be disposed of as it willed.
The memo was considered at the meeting of the A*C*I*Q*
3on 2 November 1932, and it was agreed to circulate the memo
to the Executive committee. The A.C.I.Q« also decided to
draw the attention of the Executive Committee to the line
taken by the 'Daily Herald* on the North Charterland Company
and to point out that it was surprising to find a Labour
newspaper supporting the claims of the shareholders in a
Company, the interests of which were contrary to those of
the Africans* The matter was discussed by the National
Executive Coimiiittee*s international sub-committee on 10
November 1932. The committee agreed that the policy of
tbe «Daily Herald* in the matter was inexplicable and
T. «The CoTonial Empire•, op.cit., p*9. 
o# A.C.I.Q* Memo 109, October 1932, 'Northern Rhodesiat North Charterland'.
- A.C.I.Q- Minutes, 2 November 1932.
4 N.E.C* Minutes, 10 November 1932.
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recommended the Executive to consider the advisability of 
making appropriate representations through the proper channels.
The Labour party added the fact that the Company owned the 
land in Northern Rhodesia to its list of the African grievances 
in East Africa. On issues such as this the party was very 
dependent on the A.C.I.Q. because very few people knew 
anything about them. The A.C.I.Q. grip on the Labour p«rty«s 
colonial policy when the party was out of office is shown by 
the fact that it managed to get the «Daily Herald* rebuked 
for following a different line.
The Morris Carter report was published in May 1934.1 
The Commission defined the highlands, which were to be 
reserved for exclusive White use in Kenya, as consisting of 
16,500 square miles of which 3,950 was forest reserve. The 
Commission argued that «it is a fair aid reasonable arrange­
ment, in the particular circumstances of the case to reserve 
agricultural land in the higher and cooler areas for 
Europeans while allowing the Indians and Arabs to take up 
land in the lower and warmer climates to which they are 
accustomed in their own land.« 2 The Commission recommended 
some changes in the boundaries of »native reserves« and also 
thought that some areas outside the reserves should be set 
aside for lease to Africans. The rest of Kenya was to be 
available to all the communities in Kenya, African, European 
«id Indian. An addition of 1,500 acres to the North Kavirondo 
Reserve was recommended to compensate for any surface land 
excluded from the Reserve for mining leases in the future.
It also recommended an alternative system of mining leases.
It also thought that the Land Trust Board in Kenya should be 
abolished and superseded by a Board appointed by Order in
1# 193*0 • °f th* Kenyi* Land ComB,i8Sio«* C®«*« 4556, (May,
2. ibid., p.91.
Council, and a tentative recommendation was made that the new 
Board should sit in London. The National Government discussed 
the proposals in a White Paper, which was issued simultaneously 
with the Report«1 The Colonial Secretary accepted the 
recommendations in regard to the proposed additions of land to 
the reserves and he also accepted the definition of the 
boundaries of the European Highlands. Concerning the Land 
Trust Board, the Colonial Secretary thought that it must be a 
local board as in the past but its future composition was under 
consideration.
The A.C.Z.Q. decided to ask Norman Leys and McGregor Ross
2to eachsubmit a memo on the report. Norman Leys wrote in his
memo that 'with a few minor exceptions the areas proposed to
be added to the Reserves are devoid of permanent streams and
uninhabitable by peasant f a m i l i e s . T h e  areas that the
Commission would add to the reserves were so worthless that,
though they had always been uninhabited, no European had ever
applied for land in them. 'No European would be such a fool
as to accept land of that typ*e as a free gift.' The real
authority would rest with the Land Boards which would be
composed of Europeans. This was ignoring the lesson that
history had taught in India and elsewhere that where self-
government was first derided, then feared, it was finally
grudgingly given to people to whom Britain had allowed no
opportunities to prepare themselves for so difficult a task.
Leys thought that the Africans would repudiate the Report on
the ground that the lands offered them in place of the lands
that had been stolen from them were in general worthless, and
that they themselves were not given even the hope of future *23
Kenya Land Commission Report: Summary of Conclusions 
reached by H.M.G., Cmd. 4580 (May, 193^)»
2. A.C.I.Q. Minutes, 16 May 193^.
3. N. Leys 'Memo on the Kenya Land Commission* A.C.I.Q. No. 
136, May 1934.
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control of their reserves. The Labour party should make It 
clear that it did not accept the decisions of the Commission 
as final and, that in regard to tribal lands, it would respect 
only decisions to which popular opinion freely expressed was 
given. Of even greater importance than the fate of the lands 
still in tribal occupation was the fact that in regard to 
land, as in everything else in Kenya, Africans were denied 
civil liberties. No African in Kenya, or group of Africans, 
owned or leased an acre of land. The law deliberately made 
it impossible. Leys returned to his favourite theme, stating 
that one of the measures that the next Labour Colonial 
Secretary should put into effect as soon as he achieved office 
should be to require the Governments of all the Imperial 
Dependencies to give their ‘native* inhabitants the same 
rights and opportunities to buy and lease land in every part 
of their country as Europeans enjoyed. However, the right 
to buy and lease land, was only one of elementary human right 
that the Africans in Kenya were refused.
McGregor Ross's memo was written in more subdued 
language than that of Leys . 1 Ross thought that the 
oustanding fact in the report was that the Africans who 
were proved to have lost hundreds of square miles of land 
were to get practically none of it back. The Africans were 
not to get back their old lands which in some cases remained 
entirely unused. On the contrary, the inviolability of the 
outside boundary of the white settlement area was to be 
established by Order-in-Council. The Labour party had 
questioned the composition of the Commission when it was 
announced and was explicitly relieved from any complicity 
in its operations. There were some points on which the
1 A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 138, 'The Morris 
McGregor Ross, June 193^« Carter Land Report'
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Commission deserved credit: they did state that some land 
should be added to the native reserves and they had exploded 
the idea that the Natives Lands Trust Board had been, or 
could be, an adequate guardian of the rights of Africans*
But the settlement suggested in the case of the land-losses 
of the Kikuyu tribe, which was the tribe most heavily 
victimised, was entirely bogus* The land was low-lying, 
hot and malarious and the Kikuyu.would regard the offer of 
this land with derision and accept it only under compulsion* 
The fact that the areas to be given to the Kikuyu tribe in 
respect of their claims were empty after 30 or more years 
of land-grabbing spoke for itself.
Ross wrote that no tribe or section of the Kenya 
African population should be stampeded into concurrence 
with the Commission’s rather mean proposals* African 
comment should be awaited and considered before action was 
taken* Ross thought, as Leys did, that a Labour Governmenti *
should withdraw tie exclusive European possession of the 
highlands and allow the Africans to buy in the open market 
anywhere in the colony. He did not think that the major 
forest areas should be included in the »European highlands». 
All minerals discovered on »native» lands should be worked 
in the «natives* interests. (The Commission had recommended 
that some lands should pass from the classification 'Crown 
Lands* to »Native Lands*.) Ross thought that the 
Commission's remedial steps concerning the Kakamega gold 
scandal were inadequate and the Labour party should not 
regard itself as bound by the Commission’s proposals. In 
conclusion, McGregor Ross stated that the Commission had 
nowheze faced the contention, which he had put before it, 
that the »whole exploit of the monopolisation of the land
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of the colony was an act of force majeure in violation of 
the tenets of international law. * 1
The A.C.l.Q. considered these memos at a meeting on 6 
June 1934b and decided that McGregor Ross should draft a memo 
for submission to the Executive Committee. 2 The N.E.C. 
decided that there should be a meeting of its international 
sub-committee and the Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions. 
At a meeting on 26 February 1933 the memo on the Kenya Land 
Commission was discussed. During the discussion it was urged 
that the party should make a formal declaration to the effect 
that it dissociated itself from the Morris Carter Report« 
as this step would be of great value« particularly in Kenya.
It was resolved 'that a declaration to this effect« to be 
drafted in consultation with Mr. Lansbury and the Parliamen-
3tary party« be issued.
Norman Leys published his opinions concerning the
¿LCommission in the 'New Statesman*• His article appeared 
on 28 July 1934. He made the same points as he had made 
in his memo for the AoC.I.Q. The Kikuyu had lost good 
land and were to be given bad land in its place. 1,029,422 
Kavirondo were restricted to a reserve of 7,114 sq.miles« 
while 7,000 Europeans possessed 16,700 sq. miles of good 
land. He concluded by stating that "on the day when a 
Labour government has the courage shown by the British 
government of exactly a century ago, when it compelled the 
government of Jamaica to grant to its black inhabitants 
the same rights in law as its white inhabitants enjoyed.• 
on that day this report will be obsolete." On colonial
1. A.C.l.Q. Memo No. 138, p.4.
2. A.C.l.Q. Minutes, 6 June 1934.
3. N.E.C. Minutes, 26 February 1935.
4. 'New Statesman', 28 July 1934, 'Report of the Kenya Land 
Commission*, N. Leys.
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problems most of the articles written in the official Labour 
press, if any articles were written at all, were written by 
people who were members of, or connected with, the A.C.I.Q. 
•The New Statesman* published articles by Norman Leys, Lord 
Olivier and Leonard Woolf. Before the l.L.P. left the 
Labour party, the »New Leader* relied mainly on Norman Leys 
for its articles on African colonial problems. In the 1930s, 
it relied upon writers further to the left such as Reginald 
Reynolds and George Padmore. »The Daily Herald* very rarely 
contained any general articles on colonial problems, although 
it did occasionally publish articles by George Lansbury which 
touched on the problem.
The Morris Carter Report figured largely in the Colonial 
Office Debate of 12 July Mr. William Limn was agin the
leading Labour party speaker. 1 Lunn began by stating that 
the Colonial Office debate was a placid debate compared to 
debates on home affairs. There was very rarely a division 
and there were not very bitter differences of opinion.
However, it did not follow that the Labour party accepted 
everything. He did not expect the Government to accept the 
•Socialist* policy in regard to the colonies, but since the 
Government had accepted that they were trustees of the people 
who inhabited the colonies and had accepted the paramountcy 
of »native* interests in the colonies, it ought to be 
possible for the Colonial Secretary to accept many of the 
suggestions which were made from all parts of the House in 
thetinterests of the colonies. Lunn was still advocating 
the trusteeship policy rather than the »equal rights* policy 
of N. Leys.
Turning to the Morrie Carter Report, Lunn stated that 
572-583^ « “July 193?!*’* Fifth Sarle>« Vol‘ «»la.
the Labour party did not regard it as final and did not regard 
themselves as bound by it. Lunn appreciated the Commission's 
work and the fact that it had listened to nearly 500 African 
witnesses. Although 1,500 acres were to be added to the 
reserves of Kavirondo, Lunn was disappointed to find that 
very little of the land that had been taken away from the 
•natives» previously was to be restored to them, and that the 
land that was to be added to the reserves was malarial.
•We should have liked to see some of the hundreds of miles 
of the best land in respect of soil, water and climate 
restored to the A f r i c a n s . T h e  Labour Government's »native* 
charter in 1930 laid down that the Africans occupation of 
the land was for ever, but that has been violated. The
gold in Kenya should be the property of the nation. *We
shall reserve our right when we are in power...to alter what 
may be done as a result of this report.
Major Milner, a Labour M.P., asked whether the African 
was to be prevented for ever from »poking his nose into 
the highlands} which were the better part of the country.^ 
Colonel Wedgwood thought that the real question*that 
mattered was: what were the »natives* going to do with the 
land when they got it and how were they going to get it.
The Colonial Office should make up its mind whether they 
were going to continue collective ownership, faith in the 
headman, a sort of Lord of the Manor idea that the chief 
has sole rights in the land or were going to introduce the 
system which had worked so well in Northern Nigeria, where 
the land was held by the peasant from the State at a rent 
which varied according to the value of his land. This was 
individual ownership coupled with State ownership and
1 . ibid., col. 578.
2. ibid., col. 58la
5. ibid., col. 605.
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Wedgwood held it to be an admirable combination, 1
Mr, Morgan Jones summed up the debate for the Labour 
party, 2 He said that it was sometimes argued that the 
Labour party showed no interest in imperial problems, but 
he thought that they had succeeded in showing in recent years 
that whether their views were orthodox or unorthodox, and 
they were probably regarded as the latter by the National 
Government, they at any rate had definite views on these 
problems. The Labour party's view was that the more remote 
a governed area was from London, the more vigilant they 
were called upon to be in regard to its affairs.
Labour's speakers in the House of Commons relied, to a 
great extent on information supplied by the members of the 
A.C.I.Q. McGregor Ross was particularly active on the 
question of land in Kenya. He wrote to Morgan Jones that 
it was becoming increasingly clear that the 'Morris Carter 
Commission was a one-man Ramp by Lister. ' 3 He expressed 
similar views to Milner, another of Labour's colonial 
spokesmen in the Commons. McGregor Ross thought that it 
was 'the greatest hypocrisy for Lister to suggest that 
there is any possible basis for fair negotiation, or honest 
agreement between the Kenya government and the scattered 
groups of African villagers, whose rights Carter had 
recommended should be rendered inoperative.* The Morris 
Carter Commission was 'dirty, dirty, work.'^ To 
Addison, McGregor Ross wrote! 'can nothing further be done 
to make him (Cunliffe-Lister) "call off" the Kenya
1 .
2.
3-
4.
ibid., cols. 633-634.
House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 
641-650, 12 July 1934.
McGregor Ross to Morgan Jones, 21 March 1 
Ross Papers, Rhodes House, Mss.Afr. s.117 
McGregor Ross to Milner, 21 March 1935, i
130, cols 
McGregor
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government from harassing African villages. * 1
Ross* views were put in the House of Commons during the 
next Colonial Office debate, lunn declared that the Labour 
party believed that the Morris Carter Commission had 
supported the whites* claims to land and denied the rights 
of the African population. The report had urged exclusive 
legal* right of ownership to Europeans, which meant that the 
best land in Kenya could never be held as of right by 
Africans, He promised that a Labour Government would never 
agree to the ideas of the Morris Carter Commission and would 
repudiate them as soon as possible. Lunn also criticised 
the National Government for foiling to enforce a «non-native* 
income tax in Kenya, as Moyne had recommended, Lunn hoped 
that policies in Kenya would, in the future, be more in line 
with the declared policy of both parties, vhih »as that the 
interests of the Africans should be paramount. 2
The National Government also received pressure from the 
Africans themselves to change its policy. Kenyatta wrote 
to Malcolm MacDonald, the new National Government Colonial 
Secretary, asking him to prevent the Kenya government 
removing the Kikuyu from ancestral land against their will. 3 
MacDonald, however,did not respond to this plea. McGregor 
Ross helped and guided the African leaders, Kenyatta and 
Parmenas Mockerie, in the early 1930s. Ross befriended 
Kenyatta and found H, Hooper, an ex-Kenyan missionary, 
to act as friend and guide to Mockerie. Ross was a strong 
Christian and hoped to steer the African leaders along the 
Christian path. However, the African leaders drifted apart
1 . McGregor Ross to Addison, 21 March 1935, ibid.
2. House of Commons Debat», Fifth Series. Vol. l4l eoi,
2055-2062, 25 July 1935. # COiS*
3. Kenyatta to M. MacDonald, 13 November 1935, McGregor Ross
a Ap6Z*8| Op«Cl v#
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from their Christian mentors and fell in with people to the 
left of the Labour party. Kenyatta, in particular, was 
strongly influenced by George Padmore, the West Indian 
leader, who was a communist. Kenyatta paid a visit to Moscow 
during the winter 1932-3. He was falling more and more under 
the guidance of Padmore rather than Ross. Even Harry Thuku, 
the K.C.A. leader, was worried about Kenyatta. He wrote to 
C.R. Buxton that he was 'very disturbed by Mr. Kenyatta* 
because he had gone to Germany and Russia where the K.C.A. 
had not wanted him to go . 1 Thuku had heard nothing from 
Kenyatta and he was particularly anxious that Kenyatta should 
support the K.C.A. case before the Morris Carter Commission. 
However, Kenyatta had already presented his evidence in 
London without informing Thuku. Kenyatta*s views were 
becoming more radical than those of the Kikuyu leaders in 
Kenya. The leaders in Kenya looked to the British Govern­
ment for their welfare and saw the future in colonial terms 
but Kenyatta was thinking in terms of African self-government.
The leaders in Kenya were not united. The «official* 
Kikuyu leader was Chief Koinange, who, with the President 
of the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association, and a Kamba 
headman from Machakos, had represented the Africans in Kenya 
before the Joint Committee on Closer Union. The K.C.A. was 
a more radical organisation with the support of the younger, 
educated Kikuyu. Kenyatta and Mockerie had come to London 
in 1931 to put the K.C.A. point of view to tie Joint Committee 
but had been refused an audience. They remained in Europe 
to gain 'education*. Mockerie returned in 1933 but Kenyatta 
remained, using London as a base for his travels in the 
1930s. Harry Thuku became the leader of the K.C.A. in June 
1 . J. Murray-Brown, »Kenyattrf (Fontana ed. 1974),p.l73.
403
1932» after his release from prison* The K.C.A* then split
between Thuku and Kangethe* the former leader* All the
African leaders» however» managed to get together in February
1934 to present a joint list of grievances to the Colonial
Office*1 The main grievances that the Africans put forward
were that their educational facilities were inferior to those
of the white settlers. The rate of taxation of the Africans
was too high» particularly hut tax* The Europeans paid
relatively little taxation* There were too many restrictions
on coffee growing* The land was unfairly distributed and
the Africans had no secure rights to their land* The
Africans were also worried about European domination of East
Africa* j These grievances were very similar to those that
the Labour party put forward in its pamphlets on African policy*
Kenyatta took a stronger line than the Labour party and
the other African leaders in Kenya* In the January 1933
issue of »Negro Worker», he wrote a long article, in which he
declared that the history of British rule in Kenya was 'one
of the blackest spots in the black history of British
Imperial ism. * The Africans1 land had been stolen by the white
men and the Africans chosen to speak before the Joint
Committee on Closer Union were stooges* Missionaries had
been used as 'agents of imperialism' teaching the Africans
that they must bear oppression and exploitation in order to
have 'better conditions in heaven when they die! *
Kenyaita called for the 'evacuation of the imperialist
2 "robber from the land** In a more considered article for 
Nancy Cunard's anthology entitled 'Negro', Kenyatta stated 
that 'British imperialism supports the backward form of 
social relationships in Kenya.' Colonial administration
J. Murray-Brown, op*cit., p*179*
2. ibid*, p.175-176.
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preserved tribal society which would never be able to break 
loose from colonialism* Only the detribalized African could 
lead Africa out of colonial domination*1
Kenyatta's views were outlined at length in his book 
'Facing Mount Kenya* which was based on the papers that he had 
written in 1936-37 for Malinowskl*s seminars at the London 
School of Economics* His main theme was that the Kikuyu 
way of life, before the intervention of the white man, had 
integrity and virtue* "In the old order of the African 
society« with all the evils that are supposed to be connected 
with it« a man was a man, and as such he had the rights of 
a man and liberty to exercise his will and thought in a 
direction which suited his purposes as well as those of his 
fellow men; but today an African, no matter what his station 
in life, is like a horse which moves only in the direction 
that the rider pulls the rein*" Kenyatta was annoyed by 
the white man's assumption of superiority* He was urging
the Africans of Kenya to be proud of their past and demand
othe right to govern themselves in their own country*
Despite Kenyatta's radical views, he did not lose 
complete touch with the Labour party* When Creech Jones 
became Labour's main colonial spokesman, after the 1933 
election, Kenyatta kept him supplied with information. 
However, McGregor Ross and Kenyatta finally came to a 
'parting of ways' because Ross found Kenyatta unreliable 
about keeping appointments and paying debts* Ross was 
disconcerted at Kenyatta's 'cavalier' attitude to life* 
Nevertheless, Ross had made tremendous efforts to help 
African leaders when they came to London* It was due to 
1 , ibid*, pol76-177•
2# J. Kenyatta, 'Facing Mount Kenya' (London, 1938)
Quoted, J. Murray-Brown, op.cit*y p.192.
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people such as Ross, Leys, Buxton and Creech Jones that the 
Labour party did not completely lose the confidence of the 
emerging African leaders. Fenner Brockway also played an 
Important part In helping African leaders, but, In the 1930s, 
he belonged to the I.L.P., rather than the Labour party.
During the early 1930s, the Labour party, under the 
guidance of the A.C.I.Q. made an attempt to protect African 
rights in East Africa. However, the party was so numerically 
weak that It could not make any dent in the policies of the 
National Government. Leys and Ross, the party's main experts 
on East Africa, felt that the situation was deteriorating 
there. The Moyne report had proposed moderate reforms in 
taxation but these had been abandoned in the face of 
protests from the white settlers. The Morris Carter Report 
had been a great disappointment to the Labour party and the 
Africans in Kenya. The white settlers came off much better 
than the Africans. The discovery of gold at Kakamega in an 
African reserve led to the amendment of the Kenya Native 
Lands Trust Ordinance to the detriment of the Africans.
The Government yielded to the pressure by the white settlers 
to release the African land for prospecting. Kenyatta 
believed that this proved that the Africans could have no 
faith in »hypocritical promises which mean nothing but the 
oppression and exploitation of the masses».1 Passfield's 
Ordinance had soon been reversed. McGregor Ross wrote 
to Archdeacon Owen that it made him »sick* to read the 
numerous quotations of East African gold shares in »The 
Times»: «1 still cherish hopes that if we escape a world 
war, a Socialist government, given a proper Colonial
1 . Quoted, J. Murray-Brown, op.cit., p.178.
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Secretary, might give the whole lot a time-notice and frog­
march them off the land-substituting state operations. * 1 
Norman Leys seemed to feel that all he had fought for had 
failed. He wrote that in 1906 . he had made up his mind 
to subordinate everything to working for the Africans and 
had had great hopes that a Labour Government would act on 
its intentions in Africa, *but as the years passed...it 
had all proved a dream.* Leys and Ross felt that the 
1929-31 Labour Government had missed its chance to radically 
alter the situation in Africa and reduce the power of the 
settlers. The events of 1931-5 had proved that the 
settlers were still predominant in East Africa.
1 .
2.
McGregor Ross to Archdeacon Owen, 19 March 10«  
McGregor Ross Papers, op.cit, 1"35
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CHAPTER 9.
INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE APPROACH TO WAR
k 0 8
During the second half of the nineteen thirties, the 
Labour party devoted more attention than it had previously 
done to the conditions of labour in the colonies* It had 
always been concerned to prevent forced labour and ensure 
that the African was paid a fair wage but towards the second 
half of the nineteen thirties, industrialisation in East 
and Vest Africa became more extensive and the Labour party 
took an increasing interest in its effects upon the African* 
The T*U*C* awoke to the problem, largdy because it feared 
the effect of low wage African labour* It feared that it 
might provide competition to British labour* Ernest Bevin 
was particularly concerned that if the colonies did develop 
their industrial resources, they might provide competition 
for workers in Britain* At thè 1930 T.U.C* Conference, he 
had asked "Ought there not to be some control against the 
possible development of coal in Tanganyika which might come 
into competition with your coal here?"1
There were varying schools of thought within the Labour 
party about the industrialisation of Africa* Josiah 
Wedgwood believed that it would inevitably lead to the 
exploitation of the African* He thought that the major 
cause of African misery was the expropriation of the land.
As a result of the loss of their land, the Africans were 
forced to work for the white settlers in order to acquire 
the money to pay taxes. Wedgwood's ideal was an African 
tilling his own land* He did not share the Labour party's 
general enthusiasm for the West African system where the 
land was the property of the tribe, and was left in the 
hands of the chiefs. The result was that African landlord­
ism had developed instead of white landlordism* The chiefs 
were becoming as bad as white landlords and a landless
1 . T.U.C. Report 1930, p.286.
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proletariat was developing with a few rich African landlords* 
Wedgwood also opposed indirect rule through the chiefs and 
pressed instead for direct rule by the colonial service until 
the Africans had been educated for liberty*^
The Labour party*« other experts were divided about the 
questions of economic development and indirect rule* However, 
most of them seemed to think that the African could no longer 
be left to look after himself on his own plot of land, as 
Wedgwood thought* There was a feeling that the African 
could no longer be kept out of the modern wage economy.
Tribal institutions were being broken down and it was felt 
that Africans could not be kept out of the Western way of 
life* Buxton thought that the fundamental grievance of the
Africans was not malnutrition but that *we have broken down
the old tribal life in the Interests of white exploiters
and failed to build up prosperity either materially or by
education#*2 Leys believed that the policy of ‘African
development along African lines* was ‘humbug* and that
Africans should be allowed to do the same as other human
beings*^ Leys and Barnes were beginning to feel that
African tribal institutions were no longer appropriate and
were being used as a method of preventing the Africans
having equal opportunities with the Europeans* They
thought that by encouraging tribal institutions, the
Colonial Office was preventing the progress of the Africans
into the m o d e m  world* Leys and Barnes felt that the policy
of indirect rule was no longer appropriate because it
prevented African development and encouraged dominance by
1„ J.C. Wedgwood, *My Fighting Life*, (London,194l),p.l85.
2# C.R* Buxton, 'Memo*, November 1936, Buxton Papers Box 6*
3, N* Leys to *Peg and William*, 27 February 1935, W* Holtby Papers, Drawer 4, File 9«
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the chiefs. Leys* hope was that educated Africans would be 
trained on an equal basis with Europeans and would eventually 
be able to rule their countries. He was full of praise for 
Achimota college in the Gold Coast where Africans were being 
educated in an atmosphere of equality between European and 
African. 1 However, some members of the A.C.I.Q. such as 
Green and Benson, thought that a policy of indirect rule 
was useful as it provided a method of training Africans in 
local government. The Labour party experts were divided 
about the benefits and disadvantages of indirect rule. 
Nevertheless, they had abandoned the idea that the African 
could be left in peace to till his own land, as Wedgwood 
and Morel had hoped. As Buxton put it: »the Western way of 
life had been imposed upon many Africans and it would be
Impossible to keep them from the Western social and
2economic system« v
Ernest Bevin, who had first come into contact with the 
»struggling, impoverished world of the underdeveloped 
countries»3 when he served on the Colonial Development 
Advisory Committee set up under the Colonial Development 
Act of 1929, believed in developing the raw materials of 
the Empire in order to help British industry. He was in 
favour of imperial protection - unlike most members of the 
Labour party and A.C.I.Q. who favoured a policy of free 
trade and the »open door*. He had urged upon the second 
Labour Government that, in addition to the political 
organisation of the Empire, there should be an economic 
organisation as well. He stated, «1 am no Imperialist but 
an Empire exists.» 4 The T.U.C. became concerned with
22 ip yrli Gold C oaat’ * •* " '
2 - £ £ : ■ - * • « -  •-<*
3 ‘ *nd Time* o i  Ern**t Bevin* . vo1- 1 .
4. T.U.C. Report 1930, pp.257-261.
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African industrialisation and labour conditions in order to 
protect their own labour conditions and wages. In 1937 it 
set up the Colonial Advisory Committee to consider how best 
to help Africans to improve their labour conditions and set 
up trade unions.
Ramsay MacDonald had opposed the scheme for imperial
protection which had been put forward in 1930 on the grounds
that it would jeopardise Britain‘s standard of living. He
thought that if the Dominions* products were let in free
British farmers would suffer.1 However, by 1931» he had
left the Labour party and the official policy was that the
Labour party believed in ‘complete equality for all nations
in the markets of the non-self-governing Empire, and is
opposed to any administrative discrimination against
foreigners in the disposal of property or grant of concessions.
Any Imperial fiscalpolicy which is based on the conception of
a colony as a market or field for exploitation which may be
reserved, as far as possible, for the benefit of British or
Dominion traders and capitalists, regardless of native
interests is to be deprecated, both from the standpoint of
native interests and of international political considerations.*
The party opposed the Ottawa agreements which had been made
2by MacDonald‘s Government.
The official colonial policy of the Labour party could 
be summed up, said the 1933 pamphlet, in the words 
»socialisation and self-government *• Industrial development 
was accepted but ‘the transition from capitalist to socialist 
enterprise must be hastened to the fullest possible extent.* 
‘Conditions of labour, wages, etc., must be under the control 
of the Government, and must allow for a good standard of life
I.' Davies, ‘The Labour Commonwealth*, New Left Review,
No. 22, December 1963» P»77«
2. 'The Colonial Empire« (The Labour Party, 1933)pp.14-15.
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and opportunities for leisure and self-development.»1
•For Socialism and Peace* had stated that the economic 
policies of Ottawa were »ill-guided»2, and the 1935 General 
Election manifesto had declared that »a Labour Government 
would...seek full international co-operation in economic and 
industrial questions with a view to increasing trade and 
raising standards of living throughout the world, and 
removing the economic cause of war, through equitable 
arrangements for access to markets, for the international 
control of sources of supply of raw materials, and for the 
extension of the mandate system for colonial territories. * 3
The Abyssinian crisis opened the question of the lack of 
colonies of Italy and Germany. George Lansbury thought that 
Britain should share her colonies and markets with the rest 
of the world . 4 Whether the Germans and Italians were 
genuinely concerned at their lack of colonies or whether
they were just playing the issue for the sake of propaganda
5is open to doubt. However, in an article in the »Daily 
Herald* on the dissatisfied powers* claims, Francis Williams 
wrote that »if we are to oppose the dissatisfactions of the 
••have-not” Powers with a stiff-necked refusal to take into 
account anything but the narrowest considerations of 
imperial prestige, there can be no outcome to the present 
world situation but war, sooner or later.» 6 In another 
article, he wrote that »because the lack of colonies has 
become the focal point of that feeling of economic injustice 
under which the dissatisfied powers live, a solution of the
1 .
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
ibid., pp.4-5*
•For Socialism and Peace» (The Labour Party, 1934),p.12. 1934 Manifesto.
The Times, 15 July 1935«
•The Appeasers«, Gilbert & Gott (London, 1967),pp.80-101. •Daily Herald», 12 March 1936. ,PP
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colonial problem is the most urgent of all**1 Leonard 
Barnes stated in a pamphlet ‘The Future of the Colonies*** 
that the lack of colonies had become the focal point of 
that feeling of economic injustice under which the 
dissatisfied powers lived .He also belived that*a 'solution to 
the Colonial Problem is the most urgent of all*«
A special sub-committee of the National Executive 
Committee of the Labour party was formed to examine the 
question of the German and Italian claims for colonies* It 
was a Joint Committee comprising members of both the 
International Advisory Committee and the Advisory Committee 
on Imperial Questions. The N.E.C. resolved that Ernest 
Bevin, F.W. Pethick-Lawrence, John Wilmot M.P. and Francis 
Williams be added to the sub-committee. 3 Bevin was too 
busy to attend but the minutes were sent to him. In the 
event, E.F.M. Durbin, H. Gaitskell, G. Hutton and Francis 
Williams and D.T.T. Jay were co-opted.^ The full Joint
Special Committee began work at the end of 1935 with Leonard 
Woolf as the secretary.3
The N.E.C. circulated a private and confidential memo 
on Labour's foreign policy on 1 March 1936. In the section 
dealing with the claims for colonial policy of the unsatis­
fied powers, it stated that if these were to be satisfied 
they would have to be satisfied in Africa. It seemed to be
1 . 'Daily Herald*, 27 February 1936.
2. L. Barnes, *The Future of the Colonie«*
3. N.E.C. Minutes, 19 Septenber 1935. U-ondon,1936).
4. N.E.C. Minutes, 25 November 1935.
5. Members of the Committee included C.R. Bnr+nr, u rJohn Dugdale, S.H. Bailey, T. Raid ^ 3 '  Ca£lin, 
Jones M.P., A. Henderson M.P.^J.F.n ! Green sinfdon* Morsan 
A. Creech Jones, M.P., H.V. H
Ross, W.E.A. Forster, G. Lathan M.P. D. Jay *H *Gaitsk«TiH. Dalton, E. Wilkinson and W.Giiilei. ’ * Gaitskell,
thought that European nations needed colonies to satisfy 
prestige but the memo stated that it was to be »doubted 
whether claims based upon such psychological reasons can be 
satisfied imperialistically in a world in which there are 
so many nations but only a limited supply of backward 
peoples».1 The memo continued that the more possession of 
colonial territories was no guarantee that the colonies* 
raw materials would be available to the possessing power in 
time of war. If the League of Nations were really effective» 
states could look for security in collective resistance to 
aggression and the importance of colonial possessions would 
diminish and eventually disappear. The original raison 
d*etre for imperialism, stated the memo, was that it was 
associated with the possession of surplus capital for export 
and closely associated with this factor was the consideration 
that colonies were of economic and social advantage to the 
•upper* classes in imperialist countries because they 
provided lucrative and attractive administrative and military 
jobs for civil servants, planters and military and naval 
officers. (Here the memo closely followed J.A. Hobson*s 
book »Imperialism*)2 The section on the colonies concluded 
by stating that a committee of the party was studying »the 
whole problem and its solution in so far as it arises out 
of genuine grievances capable of satisfaction. * 3
The final meeting of the Joint Special Committee on 
the Demand for Colonial Territories and Equality of Economic 
Opportunity took place on 1 July 1936, when the draft memo 
was finally passed after the section on population had been 
re-considered, and it was sent to the N.E.C. for approval. 4
1 . N.E.C. Minutes, 1 March 1936, Memo on «The Labour Party's
Foreign Policy*, p.21. J
2. J.A. Hobson, »Imperialism* (London m o o  , .... %
3. N.E.C. Minute., i March 1936. "n edltlon)-
4. J.S.C. on D. for C.T. and E.E.CP#Cm Î« *+P#23n* . ^Minutes, 1 July 1936.
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It was discussed by the N.E.C. on 22 July 1936 when it was 
resolved »that the memo should be published at once* and the 
committee should prepare a shorter statement of policy based 
upon the report• *
•The Demand for Colonial Territories and Equality of 
Economic Opportunity* was published in August 1936.2 The 
foreword stated that it had been prepared by a sub-committee 
at the request of the N.E.C., but the N.E.C. did not consider 
itself bound by all the pamphleifs1 recommendations. P.
Williams had drawn up a draft on the export of capital, in
b
which he stated that the whole idea of exploitation should 
be ahandoned. It was no good merely handing over the right 
to exploit. He thought the mandate system should be applied 
to all colonies and that the best solution to the question 
of financial development was to set up a League Loans 
Authority which would provide investors with an equal 
opportunity of taking advantage of the outlet of capital 
provided in colonial territories. 3 N. Bentwick drew up the 
draft on population stating that there should be no 
discrimination in the British Dominions and Colonies in 
favour of the nationals of the metropolitan country as 
against the nationals of other countries for the purposes 
of immigration. The policy of the Open Door should apply 
to men as well as to goods. 4 B. Riley5 wrote a draft memo 
on access to raw materials. He thought that there should 
be free access to raw materials for the ‘dissatisfied
1. N.E.C. Minutes, 22 July 1936.
2. ‘The Demand for Colonial Territories and Equality of 
Economic Opportunity* (The Labour Party. August
3- c-ssn*of fu
4. N. Bentwick, The Problem of Population, ibid.
5. B. Riley, Access to Raw Materials, ibid.
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powers*. This would be better than any exchange of territory. 
L. Barnes drew up a list1 of policies and remedies. The 
main point was that the Mandates Commission of the League of 
Nations should ensure that there was equal access to the 
colonies for the »dissatisfied powers*. The finished 
pamphlet, combining the drafts, represented the collective 
opinion of the members of the International Advisory 
Committee and the Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions. 
The pamphlet began by stating that it was limited in its 
enquiries to the claims of the dissatisfield powers, Germany, 
Italy and Japan, whose claims, if they were to be satisfied, 
would have to be met in Africa and the Pacific. The alleged 
reasons for demanding a colonial empire belonged to three 
general categories: prestige, strategic considerations and 
economic considerations. Concerning prestige, the pamphlet 
stated that there was only a limited supply of backward 
peoples and the removal of such peoples from the colonial 
status would still further limit the supply but would reduce 
the inequality between imperial and non-imperial powers.
As instruments of strategy colonies were useful for 
communication. Economically, they provided security of 
supplies of essential raw materials, markets for the 
produce of the home country's industry, a closed field for 
the export of capital and the exploitation of concession* 
lucrative and attractive jobs and an outlet for the 
surplus population of the over-populated countries.
The pamphlet examined each of these points in turn. 
Concerning access to raw materials, the conclusion was that 
whatever the merits of the dissatisfied powers* claims to 
sources of raw materials they could not in fact be
1 . L. Barnes Statement of Policy and Remedies, ibid.
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satisfied by an exchange of colonial territories because 
most countries* main sources of raw materials were not their 
own colonies. On the question of providing markets the 
conclusion was that, although in the case of Britain her 
colonial market was more accessible to British than to 
foreign exporters, the quantitative importance of the 
market was not great. The population argument was also 
not a strong one because Germany and Italy Adless population 
pressure than Britain which had the greatest colonial empire 
in the world, the possession of which had clearly not saved 
Britain from an unemployment problem. Concerning the 
argument that the possession of colonies was advantageous 
from the point of view of providing a market for capital, 
the conclusion of the committee was that this was not all 
that important since Great Britain had large investments 
in South America over which she had no political control. 
However, the colonies did provide a substantial attraction 
in that they provided a closed market for capital which was 
at a disadvantage in the open market where there was highly 
organised competition. Colonies also provided opportunities 
for profitably speculative investment though the obtaining 
of private concessions which practically always went to 
nationals of the colonial power. In order to alleviate 
this problem the pamphlet advocated a Colonial Development 
Board which would be closely associated with a strengthened 
Mandates Commission. The Board would scrutinise projects 
of colonial development and consider proposals made for 
financing official projects of development - ensuring that 
there was equality of opportunity for tendering or under­
writing any issue and scrutinising private projects. It 
would ensure that there was equality of opportunity for
firms of any state which was a member of the League of
4l8
Nations to tender for contract. Concerning the point about 
providing jobs for the upper classes, the pamphlet decided 
that it was not all that strong since in India and all 
Britain*s colonies the total employed - civil and military - 
was only 19*190.
Summarising the economic part of the survqr, the pamphlet 
stated that colonies were of some, but not great, economic 
importance; the non-possession of them was only really 
injurious in so far as discriminatory practices were adopted 
by the 'possessors'. The abolition of discrimination rather 
than the exchange of territories should be the aim of policy, 
thought the Advisory Committee. However, the abolition of 
preferential and discriminatory practices would not remedy 
the dissatisfied powers' principal economic troubles; the 
real remedy of those troubles was in their own hands. 
Nevertheless, the removal of discrimination should be 
undertaken since a return to multilateral trade was desirable 
not only on general grounds but also because of the great 
dependence of certain of the dissatisfied powers upon a 
multilateral system. 'We regard the removal of trade 
barriers on the above lines as the most important contribu­
tion which the British Empire could make today to the cause 
of peace.'
There should be guarantees of uninterrupted supplies 
of raw materials which should be given in the form of an 
international convention. Concerning the administration 
of Colonial Territories, there were five possibilities: 
transfer of sovereignty, transfer of territory, transfer 
of mandates, administration of the existing colonies by an 
international authority acting for the League, and an 
extension of the mandate system. The Joint Advisory 1
1 . D.C.T. and E.E.O., p«45.
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committee thought that the first three ideas should be 
rejected? the fourth had attractions but entailed practical 
difficulties while the fifth seemed the most hopeful.
There were two ways of putting the fifth proposal into effect. 
Either the colonial powers could accept the supervision of 
the League, acting through the Permanent Mandates Commission 
in respect of territories held as colonies or protectorates, 
or the supervisory powers of the League could be made wider 
and more strict.
The pamphlet advocated that Britain should offer to 
bring her African colonies under the mandate system, and 
provided that such a League system of collective security 
was accepted and established, Britain should take steps to 
see that other Imperial powers were invited to deal with 
their colonies on similar lines. Even if this invitation 
were not immediately accepted, Britain should declare that 
it accepted the mandatory system in principle for all the 
colonies inhabited mainly by peoples of primitive culture 
and would accept the scrutiny of the Mandates Commission 
in such cases if it could be arranged. However, the offer 
should be conditional on an extensive reform of the 
Mandates Commission to give it machinery to exercise more 
direct control over policy.
There was considerable discussion of policy concerning 
the dissatisfied powers in the press. Stafford Cripps 
wrote in »Tribune»1 that he was not one of those who 
believed that injustice could be righted by some swapping 
of colonies amongst the imperialist nations? as far as he 
was concerned, he would never support a policy which aimed 
at putting another living soul under the domination of the 
l"I »Tribune', 2 8 October 1938, pp.1-2.
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Nazi regime. He thought that until the 'native* peoples 
were ready for self-government, the interests of the 
•native* people and the peoples of the world in the products 
of the territories could be guarded by a truly international 
administration of the group of countries that were prepared 
to take part in the scheme. The international administration 
of the raw material growing areas of the colonies would be 
built up as an international civil service and would be 
subject to a planning committee representing the nations 
who were taking part in the scheme.
Cripps also put forward his views in Parliament on 5 
October 1938» when he stated that what was needed for a 
sound foreign policy was the strength to maintain the rule 
of law internationally and second, the courage to initiate 
a complete reorganisation of the economic life of the nation 
even at the price of sacrificing some imperial interests.
»1 do not and never would suggest the handing over of any 
Imperial possessions of this country to another Imperialist 
nation .* 1 Rival imperialisms would never be satisfied by 
the handing over of the smaller nations of the world; the 
time would come when the clash would be at Britain's door­
step. The Labour party dissented from the Government*s 
policy of giving away the property of others and building 
up huge armaments. This would never resolve the problem 
of peace. Cripps was speaking for the Labour party in 
Parliament, but the policy of international control which 
he had proposed in his article was more radical than that 
advanced by the party in its pamphlet on »Economic 
Opportunity....* The party had put forward the idea of 
internationalisation of the colonies in 1917 in its »Memo
1. 413 H.C.Deb., 5*., cols. 413, 5 October 1938.
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on War Issues* but had later decided that this scheme was 
too Idealistic, favouring instead an extension of the mandate 
system.
The Labour party*s policy towards 'the dissatisfied 
powers' put the emphasis on equal opportunity for all powers 
to trade with the colonies. It appeared that the welfare 
of the Africans was not the paramount consideration. The 
Labour party A.C.I.Q. did not consider asking the Africans 
what their views on the question were. The main considera­
tion seemed to be the desire to appease the German and 
Italian governments. This was the main concern of the 
leaders of the party, such as Dalton and Bevin. The major 
question that was asked was: 'how can the colonies be used 
to appease Germany and Italy?' The problem of how the 
African colonies could be helped to independence, on the 
basis of a strong economy, was not considered, in any 
detail. The Labour party remained committed to the 
Africans* welfare in its public statements but it is 
significant that the party did devote attention to the 
question of sharing out colonial markets. The Labour 
party's attitude seemed to prove the I.L.P.»S point that 
the Labour party regarded the Africans as incapable of 
having much say in their own development.
In a motion, put forward in the Commons on behalf of 
the Labour party, by Noel-Baker, it was stated that no 
redistribution of the colonies or mandated territories 
should take place 'without the consent of the inhabitants' 
but it was not stated how the views of the inhabitants 
were going to be obtained. The motion was: 'in the 
opinion of this House no redistribution of Colonial or 
mandated territories should be made without the consent
of the inhabitants; and that^  as part of a general peace 
settlement, international agreements should be drawn up 
extending the application of the mandate to all Colonial 
territories which are not ripe for self-government, 
providing equal economic opportunity- in such territories 
for the nationals of all signatory powers, and establishing 
as a primary purpose of Colonial policy the welfare and 
progress of the Native i n h a b i t a n t s * A f t e r  debate the 
motion was defeated, but Philip Noel-Baker's speech was
Opublished as a pamphlet by the Labour party* In this he 
stated that the colonies were no longer an important source 
of raw materials* The Western nations had to prove that 
they were in earnest about applying trusteeship to the 
colonies* This they could do by applying the mandate system 
which was based upon three principles: that the progress and 
welfare of the 'native* population must be the primary 
purpose of colonial government, that there should be economic 
equality for all nations and that there should be full 
publicity with regard to administration* The Labour party 
believed that by applying these principles to the British 
Empire 'we shall preserve for ever, for ourselves and for
mankind everything in the British Empire of which we can
3be proud*I*
The Labour party was definitely against any exchange 
of coloniest although the Government seemed to be consider­
ing the idea* James Browning wrote a letter to 'Tribune* 
in which tie declared that 'it would be an open betrayal of 
the 'trusteeship' which Britain has accepted if we were to 
hand over thousands of natives to Fascist slave rule as if
1. 342 H*C*Deb*, 5s*, cols* 1199—1211, 7 December 1938«
2. P* Noel-Baker, 'Common Sense About the Colonies' (The 
Labour Party, 1939)*
3. ibid., p.l4.
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they were so much cattle* World peace cannot be secured by 
placing Germany's former colonies under Hitler*s rule, but 
only by the complete abolition of colonial imperialism* . 1
G.O.H. Cole put forward similar views in his book 'The 
People's Front», in which he stated that 'colonial empire 
is a plain denial of democracy: it is a predatory institution 
which no real democracy can defend. It is, moreover, an 
insuperable barrier to the secure establishment of peace.
Away with it ! ' 2 'Empire* declared that the essential fact 
of the Empire was that the common people had no say in how 
they were governed. It was a common trick of progressive 
thought on the colonial question to demand equal opportunity 
for all nations in trade and investment in the colonies and 
some extension of international control of the colonies, 
usually through a strengthened mandates system, but the 
weakness of these proposals (which the Labour party made) 
was that even if they were adequate to placate the 
dissatisfied imperialist powers, they did not solve the 
problem of the colonial peoples. The weakness of the Labour 
party's policy, which called for opposition to imperialist 
aggressors, was that Britain herself had as anti-social an 
imperialism as any of her rivals.^
H.N. Brailsford thought that although the Labour party
423
1 .
2.
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4 .
'Tribune*, 29-October 1937.
6.D.H. Cole, »The People's Front* (London,1937).«.168  
•Empire*, Vol. 1. No. 5, October 1938, pptsi-z.
•Empire* was on anti-imperialist journal founded in 
June 1938 by Frank Horrabin, Leonard Barnes and Julius 
Levin. ** "° official standing within the Labour
party, « r a n  into financial difficulties and vas taken 
over by the Fabian Society in 194o. Its'policy line» 
was generally to the left of 'official* Labour policy 
during the period 1938-40. Leys resigned from the 
editorial board in 1939 because he thought »Emnire« was 
becoming too 'Marxist' in its analysis. P
'Empire', Vol. 2, No. 10, October 1939, p.159.
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stood for full autonomy and even self-government, it did not 
seem to have realised that the fact of empire meant a 
primarily financial relationship between the white creditor 
and black debtor which allowed the former to thrive on roast 
beef, while the latter starved on rice* The end of 
imperialism meant one thing- the smashing of the relationship 
of debt and the equalising of the two standards of life.* 
Leonard Barnes, a member of the A.C.I.Q., and, of the 
editorial board of 'Empire*, wrote a number of influential 
books and pamphlets in the middle and late thirties on the
colonies and the question of their international supervision.
2 *In 'The Duty of Empire* , he thought that an extension of 
the mandate system would probably not be viable: *A direct 
extension of the present mandate system would be useless 
in view of the existing condition and constitution of the 
League of Nations. But, if and when, an International 
Socialist Federation can be created, colonies might well 
be administered under Mandates from the Federation, and 
the non-native colonial services, so long as they were 
necessary, might be recruited from all member states.
Barnes thought that Lenin's statement that a 
'socialist' colonial policy was an utter confusion was 
correct in theory in the sense that one group of workers 
should not exploit another set in order to remain on a 
higher standard of living. However, the British Empire 
did exist and was, to some extent, a going concern and 
therefore could not help forming a legacy and a problem 
to any British Government, 'socialist' or otherwise. 123
1. H.N. Brailsford, 'Why Capitalism Means War* (London.
1938).
2. L. Barnes, »The Duty of Empire' (London,1935)
3. L. Barnes, op.cit., p.293.
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A »socialist* revolution in Britain was the pre-condition 
of any tolerable imperial system but this did not only mean 
the rise of the Labour party to power but a decisive change 
in the economic structure of British society which would have 
to be consolidated by corresponding and concurrent changes in 
the internal economies of the colonies* Genuine progress in 
the colonies was impossible until they had been taken out of 
the hands of profit-seeking interests and brought under 
effective social control. Barnes thought that this could 
be accomplished by socialisation of the whole capital supply 
and development purely in the interests of the »natives*•
The marketing of »native* produce should be organised by 
a disinterested public agency. There should also be the 
quickest possible growth of self-government which should 
be accompanied by the growth of an internationalist rather 
than nationalist spirit. A start could be made by staffing 
the medical, health, technical and administrative services 
with »native* personnel and pushing forward with education. 
Concerning trade, Barnes thought that the policy of the 
•open door* with full commercial equality should be pursued.
Barnes emphasised the need for a decisive change in the 
economic structure of Britain and the creation of an 
International Socialist Federation to replace the League 
of Nations. Norman Leys welcomed Barnes* book in the 
•New Statesman* as the 'best book in existence on modern 
imperialism and the best written.»1 Leys wrote to W.Holtby 
that he and Barnes agreed about almost everything. 2 
However, even Barnes did not think that political 
independence could come in the African colonies for 20 to 
3TI 'New Statesman', 25 May 1935, p.756.
2. N. Leys to W. Holtby, 25 June 1934, V. Holtby Papers, 
Drawer 4, File 8. * *
30 years* In *The Future of the Colonies ' , 2 he wrote that 
colonies should not be regarded as 'swag'; the problem was 
not one of fair distribution among the robbers, but of looking 
after the interests of the 'native' peoples* He advocated 
an Empire low tariff group which was open to all countries to 
join, an international convention to deal with raw material 
supplies and an undertaking to turn colonies into mandated 
territories and bring movements of capital under League control* 
Mandates should be held in trust from the League. 'Britain 
would properly take steps to see that other imperial powers 
were invited to deal with their colonies on similar lines.
But Britain's own action should emphatically not be 
conditional on the acceptance of the invitation by the other 
powers.*'' Barnes went further than official Labour party 
policy which had suggested that action should be dependent 
on the acceptance by other powers of the same obligations. 
Francis Williams, in a review in the 'Daily Herald', hoped 
that 'The Future of the Colonies' would have the widest
4possible circulation.
In the 'Political Quarterly', Leonard Barnes stated 
that the fundamental problem in tropical Africa was to 
develop the internal market so that Africans would be given 
a much larger share in the wealth of their country. The 
trading and marketing monopolies that disposed of Africa's 
wealth should be transferred to democratic African control 
based upon the principles of co-operation."5 In 'The 
Skeleton of Empire',** Barnes wrote that 'the poverty of
1 . L. Barnes, »Empire or Democracy' (London, 1939)
2. L. Barnes, »The Future of the Colonies' (London,1936)
3. ibid., p.44.
4. 'Daily Herald', 27 February 1936.
5. 'Political Quarterly', Vol. IX, No. 4, Oct-Dec. 1938.
PP*503-515* *
6. L. Barnes, 'The Skeleton of Empire», (London,1938).
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colonial populations is due first and foremost to the fact 
that the most profitable of the natural resources of their 
countries have been taken out of their ownership and control 
and made over to that of European immigrants. In the 
system of production which arises in consequence of this 
alienation* a minimum of the wealth produced remains in the 
colony or in the hands of the natives whose labour is employed 
to produce it.* A reviewer in the 'Political Quarterly* 
thought that the 'socialism* which Barnes turned upon the 
Empire revealed a disquieting skeleton. 1
However, George Padmore, the communist who had joined* 
the I.L.P., wrote a review of 'Empire and Democracy» in 
»Empire' which was strongly critical of Barnes and the 
Labour party. 2 He thought that the official Labour Movement 
had neglected to educate its rank and file to recognise 
their responsibilities towards the colonial workers and
peasants. A small number of plutocrats, headed by monopoly 
capitalists and in control of the state machinery and the 
instruments of propaganda - the press, church, school and, 
above all, the crown - was deluding the common people into 
the belief that the maintenance of the Empire was to the 
benefit of the nation as a whole. Padmore thought that 
the only way of liberating the Africans in the colonies 
was to break up the capitalist machine at home and in the 
colonies. He was disappointed that Barnes did not advocate 
independence sooner. 'Africans, says Mr. Barnes, are too 
illiterate for self-determination now, but they will not be 
considered too illiterate to die in defence of democratic 
imperialism in the coming world war. The principle of
1 . 'Political Quarterly», Vol. I X N o l ,  Jan-March 1938,p.137.
2. »Empire», Vol. 2, No. 3* March 1939, pp.79-80.
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self-determination admits no equivocation. People either
have a right to be free or a right not to be free - today
and not tomorrow. And Hr. Barnes reflects the impudence
of most Britishers - even those who call themselves
socialists - in assuming the pontifical right of determining
who will be free today and who tomorrow. • 1
Padmore put forward his own views on colonial policy in
his book, •Africa and the World Peace*. He believed that
the mandate system could provide no solution because it was
under the control of imperialist nations and had been used
as a means of bringing the German colonies into the hands of
other imperialist nations. This had been thinly disguised
as trusteeship. The solution to the problem was to destroy
imperialism and this could not be done by taking part in an
imperialist war. If there was a war, the Africans should
not take sides but use it as an opportunity to overthrow
imperialism which was just as much their enemy as fascism.
Sir Stafford Cripps appeared to support this view for a time.
He wrote a foreword to Padmore*s book stating that *the
problem of imperialism has never been fully understood within
the Labour Movement of Great Britain« we have been far too
complacent about the sufferings of the colonial peoples and
have not had the vision to realise the very pressing dangers
that we are facing are due even more to British Imperialism
3than to our domestic Capitalism.
This was written when Cripps was working forft*United 
Front * between the Labour party, the Communist party and 
the I.L.P. against British Im per id. ism. He believed, at the
time, that the ruling class of Britain was the enemy of the 
2_. 6. Fa dm ore, op.cit., p«80.
2. 6. Padmore, ‘Africa and World Peace* (London,1937)•
3. ibid., p.XI.
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workers of Britain and, on all international questions, he 
took his stand on the principle of fighting the class enemy 
in one's own country. As the international situation 
became more desperate, he changed his mind and saw Hitler 
as the main enemy and thought that there should be an 
alliance between socialists and 'capitalists• to resist 
fascism more effectively.'*’
At a conference on 'Peace and the Empire« in 1938,
Cripps thought that one of the reasons why Britain should 
emancipate her colonies was that they would use their 
freedom to support the democracies against their enemies.
It might take time to complete full independence for the 
colonies but during that time Britain should, by herself, 
or in company with a like-minded group of countries, devise 
methods whereby a true trustee-hip could be carried out . 2 
This was similar to the view of Harold Laski who wrote in 
the 'Political Quarterly* that the only way to Justify 
colonial possessions was to make the principle of trustee­
ship so plain a living reality that the record was not open 
to question. 'No one*, he said, can read that record 
today and claim that this is the case.*3
The I.L.P. position on the colonies in the 1930s was 
well to the left of that of the Labour party. The 'New 
Leader' stated that the Labour party advocated the progress­
ive development of the colonial countries to self-government 
through constitutional methods, but all experience had shown 
that the problem could not be solved in that way. 'The
1 . E. Estorick, ' Stafford Cripps« (London, 1949) „ lfi2.
?;ench,Ué5d’ CíiPPa'* }n Sl-O”» «ndFrench, ed., »The Age of Austerity' (London. 1 9 6 ) nn v ?a iAi
2. «Empire-, Voi. 2, No. 8, August 1939. p.128 3 ’ P 7®'18 *
3. «Politicel Quarterly «, Voi. IX, No. O c t r e e .  1938,p.551.
subject races demand independence. The semi-starved peasants 
and workers demand social justice.» Only the I.L.P. stood 
as strongly as ever for the right of the peoples of the 
Empire to national independence. 1 It thought that the 
collective security of the governments of Europe was an 
instrument to maintain imperialism. European workers should 
help the colonial workers to gain independence as part of 
their own struggle against fascism and capitalism. Only 
when Imperialism was overthrown could collective security
function for peace and a world order of freedom and co-
2operation be established»
The 'New Leader« published an article by George Padmore, 
in which he stated that to «conceive of getting rid of 
capitalists without smashing up the Empire is like trying 
to make an omelette without smashing the egg. It therefore 
follows that the colonial peoples are the potential allies 
of the workers against a common enemy - The British 
Imperialist class.« The Labour party, according to Padmore, 
was a reformist organisation which would necessarily follow 
opportunist policies. The bourgeoisie knew that in every 
crisis of British Imperialism the Labour leadership would 
line up behind them. On the question of self-determination, 
the record of the Labour government was well-known. «People 
who can bomb Indians struggling for independence, and apply 
the most repressive measures to safeguard the interests of 
the British capitalists in the African and West Indian 
colonies, are the last people in the world to support self- 
determination. The colonial peoples had no illusions about 
this.* The Communist party had also failed by pursuing a
1 ’ p!8: ! ! " “'1" ’ 25 Febru”ry X938‘ Special Supplement,
2. «New Leader«, 22 July 1938, p.5 .
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policy identical to Labour, believing that fascism was the 
major menace and trying to persuade the colonial peoples to 
help the democratic governments of Europe against the 
fascists. The I.L.P., thought Padmore, was the only party 
to maintain the correct theoretical approach on the questions 
of ImperM-ist war and the colonies. 'Under no condition 
must the British workers support "their" bourgeoisie in 
Imperialist war or help the capitalists to drown in blood 
the struggles of the colonial peoples. * 1
Clement Attlee, the leader of the Labour party, felt 
that the colonial question was a complex and difficult one 
which could not be solved by simple slogans. The Labour 
party was in the peculiar position of being a protagonist 
at home of the stuggle of the workers against the capitalists^ 
but *in relation to the less developed peoples of the world, 
(it was) part of a dominant race which collectively 
exploits them.'^ As the crude ImperMism of the early 
days had been modified, largely through the force of public 
opinion created by the efforts of radicals, socialists and 
humanitarians, it had been realised that the relationship 
between advanced and backward peoples raised problems which 
were not easy to solve. The past could not be wiped out 
and simple surrender of ill-gotten gains was undesirable 
and unpractical. Therefore, the Labour party had given 
much time to the consideration of colonial problems and the 
application of 'socialist' principles in this sphere. It 
was not possible simply to relinquish control, for the 
impact of European civilisation had been felt by all 'native' 
Yl 'New Leader, 25 February 1938» p.21.
2. C.H. Attlee, 'The Labour Party in Perspective', (London 
1937).. C.R. Attlee, op.cit., p.228.3
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communities, generally with a disintegrating effect upon the 
structure of 'native* society« The Labour party's policy, 
said Attlee, could be summed up, as had been stated in 'The 
Colonial Empire', in the two words - 'socialisation and self- 
government«
This policy could not be implemented without thought 
because there was a grave objection to trying to transplant 
institutions which were indigenous to Britain into a soil in 
which they could not flourish. The Labour party would insist 
upon the widest franchise and not give in to demands for 
self-government by the whites. The Party believed that 
the British government should act as a trustee for the 
'natives' until, through educatinn, they had been prepared 
for self-government• All land in the colonies should be 
held in trust for the 'native' inhabitants« The Labour 
party rejected the conception of the Colonial Empire as an 
exclusive field of exploitation for the British capitalist, 
believing in the application of the mandatory principle to 
all colonies, with regular examination by the League of 
Nations. Re-allocation of colonial territories between 
the various great powers was no solution to the colonial 
problem. The Labour Party's policy remained the same 
throughout the interwar years - to govern the colonies in 
«trust* for the Africans. Trusteeship was still emphasised 
instead of a policy of equal rights. The problem with 
trusteeship was, as Cripps had pointed out that it was not 
being exercised properly. As the I.L.P. stated, the 
Labour party did not prove antagonistic to the established 
order in Britain or the empire. Its two, admittedly brief 
periods of office had left Britain and the empire basically
'The Colonial Empire' (The Labour Party, October 1933),
p.4.
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unchanged and there had been no real Indication that the 
reason for the lack of change was their dependence on the 
Liberals. It seemed in domestic, as in imperial affairs, 
that the party leaders had neither radical ideas for reform 
nor the will to change Britain and the empire. In 1937 
Attlee could still put forward the same basic colonial policy 
as had been put forward in 1920, glossing over the fact that 
Labour's two Colonial Secretaries had made no determined effort 
to ensure that the policy of trusteeship was carried out.
They had seemed content to maintain the empire rather than 
reform it. One of the reasons for this lack of achievement 
was that, despite the efforts of the A.C.I.Q., there had 
been no real pressure from any powerful section of the 
party to implement its pledges on colonial policy. The
T.U.C. had been a sleeping giant as far as colonial affairs 
were concerned.
The T.U.C. awoke to the colonial problem mainly because 
of the riots and disturbances that broke out in the various 
colonies in the nineteen thirties. In May 1935 there was a 
strike in the Northern Rhodesian copper mines because the 
poll-tax of the miners had been raised from 12s.6d. to 15 
shillings. Norman Leys reported in the 'New Statesman* 
that the strikers had been bullied by the police. This 
had led to a riot and six of the strikers were killed and 
twentyfive wounded. Leys wrote that wages were not fixed 
in East Africa as a result of bargaining, except in the case 
of a semi-skilled minority. The Africans did not want to 
work but they had to do so in order to pay taxes. Enough 
wages were paid to enable the »native* to pay direct 
taxation. Leys thought that the 'black subjects of the 
crown in East Africa deserve a new deal from us. If half
k y k
the men and women whose bosoms swelled with pride in the 
Empire at the King*s jubilee knew how the Empire was 
governed they would get a new deal. * 1
There was also trouble on the Vest Coast of Africa,
In 1937 there was a cocoa hold-up in the Gold Coast. The 
European syndicates for buying the cocoa were paying as 
little as possible for the Africans* raw materials and 
charging as much as possible for imported goods. The
Africans, having exhausted all peaceful methods of redress,
2were goaded into direct action. The Government appointed 
a Commission to investigate the causes of the strike.
The Commission^f report was sympathetic to the grievances 
of the Africans and recommended that co-operatives should 
be encouraged to take over the marketing of cocoa in 
Nigeria and in the Gold Coast. Where co-operatives had 
had a discouraging past, it recommended the establishment
of a Government Board with the sole right to deal with
3the farmer.
In 1937 there were serious riots in the West Indies 
when the Trinidad oil workers struck for more pay and 
better conditions. A warrant was issued for the arrest 
of the strikers* leader. The strike spread to the sugar 
plantations and riots broke out. Eleven rioters were 
killed, marines were landed, a warship was rushed to the 
island and the Governor asked for a cruiser and a company 
of infantry.^ George Padmore wrote in »Tribune* that 
•the official labour and trade union movements in this
country should give the maximum amount of support to these
1 .
2.
3-
k.
•New Statesman*, k January 1936, p.9.
•Tribune*, 23 December 1937* P«3; *Empire*, Vol. 1 No.7*December 1936* pp.64-5»
•Empire** Vol. 1, No. 7* December 1938»PP«S4-86.
•New Leader*, 26 November 1937, p.3*
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coloured colonial workers in their heroic struggle against 
squalor and degradation, for a better life? for the right 
of collective bargaining.
Following these riots there were disturbances in 
Barbados. A member of the Trinidad Labour Union visited 
the town and advocated trade unionism. The authorities 
deported him. A large crowd came to see him off and 
clashed with the police. There were riots; shop windows 
street lights and motorcar windows were broken; and 500 were 
arrested. 2 Norman Leys wrote in the «New Statesman* that 
the riots were a result of the fact that the working class 
had no means of expressing itself except by murder and 
destruction. Capitalists were using the workers as a 
source of cheap labour.^
In May 1938 there were disturbances in Jamaica when 
dockers in Kingston came out on strike for higher wages.
This soon led to a General Strike and a Commission was 
appointed to investigate the disturbances. 4 In 1939 
there was trouble in Sierra Leone. The Government 
decided to pass four ordinances to deal with sedition and 
troublemakers. They were to regulate the deportation of 
undesirable British subjects, to provide for the punishment 
of seditious acts and libels, to prohibit the importation and 
publication of undesirable literature, and to stop incitement 
to disaffection. There was no writ of habeas corpus.
The »natives* felt strongly about the ordinances and mass 
meetings were organised in the capital, Freetown, to protest
1 . »Tribune*, 9 July 1937, pp.9-10.
2. »New Leader*, 26 November 1937, p#3#
3. »New Statesman*, 12 February 1938. n.24*i
4. «Empire*, Vol. 1 , No. 2, July 1938, pp.18-19
against them. There was mutiny among the »native* soldiers 
and eleven were court-roartialled, receiving sentences of 
7-10 years penal servitude. At the opening of the Legisla­
tive Council there was widespread unrest in Freetown and 
troops were brought in.*
♦Tribune' thought that the Empire was being used by 
financiers to make profits. The commercial might of 
Unilevers was founded upon West Africa and in East Africa 
white men had decided that Africa should belong to any but 
the Africans. It was the rich men of England who ruled 
the British Empire. In the money markets of London, they 
dealt in the lives and sweat of the workers of Africa 
and India and the West Indies. They prescribed the law 
which imposed degenerate poverty in the West Indies, serfdom 
throughout the African colonies, something well-nigh 
approaching Fascist dictatorship m  India and a colour bar 
throughout the length and breadth of their domains. When 
emergency demanded it, they invoked British arms, British 
bombers, British machine-guns and British blue-jackets 
to enforce their will. 2 In another article, •Tribune* 
stated that the task of changing the empire of capitalist 
exploitation into a true commonwealth of free happy 
peoples could only be fulfilled by 'socialism*. It did 
not rest alone on the shoulders of the peoples repressed 
by British Imperialism but in the highest degree upon the 
British working class.^
The British workers in their trade unions had not 
shown much interest in the colonies in the 1920s and early 
1930s. Arthur Creech Jones thought that the T.U.C.'s
1 . «New Leader', 9 June 1939; 'Empire*, Vol. 2. No 6
2. »Tribune*, 5 August 1938, p.l.
3. 'Tribune', 28 May 1937t pp.8-9.
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preoccupation with Europe had undoubtedly been a drain on its 
resources and had overshadowed its interest in »native* 
labour problems.1 However, the T.U.C. had helped to draft a 
convention on the recruitment of »native » labour at the 
International Labor Conference in Geneva in 1934.2 At the 
Conference the T.U.C. delegate had proposed that the draft 
convention should have a definition which aimed at the 
regulation of recruiting with «a view to the total abolition 
of recruiting in all forms, in favour of a spontaneous offer 
of labour.» However, this proposal was rejected and the 
recommendation adopted by the I.L.O. drafting committee 
stated the desirability of the progressive elimination of 
recruiting by the improvement of labour conditions, the 
development of means of communication and the creation of 
institutions for facilitating and, if necessary, controlling 
voluntary movements of labour. It also recommended that 
schooling facilities should be provided where workers were 
accompanied by their families and required that the expenses 
of the journey of the recruited worker from and back to his 
home and protection on the journey should be borne by the 
recruiter or employer. The South African mining employers* 
representative protested strongly about the last proposal.3 
The T.U.C. put these proposals to the Government on i24 
January 1935 at a meeting between the General Council and 
the Minister of Labour. The Colonial Office later announced 
that it was in sympathy with the I.L.O. Convention. Creech 
Jones welcomed this announcement in the House of Commons in 
July 1936.4
1. »Empire», Vol. 1, No. 2, July 1938. p .15
2. T.U.C. Report 1935* pp.l69-172.
3. ibid., pp.171-2.
4. 314 H.C.Deb., 5s., col. 1504, 9 July 1936.
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Ernest Bevin drew the attention of the T.U.C. to labour
conditions in the colonies in his Presedential Address to
the T.U.C. Congress in 1937«1 He stated that 'news is
coming through that all is not well regarding labour matters
in our colonies. There are 66,000,000 people, mainly
coloured, ruled from the Colonial Office in Whitehall. Host
of them are voteless. A great responsibility rests upon us.
The disturbances which have taken place in the British West
Indies are not without cause. A public survey of labour
standards and conditions is absolutely imperative. I am
certain that the citizens of this country do not want to be
party to the exploitation of dependent coloured peoples.
This Congress could do a great work by initiating an
investigation into Colonial Labour conditions and publishing
the results so that the public could be informed. * 2
Bevin*s advice was followed up and the General Council
appointed a Colonial Advisory Committee to deal with the
question of colonial labour. At the 1938 T.U.C. Conference
at Blackpool, the President, H.H. Elvin, announced that the
General Council had been preparing for the future and had
set up a Colonial Advisory Committee which placed at the
T.U.C.*s disposal »an armoury of data secured from a life
experience in gaining that -earth» knowledge which will help
us to understand better and <feal with reality the problems
to be faced in all parts of the Empire. * 3 The General
Council had considered that the colonial labour problem was
urgent after the disturbances in the West Indies and felt
that the T.U.C., which for several years had had relations
with some Labour Movements in the Dominions, ought to devote
l"I *The Record*, March 1938, p.200.
2. 1937 T.U.C. Report, pp.74-75.
3* 1938 T.U.C. Report, p.73.
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more sustained attention to the whole problem of colonial 
labour. It accordingly decided to form a Colonial 
Advisory Committee. Experts on Africa and the colonies 
were asked to help the T.U.C. Invitations were sent out 
to specialists, most of whom were serving or had served 
on the Labour party's Advisory Committee on Imperial 
Questions. The T.U.C.*s Colonial Advisory Committee 
consisted of C.R. Buxton, J.P.N. Green, A. Creech Jones,M.P., 
Roy Macgregor, Professor W.M. Macmillan, H.S.L. Polak,
Arthur Pugh, T. Reid, W. McGregor Ross and Dr. Drummond 
Shiels. The T.U.C. representatives were H.H. Elvin 
(Chairman, T.U.C.) E. Edwards, George Hicks, M.P.# Arthur 
Shaw (T.U.C. General Council) and Sir Walter Citrine 
(General Secretary).*
Arthur Creech Jones wrote in »Empire* in July 1938 
that the unrest in many places was indicative of the 
absence of a progressive economic policy. The neglect 
of the Colonial Office and of the Colonial Governments, 
and the indifference of the planters and big capitalist 
interests were seen in the appalling social and industrial 
conditions everywhere in the colonies. The T.U.C.»s 
special advisory committee would review the whole range 
of problems, including the protection of 'native* peoples 
and the administration of industrial legislation. It would 
also advise the colonial workers on how to build up 
independent trade unions. 1 2 The official terms of 
reference were to make "an investigation into the conditions 
of the principal races of the Colonial Empire, the object 
being to see how far the T.U.C. can contribute towards 
raising their standard of life and generally improving their
1. 1938 T.U.C. Report, p.205.
2. »Empire', Voi. 1, No. 2, July 1938, p.1 5 .
conditions"#'*'
In an article in »Tribune», Creech Jones stated that 
the conception of »trusteeship* was being subordinated to 
an ugly economic realism which was enforced by those who 
enjoyed the opportunities of exploiting the colonial 
peoples. Working people were confirmed in squalor and 
disgusting hardship which could not be excused by reference 
to the unfortunate results of the world depression. The 
Labour party had declared it» colonial policy but the party 
also had to remember that each colony had a separate 
problem - industrial protection, social needs, and political
reform. »Native* workers would have to be properly
2represented*
One of the Colonial Advisory Committee's main problems 
was to find the best method of giving assistance to attempts 
to initiate trade unionism in the colonies. A. Creech 
Jones wrote that the Committee had received many requests 
from groups of workers in the colonies asking for advice 
on the formation of unions. 3 Affiliation to the T.U.C. 
itself was precluded, so the Committee decided to invite 
any colonial union which so desired to become associated 
with the Committee with a view to obtaining information 
and assistance in the development of their movements. This 
decision was confirmed by the General Council on 27 April 
1938 and notified to all colonial trade union centres. 4 
A model trade union constitution and explanatory notes 
were also prepared to help the colonial trade unions to 
build up their organisations. These were printed at the 
end of May 1938 and circulated to trade union centres, tin
1 . 1938 T.U.C. Report, p.205.
2. »Tribune», 24 June 1938, p.5.
3. »Empire», Vol. 1 , No.. 2, July 1938. „.i*
4. 1938 T.U.C. Report, p.206. * P
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Colonial Office and the International Labour Office.-*-
The Committee also decided that it would be desirable to 
establish a special Native Labour Department in the Colonial 
Office* Creech Jones was the driving force behind the 
suggestion. He had written a memo for the A.C.I.Q* on the 
subject« stating that the Colonial Office had a Colonial 
Labour Committee which was an interdepartmental committee 
consisting of members of the Colonial Office, the Ministry 
of Labour and the Home Office, with the function of advising 
upon questions relating to Colonial'Labour Legislation 
when they arose* Since the proceedings of this body were 
not published and it had no executive authority Creech
2Jones thought that there was a need for something more*
The Labour party A.C.I.Q. decided that the party should 
press for a special department to be put in charge of all 
labour in the Crown Colonies* Creech Jones wrote to the 
Colonial Office and pressed the Colonial Secretary in the 
House of Commons on 2L July 1937» He asked for a stronger 
committee in view *of the recent disturbances in a number of 
colonies, the rapid growth of mining and industrialisation 
in Africa and elsewhere, the increasing interest of the 
I.L.O* in colonial labour matters and the necessity of 
building up a minimum of labour protection and welfare 
conditions now that large numbers of natives are being 
brought together attracted by wages** He wanted a committee 
to review industrial legislation, keeping the need for it 
under continuous review and advising on new proposals where 
they were necessary. The Colonial Secretary, Ormsby-Gore,
1 . ibid. „
2. A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 189, November 1937*
3. A*C*I*Q«> Minutes, 10 June 1936.
ki 326 H.C.Deb., 5s., col. 2190, 21 July 1937. A. Creech Jones 
to Lord Dafferin, 3 August 1937, Creech Jones Papers Box 14.
refused this request for a new committee because he 
believed that the one that existed was adequate to deal 
with the problem. However, he did appoint a Colonial 
Labour Advisor, Major Orde Browne. Creech Jones was 
invited to meet Orde Browne by the new Colonial Secretary, 
Malcolm MacDonald. 1
On 23 June 1938 a T.U.C. deputation consisting of 
H. Elvin, W, Citrine, G. Hicks, E. Edwards and Arthur 
Creech Jones called on the Colonial Secretary to discuss 
the proposal 2 for a special Native Labour Department.
The T.U.C. delegation noted with satisfaction the appoint­
ment of a Labour Advisor to the Colonial Office. However, 
the T.U.C. considered that these steps did not go far 
enough, particularly in view of the grave labour unrest 
in many parts of the colonial empire and advocated the 
formation at the Colonial Office of a permanent Native 
Labour Department to give its whole attention to the 
subject of colonial labour. The introduction of such a 
Department would be facilitated by the presence in the 
Colonial Office of a nucleus of higher staff specialising 
in «native* labour matters. 3 The Colonial Secretary 
promised to give the matter serious consideration but he 
decided not to set up a native labour department.
The T.U.C. passed a long motion on the subject of 
colonial labour at the 1938 Conference at Blackpool.
G. Hicks, one of the members of the T.U.C. Colonial Advisory 
Committee, moved the motion on behalf of the General Council 
This stated that Congress viewed with grave concern the
1# A* °reeCh J°neS 14 July 1938» Creech ¿one
2. 1938 T.U.C. Report, pp.206-20?.
3* I3 J M e ' w a i “1 AdVi"OPy Co”nitt®<' Deputation 14/1,
persistence in many British Crown Colonies and Dependencies 
of deplorable conditions of »native* labour which were 
incompatible with present-day social and industrial standards 
and which had been the main causes of the outbreaks in various 
Vest Indian colonies during the past year. Congress 
recognised that the Government was making some steps in the 
right direction in its new colonial policy outlined in the 
circular of August 19371 and urged the Government to insist 
that colonial administrations should give immediate effect 
to this policy. It was particular necessary to introduce 
Labour departments and inspectorates in the colonies, 
promote trade unionism, make provisions for workmen's 
compensation, eliminate penal sanctions for labour offences, 
investigate the low standards of »native* health, housing 
and wages and apply to all Colonies the relevant international 
conventions adopted by the International Labour Conference. 
•Congress considers that in order to raise effectively the 
level of native labor conditions it is essential to 
introduce trade union principles, particularly that of 
collective bargaining, into the conduct of colonial 
industry and commercial and public enterprise and calls 
upon the Government to facilitate in every possible way 
the application of these principles. Congress further 
calls upon the Government to admit the native populations 
to an adequate share in the responsibilities of Government 
by a wide extension of the franchise and by adapting the 
colonial constitutions to modern democratic ideas; and to 
ensure free access to the land for all natives desirous 
of cultivating it.» Congress instructed the General 
Council to maintain the closest possible connection with
1. Cmd. 3760 <1938).
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the trade union movements in the colonies and to assist them
to the utmost of its power towards the development of trade
union organisation and the realisation of civilised
conditions of life and labour* The resolution was carried«^
During the year 193^-39 the T*U*C* Colonial Advisory
Committee held one special and six extraordinary meetings*
The special meeting was on 5 August when the Committee met
tha nev Labcur Advisor to the Colonial Office, Major Orde-
Browne, prior to his mission of investigation into labour
conditions in the West Indies* The other work of the
Committee included dLiscussion of the T.U.C.'s reply to the
I.L.O* questionnaire to governments on the regulation of
contracts of Employment of Indigenous workers, reception
of a deputation from the West Indies on the condi tions of
workers in the colonies, discussion of the conditions in
the West Indies, the construction of model trade union rules
and making representations to the Colonial Office on African
labour conditions in East and West Africa.2 The lobbying
had some effect for on 1 April 1939, the Colonial Office
created a Social Service department to consider problems
of 'native* health, labour and nutrition*
During the period 1935-39, the Labour party in
Parliament criticised theGovernment for its complacency
over the riots, its slowness to improve labour conditions
as industrialisation progressed in the colonies, and its
apparent readiness to consider an exchange of colonies in
order to try to satisfy Germany's sense of grievance at
its loss of colonies after the first world war. Labour's
main spokesmen were Arthur Creech Jones, Morgan Jones,
William Paling and William Lunn. Arthur Creech Jones was
. 193d T.i/.C. Report, p.433*
. 1939 T.U.C. Report, pp.23^-236.
very active in asking parliamentary questions concerning 
individual cases of injustice to Africans. He was so active 
in this roll that Margery Perham called him the member for 
the Africans. 1 His private papers contain many cases which 
he took up on behalf of the indigenous peoples of the 
colonies.^
One of the main issues of policy that was considered 
during this period was the question of the amalgamation of 
the two Rhodeias and Nyasaland. The main pressure for 
amalgamation came from the white population of both Rhodesias. 
Green wrote a memo for the A.C.IoQ. He stated that the 
whites of Northern Rhodesia felt that by joining with 
Southern Rhodesia they would be better able to maintain 
white rule and the whites of Southern Rhodesia wished to 
control the enormous wealth of the copper mines of Northern 
Rhodesia. The Labour party** attitude was put in the 
House of Commons by Arthur Creech Jones in the Colonial 
Office debate in June 1937 when he said that Northern 
Rhodesia was essentially a black nan's country and Britain 
had a very definite responsibility to the *natives* of the 
protectorate which could not be lightly surrendered. The 
»native* people did not want amalgamation and the Labour 
party did not want to see a rigid application of past and 
other »anti-native* laws applied in Northern Rhodesia as 
they were applied in Southern Rhodesia. 5 The Government 
appointed a Royal Commission in 1939 to consider the question
1 . M. Perham ‘The Colonial Reckoning* (London,196l),p.42.
2. Creech Jones Papers Box 18.
3. The question of amalgamating North and South Rhodesia had 
been proposed by the settlers of Northern Rhodesia in 1930. 
However, the issue did not develop into a major question 
because the Colonial Office civil servants, including 
Green, managed to persuade Lord Winterton, the Conservative 
spokesman, that the settlers* demands were extravagant.
4. A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 185» April 1937.
5. 324 H.c. Deb., 5s., cols. 1059-1060, 2 June 1937.
of amalgamation.'*' It recommended that Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland should amalgamate under a single administration 
(Mr. Mainwaring, the Labour representative on the Commission, 
dissented), but that triple amalgamation should be deferred 
until the divergence between the ‘native* policies followed in 
Southern Rhodesia and the protectorates was reconciled. 
•Empire* declared that * it is a genuine progressive interest 
that the encroachment of the colour bar should be blocked. 
Hence it is the duty of all progressives to exert every 
influence to ensure that the plan for bringing Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland under the control of the Southern 
Rhodesian parliament is well and truly torpedoed. * 1 2 The 
view of the Labour party*s experts had been put at a Confer­
ence on Africa in 1938. Norman Leys had moved and carried 
a motion ‘that nothing should be done to weaken1the existing 
responsibilities of the Imperial Parliament and the Dominions 
Office and the Colonial Office for Northern and Southern 
Rhodesia* .3 4
Another problem connected with Northern Rhodesia was
the question of migrant labour from Nyasaland to work on
the copperbelts of Northern Rhodesia. The migrant African
workers were kept in poor conditions by the Northern
Rhodesian businessmen responsible for the Copperbelt.
LBuxton wrote a memo for the A.C.I.Q. He argued that
internatioihlagreements should be made providing for the
enforcement of reasonable conditions for the recruitment and
repatriation of migrant labour. This was followed by a memo
5from J.F.N. Green, who had tried, unsuccessfully, to
1 . Cmd. 59^9 (March, 1939)
2. »Empire*, Vol. 2, No. 9* September 1939, ppl34-6.
3# »African Conference*, 12 April 1938, Creech Jones Papers 
Box 23* File 1»
4. A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 171A, October 1936.
A.C.I.Q* Memo No. 175» November 1936.
persuade Northern Rhodesian businessmen to improve conditions 
for migrant labour while he had been a civil servant at the 
Colonial Office, working on the problems of Tanganyika, Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. (He had retired from the Colonial 
Office in 1933 and joined the A.C.I.Q.) He advocated the 
policies he had proposed at the Colonial Office. He thought 
that assistance, free of Treasury control, should be given to 
Nyasaland by the British Government to try to reduce the 
contrast between Nyasaland and copper-rich Northern Rhodesia.
He believed that individual recruitment should be discouraged 
and there should be migration of villages or groups of 
families instead. In general, barriers to the movement of 
labour within the British empire should be ended. The pass
system should not be extended. Green also thought that the 
principles of taxation which had been laid down in Passfield*s 
1930 memo - that the white settlers should bear the brunt 
instead of the Africans - should be followed. The T.U.C. 
took the question of migrant labour in Northern Rhodesia 
to the I.L.O. and deputations were made to the Colonial 
Office but little was done to improve the conditions of the 
migrant labourers in Northern Rhodesia.
The A.C.I.Q. was in rather a frustrating position.
When the Labour party was in office, its advice had been 
ignored by the Labour Colonial Secretaries in favour of the 
advice of the senior civil servants. When the Labour party 
was in opposition, it generally accepted the advice of the 
A.C.I.Q. but was unable to persuade the National Government 
to stray from the path *mapped out* by the Colonial Office 
civil servants. The civil service was a strong pressure 
for continuity in colonial policy. There were a few 
radical civil servants, like J.F.N. Green, but most of the 
senior civil servants sympathised with the problems of the
white settlers, as did the Permanent Secretary, Sir Samuel 
Wilson. The civil service accepted the doctrine of ‘trustee­
ship* but it did not feel there was need for any drastic 
change in British African policy. The civil service believed 
that African policy was generally on ‘the right lines*• They 
thought that Britain would be exercising a ‘trust* for the 
Africans for many years ahead. The civil service did not 
see its task as to prepare the Africans for independence as 
soon as possible. The Colonial Office saw its job as to 
preserve a balance between the interests of the settlers and 
those of the Africans.^ The problem was that, because of 
the civil servants* background, education and training, the 
balance tended to come down more on the side of the settlers 
than the Africans.
The difficulty of protecting African interests in Africa 
was again illustrated over the question of the South African 
protectorates - Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.
General Hertzog wanted South Africa to take over responsibility 
for these protectorates but the problem was that in South 
Africa the interests of the Europeans were clearly paramount 
over the interests of the Africans. The policies of the 
South African government were against the stated aims of 
British colonial policy.
In April 1935* W.G. and M.L. Ballinger wrote a memo 
for the A.C.I.Q. on the question. They believed that if 
the protectorates were transferred, the last vestige of belief 
in Britain*s 'protective and benignant power* would be 
destroyed. Leonard Barnes-' agreed that there should be no 
departure of policy. Nothing should be done which would
1 . J.M. Lee, 'Colonial Development and Good Government'.(Oxford, 1967)
2. A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 155* April 1935.
3# A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 156, May 1935.
encourage the transfer of protectorates to South Africa.
However, by 1937, the A.C.I.Q. was adopting a more fatalistic 
point of view. Thomas Reid1 pointed out that the reality of 
the situation was that if South Africa did not take over the 
protectorates with the consent of Britain, she would »take 
them over without consent and not a single shot will be fired 
by Britain as a result». He thought that the situation 
should be accepted - the best that could be done was to try 
to ensure that South Africa was given a mandate for the 
protectorates which sU would honour 'probably as well as any 
other Mandatory Power». »The introduction of the world- 
conscience represented by the Mandates Commission, might have 
beneficial effects in South Africa even outside the territories 
of the Protectorates*. Julius Lewin, however, did not seem 
very hopeful that the interests of the Africans would be 
safeguarded in the protectorates.2 The members of the 
A.C.I.Q., who were experts on South Africa, came to the 
conclusion that nothing much could be done to safeguard the 
rights of the Africans in the three South African protectorates. 
A mandate could be given, but, in reality, it was unlikely 
that South Africa would honour it. The difficulties of 
influencing South African policy had been shown earlier when 
the Labour party had tried unsuccessfully to protect migrant 
African labour working in the Rand mines. Julius Lewin3had 
pointed out the problem to the A.C.I.Q. but it had been 
powerless to influence the South African government.
The theme running through the speeches of the Labour 
party's spokesmen in the House of Commons during this period 
was that the indigenous peoples in the colonies could not
1. A.C.I.Qo Memo No. 188, November 1937.2. A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 195, April 1938.3. A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 186, May 1937.
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remain unaffected by the march of industrial civilisation 
and that care should be taken to exercise Britain's duty of 
trusteeship. Creech Jones stated in the Colonial Office debate 
in 1937 that the whole economy of the African continent was 
changing with the development of agricultural and mineral 
resources, the growth of communications and transport and 
the rise of industrialisation. Moreover, very fundamental 
alterations were occurring in the mode of life of the African 
and in his control of his environment. The process of 
detribalisation was going on rapidly and the old authority 
in the villages was disappearing. Creech Jones was glad 
that the Colonial Secretary had agreed to ratify the l.L.O. 
•Convention on Native Recruitment' but he thought that the 
time was ripe for an inquiry into industrial practices in 
Africa so that they could discover how best the standards 
of life of the Africans could be protected against the 
ruthless exploitation which went on in many parts of the 
continent. 1
Wedgwood thought that the West had started all the 
industrial problems in Africa by taking away their land 
and so forcing the Africans to work. He had come round 
to the idea that the Africans ought to be taught to become 
English working men so that they could organise themselves.
He also thought that they should be represented in the 
British Houses of Parliament, although no-one else in the
OLabour party seemed very keen on the idea.
In the Colonial Office debate of 1938 the same themes 
were repeated. William Paling asked whether the Government 
would change its policy of relentless exploitation of the
T. 324 H.C." Deb., 5s., cols. 1051-1061, 2 June 1937« 
2I 324 H.C.Deb., 5s., cols. 1065-1074, 2 June 1937»
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Africans in the interest of making profits for people in
England and carry out the declarations of the Duke of
Devonshire«^ Creech Jones suggested that a system which
subordinated the life of a colony to the interests of the
profits of remote investors, instead of building up the
social, economic, and political life of the people was
2fundamentally wrong«
Aneurin Bevan wrote in 'Tribune' that the speeches of 
Creech Jones and William Paling should be published in order 
to educate the British people in the realities of Empire«
The truth was, said Bevan, that the British capitalist class 
looked upon the Colonial Empire as a vast reserve of cheap 
labour, available for merciless exploitation, and they could 
no more be trusted to treat this labour decently than they 
could in Britain before the rise of the trade unions.*^
The New Fabian Research Bureau held a Conference on 
Colonial Trusteeship in March 1938» Most of the Laboor 
party's colonial 'experts' attended the Conference« Leys 
stated that Africa needed modern institutions to replace 
its old customs and tribes« He thought that African and 
British children had substantially the same mental capacities. 
The backwardness of the African was the responsibility of 
Britain for not providing the necessary education. »Our 
aim should be to train the Africans for equality*. Leys 
was still advocating the equal rights policy, which he had 
consistently put forward throughout the interwar period, 
instead of the trusteeship policy, which was given most 
emphasis by the official Labour party pamphlets.
McGregor Ross thought that there was no reason why
1. 337 H.C.Deb., 5s., cols. 176-183, 14 June 1938.
2. 337 H.C.Deb., 5s., cols. 150-161, 14 June 1938.
3. »Tribune' 17 June 1938, P»7.
Africans should not sit in the Kenya Legislative Council but 
he doubted whether the Africans had sufficient education to 
organise in trade unions» However, Leonard Barnes thought 
that steps should be taken by the T.U.C. to train Africans 
as trade union leaders. Barnes tended to be in favour of 
the Leys*s policy of equal rights rather than the official 
policy of trusteeship. He stated that the proper relations 
with colonial peoples must be those of allies not trustees. 
He continued that indirect rule, ignoring as it did the 
effect of economic penetration in breaking up 'native* 
institutions, offered no real solution to the problem of 
self-government. It was more practicable to press for the 
development of Legislative Councils with adequate African 
representation on them.*
The question of the success or failure of indirect rule 
was debated in the A.C.I.Q. by Norman Leys and Professor 
W.M. Macmillan, concerning the Gold Coast. Leys thought 
that indirect rule was an open failure. ‘The tribal 
institutions of the Gold Coast are so unfit to provide 
what a modern society needs and desires as King Arthur's
Court would be to perform the functions of the L.C.C.
If the Africans were frankly told that self-government 
was the aim, they themselves might work out new tribal
organs, especially, if they were given representatives on 
the Legislature. 2 Professor Macmillan thought that the 
strong point of indirect rule of the better 'Cameron' type 
„as that, though it probably evaded the problem of securing 
representative control of central government, it at least 
gave the Native Authority both real p e e r  and the financial
means to use that power - a regular refund of local tax,
1 . New Fabian Research Bureau, Confer.«__ „ ,
Trusteeship, Oxford 1920, March l<n8 °a Colonlal
2. A.C.I.Q. Memo I89A, November 1937
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Howevert he thought that a more adequate form of representa­
tion of local units at the centre would have to be evolved. 1
OMacmillan agreed that indirect rule was *no panacea*.
C.R. Buxton adopted the middle position of thinking that 
indirect rule should be accepted as a form of local government' 
but it did not provide the machinery for the central govern­
ment of a colony. Buxton thought that the model of the 
Legislative Council should be kept for central government but 
the executive power vested in the Governor should be traxsferred 
to a Ministry responsible to the Council as soon as the Council
became sufficiently representative of the whole population,
3coloured as well as white.
W. Benson, writing for the Fabian Society, thought that 
a lot of mystical nonsense was talked about indirect rule.
It was the usual form of administration by weak empires 
interested mainly in taxation. Nevertheless, it was of some 
value if it was directed towards the association in local 
government of all the members of a community. The goal 
should be democratic, parliamentary, non-racial government.
The types of councils that existed representing the govern­
ment, racial and economic interests were more a hindrance 
than a help. No increase in their power should be granted 
to them unless it was accompanied by abolition of colour 
bars. He thought that economic councils developing out 
of land boards would be of greater value to transitional 
colonies, while the ground was being prepared for national 
councils through education in local government .^ 1 J.F.N.
Green also seemed to think that indirect rule had served
1 . A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 197, 1937.
2. Manchester Guardian, 2k April 1939.
3. C.R. Buxton, note on the C.O. vote, 7 June 1939, A. Creech Jones Papers Box 16«
k. W. Benson, »The Development of Colonial Peoples* (Fabian 
Society) A. Creech Jones Papers Box 1 7.
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some useful purpose in the Gold Coast
The division among the experts seemed to be that some 
members such as Barnes and Leys regarded indirect rule as 
serving no useful purpose because it only encouraged old 
tribal institutions which prevented the growth of democracy. 
Macmillan- and Buxton were doubtful about its value but thought 
that it could, in a modified way, serve as a basis for local 
government. Benson and Green, while recognising that it 
was no panacea, thought that indirect rule could be of some 
value. Official policy followed Macmillan, Buxton, Benson 
and Green, in thinking that indirect rule could serve as a 
basis of local government but it was not very clear about 
how it could be used.
Leys was trying to make sure that the party was 
committed to definite action if it achieved office again.
He wrote to Creech Jones at the beginning of 1938 to say 
that the Labour party should put forward a resolution in 
the House that the preparation of the common people for self- 
government should be the chief aim of the governments of all 
the Dependencies of the Colonial Empire and that the 
Governors should be directed to make a public announcement 
of this policy. It was imperative that it should be made 
public in Africa. He thought that if such a resolution 
could be put through great work would have been done. 2 
Creech Jones replied that he would urge the general points 
in the next C.O. debate. However, he was not able to achieve 
the declaration Leys wanted.^
1 . A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 184, Health Conditions in the Gold 
Coast, J.F.N. Green
2. N. Leys to A. Creech Jones, 20 January 1938, Creech Jones 
Papers, Box 2.
3. A. Creech Jones to N. Leys, 2 February 1938, ibid.
Norman Leys wrote again to Arthur Creech Jones in 
February 1939 to urge the necessity of a programme for 
immediate action by the next Labour Colonial Secretary:
•From 1918 to 1929 I did all I could to get the party 
committed to certain actions. Passfield wouldn*t pay the 
least attention, and when the Advisory Committee refused to 
do anything to try to make him I resigned. What I suggest 
now is that you should give notice to Woolf of a proposal to 
appoint a sub-committee to draw up a programme for immediate 
execution by the next Labour Secretary of State at the 
Colonial Office. Just how much it ought to contain is the 
problem since we would all I hope agree about our entire 
programme but not perhaps about the things that ought to be 
done first and at once.1*
Creech Jones wrote back to say that he agreed that
•the party ought to have a programme for immediate action.
So far we have relied on vagueness of expression which has
not brought too great a credit on the party when Labour had
had the opportunity of getting something done. I will raise
the question on the Advisory Committee. I hope you have not
definitely excluded yourself from it, for I was very happy
to see you present at the last meeting. 1 (Leys had not
officially rejoined the A.C.I.Q. but he occasionally attended
its meetings and presented memos.)
Leys wrote a memo for the A.C.I.Q. in February 1939 as
part of his campaign to draw up a programme for immediate
execution. In this, he stated that racial discrimination
had long ceased to be a danger to be guarded against but
3had become an established fact. By 1939, Leys thought
X. Leys to A. Creech Jones, 9 February 1939» A. Creech Jones 
Papers, Box 14.
2. Creech Jones to N. Leys, 10 February 1939, Creech Jones 
Papers, Box 14.
3. A.C.I.Q* Memo 205, February 1939*
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that the question of racial discrimination had become the 
main issue in all the dependencies. The realisation of 
this had been obscured by the false idea that the indigenous 
inhabitants of the colonies led lives of their own. The 
truth was, wrote Leys, that the people of the Colonial Empire 
lived under British law and had been enlisted into British 
industries. Everything still remained to be done. When 
Lord Passfield's White Paper reached Kenya, Lord Delamere 
had said in the Legislature that compliance with the White 
Paper's passage on racial discrimination alone would involve 
the amendment of over 30 laws. None had been amended by 
1939. Kenya was the most clear example of discrimination 
but discrimination was becoming plainer everywhere. Leys 
thought that the advent of the next Labour Government would 
increase the probability of explosions if the hopes it 
ra.sed were found to be vain. This made it very important 
for the Labour party to have ready in advance a policy of 
action, including measures of reform. What was necessary, 
thought Leys, was an early public announcement that measures 
would be taken to put an end to the privileges now enjoyed 
by the minorities and the disabilities suffered by the 
majorities. Some specific measures should be enacted 
immediately a Labour Government came into Office as an earnest 
that others would follow. The problem was how to ensure 
that these measures would be taken within a month of taking 
office. Leys warned that the Labour party should always 
bear in mind how strong the opposition would be; the 
Conservative party, the settlers, the civil service, the 
colonial administration and the Governors and the press were 
against radical change. No recent Governor in Africa had 
a policy so near to the Labour party.. as Sir Donald Cameron, 
yet in his book he rejected the view that it was for the
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Africans to decide the rate and extent of the changes which
must ensue in their lives»
No-one, declared Leys, denied the gravity of the 
industrial causes of unrest in the Dependencies. What made 
all the difference and what was the source of the specific 
evils of the colonial system was the semi-serfdom which had 
no single root as chattel slavery had, but, especially in 
Africa, was the product of numerous restrictive contrivances. 
•It may prove to be the case that the greatest danger to our 
national security is not Hitler*s Germany but the actions of
those many subjects of the crown who awaken to find them-
2selves half-slave and half-free.*
In the Colonial Office debate of 1939, William Paling 
said that although some things had been done with regard to 
the appointment of labour advisers and labour inspectorates 
in some colonies, the amount that had been done in relation to 
what remained tote done was positively Insignificant. In the 
Gold Coast it would take 700 years before the whole population 
uould be able to read and write if the same rate of progress 
was maintained» In East Africa even teat figure would be 
optimistic. Wage-earners could not afford to pay for 
education out of a wage of 8s a month. Education was only
3being given to those who could afford it.
Creech Jones asked that the African should be permitted
to be trained in the art of government and allowed to take
his place on the various councils. He thought that the
people of the colonies should be enabled to stand on their
own feet as soon as possible and take a larger share in the
4government of their territories.
1 . Sir Donald Cameron, »Principles of Native Administration* 
(Lagos, 1935)
2. A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 205» February 1939.
3. 348 H.C.Deb., 5s., cols. 457-466, 7 June 1939.
4. ibid., cols. 484-496, 7 June 1939.
Colonel Wedgwood thought that the democratic control of 
the colonial administration by the House of Commons had never 
been lower or more feeble. He thought that direct rule should 
be instituted in the African colonies as a natural step towards 
responsible government. Indirect rule was bolstering up 
landlord and aristocratic domination in the African colonies. 
The Africans' own chiefs had become landlords. Wedgwood 
thought that the year that had just passed had been the most 
damaging year to British prestige and traditions with its 
riots and disorders.^-
Noel-Baker believed that industrialisation and education 
were changing the lives of the colonial peoples at an 
unprecedented rate. There was a need to reorganise colonial 
administration and policy. There should be no colour bar, 
labour conditions and wages should be improved, and the I.L.O. 
supported. In Nyasaland the emigration of recruited labour 
abroad should be stopped or the social life of the country 
would be destroyed. More money should be provided for the 
training and education of the Africans and there was a 
necessity for some greater development of parliamentary 
control over colonial administration. 2
The Labour party as a whole discussed colonial policy 
at the 1939 Party Conference. The Rev. R.W. Sorensen M.P. 
moved a resolution on behalf of the Leyton West district 
Labour party. The resolution stated that the purpose of 
colonial policy was the moral and material welfare of the 
indigenous peoples. It urged that the scandalous conditions 
which had been exposed in the West Indies should be ended and 
a rapid advance towards self-government and social equality
1. 348 H.C.Deb., 5s., cols. 524-528, 7 June 1910
2. ibid, cols 544-552, 7 June 1939.
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be made* The franchise should be widened, the trade union 
movement encouraged, land reforms should be introduced, and 
agriculture and industry developed according to a comprehen­
sive plan. African self-government should be encouraged, 
education promoted, and medical and social services improved. 
The Africans* inherent right to their own land should be 
enforced. The motion declared that these policies could 
best be achieved by an extension to all such colonies of the 
mandate system of the League of Nations. In no circumstances 
and on no conditions should any colonial peoples be handed 
over to *the merciless misrule of fascist dictators whose 
racial doctrines and aggressive militarism render them wholly 
unfit for such a trust. * 1
Sorensen said, in support of the motion, that the tragic 
conditions of labour in the West Indies or the strike that 
took place in West Africa concerning the cocoa industry or 
the driving of the Africans from the Kenyan Highlands or 
the facts concerning the maltreatment of indigenous peoples 
and the introduction of sedition laws and goals showed that 
the colonies were still looked upon as fields for exploita­
tion by the capitalist class. The Labour Party should lay 
down the principle that the peoples of Africa were as 
entitled to self-government as the people of Britain, 
although there were difficulties, psychological and other­
wise. Sorensen declared that ’unless we are determined to 
apply Democracy to those other areas, to assist these other 
peoples towards economic development and political dignity, 
then undoubtedly this country will suffer in the days that 
are ahead.*
An amendment was moved by C. Meredith (University Labour 
Federation) to the resolution. This stated that *in view of
1 . Labour Party Conference Report 1 9 3 9 , p . 3 1 0
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the deterioration of the international situation and the 
failure of aggressive states to respect collective agreements» 
the Conference cannot place any faith in schemes for the 
Internationalisation of Colonial areas or the admission of 
such states to an equal control with the Democracies over 
the fate of the Colonies. * 1 Meredith argued against an 
extension of the Mandate system and declared that the Labour 
Movement should proceed to the emancipation of the Colonial 
peoples as had been pursued in the Soviet Union.
Creech Jones suggested that the Conference should reject 
the amendment and accept the resolution which was nearer to 
previous declarations of Labour policy than the negative 
attitude assumed in the amendment. A great change was 
coming over the face of Africa, industrialisation was 
obtaining a hold and resulting in the de-tribalisation of 
large numbers of African peoples and their segregation in 
mines and factories and other industrial undertakings with 
all the resultant squalor, misery and suffering which had 
occurred in Britain a hundred years earlier. The Africans 
were up against the penetration of Western capitalism and 
Western industrialisation and therefore it was vitally 
important that they should be armed with the methods of 
resistance that the workers of Europe had discovered.
»While we would seek to preserve what is good in native 
institutions, do not let us be hoodwinked by anthropologists 
and those who believe in indirect rule and who would ask us 
to work through the Chiefs in developing the principles of 
pemocracy, the principles of trade unionism, or the 
principles of industrial protection.» 2 There should be a 
whole series of new social services in respect of health,
1 . Labour Party Conference Report 1939 n m
2. ibid., p.313. * P O
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education, etc., and there should be adequate industrial 
protection, a proper law for compensation in factories, 
proper wages should be paid and there should be an extension 
of the political rights of the natives. The Labour party 
should insist that Britain should be prepared for international 
supervision and responsibility over the colonies.
Philip Noel-Baker M.P. summed up for the N.E.C. and 
accepted the Leyton resolution, welcoming Sorensen*s 
proposal for a conference of representatives of the colonial 
peoples. Noel-Baker thought that there were three essential 
points about extending the mandate system: first, the 
interests of the indigenous peoples should be supreme;second, 
there should not be exclusive economic exploitation by the 
governing power, but economic equality for all the nations 
of the world; and third, the administration of the governing 
power should be subject to the control and supervision of 
an international authority. He believed that the mandate 
system had proved better than the old colonial system and 
that it had raised the standard of colonial government*
•We are certain that by the mandate system we can bring 
these people through to self-government and greater prosper-, 
ity and happiness than they have ever known before. * 1 
Conference accepted the arguments of the N.E.C.; the 
amendment was defeated and the resolution was accepted by 
a large majority.
The Labour party again rejected the revolutionary 
course of immediate emancipation in favour of the policy of 
trusteeship and preparation of the Africans for eventual 
self-government by education and international supervision. 
However, there was still no indication of how long the 
African colonies would be waiting for self-government.
1. Labour Party Conference Report 1939, p.315
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Leys's suggestion that the party should prepare a clear 
programme for immediate action had not been taken up.
Reid's demand that the party should prepare 'carefully 
worked out economic plans on socialist lines'^ had also been 
ignored. The official Labour party policy for the African 
colonies was still vague and there was still no sense of 
urgency about preparing the Africans for independence. There 
had been surprisingly little development in the Labour 
party's policy towards the African colonies during the 
interwar period.
The party attempted to protect African interests in
Parliament in the thirties but it was difficult to influence
the National Governments which were dominated by the
Conservatives. The Labour party was numerically weak in
the House of Commons in the thirties; after the 1931
General Election it only had 52 M.P.s an4 after the 1935
Election, it had 15^» The Conservatives, by comparison,
returned 473 M.P.s at the 1931 General Election and 432
2at the 1935 General Election. Arthur CraBchJones was a 
vigorous champion of African rights, and Milner, Lunn,
Morgan Jones, Paling and Wedgwood spoke, and asked 
questions, on African colonial affairs, but they did not 
have much impact on the colonial policy of the National 
Governments, except, perhaps, when Malcolm MacDonald was 
Colonial Secretary (1935* 1938-1940). The other National 
Government Colonial Secretaries, Cunliffe-Lister (1931-35),
J.H. Thomas (1935-1936) and Ormsby-Gore (1936-1938), were 
not sympathetic to Labour's policy. It might have been 
thought that J.H. Thomas, who had been a Labour Colonial
1 . T. Reid, *A Socialist looks at the Empire', Paper for 
the New Fabian Research Bureau, 1938.
2. D. Butler and A. Sloman, 'British Political Facts, 
1900-1975*, pp.183-184.
Secretary, would have been favourably disposed towards his 
former colleagues, but, as has been shown above, he had not 
been very keen on implementing Labour policy even in 1924. 
Thomas was more suited to be a Colonial Secretary in a 
Conservative-dominated Government than a Labour Government. 
Beaverbrook wrote to Thomas in 1935 to congratulate him for 
standing up against those who wanted to give away parts of 
the British Empire. 1 After Thomas resigned, as a result of 
an indiscretion over the budget, McGregor Ross wrote to 
Paling: 'Jimmy Thomas having gone (thank heaven!) could 
you get into touch with Lunn, Milner, Morgan Jones and 
Buxton to bring the actual state of affairs abruptly to 
the notice of the new Secretary of State for the Colonies.» 2 
The Labour party derived no benefit from Thomas being the 
National Government Colonial Secretary. Cunliffe-Hster 
and Ormsby-Gore were also indifferent to the pleas of 
Labour's African experts. McGregor Ross wrote to Morgan 
Jones, when Cunliffe-Lister was Colonial Secretary, that 
the prospect of overthrowing Cunliffe-Lister was 'delicious' 
but there was not much hope of changing African colonial 
policy ' among all the vast preoccupations engendered by 
India and Hitler. * 3 Ormsby-Gore was sympathetic to the 
white settlers in Africa, having been a member of the East 
Africa Commission of 1925, which had produced a report 
favourable to the settlers. The only National Government 
Colonial Secretary who was sympathetic to the aims of the 
Labour party's A.C.I.Q. and its pro-African M.P.s was 
Malcolm MacDonald.
1 . M. Beaverbrook to J.H. Thomas, 24 December 1935 15
February 1936, J.H. Thomas Papers UI625, C27 C28
2* P a p e r B<” ” *° Pali”s* 10 Mi>y 1936, McGregor Ross
3. McGregor Ross to Morgan Jones, 21 March 1935, ibid.
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Malcolm MacDonald was only Colonial Secretary for a 
brief spell in 1935 but returned in 1938 to be responsible 
for the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act which, 
unlike earlier colonial development acts, was primarily 
concerned with the development and welfare of the colonies, 
not with solving Britain's unemployment problems. 1 Malcolm 
MacDonald was largely in agreement with Creech Jones over 
colonial questions and knew some of the Labour party»s 
colonial experts, particularly, Professor V.M. Macmillan. 
MacDonald fought a battle with the Treasury to secure the 
money for the Colonial Devdopment and Welfare Act.
Eventually, with the support of Neville Chamberlain, he 
managed to squeeze £5m. out of the Treasury for the Colonial 
Development Fund. The Labour party supported MacDonald»s 
efforts to pass the Colonial Developmentand Melfare Act of 
1940. The only criticism was from Labour M.P.s such as 
Wedgwood who thought that MacDonald had failed to gain 
enough money for the fund. MacDonald had originally asked 
for £lOm9 but had to be content with £5m . 2
In the thirties, the Labour party in Parliament acted
as a pressure group to protect African interests and
encourage a more positive colonial policy. The later aim
met with some success when Malcolm MacDonald was Colonial
Secretary but, before that, Labour«s pro-Africa M.P.s and
A.C.I.Q. had little success apart from securing the
appointment of an adviser of colonial labour, Major Orde-
Browne. The National Government Colonial Secretaries,
apart from M. MacDonald, were sympathetic to the white
settlers, and the public was largely indifferent to the
problems of Africa. Unemployment in Britain and the
1- (Oxford^* 1967 )?"lal DeVel°pmet,t and Good Government '
2. Interview with Malcolm MacDonald, 21 August i973.
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aggressive moves of Germany and Italy seemed much more 
pressing problems to most people in Britain than the right 
of Africans.
CONCLUSION
467
As was stated in the introduction the aim of this thesis 
is not to castigate the Labour party for not achieving 
socialism according to Karl Marx. It is obvious that the 
Labour party has not achieved the abolition of the capitalist 
system which, according to Marx, was the root cause of human 
conflict, alienation and false consciousness. This thesis 
is not concerned with whether this Marxist vision is true 
or not but with whether the Labour party has made a vigorous 
effort to implement its own version of 'socialism* as 
outlined in its policy statements such as 'Labour and the 
New Social Order' and 'Labour and the Nation'’and in the 
writings of people such as Tawney. This version of 
'socialism* concentrates on democratic methods to try to 
reform society from one which is primarily based on 
competition and the struggle for profits to one which is 
based on co-operation and social justice - a society where 
there are not great inequalities of wealth and where there 
are no great differences in opportunity. Instead of 
concentrating on the Labour party's domestic policy, a study 
has been made in the area of colonial policy towards Africa 
to ascertain whether the Labour party's avowed devotion to 
social justice spread to Britain's colonial empire. This 
area is particularly interesting because it is one in which 
the Labour party is generally thought (for example by
M. Perham and R. Hinden)1 to have achieved the objectives 
of a democratic socialist party by showing humanitarian 
concern for the problems of the people of the colonies and 
trying to prepare them for independence by education and 
extending a helping hand. The period studied has been the
1 . M. Perham, 'The Colonial Reckoning», (London, 196l)
R. Hinden, 'Empire and After', (London, 1949).
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interior period because it was*during this period that the 
Labour party formulated its policy for the colonies and laid 
the groundwork for the 1945-51 Labour Government. It was 
during this period that the Labour party became the main 
opposition party to the Conservatives and set the guidelines 
for its future development. African opinion was not clearly 
developed; the Labour party was one of the main voices 
protecting African interests during the interwar period.
One of the difficulties of studying the interwar period 
in relation to the Labour party is that, although the Labour 
party did become the main opposition party during this period, 
it did not achieve complete power. Its two brief periods 
of government were periods of minority governmenta , during 
which it was dependent on the Liberal party for support.
It could be argued that this dependence restricted the 
Labour party and prevented it from pursuing the policies 
which it would have pursued if it had achieved a full 
majority. However, a study of Cabinet documents, Colonial 
Office minutes, private papers and memoirs suggests that 
the Labour ministers did not feel unduly restricted as 
far as colonial policy was concerned. There is no indica­
tion in the relevant papers that the Labour ministers felt 
restricted over colonial affairs by dependence on the 
Liberal party in Parliament. There is never any mention 
that the Labour Party ministers would have liked to pursue 
a certain policy but were held back because they were afraid 
that it would be defeated in the House of Commons. As far 
as colonial policy is concerned it would seem that the same 
policies would have been followed by the two ministers 
concerned , 1 J.H. Thomas and Lord Passfield, even if the
1 . Thi. la also tha point of vie. of Brett, op.cit., p.6 2.
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Labour party had had a comfortable majority. Whether 
different ministers would have chosen different policies 
is another question. Before an assessment is given of 
the Labour party's performance in office, it is necessary 
to sum up the Labour party's policy.
The Labour party issued three policy statements on 
colonial affairs in Africa between the wars1 and another 
was issued during the war. The policy statements between 
the wars were all very similar, there was little development 
in policy. The main theme of these policy statements was 
that two different policies were being pursued in Africa: 
the 'African' policy, mainly in West Africa and the 
•European' policy in most of East Africa, particularly Kenya. 
The 'African' policy was considered by the Labour party to 
be the better policy. In West Africa and the mandate, 
Tanganyika, the Africans kept the land and produced crops 
which were sold to European combines. There was also a 
policy of 'indirect rule*, by which the African chiefs 
played a part in the administration of the colonies. The 
Labour party tended to discuss East Africa in terms of 
Kenya, where the problem of the white settlers came to 
dominate most of the discussion about African colonial 
policy between the wars. In Kenya, the white settlers 
had taken the best land to cultivate themselves and the 
Africans were driven by economic circumstances to work 
for the white man in order to earn the money to pay taxa­
tion, which was higher for the Africans than the white 
settlers. Despite paying higher taxes, the Africans had
1 . 'The Empire in Africa: Labour's Policy* (1 9 2 0 );
•Labour and the Empire: Africa*, (1926)? »The Colonial
Empire* (1933 
The Colonies, (1943)*2.
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less money spent on their education per capita than the 
whites. More money was also spent per capita on other 
services for the whites« such as roads« than on other 
services for Africans. The Africans also had less civil 
rights than the white settlers« and hardly any say in the 
running of the East African colonies. Representation in 
the Legislative Council was on a communal basis and not on 
the principle of every nationality having the same voting 
system. Africans were not directly represented« missionaries 
usually representing them. This communal system was used to 
give the white settlers more seats than they would have 
warranted if voting had been proportional to numerical 
strength. The Africans and the Indian community were very 
critical of the communal franchise.
The main emphasis of the Labour party»a colonial policy 
between the wars was to try to apply the 'Vest African* 
policy to all parts of Africa which meant restoring the land 
to the Africans« giving them equal education and taxation 
with the white settlers and preparing them for eventual 
self-government, starting by a training in local government. 
The Labour party endorsed the policy of 'trusteeship* which 
had been put forward in Devonshire's White Paper of 1923, 1 
where it had been stated that whenever there was a conflict of 
interests in East Africa, the interests of the Africans 
would be paramount over those of the white settlers and 
the Indian community. Both parties upheld this policy but 
it appeared that the Labour party would be more determined 
to put it into operation since the Labour party did not 
have the links with the white settlers which many members 
of the Conservative party had.
1 . Memo on Indians in Kenya, Cmd.1922, 1923.
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The Labour party’s colonial policy was made mainly by 
E.D. Morel« Leonard Woolf* and C.R. Buxton* Other members 
of the A.C.I.Q. made comments and provided constructive 
criticisms« particularly Norman Leys, McGregor Ross and 
J.F.N. Green* Morel and Woolf wrote the first pamphlet, 
Woolf and Buxton, the next two after receiving advice from 
the A.C.I.Q. and Woolf wrote the 1943 pamphlet, again after 
consulting the A.C.I.Q* Morel and Woolf were mainly 
responsible for the idea that all the African colonies should 
follow the example of West Africa. C.R. Buxton was particul­
arly keen on the idea of pursuing an ’open door* policy of 
free trade in the colonies and providing international 
supervision of Britain’s colonial administration. Woolf and 
Green were both Fabian ex-civil servants and believed in 
gradual progress through education and local government.
Green also put emphasis on economic development. Leys and 
Ross were professional men (Leys was a doctor and Ross a 
civil engineer), who had worked in East Africa and been 
disgusted at the way the black population was being denied 
its rights. They had both joined the Labour party via 
the I.L.P. Leys was particularly keen on an equal rights 
policy and thought that the Labour party should put more 
emphasis on pursuing a policy of equal rights in the African 
colonies rather than pursuing a policy of trusteeship. He 
thought that the trusteeship policy of looking after the 
Africans until they were ’ready* for self-government was 
»hopelessly vague and sentimental* and put the Africans 
»into splints* when what they needed was to be ’allowed 
f r e e d o m * L e y s  thought that the Labour parV should make 
a firm commitment to abolishing all discriminatory legislation 
as soon as the party achieved power and instituting a policy 
1 . Leys to Harris, 17 February 1929 (A.S.A.P.S. Papers).
of complete equality between white and black In Africa, which 
would have meant an end to reserving land for the whites.
It would also have meant equal taxation for blacks and whites, 
equal expenditure per capita on education, roads and other
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service, for blacks end »hi tee and .«king e declaration that
the ale. of colonial government w.a to give aelf-government to 
the African, as soon a. possible. There should have been an 
equal franchise with an education test and white people should 
not have been given a vote if it was not allowed to the black 
people. The party should have done all it could by a 
programme of education and training to enable universal franchise 
to be instituted as soon as possible. Leys did not place much 
faith in a policy of indirect rule, believing that it was not 
preparing the Africans for self-government but preserving out­
dated tribal institutions which were dominated by the tribal 
chiefs and did not provide a basis for democratic government. 
Leya's policies of equal rights were themselves not completely 
clear but the main idea was that all discriminatory legisla­
tion should be repealed. Leys himself did not believe that 
the Africans should be given immediate- self-government during
the interwar period, but he felt that a greater sense of 
urgency should be devoted to colonial policy and he disliked 
the policy of trusteeship with lt. overtones of white 
superiority. Leys, and . few others in the Labour party 
such as Fenner Brockway, did regard the African, as of equal 
capabilities to whit, men but there were many i„ the party 
who suffered from a tremendous sens, of superiority in 
relation to Africans. The attitude of many was similar 
to that of the Webbs who wrote in 1 9 1 3 that the Africans 
should be regarded a. children and 'it would be idle to 
pretend that anything like effective self-government, even 
a, regards strictly local .ff.ir,, can lntroducod ^
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many generations to come and in some cases, conceivably 
never.«1 The Webbs did write this in 1913, when no one 
was advocating immediate self-government for the Africans, 
but it does indicate the Webbs* attitude of racial superiority. 
The Webbs, and many others in the Labour party, thought that 
very leisurely progress should be made towards self-government 
for the Africans. The main difference between Leys and 
people such as the Webbs, was that Leys believed in 1918 
that independence should come in about 20 years, and great 
efforts should be made by the colonial power to give 
independence as soon as possible; Webb, however, thought 
that many generationswould have to pass before the Africans
« r .  'ready1. H. thought that ther. va. no immediate hurry 
to achieve independence.
Leys%ideas about equal rights did have some influence 
on the Labour party: the 1943 colonial policy statement did 
show more concern at the existence of colour bars in the 
African colonies. Another slight change in the 1943 
statement was concerning the development of the African 
economies. The interwar colonial policy statements had 
not shown much concern with the development of the African 
economies. Although the 1933 statement had stated that
the aim of Labour policy was «Socialisation and self-
: 2government», there was not much indication of how this 
socialisation of agriculture and industry was to be achieved.
The main reasn for this lack of economic analysis was that 
Morel, Woolf and Buxton did not place much emphasis on the 
development of modern agriculture and industry in Africa. 
However, in the late thirties, Green and Reid tried to make
3 7 c S 2 7 i » * E " U ? o e i*l l ~ aBd tho C h8ii" s *2. The Colonial Empire, op.cit., p#4.
the Labour party more aware of the need for economic develop­
ment in the colonies. They tended to place this before 
political development and Leys argued with Held that political 
development should come f i r s t I t  would seem to be the case 
that both were needed together but there were some in the 
Labour party who hoped that the African could be spared the 
process of industrial development. Wedgwood thought that 
Britain should not try to impose its own civilisation on the 
Africans. He thought the African should be left alone on 
his own land and should not be pressed into the labour market. 
The Labour party during this period was not really concerned 
with the question of whether the African colonies should give 
priority to agricultural or industrial development. Its 
main concern for most of the period was to make sure that 
Africans had enough land to be self-sufficient as in West 
Africa. The main idea was to prevent the African from 
being exploited by the white man. Most of the Labour party*s 
experts were wary of economic development because they felt 
that it might lead to greater exploitation of the African.
As Brett says, * Lab cur, at least until the late thirties, 
took little positive interest in the development debate 
except with regard to the protection of African labour*.2
i
This attitude was also supported by the unions, particularly 
Ernest Bevin who was worried that if there was economic 
development in the African colonies this would lead to 
competition for British workers. Therefore, for the inter­
war period the Labour party devoted little thought to how 
African agriculture and industry could be developed. It 
was M. MacDonald who did the most for the economic development 
of the colonies during the war and the Labour party responded
1. Gupta, op.cit., p.279.
2. EoA. Brett, op.cit., p.60.
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to these developments in Its war statement on colonial policy* 
However, the basic policy outlined in 1943 was still that 
which had been put forward in 1920*
The I*L.P. provided strong criticism of Labour party 
policy in the 1930s, after the 1*L*P* had left the Labour 
party* In the 1920s, I.L.P. policy was similar to Labour 
policy because the I*L*P* Empire Committee and the Labour 
party's A.C.I.Q. had an overlapping membership - Buxton,
Leys, Ross and Woolf* The main influences on the A.C.I.Q* 
were Buxton and Woolf, the chairman and the secretary, but 
people such as Leys and Laski wielded more influence on the 
I.L.P* committee, therefore the I*L.P. policy, although 
basically the same as Labour party policy, had a greater 
sense of urgency about it* In the 1930s, the I.L.P* 
repudiated Labour policy totally. I.L.P. policy became 
much more radical and Labour policy was continually 
criticised in the I.L.P. press, particularly, the 'New 
Leader*• Reginald Reynolds and George Padmore were 
critical of Labour policy because of its paternalistic 
assumptions of white superiority. Reynolds thought that 
Transport House treated the Africans as if they were 'pigs 
being fattened for the market*. He believed that the 
Labour party's empire policy was 'the theory of fascism 
disguised in Gladatonian rags.'1 By this, ha meant that 
the Labour party did not regard the Africans as equals but 
as inferiors who could not make any contribution themselves 
and must wait until*LondonJ meaning Transport House and 
Parliament, deemed they were 'fit* for self-government•
The 'Gladstonian rags' were the Labour party's attachment 
to the Liberal principles of free trade and international
1. see above pp.374-375
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supervision for the colonies* Reynolds*S arguments were 
propaganda rather that detailed analysis: it was unfair to 
brand the Labour party as fascist in the same manner as 
Hitler*s Germany. However, Reynolds did have a point for 
many leading figures in the Labour party, particularly Sidney 
Webb/Lord Passfield, did regard the Africans as different 
and, in many ways, inferior to white men* Therefore, the 
colonial power would have to look after them as children until 
they had ’grown up*. However, there were some, mainly on the 
left of the Labour party, such as Leys, Brockway, and, to a 
certain extent Wedgwood and McGregor Ross, who did not suffer 
from this handicap* It was these people who were mainly 
responsible for the good reputation which the Labour party 
unde among some African leaders, who were befriended and 
helped when they came to London* It is true that most 
people at the time did asstime this attitude of racial 
superiority but one might have expected the Labour party 
to have made more of an effort to counteract these ideas 
of racial superiority rather than, in the main, to agree 
with them*
It is easy to criticise the Labour party’s colonial 
policy in the interwar period with the benefit of hindsight. 
However, during this period, Britain was largely preoccupied 
with her own economic troubles and most people in Britain 
had neVer travelled outside the country, let alone
to the African colonies* The same probably applied to 
the P*L*P* It was the people who had most direct contact 
with the colonies such as Leys, Brockway and Ross who were 
urging the party to put more effort into its colonial policy 
and treat the Africans as potential equals rather than a 
different species. The main criticisms that can be made 
of the Labour party’s colonial policy during this period
were: (l) It did not put enough emphasis on a policy of 
equal rights for all in the colonies irrespective of class, 
colour or creed: (2) There was too great a readiness to 
believe that everything was perfect in West Africa, when, 
in that area, the Africans were mainly dependent on selling 
crops to? huge combines which were more interested in making 
profits than furthering the interests of the Africans (also, 
in West Africa, there was the question of whether too much 
power was given to African chiefs and whether this restricted 
the democratic progress of their people): (3) There was not 
enough emphasis on the economic development of the colonies 
because the people who made the party's policy, Morel, Buxton 
and Woolf placed most emphasis on protecting the African 
from exploitation by the white man rather than developing 
African industry and agriculture (they hoped that the 
Africans could be spared the process of industrialisation 
which had caused so much misery in Britain):(4)There was too 
little sense of urgency in the Labour party's policy 
statements and there was no indication of what sort of 
timescale the party was working on| the policy was rather 
vague about the process by which the Africans would gain 
independence and when it would come. Nevertheless, the 
policy would have made a difference if it had been 
implemented and would have put some substance into the 
promise that British colonial policy was ensuring that 
the interests of the Africans were 'paramount1 over all 
other groups in Africa. Leonard Woolf wrote that if the 
Labour party had tried to put its policy into effect, it 
would have seveniy hurt the interests of the white colonial 
population and he expected them to 'fight like cats in a 
corner»1 to prevent the implementation of the policy. The
1 L. Woolf Papers, Memo on the Problems of East Africa.
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policy did worry the white settlers. This is clearly shown 
in M. Perham's journal of her travels in East Africa at the 
time of the Second Labour Government. 1
Despite the weaknesses of Labour's policy, it had been 
worked out by the beginning of the 1920s, printed in a 
pamphlet, discussed in books by leading party members and 
presented in parliament as Labour policy by Labour's main 
colonial spokesmen, Wedgwood and Spoor. There was no 
reason for a Labour Colonial Secretary to state that the 
party had not worked out a policy and he would therefore 
have to follow the lead given by his civil servants. The 
A.C.I.Q. had worked out a policy for a Labour Colonial 
Secretary to follow if he had the inclination. J.H. Thomas 
was not a suitable choice for Colonial Secretary in the first 
Labour Government. He had no experience and knowledge of 
the colonies, he was a trade unionist who was more interested 
in Britain's domestic problems than the problems of the 
Empire. He tried to refuse the post because he felt that 
it was not important enough for him until it was pointed out 
that the office was high up the official Cabinet list. His 
friend Lord Beaverbrook congratulated him on achieving one 
of 'the biggest offices in the stall.' There were more 
suitable people in the Labour party who had shown a continued 
interest in the problems of the empire. Josiah Wedgwood 
would have been the most appropriate choice since he had 
been Labour's main Colonial Spokesman in the House of 
Commons, where he had put forward the A.C.I.Q.'s colonial 
policy forcefully and had committed the party to looking at 
the question of communal franchises in the empire with a view
to their abolition. Wedgwood had made an impact in the
1 . M. Perham 'East African Journey*, (London, 1976)
2. Beaverbrook to Thomas, 23 January 1924, Thomas Papers.
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House of Commons and was talked about as a possible leader 
of the party but he and MacDonald were not on good terms 
and because MacDonald may have regarded him as a rival, the 
Prime Minister may have decided not to give Wedgwood a post 
which he wanted and where he might have made an impact. 
Another factor may have been that MacDonald felt that 
Wedgwood would stir up too much trouble with the settlers. 
Morel, who had worked with MacDonald before the war, would 
have also been a more appropriate choice than Thomas;
Morel was an expert on colonial policy and the co-author 
of the A.C.I.Q.'s statement on colonial policy. MacDonald 
probably thought that he was not an Important enough figure 
in the Labour party to be given the Colonial Office.
However, he did suggest to Thomas that perhaps he should 
have Morel as his private secretary. This suggestion was 
rejected by Thomas because he felt that Morel was an 
extremist who would not be acceptable to the settler 
interest in Africa. MacDonald did nothing to suggest to 
Thomas that the aim of Labour's policy was to reduce the 
power of the settlers, not let them determine who should 
be in the Labour Colonial O f f i c e T h e  appointment of 
Thomas as Labour's first Colonial Secretary was an example 
of the low priority which MacDonald placed on trying to 
achieve the policy that had been worked out by Labour's 
A.C.I.Q* MacDonald made no effort to utilise the 
A.C.I.Q* to provide detailed advice to the Colonial Secretory 
on how the Labour party could achieve its colonial policy. 
Instead of putting the emphasis on listening to the party 
experts, Thomas, the Colonial Secretary, became very 
dependent on the civil servants of the Colonial Office who
X. Morel rapers•
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regarded the Labour party experts as »extremists'.
Thomas made no effort to put the Labour party*s policy 
Into effect when he was Colonial Secretary. Brett's 
assessment Is that Thomas was »doubtless the worst Colonial 
Secretary of State this century, who made no noticeable 
attempt to understand any of the problems with which he had 
to deal and therefore invariably allowed matters to take the 
course already set for them . 1 This assessment seems to be 
borne out by the facts. Thomas failed to honour the Labour 
party's pledge to the Indians in Kenya. He pursued a policy 
of continuity, following the path set in Kenya by the Duke of 
Devonshire. His main contribution was to set up various 
commissions to examine the problems of Africa but he made no 
attempt to ensure that the views of the A.C.I.Q. would be the 
main ideas examined. The commissions were nicely balanced 
to ensure there was no domination by people the settlers might 
regard as 'extremists'. Thomas chose as the Labour 
representative for the Commission which visited East Africa, 
Major Church who had no expert knowledge or great interest 
in African affairs. When the Commission eventually reported, 
during the next Conservative administration, Major Church 
was full of praise for the white settlers of East Africa.
The result of this was that anyone who criticised the 
settlers, such as Leys or Ross, was regarded in official 
circles as a 'dangerous extremist*.
In Cabinet' Thomas argued against redeeming tfedguood's 
pledge about the abolition of the communal franchise in 
Kenya. In Parliament, Thornes emphasised the need to 
preserve continuity in colonial policy vith the Conservatives. 
The problem „as that if Labour „as going to implement the 
A.C.I.Q. policy, there „as need for some discontinuity.
1 . E.A. Brett, op.cit., pp.180-1.
This applied particularly in Kenya where the interests of the
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white settlers were paramount. In order to implement the 
policy of making African interests paramount, the settlers 
would have been forced tolose the many privileges they 
possessed compared to the Africans. No attempt was made by 
Thomas to reduce the privileges of the settlers •
Thomas «s major interest seemed to be to go round the 
country and the empire making speeches trying to reassure the 
middle classes that Labour meant no harm to the empire. At 
the British Empire Exhibition, he declared that ‘nothing is 
more mistaken than the idea..•.that Labour is hostile to the 
Empire and the imperial idea. * 1 Thomas was very proud of 
the empire and the British Constitution which had enabled 
him to come from humble beginnings as an engine cleaner to 
become a Cabinet Minister. He did not seem to be aware 
that in many parts of the empire, particularly, in Africa, 
the Labour Government was presiding over a system which did 
not provide social justice for the Africans. Yet he himself
had outlined the A.C.I.Q.*s policy in a book ironically
2entitled »When Labour Rules*. When Thomas did rule as he
himself carefully pointed out, the contents of this book were 
ignored«? The Labour A.C.I.Q. policy statement was re­
issued in 1926 and Thomas wrote a foreword. However, he 
did not discuss what he had done to put the policy into 
effect when he had been Colonial Secretary. The statement 
completely ignored his period at the Colonial Office because 
little had been achieved.
It could be argued that Thomas»s task was particularly 
difficult because the Government was in a minority and it 
was the first Labour Government of all time. He had
1 . The Times, 9 August 1924.
2. J.H. Thomas. »When Labour Rules« (London. 1920)
%  see above p.I29,interview with 'Joh n Bull«,31 May 1924
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proved that a Labour Colonial Secretary could rule the empire 
as well as a Conservative Colonial Secretary. However, if a 
Labour Colonial Secretary was going to pursue the same 
policies as a Conservative Colonial Secretary, there was little 
point in having a Labour Colonial Secretary. Thomasfailure 
to make any progress in implementing the policy of the 
A.C.I.Q. has also been explained1 by stating that the A.C.I.Q. 
policy was not official Labour policy in 1924, but, as has 
been pointed out, the A.C.I.Q. policy had been outlined by 
Wedgwood in the Commons as Labour policy, and Thomas himself 
had declared that it was what the Labour party would do when 
it ruled. Another explanation that could be advanced for 
Thomas *s lack of achievement is that the Labour Government 
was only in power for under a year and dependent on Liberal 
support. However, the Labour A.C.I.Q.« 8 policy had aUpport
among the Liberals. Buxton and Morel were ex-Liberals who 
still supported many Liberal principles such as freedom of 
trade, international supervision and individual rights.
Labour policy was mainly concerned with trying to apply 
these principles to Africa. Leys stated that his main aim 
was to apply Liberal principles to the African colonies. 2 
The policy of the A.C.I.Q. did owe a lot to Liberal 
principles and there is no indication from Cabinet papers 
that Thomas felt restrained by the Liberals. LibeidM.P.s 
such as J.H. Harris, 3 were strongly committed to improving 
the position of the African vis-a-vis the settlers. It 
was the Liberal member of the East Africa Commission,
Linfield, who wrote a dissenting report critical of the 
settlers in East Africa. The point about the shortage of 
time has validity, but it seems extremely doubtful from the
1. J.H. Mower, op.eit.
2. Leys to Harris. 31 December 1919
3. He later joined the Labour party! a .s .a .p .s . PaperstGl4l.
speeches of* Thomas in Parliament, in the country and in the 
Cabinet, and by his refusal to accept Morel as a private 
secretary, that he would have pursued different policies, 
even if the Labour party had possessed a large majority 
over all the other parties* Thomas was not the right 
choice if the Labour party was determined to enforce the 
policy of ensuring that the interests of the Africans were 
made paramount in East Africa. He seemed more suited as 
Colonial Secretary in the Conservative-dominated National 
Government, which he later became.
Labour*s second Colonial Secretary was Sidney Webb, 
who became Lord Passfield to take over the Colonial Office. 
Passfield had begun his career as a civil servant in the 
Colonial Office and was one of the main 'intellectuals* 
of the Labour movement. He had been responsible, with 
Henderson, for drafting »Labour and the New Social Order* 
which had committed the party to democratic socialism. 
Passfield had also been instrumental in setting up the 
Labour party's advisory committees after the war. In 
theory, Passfield appeared to be a more promising choice 
as Colonial Secretary than Thomas but, in practice, he was 
to prove just as disappointing. As Leonard Woolf points 
out in his memoirs, 1 Lord Passfield had never shown much 
interest in foreign or colonial affairs and, as has been 
shown above, Passfield and his wife did not hold a very 
high opinion of Africans.
However, Gregory2 has interpreted Passfield's period 
of office as a moderately successful one, but this inter­
pretation was made without the benefit of Cabinet papers 
which present a different picture. Gregory thinks that 
1 . L. Woolf 'Downhill All the Way* (London. 1967) „ o,a
2* l;thTesory' aey tfebb “ d E,,* t  « * i o .? r ( 8 S ; 2 2 ? : r ,
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Passfield had reasonable success because he reformed the 
colonial office structure, passed the Colonial Development 
Act, abandoned the Conservative scheme for Closer Union in 
East Africa which would have given the settlers more 
powers, and issued a progressive «White Paper on Native 
Policy«. The reform of the Colonial Service may have been 
due to Lord Passfield because he was very keen on achieving 
«socialism« by administrative reforms but Kenneth Robinson 
has pointed out that the effect of this reform was to make 
it more difficult for Africans to achieve posts in the 
Colonial Service. 1 The Colonial Development Act was a 
Conservative measure, which Passfield put into effect.
Its main purpose was not to hasten the economic development 
of the African colonies but to try to alleviate unemployment 
in Britain and it made no great impact on the economic 
development of African colonies. 2 The main area of 
controversy was over the question of closer union in Africa 
and here, in contrast to what Gregory states, Passfield was 
very willing at first to Implement a plan favourable to the 
settlers which had been recommended by his Permanent 
Secretary, Sir Samuel Wilson. After seeing Passfield,
Grigg, the Governor df Kenya, was convinced that the settlers 
would be given more powers in Kenya. Passfield presented a 
paper to Cabinet advocating this. 3 However, Passfield was 
defeated in Cabinet, mainly due to the efforts of Wedgwood 
Benn, the Secretary of State for India, who was trying to 
safeguard the interests of the Indians in Kenya . 4 When the
1 . K. Robinson, »Dilemmas of Trusteeship« (London. 1965)
2. E.A. Brett, op.cit., p.133.
3. See above Chapter 6 and Gupta, op.cit., pp.196-199
4. Gregory underestimates the influence if Wedgwood Benn
placing toomuch reliance on B„ Webb's Diaries. *
485
Government*s White Paperi on Closer Union wo5 • eventually
issued« Grigg and the settlers were dismayed to find that
the views of the Secretary of State had changed* This was
due to opposition in Cabinet and vigorous lobbying by the
members of the A.C.I.Q., the A.S.A.P.S., and Lord Lugard and
the Rev. Oldham. These pressures had forced Passfield to
change his plan for abandoning the offical majority in the
Kenyan Legislative Council. As well as the abandonment of
this plan« the settlers in Bast Africa were dismayed at
Passfield's*White Paper on Native Policy* , 1  which closely
followed the A.C.I.Q. policy on colonial affairs.
Passfield had consulted C.R. Buxton and Brockway when he
was drawing up this paper. It emphasised that the interests
of the Africans should be paramount over the white settlers
and the Indians in East Africa, and outlined the policies
which should be pursued to achieve this aim. The members
of the A.C.I.Q. were very pleased, and hoped that progress
would be made towards implementing this White Paper.
However, Passfield showed no great enthusiasm for the
policies advocated in his White Paper. In Cabinet, he
had stated that he had written the White Paper maidy to
placate the pressure groups who were pressing for the
Africans* interests. The settlers were not to know this
and were very angry when the 'Black Papers* as they called
3them were published.
The problem was that although Passfield had set out 
Labour party policy, he made no great effort to ensure that 
it was implemented. Like Thomas, he did not implement the
Labour party's policy in detail. He made radical sounding 
statements but did not follow them up, instead, he set up the
l". Cmd. 3573. %
2 . C.P. 308 (29)
3. H. Parham, ’Bast African Jour-nay. a ondon> 19?6)
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Joint Committee on Closer Union to decide policy for him. 
Members of the A.C.I.Q. lobbied Passfield in the House of 
Lords to try to persuade him to insist upon a revision of 
the East African budgets in favour of the Africans; but 
Leonard Woolf writes that Lord Passfield had 'at his 
fingertips* all the arguments for doing nothing.* This 
made Woolf, the secretary of the A.C.I.Q., wonder whether 
there was any point in the committee working out policies 
for the Labour party if nothing was done about them when 
the party achieved office. Other members of the A.C.I.Q. 
felt the same. McGregor Ross wrote, soon after Passfield 
had been appointed, that 'Passfield has been a great dis­
appointment and anxiety to the Labour party. ' 2 He hoped 
that Passfield would improve over time. However, he was 
to be disappointed; in 1935 he wrote that a 'proper 
socialist Colonial Secretary* would have given the 
settlers ^  time-notice and frogmarched them off the land - 
substituting state operations.* Leys was so disillusioned 
with Passfield's performance that he resigned from the 
A.C.I.Q. to write another book to publicise the plight of 
the Africans in East Africa. He thought that Passfield was 
surrounded in the Colonial Office by people who hated 
Labour party policy and that Passfield preferred to listen 
to them rather than the Labour party experts.^ Leys
wrote in 1939 that the Labour Government of 1929-31 left 
'no markt on colonial policy'•
These accounts of Passfield's tenureship may have been 
partial, but even his 'second-in-command* at the Colonial
Office, Drummond Shiels felt disappointed with the leadership
1 . L. Woolf* op.cit., p.238.
2. Ross Papers, Ross to Northey, 26 December 1929.
3. ibid., Ross to Owen, 19 March 1935,
4. Leys to Harris, 8 November 1929, A.S.A.P.S. Papers 
A.C.I.Q. Memo No. 205, February 1939.
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of Passfield. He believed that Pasafield was moving too 
slowly. 1 The civil aervanta at the Colonial Office were 
not dedicated to the settlers* interests; they accepted 
the policy of truateeahip2 but they were determined to 
move at a slow pace, particularly, the Permanent Secretary, 
Sir Samuel Wilson. The senior civil aervanta at the 
Colonial Office felt that members of the A.C.I.Q., 
particularly Leya, were‘dangerous extremists« whose advice 
should be treated very sceptically. Passfield seemed to 
feel happier with the advice of his senior civil servants 
than that provided byithe A.C.I.Q. Shiela and some of the 
younger civil servants, however, may have been prepared to 
follow a slightly more radical course. A study of Colonial 
Office minutes shows that the senior civil servants were 
continually advising caution and care and were against any 
policy of «head on« confrontation with the white settlers in 
East Africa. The civil servants also upheld the status quo 
in West Africa, which, during Passfield«s period of office, 
was not the haven of peace and prosperity which it appeared 
to be from Labour party policy statements. There were many 
riots and demonstrations during this period and, on several 
occasions, force was used to contain the demonstrations. 3 
Passfield appeared eager to commend the officers Involved 
in these incidents, but Drummond Shiels advised more caution 
and wanted to find out the facts before issuing commendations. 
Inquiries sometimes found that the military had been too 
eager to use force, particularly, in the case of the Aba 
riots. Passfield seems to have been more willing to uphold 
thejtsejrf force against African demonstrator, than might have
1 • t) 0 StiA©Xfl Id M• Colt. VaKKe au.j , .
(London, 1948) * ® ebbs and th#lr
2* 1967)C°l0nlal Dov<,lop®®nt and G<>od Government« (Oxford,
3« See Chapter 7 above.
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been expected from a Labour Colonial Secretary, who waa 
concerned to see that Justice waa done in the colonies.
Passfield»s period of office waa a great disappointment 
to those in the Labour party who were concerned to see that 
the party upheld the pledge to make African interests
paramount. The policy of trusteeship was a tenable one if 
it was pursued vigorously with a real effort to ensure that 
the Africans were being prepared for self-government but 
Passfield failed to do this. Hi. tenure.hip of the Colonial 
Office was characterised by delay and vacillation. Like 
Thomas, he preferred to set up Committees rather than to 
make decisions to implement Labours policy. Radical African 
leaders such as Kenyatta were not allowed to appear before 
the Joint Committee on Closer Union, neither would Passfield 
receive them. However, Drummond Shiels did receive 
Kenyatta to point out to him that the Africans should 
pursue the constitutional path to reform as the Labour 
party had done in Britain, 1 but it could have been pointed 
out to Shiels that the constitutional path did not seem to 
be achieving very much as far as colonial affairs were 
concerned. When the second Labour Government fell, the 
settlers were still secure in Bast Africa. Land, labour, 
education and taxation policies put the interests of the 
white settlers above those of the Africans. ihere was
.till discriminatory legislation in exi.t.nc. In the African 
colonies- In Southern Rhodesia, Pa..field had appror.d ,nch 
legislation in respect of land . 2 In West Africa, the 
African, « r e  still dominated by tcapitaliat* combine, 
and the 'landlordism* of the African chiefs. W l  that c„  
be said is that the Labour Gorernment prevented the settler.
2- tfhlch h”  «*Jr ju.t'been'r.pe^d0"; £ « “ "977! 1974,P*122*
from becoming more powerful in E.»t Africe, but thi. we. not 
due to Paaafield. Although the eettl.re were furioue when 
the Whit. Pepere were publi.h.d, they were relieved th.t they 
were not fully implemented rad became the 'obiter diet«» of 
a minority government, aa Grigg later wrote.1
In defence of P.aafi.ld and the Labour Government, it 
could be «aid that the Government did not have an ab.olut. 
majority and waa dependent on Liberal aupport. It could 
■lac be pointed out that Britain waa in the midat of a world 
wlda depreaalon which made people think that Britain could 
not devote much reaourc.a or energy to the problem, of the 
African coloniea. However, a. ham been pointad out when 
Thomaa waa the Colonial Secretary, there la little to 
indicate that the Liberal.would have been agalnat the 
Labour party»« policy if there had b.en .a attempt to 
Implement it. On the contrary, many Liberal« were urging 
the government to be firmer in implementing it, commitment..2 
Ih. point i. that the will wa. lacki^. The .am. lack of 
will and determination to implement policie. ehown on 
1h. domeatic front. The Labour party failed, with greater 
con.equencea for it.elf, on economic policy. The Labour 
Chancellor, Philip Snowden, waa more orthodox than the 
TV.aaury. Radical id... auch a, thoa. put forward by Key»., 
and Moaley were ignored, a. radical idea, on colonial policy 
had been ignored. Again, the Liberal, would have aupport.d a 
more radical economic policy: the Liberal party had included 
a policy of public work. .. p.rt of their progremm..
Labour», l.ad.r.hip during the int.rw.r period we. very 
orthodox on economic policy. D. Marquand3 ahow. in hi.
i r r ^ t r i n c h a m  (Sir Edward Grigg, E.ny... Opportunity 
2* See Chapter 6.
3 . D. Marquand, »R.„,.y MacDonald* (London,1977) Chapter 2 3 .
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biography of MacDonald that it was not only MacDonald who 
waa sceptical of public works but the entire Labour Cabinet*
The Labour leadership lacked radical ideas about what to do 
in office* Although they expressed high ideals in their 
speeches« when they were in office they had no great determina­
tion or idea of how to turn their ideals into reality* There 
were alternative policies available on economic affairs and 
colonial affairs but the leadership chose the policies which 
were presented to them by their civil servants rather than 
those proposed by radicals such as Mosley and Leys* As 
Marquand points out« the Labour party was ‘shot through, often 
without its realising the fact, with assumptions derived 
from the social order against which it was in revolt*
During the interwar period the Labour party had a ready made 
excuse for its failure to achieve anything in office* It 
was because it was dependent on the Liberals. In reality, 
this disguised the fact that the leadership had no great 
desire or idea of how to achieve anything radical. Radical 
advice was regarded as unsound and inappropriate to the 
circumstances* The Labour party was unwilling to critically 
examine the roots of a problem and work out detailed policies 
which would have led to root-and-branch change* It 
preferred instead to rely on vague rhetoric, which, when 
tested, turned out to have little substance*
Labour's lack of determination to pursue policies which 
would have made a difference to the power structure applied 
equally at home, and in the colonies* A determined attempt 
to redistribute resources from the middle classes to the 
working classes at home and from the settlers and combines to 
the Africans in the colonies might have led to opposition in 
parliament* The point is that no such attempt was made
X* ibid*, pp.794-795«
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and the ministers concerned did not give the impression that 
they would have followed more radical1 policies to cure 
unemployment at home and ensure African interests were 
paramount in the colonies, even if they had had a good 
working majority in Parliament.
A* additional difficulty In i m p l a n t i n g  colonial policy 
waa the distance that the minister was from the colonies.
The Colonial Office had the problem that it was far removed 
from Africa and it took time for communication, to reach 
Africa and replies to return. The Colonial Secretary 
depended for information, and the implementation of his 
policy, on the 'men on the spot* . the administrators in 
the colonies. However, as Drummond Shiels, pointed out, 
some of these people were looking for a firmer lead from 
London than they received from Lord Passfield. Also 
Pasafield could have been more determined to replace people 
who did not follow the instructions of the Colonial Office. 
Governor Grigg of Kenya frequently had arguments with 
Passfield because Grigg was very sympathetic to the European 
settler.! but Pa.sfield did not recall him, despite 
suggestions from Drummond Shiels that he should do so.
It was obvious that as long a. Grigg was Governor of Kenya, 
no move, would be made to ensure that African interests were 
made paramount. One would have expected a Labour Colonial 
Secretary to make sure that the Governors were people who 
would put African interests to the fore - as all parties 
had stated this was their policy. Pa.sfl.ld was too willing
to accept things as they were, instead of making . vigorous 
effort to change them.
Radical is taken here, and throughout the thesis, to mean 
affecting the foundation or going to the root of a problem - 
root-and-branch change or reform. (Oxford Dictionary).
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Gupta concludes his discussion of Passfield's period 
at the Colonial Office by stating that 'in the tussle between 
principles and expediency principles won.'*- This conclusion 
is somewhat different from that of the members of the A.C.I.Q. 
who thought that Passfield, although he had outlined Labour 
principles, had not done enough to ensure that they were put 
into practice* It seems, to the present writer, that during 
Passfield's period at the Colonial Office Labour principles 
were not carried out, there was no determined attempt to 
implement the White Paper of 1930* No extra resources were 
devoted to African education in order to train the Africans 
for independence* The position of the African did not 
improve during Passfield's tenureahip. The white settlers 
still maintained all their privileges over the Africans* 
Although Passfield was pressed tomake greater efforts to 
implement the White Paper, he showed no sense of urgency, 
it seems that under Passfield, as under Thomas, expediency 
was the main determinant of Labour policy at the Colonial 
Office. As Leonard Woolf wrote, Lord Passfield, as 
Colonial secretary, displayed a 'masterly inactivity' 
whenever an opportunity arose to do something different 
from what Conservative Governments and the Colonial Office
civil service had endorsed as safe, sound and 'progressive'
2for the last half-century.' Woolf concludes,correctly 
in the opinion of the present writer,that despite all the 
difficulties the Labour Governments faced in the interwar 
period, both Thomas and Passfield failed to carry out 
Labour's 'promises in cases where they could and should have
3done so*'
Drummond Shiels was a member of the A*C*I*Q* and did
Gupta, op.cit., p*200
2. L. Woolf, op.cit., p.237.
3, ibid., p.236.
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make some effort to implement the party*« policies but he 
was dismayed by Passfield*s conservatism. However, Drummond 
Shiels did start work in the Colonial Office to help develop 
proper trade unions in the African colonies, but this work 
had only just begun when the Labour Government fell, and the 
Conservative Government did not put so much emphasis on it. 
Nevertheless, the Labour movement did follow the question up 
and the British trade unions began to take an interest in the 
colonies in the 1930s. The trade unionists, in particular, 
Ernest Bevin, were worried that if the African colonies began 
to industrialise, they might provide competition for Britain, 
as a result of the low wages that were paid to the African 
workers. Therefore, in order to prevent undercutting of 
British wages, the T.U.C. formed its own colonial committee, 
to advise African trade unionists and help the Africans to 
develop trade unions. The committee, which was largely 
staffed by members of the A.C.I.Q., provided model rules 
for African trade unions.
In Parliament during the 1930s Creech Jones, a trade 
unionist, became very active on behalf of the Africans.
He asked many questions and conducted a great deal of 
correspondence on behalf of the Africans, trying to deal 
with their grievances. He was a member of the A«C*I.Q. 
and was provided with information and help from the other 
members of the A.C.I.Q. particularly CoR.Buxton, McGregor 
Hoes and Norman L e y s I t  was these people who were 
responsible for the Labour party's »good reputation' on 
colonial matters between the wars and not the leadership 
or. the Colonial Office Secretaries of State.
After the war, Creech Jones became the Colonial 
Secretary. He was a better choice than the other Colonial 
Secretaries had been and he did make an effort to try to 
I.Xeys vas aforuer »ember but he kept Bending and later attended again
implement the policy that Labour had worked out in the inter­
war period but the problem was that by the end of the second 
world war« the policy that had been appropriate in the 
early 1920s was becoming dated. By 1945, there was need 
for some urgency in the:preparations for self-government 
for the African colonies and also for resources to be devoted 
to the economic development of the colonies. As Fenner 
Brockway points out, the war had given experience of wider 
horizons to Britain*» colonial subjects: 'they had fought 
for democracy; they gave themselves...to its achievement 
in their homelands’ after the war. The sixth Pan- 
African Congress was held in Manchester in 1945* For the 
first time younger more determined African leaders were 
there - among them Kenyatta from Kenya, Nkrumah from the 
Gold Coast, AkLntola from Nigeria, Johnson from Sierra 
Leone. As Basil Davidson states, the notion of ’European 
trusteeship' went ’neck and crop out of the window into 
the Manchester fog.* The delegates declared; *we demand 
for Africa autonomy and Independence, so far, and no further, 
than it is possible in this One World for groups and peoples 
to rule themselves subject to inevitable world unity and 
federation.•.We are determined to be free, (but) if the 
Western world is still determined to rule Mankind by force, 
then Africans, as a last resort, may have to appeal to force 
in the effort to achieve f r e e d o m . T h e  Africans were soon 
disappointed by Britain’s unwillingness to move rapidly 
towards the acceptance of African independence and its 
unwillingness to provide much economic aid to the African 
colonies. Britain was not in a very good position to 
provide much economic help after the war, but many Labour
1 . Fenner Brockway, ’The Colonial Revolution', (London,
1973)»P»37*
2 . B. Davidson, ,,’Which Way Africa?’ (Penguin,3rd ed.)1971,P«66.Quoted, ibid.
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ministers gave no indication that they had much desire to 
help the Africans. Hugh Dalton, as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, was very reluctant to provide economic aid to 
what he later called ’the pullulating, poverty-stricken, 
diseased nigger communities.«1 Bevin, Labour's Foreign 
Secretary, regarded the colonies in terms of Britain's self- 
interest, as sources of raw materials which could be used as 
a bargaining counter with the U.S.A. Neither of these two 
ministers was prepared to help the African colonies for the 
benefit of the Africans. If the interests of the Africans 
tied in with those of Britain, that was well and good but 
if they did not, Creech Jones had great difficulty in 
persuading the Labour Government to provide help. The 
major scheme of economic development, which was meant to 
be of mutual benefit to both countries, was the groundnuts 
scheme, but it ended in disaster.
The Labour Government and the Colonial Office were 
shocked out of their complacency towards the African colonies 
when riots broke out in the Gold Coast in 1948. This
was a turning point, concessions had to be made. The 
Labour party began to realise that one of the factors in 
the situation which it had regarded as constant was now 
beginning to change. The Africans were no longer going to 
wait until «London* decided that they were capable of «good 
Government«, they wanted self-government, whether it was 
•good* or «bad» in British eyes. The assumptions were 
beginning to change - a policy of slow progress to self- 
government was no longer appropriate. Self-government was 
something which would have to come in the fairly near future 
and not something which was generations away. However, as
1 . Quoted, P.S. Gupta, op.cit., p.3 3 6.
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Lee points out, it vas not until the Conservative Colonial 
Secretary Iain Macleod grasped the nettle of independence
that the assumptions of the Colonial 'Office civil servants 
really changed.^
The achievements of the Labour party in office as 
regards colonial policy were not great. During the inter- 
var period, although there were difficulties because of lack 
of time and lack of a parliamentary majority, the Labour 
Colonial Secretaries were disappointing because they showed 
no real effort or desire to implement • vigorous policy of 
trusteeship. After thé war, the problem was that the policy 
Creech Jones was trying to impHnent was not completely 
relevant to the developing situation and the other ministers 
were reluctant to provide resources for the development of 
the African colonies at a time when Britain herself was in 
need of investment and development after the second world 
war.
The Labour party*s record on colonial policy was 
disappointing from a democratic socialist point of view.
The party made very little effort to carry out its policy 
between the wars and after the second world war, the Labour 
movement, as a whole, idled to pay much attention or provide 
much help to the African colonies. After the war the 
Labour party failed to provide workable ideas on how to 
achieve economic development in the colonies before the 
transfer of power to the Africans. One of the main 
reasons for this was that this subject was neglected by 
the party in the interwar period. Gupta states that the 
Labour party abandoned a positive colonial policy to 
concentrate on building a ’socialist Britain*
X. Lee, op.cit.
2. Gupta, op.cit., pp.391-392.
after the war 2
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However, it appears to this writer that the Labour party's 
achievements in colonial policy are tied in with its achieve­
ments in domestic policy. During the interwar period, the 
Labour party failed to implement it. program., in .any ar.as- 
colonlal policy «as not the only area where ita parformanca 
waa diaappointing. Thera were, a. ha. been ..id many 
extentuating factor., but taking .1 1 the., into account, the 
Labour minister, during the interwar period ...m.d to suffer 
from a lack of will, determination and belief ln them.ely... 
There were alternative policies to deal with unemployment 
and the colonies which would probably have g . m . d  the backing 
of th. Liberal party but the Labour leadership did not ...» 
interested ln these id... . MacDonald, Snowden, Thomas, 
P.s.fi.ld, ciynes etc. seemed more concerned to follow the 
advice of their civil servants and keep to th. well-trodden 
paths of conventional economic and colonial policy. There 
was am ’unwillingness «to jettison cherished assumptions 
in the face of changing realities«.1 This applies 
particularly to colonial policy.
After the war, the leadership had changed, and there 
was more determination to implement the party*» policies. 
Creech Jones made more of an effort to implement a positive 
colonial policy but was defeated by the economic situation.
The party, as a whole, during this 1945-51 Government made 
an effort to carry out the policies and programmes which had 
been worked out before the war in the 1930s. This was 
true of colonial policy as well as domestic policy. In 
domestic policy the party made an attempt to set up the 
•welfare state* but in setting up the National Health Service, 
Bevan had to make many concessions to the doctors. The
1. D. Marquand, op.cit., p.795.
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National Insurance Act was disowned by Beveridge in the 
House of Lords because it did not pay benefits at 
subsistence level« The nationalisation programme used 
the Morrisonian idea of the public corporation to run the 
industries with the result that, for the actual workers, 
there was little change« In imperial affairs other than 
Africa, the Labour Government gave independence to India 
with the result that there was widespread bloodshed and loss 
of life« The moral of this episode, for Africat was that it 
was vital for the colonial power to devote resources to 
preparing colonies for independence« If countries were 
given independence without adequate preparation, there was 
likely to be bloodshed. By the 1940s it was too late to 
devote much time to preparation for Indian independence for 
the nationalist movements had become too vociferous; the 
time for the preparation had been the irttervai* period. This 
period was an opportunity missed as far as India was 
concerned and also as far as Africa was concerned.
The Labour Government of 1945-51 followed mildly 
reformist policies at home and abroad. The policies were 
mainly a response to the problems of the interwar period«
Vhen the Labour party had completed its programme it ran 
out of ideas about what to do next« This applied to 
colonial policy as well. When it became obvious, after 
the Gold Coast riots, that the colonial policy prepared in 
the interwar period was no longer appropriate, the party 
was at a loss to know what policy to pursue« The Labour 
party did not abandon colonial policy to achieve 'socialism* 
at home« As it ran out of ideas on colonial policy, so itwas 
also running out of ideas on domestic policy« The point is
that leaders who are determined to change things will change 
at home and abroad; and leaders who lack the will tothem
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change society will not make any significant changes at home 
or abroad. The leaders of the 1945-51 Labour Government 
were not Marxian Socialists or even people who were dedicated 
to achieving «clause 4» type of eocialism but they were 
moderate reformers and they made moderate reforms at home and 
abroad, which did not basically change the nature of 
British society or colonial society. The exceptions were 
India and the Gold Coast where the Government was forced to 
make changes by nationalist pressure.
A. Nor.«. Leys wrote in the 1930«, -only and Hom.n
with the audecity to challenge the exieting eoeiel order in 
England will ever have the guts to do justice in Africa.«
'the only hope Leys had for Africa was party that openly 
and determinedly does battle with the City and the Landed 
Aristocracy and Big Business.« He felt that if the Labour 
party was not that kind of party the Africans would only 
•achieve justice» when they were »ready to kill and be 
killed*• There were links between the settlers in Africa 
and the landowners and aristocracy in England. If the 
Labour party had been prepared to redistribute resources in 
Africa towards the Africans, it would have had to fight'the 
middle classes, the landowners and the aristocracy in 
England. In the interwar period, the party avoided either 
struggle. After the second world war, the party did make 
more effort, but there was still no great redistribution of 
resources in England or the colonies.
The policy that the Labour party could have followed
wes that of Norman Ley., who wa. .n expert on Ea.t Africa.
It wa» people, «uch a. Leya and Eoa«2, who had lived in Africa
1 .
2.
Leys to Harris, 17 July 1 9 3 2 , A.S.A.P.S. 
Leys and Ross were both strong Christiana 
was based on Christianity not Marxism.
Papers, Gl45« 
whose »socialism*
and realised the problems vrho pushed for a vigorous 
implementation of a positive colonial policy based on 
ensuring that equalrights were given to everyone in Africa. 
Leys* policy was not Marxist or particularly extremist but 
it would have meant that the British Government put more 
effort into carrying out its protestations that it was 
looking after the interests of the Africans and preparing 
them for independence. The policy would have meant the 
repeal of discriminatory legislation* taking some of the 
land from the white settlers and giving it back to the 
Africans* spending equal money on African education to 
white education per capita and spending more money on roeda 
which benefited black communities instead of those which 
benefited white communities* and making taxation dependent 
on income so that the members of the white population would 
be taxed higher than the black Africans who on average 
earned much less than the whites.
Leys was also more sceptical of the policy of indirect 
rule than some members of the A.C.I.Q. He did not want 
the African to be dependent on chiefs, who were taking part 
in the British colonial administration, especially, in 
West Africa; Leys wanted the black Africans to be «freed* 
from traditional African government as well as from white 
domination. This issue was by no means clearcut but Leys 
distrusted the policy of indirect rule because he believed 
that the most important point was to educate the black 
Africans so that they would not be dependent on white
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settlers or African chiefs«1 It was because the A.C«I«Qa 
attached so much importance to education that the members 
tried to persuade Passfield to force amendments in Colonial 
budgets so that more money would be spent on African
education and, at leasts the same per capita as was spent 
on white education. Very rapid progress to independence 
may have left the Africans dependent on the chiefs, but 
Leys did not advocate immediate independence. He was
thinking in terms of about 20 years from the 1920s. If 
the policy of Leys had been followed in the 1920s and
British Governments« Labour and Conservative« had
practised what they preached about trusteeship, maybe 
British colonial rule in East Africa would have finished
in happier circumstances. The problem was that Leys, 
Buxton, Ross, Woolf and the other members of the A.C.I.Q.
saw the urgency of doing something about Africa but they 
could not convince the leadership of the Labour party that 
the question was one that required immediate attention.
Although the A.C.I.Q. was very influential in formulating 
the •official* policy they were not influential enough to 
affect •real* policy as practised by the party leadership. 
It could be said in defence of the leadership of the
Labour party that they « r ,  only following th. indiff.rence
1 . Leya'«Interpretation was open to the criticism that if 
power was taken away from the chiefs, the coloul.in 
could be accused of destroying traditional s^ci^tieS The problem was that if Africans were k . pieties. 
Weetern oirili.etion, tribe!
discarded. If the Afrlcana were not educated v..t 
civilisation, it would be very difficul? ?oi til, i» ” ? independence • Ley« believed that tribal i n . t , * ®ain 
loyalties would have to b. r.pl,c.7 ^  c S  J h , "
and a loyalty to the country .. a whole. He thought thit”” educated, young Africans should reolace th- ia. the leader, of th. African
problems for independent African leaders h«. k “ ala , 
national loyalties greater thaS t r * b . r i o $ i i t i ' “”ke, feuds have proved to be one of the main vllitiaa’ Pa^ hlRl
conflict in post-colonial African c^tEies!“ -“ produclB®
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of the electorate on colonial problems,and also the indiffe­
rence of the party as a whole*1 The policies of the Labour 
Governments could be said to be 'democratic' in relation to 
the Labour party and 'democratic1 in relation to the British 
people as a whole* However, this assumes that political 
parties do not have a duty to try and lead the public on 
issues, which, although not of immediate importance to the 
people of Britain, had great long term significance* There 
was surely a duty on the politicians, particularly« 
politicians of a reformist party, which held itself up as a 
•democratic'socialist* party, to try to lead the British 
people into an tinderstanding of the problems of the peoples 
of the colonies* As Woolf writes, the British people and 
the Labour party were 'profoundly and complacently 
ignorant' about what 'was happening in remote places, among 
strange people'• This was particularly so with Africa*
India was the imperial problem which attracted most attention 
during this period* Those M*P*s who did spend time on the 
problems of Africa were sometimes rebuked by their constit­
uents for neglecting the problems of the unemployed workers 
of Britain* Buxton's papers contain an example: 'Home 
First' wrote to the 'Brighouse and Elland Echo1 to say:
•I do not think we sent a man to Parliament to spend all 
his time troubling his head about people who are many 
thousands of miles away* If our member will withdraw his 
head out of the clouds and get interested in something around
1* Leys wrote to Winifred Holtby that the facts that were
so deeply interesting to them were 'damnably uninteresting 
to everyone in this country except about one in a million*' 
Leys to W. Holtby, 10 February 1931» W. Holtby Papers, 
Drawer 4, File 8*
2. L* Woolf, op.cit., p*223*
3» Even Brockway devoted most of his attention to India 
rather than Africa in the interwar period* Interview 
with Brockway, 2k July 1973«
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here he will find something else of greater importance to 
talk about...our own district is in a sorry plight.» 1 Many 
people could not see any connection between the problems of 
Britain and those of the colonies and thought that the 
Labour party should direct its energies to solving Britain's 
problems before it thought about the colonies.
This lack of popular interest is also shown by the lack 
of attention paid to the problems of the African colonies at 
Labour party conferences during the interwar period. There 
was only one real debate on the party's policy towards the 
African colonies during this period in 1933, in which the 
speakers tried to explain to the conference the importance 
of the issue despite the lack of electoral interest. 2 
The ordinary members of the Labour party played almost no 
part in the development of the party's colonial policy 
during this period. A study of colonial policy prove, 
that, when most members of the party are not interested in 
a subject, policy can be made by very few people. This 
does not fit very well with the Labour party's own 
description of its policy-making processes. The Labour 
party believes itself to be a democratic body, which 
determines policy in a democratic manner, taking into 
account the wishes of the rank-and-file. This picture 
of the Labour party has been supported by Samuel Beer3 
who instances policies such as the nationalisation of iron 
and steel and the mines. Over these issues, the impetus 
for nationalisation came from the trade unions concerned. 
This really indicates that the trade unions were, and are,
T. Brighouse and Eliand Echo, 24 December 1930.
2. See above pp.365-373
3. S.H. Beer »Modern British Politics »(London,1965)
the strongest influence on the Labour party and are likely 
to achieve their aims because they can easily dominate 
party conference by block votes. The problem with colonial 
policy was that there was no section of the party that was 
really interested in the subject and made much contribution 
to the policy except the A.C.I.Q. The trade unions, as 
has been pointed out, did not show much interest until 
they became worried about undercutting. The I.L.P. showed 
some interest in the 1920s but mainly through the efforts 
of the same people who were on the A.C.I.Q. in the 1930s, 
the I.L.P. left the Labour party and was very critical of 
Labour policy, but its criticisms made no impact on the 
party. The Fabian Society was moribund for most of the 
interwar period and played no part as an organisation until 
the Fabian Colonial Bureau was set up in 1940, mainly due 
to the efforts of Rita Hinden. However, individual Fabians 
did make a contribution, particularly Leonard Woolf who was 
one of the main, if not the main, writer of the Labour 
party’s policy. Lord Olivier, Lord Passfield and J.F.N. 
Green were also Fabians who made some contribution to 
colonial policy. Labour colonial policy was influenced by 
the Fabian idea of gradual reform rather than revolutionary 
change, but, in actual practice, under the guidance of Lord 
Passfield the reform was even more gradual than the policy 
statements implied. The politicians in the party were not 
vety interested in colonial policy because it was of no 
electoral importance and the constituency parties also 
showed little interest - there were only a few constituency 
motions presented on colonial policy during this period.
General motions were sometimes sent in from the 
constituencies condemning imperialism but there
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was no
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detailed policy worked out. The consistency with which 
conference condemned imperialism indicated that it might 
have accepted a more radical policy than that presented by 
the leadership. Although conference was not prepared to 
accept a policy of complete abandonment, during the war the 
c o n s t a n c i e s  did pass a motion moved by Haden Guest which 
urged moving faster towards self-government than the official 
policy. It called for the abolition of the colonial status, 
rapid démocratisation in the colonies and rapid economic 
development under public ownership. It was the type of 
policy that might have been expected from a democratic 
socialist party. It was accepted by Noel-Baker, on behalf 
of the Executive, and referred to the Central Committee on 
Reconstruction which was already working on colonial policy. 1 
This Committee was dominated by the experts of the A.C.I.q . 
particularly Leonard Woolf, who were already revising the 
1 9 3 3  policy statement. The policy that was produced for 
the next conference in 19*3, and put forward by the N.E.C., 
was just the 1 9 3 3  policy slightly revamped. The 1 9 4 2  
Conference motion had been largely ignored. Nevertheless, 
Conference passed the N.E.C. motion. Although Conference 
might have accepted a more radical policy than the leader­
ship presented, it was content with the leadership.* policy.
As far as »official- colonial policy was concerned, 
policy was made by a small group within the party organisa­
tion - the A.C.I.Q. - These people had the expert knowledge 
that the other sections of the party lacked. In the case 
of colonial policy, the bureacracy took over the making 
of policy f it was not made by the trade unions, the leader­
ship, the constituencies, the I.L.P. or the Fabian Society 
I. 1942 labour Party Conference Report, pp.l54-l55.
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but by a small group of Individuals who had had experience 
of the colonies and were interested in colonial problems.
The policy was eventually presented to conference but when 
it was presented« it was as, more or less, a fait accompli, 
not a discussion document. Conference accepted the policy 
because it did not have the knowledge or depth of experience 
to be able to offer detailed criticism. This seems to 
illustrate Michels thesis that in large mass parties where 
the masses are ignorant of the issues the bureaucracy takes 
over and makes i policy for the masses. 1 However, the policy 
was eventually submitted to conference and, if conference 
had managed to work out its own policy, it is doubtful 
whether it would have been very different.
R.T. McKenzie in his work on British political parties2 
has argued, in contrast to Beer, that in actual practice 
the role of the Labour party conference is not much 
different from that of the Conservative party conference.
In theory, he states, Labour is supposed to follow conference 
decisions but, in practice, when in office, Labour Governments 
have ignored conference. The Conservative leader is supposed 
to be responsible for working out policy him self but, * 
in practice, the leader will pay some attention to the 
wishes of conference. McKenzie concludes that «the 
distribution of power within the two parties is overwhelm­
ingly similar.» 3 McK«nzie»s thesis has. been subject to 
much criticism. Miliband has pointed out that a leader 
of the Labour party could not consistently follow policies 
which the conference rank-and-file disagreed with} that
the members of each party are very different in ideals and
’i. Michels, »Political Parties* (New York, 1962)
2. R.T. Mci%nzie, »British Political Parties' (London,1955)
3. ibid., p.582.
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occupations; and the atmosphere and ideals of the two party 
conferences are completely different. 1 S. Rose has stated 
that McKenzie's division between the leadership and the 
conference is an oversimplification and that there are 
divisions within the leadership, party conference and the
N.S.C. - the conflict may not be between the Parliamentary
leadership and the conference but between different sections
2 „of the P.L.P., the N.B.C. and the party conference. R.
Rose^ has pointed out that McKenzie has ignored the importance
of the unions in the Labour party because at the time he was
writing, the major unions supported the leadership. The
block votes at party conference of the major unions have a
very important influence on policy determination. When the
major unions became more 'leftwing* in the late sixties and
the seventies, the unions swung the party in a more 'leftwing*
direction. During the 1974 Labour Government the major
4unions decided to back the Government. Both Government and 
unions accepted the 'Social Contract' with the result that 
the Government was able to gain the support of party 
conference on the main issue of pay policy. Although 
McKenzie may have overstated his case, it does seem that the 
Labour party picture of a democratic conference deciding 
the policy of the movement which is then put into effect 
by the P.L.P. is not completely consistent with the facts. 
Conference appeared to play a bigger role during the interwar 
period because the party was in opposition for most of this 
period. It has mainly been when the party is in power that
1 . R. Miliband 'Party Democracy and Parliamentary Government* 
Political Studies, 1959* pp.170-174.
2. S. Rose 'Policy Decisions in Opposition* Political Studies
1956*PP»I2®~38«
3. R. Rose, 'The Problem of Party Government* (London,1974) 
pp.340-344.
4. At least until the beginning of 1977«
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a rift sometimes occurs between the Parliamentary Party and the 
party conference (apart from exceptions such as the isuues of 
unilateral nuclear disarmament and the attempted revision by 
Gaitskell of clause 4). *he original idea that the H*K*C. and 
Conference determined policy has now been repudiated by Harold 
Wilson who states in his reoent bookr 'one thing must be made 
clear. The prime minister and his Cabinet cannot be instructed 
by the W.E.C. or by Conference.Wilson seems to be arguing 
against the 1918 labour Party Constitution and supporting McKenzie's 
thesis that it would be constitutionally wrong for a democratically 
elected government to be dictated to by an extra-parliamentary body 
such as a party conference.The Labour leadership in the seventies 
seemed to have decided that party conference could not tell a Labour 
government what to do.The problem was that party conference did 
not agree with the leadership's interpretation of the Labour party 
constitution.
During the interwar period, the Labour party leadership paid more 
lipservice to the idea that conference determined policy but concerning 
colonial policy the leadership and its advisory committees were the 
main determinants of policy not the party conference* when the party 
was in office ministers paid more attention to the civil servioe 
machine than the party advisory committees.The result was that the 
party"s policies were »toned down' by the civil servioe.The decision 
to follow the constitutional path was one reason for the Labour party's 
moderation.as Miliband,Coates and Howell have suggested.^ The Labour 
party not only accepted the constitutional path but completely aooepted 
the constitutional machinery that already existed - the *2
I.H.Wilson,"The Governance of Britain* (London.1976} P.T62
2 .Miliband,Coates,Howell,op.oitations.
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a rift sometimes occurs between the Parliamentary Party 
and the party conference (apart from the issues ’of unilateral nuclear 
disarmament and clause4)*beoriginal idea that the N.E.C. and 
Conference determined policy has now been repudiated by 
Harold Wilson who states in his recent book: »one thing 
must be made clear. The prime minister and his Cabinet 
cannot be instructed by the N.E.C* or by Conference.*'*'
Wilson, here, is going against the 1918 Labour Party 
Constitution and supporting Mckenzie's idea that it would 
be constitutionally wrong for a democratically elected 
government to be dictated to by an extra-parliamentary 
body such as a party conference. The Labour leadership in 
the seventies seemed to have decided that party conference 
could not tell a Labour government what to do. The 
problem was that party conference did not agree with the 
leadership's interpretation of the Labour party constitution.
During the interwar period, the Labour party leadership 
paid more lipservice to the idea that conference determined
policy but a study of colonial policy indicates that the 
leadership and its advisory committees were the main 
determinants of colonial policy not the party conference: 
when the party was in office the ministers paid more atten
tion to the civil service machine than the party advisory 
committees. The result of this was that the party's 
policies were 'toned down' by the civil service. The 
decision to follow the constitutional path was one reason 
for the Labour party's moderation, as Miliband, Coates and 
Howell have suggested. 2 The Labour party not only 
accepted the constitutional path but completely accepted 
the constitutional machinery that already existed - the
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civil service, parliamentary procedure, the monarchy, the 
House of Lords and the accepted role of the Prime Minister 
that he should choose the other ministers by himself* This 
acceptance of the existing constitutional machinery and 
procedures was one of the main reasons for the failure of 
the Labour party to make any impression on colonial affairs 
during the interwar period. The two people MacDonald chose 
as Colonial Secretaries were not the best men for the job, 
they had no experience of or interest in colonial affairs. 
There were other people in the party such as Morel and 
Wedgwood who would have been more suitable choices and who 
would probably have made more effort to convert the Labour 
party's policy into practice. This cannot be proved but 
by their statements in the House of Commons and in their books 
there is a strong indication that they would have been more 
effective Colonial Secretaries than the two chosen. Wedgwood 
did try in Cabinet to make Thomas honour the pledges Wedgwood 
had given in the House of Commons. He was unsuccessful 
because he was not the departmental minister. Equally, 
there is no proof that if ministers had been democratically 
chosen, better ones would have been chosen but, as far as 
colonial affairs were concerned, no wr<rse ones could have 
been chosen. One of the great problems with British Govern­
ment is that people are often chosen to be ministers to deal 
with areas which they know very little about. This is 
supposed to be counterbalanced by the expert advice provided 
by the civil service but the civil service is likely to be 
committed to preserving the status quo or, at least, will 
put very carefully all the arguments against radical change. 
The position of a new minister has been vividly illustrated 
by the Crossman diaries. Crossraan wrote on becoming Minister
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of Housing* 'I realise the tremendous effort it requires not 
to be taken over by the civil service. My minister's room 
is like a padded cell* and in certain ways I am like a person 
who is suddenly certified a lunatic and put into this great* 
vast room* cut off from real life and surrounded by male and 
female trained nurses* and a t t e n d a n t s . A l t h o u g h  Crossman 
may not be completely typical* he does give an indication of 
how a new minister feels on taking office» The pressures to 
conform to the civil service point of view must have been even 
greater during the early Labour Goernmenta when the party was 
very unsure of itself and its ability to govern» Thomas and 
Passfield easily succumbed to the 'civil service embrace'• 
Malcolm MacDonald states that Passfield was 'too inclined to 
listen to the Colonial Office civil servants.' The argument 
Is not that the civil service was doing anything improper - 
the job of the civil service is to point out the difficulties 
and problems involved in new policies. However* if the 
minister is not really determined to put a policy into effect 
or does not know much about the subject, he may accept the 
difficulties that are presented to him and be content to 
follow civil service advice. As R. Rose puts it, 'a minister 
lacking objectives of his own.••.may settle down to becoming 
a selector or endorser of policies from the alternatives that 
his civil servants put before him.'^ 1 The civil servants*
without regard to partisan implications* are likely to be
Lbiased against change until it occurs.' One way of trying
to reduce this problem is to appoint partisan advisers to
provide the minister with an alternative source of advice to
jL. K. crossman* 'The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister'* Vol.l 
(London*1975)*p.21.
2# Interview with Malcolm MacDonald* 21 August 1973«
« g. Rose* op.cit.* p»4l6.
4. ibid., p.4l8.
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the civil service which is committed to ensuring that party- 
policies are carried out* This has obvious difficulties for 
civil service morale and relations between the civil service 
and the advisers: the 197^ Labour Government's limited 
experiment in this field has not been very successful« largely 
because the advisers chosen were not 'high powered* experts 
and the civil service chose to ignore them* However« if 
Passfield and Thomas had taken some members of the A*C*I*Q* 
into government with them« these experts« who knew as much« 
if not more« about colonial policy than the civil servants« 
might have been able to ensure that the Labour ministers 
made a more determined attempt to implement the party's 
»licy* Advisers committed to the party would have been 
particularly useful in colonial policy because there was 
great ignorance of this subject among the ministers chosen 
by MacDonald, and Labour leaders in general* Leys was sure 
that the civil service had 'hoodwinked* Thomas and Passfield.
The idea of appointing expert advisers was suggested 
to MacDonald after the first Labour Government by the 
International Advisory Committee which thought that, when 
next in office, the Labour party should make far-reaching 
changes, particularly at the Foreign Office* It was 
suggested that the Labour party should appoint an experienced 
member as the foreign Secretary's principal private secretary, 
ranking above the Permanent Secretary and the Labour Govern­
ment should also be prepored, on grounds of policy, to change 
the Heads of Diplomatic Missions* The International Advisory 
Committee thought that this was necessary because of the 
»absence of anyone in high positions in the Foreign Office 
or Diplomatic Services, who even remotely understands the 
mentality of l a b o u r * T h i s  could equally have applied to 
X* Quoted, D. Marquand, op.cit*, p.4l6.
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the Colonial Office and the other departments,» MacDonald was 
strongly against the idea* He wrote to Henderson that 'in 
essence this is the American system of the spoils to the victor 
with a vengeance, and is a complete reversal of all our ideas 
regarding the civil service...we would raise such a hornet's 
nest inside the Sendee that, so far from promoting efficient 
and loyal service, we wouldcbstroy both . ' 1 MacDonald was 
not willing to change the normal constitutional relationship 
between ministers and their civil servants. He was firmly 
committed to maintaining the established way of doing things 
and did not seem to be aware that by doing so, he was making 
it more difficult for the party to achieve radical change,or, 
maybe, he did not want to achieve radical change.
A very low priority was attached to colonial policy when 
the party achieved office in the interwar period. It would 
appear that the leadership of the party wanted a colonial 
policy towards Africa, not to implement, but to help to give 
the idea that the Labour party was a serious party which had 
a policy for all the problems of British Government. Morel 
wrote that 'British Labour....with.•.the exception of the 
small socialist I.L.P. movement within it (was) a purely 
trade union manual labourers' movement seeking one thing and 
one thing alone - increased wages and betterment of 
industrial conditions. And the only influence since the war 
broke out which is 'intellectualising' in the international 
sense this vast mass of ignorance is the influence wielded 
by our small group.' The story of the Labour party's 
colonial policy in the interwar period is that the A.C.I.Q. 
worked out a policy but they could not persuade the rest of 
Quoted, ibid., p«4l7*
2. E.D. Morel to Count M. Monteglas, 24 May 1921, Morel Papers.
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the party to treat It as a matter of urgency. One of the 
reasons for their failure may have been that the A.C.I.Q. 
itself was not a very representative group, mainly being a 
collection of middle class intellectuals, some of whom had 
come to the Labour party via the Liberal party, some of whom 
were Fabians and some of whom were I.L.P.members. They had 
no real power base in the Labour party or the country and may 
have alienated some Labour party members by their attitude of 
intellectual superiority which is evident in Morel*s letter 
quoted above.
However, although there were special difficulties with 
colonial policy, especially towards Africa, where there was 
widescale ignorance of the situation and electnral apathy, 
it would not be correct to imply that it was only over 
colonial policy that the Labour party's record was disappointing; 
there was a general failure in all policy areas except in a few 
instances where one or two ministers, for example, Wheatley 
at Housing in 1 9 2 ^  achieved some success. The problem 
was that most of the Labour ministers were not thinkers at 
all, let alone very radical thinkers. They did not question 
conventional assumptions and try to examine problems anew 
to look at the roots of the questions. The Labour party's 
domestic and economic policies, as well as its colonial 
policy, were based on the traditional assumptions of British 
politics. In colonial policy, the Labour party did not 
really offer anything new, its policy was based upon 
•trusteeship' which was accepted by the Conservatives, the 
Liberals and the civil service as the basis of British colonial 
policy. The only difference was that, in theory, Labour 
policy appeared to place more emphasis on the problems of the
colonies and treat these problems with greater urgency, but,
'J.Although some of the credit mav h#™ .
previous Conservative minister. ^ en dU® to N,Cham1ierlain,the
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in practice« there was a large amount of continuity. There 
were few divisions on Colonial Office votes during the inter­
war period. The Labour party was easily integrated into the 
established political system in Britain. Cowling describes 
how the Conservative party lea decs and the monarch were slightly 
wary of the Labour party after the first world war, but by 
1924 they had come to realise that the Labour party would do 
•no harm1* to the basic structure of British society. The 
same applied to the empire.
The main reason for this was« that in the interwar period 
the Labour party was unsure of itself« it had leaders who were 
not really sure what to do if they achieved office. The party 
did not have a parliamentary majority« and, in these circums­
tances it is not difficult to see why it accepted the 
conventional machinery of Government. It is not surprising 
that a few dozen inexperienced ministers failed to make any 
great changes in British society in the interwar period. 
Miliband et al. argue that by following the constitutional 
path the Labour party lost sight of its ideals. There 
appears to be some truth in this, but to accept this does 
not necessarily mean that the party should have 'taken to 
the streets' instead of working through parliament. Another 
course would have been possible, the course of reforming the 
traditional institutions of British government, which is 
something that might have been expected from a reforming 
party. On the issue of constitutionalism the Labour party 
appeared very reluctant to question the established way of 
doing things. It could have put forward a programme of 
reform of the civil service, the institution of party 
advisers, reform of the House of Commons and House of Lords 
and the electoral system. (It only started to make some
X. M. Cowling, 'The Impact of Labour 1920-24* (Cambridge, 
1971)-
moves so far as the latter was concerned because of Liberal 
pressure.) The main problem during the interwar period 
was a lack of will among the Labour leadership. This was a 
particular problem as far as colonial policy was concerned. 
There was the general problem of lack of electoral support 
but many of the Labour leaders failed to give a positive lead 
because they did not seem to know what they wanted to achieve. 
In the few instances where Labour ministers did have the 
will and determination, such as Wheatley and Henderson, 
there was some positive achievement, despite the party*s 
weak electoral and parliamentary position.
The »riding for a fall» ideas of Cripps and others had 
a point. The idea that the Labour party should have put 
forward its full programme and, if it had been defeated in 
Parliament, should have gone to the electorate to try to 
secure a full mandate, would have shown that the Labour 
party had some policies. The problem with the course adopted 
was that the Labour party appeared to be at a complete loss, 
trying to put forward traditional policies which many of its 
supporters did not Relieve in, at a time when traditional 
policies were not the remedy that was required. 1 Another 
difficulty was that the leadership gave no real indication 
that they had any alternative policies to pursue, or that 
they were irked by the limitations from which the interwar 
Labour Governments suffered. In the colonial field, Thomas 
and Passfield showed no determination to put the party*s 
policy into effect and there was no sign that they would 
have pursued more positive policies if they had had a 
parliamentary majority. As D. Marquand writes the inter- 
war Labour party was »all reach, and no grasp. It had high
1 . R. Skidelsky, »Politicians and the Slump* (London,1967).
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ideals, but few ideas about how to put them into practice**^
The Labour patty has always appeared more radical than it, in 
fact, was and is. Its leadership has always tended to accept 
the •conventional wisdom* of the day rather than listen to 
radical critics. This was equally true of colonial policy as 
it was of domestic and economic policy.
This study of the Labour party's colonial policy between 
the wars does not support the Labour party's own picture of 
itself as a democratic socialist party determined to secure 
social justice for workers at home, and abroad in the colonies. 
Deq>ite all the difficulties faced by the party, there seemed 
to be a basic lack of will and determination among the leader­
ship to reform the African colonies in order to hasten progress 
towards self-government. It is true that not much could have 
been done in the brief period that the party was in office, 
but because no attempt was made to implement the policy in the 
1920s and 1930s Labour policy, and the inter-party debate on 
colonial affairs, did not advance very far from the positions 
adopted in the 1920s. The result of this was that when 
Labour came to full power in 1945, its policy for Africa was 
not really relevant to the rapidly changing situation and, 
instead of Labour colonial policy determining events in 
Africa, Labour policy was continually being outstripped by 
events in Africa.
In the end, it was Iain Hacleod, a Conservative Colonial 
Secretary, who decided that the African colonies were no longer 
worth holding on to. The Labour party did not play a very 
large part in dismantling the African empire. It seemed that 
all the efforts of the A.C.I.Q. in the interwar period and, 
later, the Fabian Colonial Bureau had been largely irrelevant. 1
1  •
D. Marquand, op.cit., p.795
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However, without the efforts of men like Norman Leys, McGregor 
Ross, Leonard Woolf, C.R. Buxton, E.D. Mbrel, Creech Jones 
end Josiah Wedgwood in the interwar period and, later, Rita 
Hinden and the Fabian Colonial Bureau and Fenner Brockway and 
the Movement for Colonial Freedom, public opinion might have 
been more determined to »hang on* to the African colonial 
empire* The experts of the A*C.I.Q* did act as a pressure 
group for a more positive colonial policy and did show 
friendship to the emerging African leaders* Without the 
continual pressure of the A.C.I.Q. during the interwar years, 
the white settlers might have gained complete control in East 
Africa* The difficulties of decolonisation were immense, 
but the policy of the A.C.I.Q. did emphasise the need to 
prepare the Africans for independence by education and 
training. If its policies had been carried out, the Africans 
would have been better prepared for independence and, perhaps, 
some of the problems that have resulted could have been 
avoided. The Labour party*s experts never advocated the 
precipitate and unprepared withdrawal from the colonies that 
had such disastrous consequences in the Belgian Congo, they 
advocated a policy of reform which would have prepared the 
Africans for independence as soon as possible. If the 
Labour party had made a more determined attempt to put this 
policy into effect during its periods of office before and 
after the second world war, the Africans would have been 
better prepared for self-government. The pragmatic evasions 
and hesitations of the leadership meant that, in the end, the 
Labour party*s contribution to African colonial policy was 
less significant than it would have been if the party had 
followed the advice of radicals, such as Norman Leys and 
Josiah Wedgwood. Leys and Wedgwood did not accept the
•conventional wisdom* that trusteeship was the correct policy
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but stated that the root of the problem was »status* - 
Wedgwood and Leys advocated the policy of »equal rights' 
instead of the policy of trusteeship with its overtones of 
superiority. Leys and Wedgwood also tried to ensure that 
the party lived up to its promises when in office, but the 
leadership, despite rhetoric about trusteeship, showed little 
concern to prepare the Africans for self-government or carry 
out its promises concerning the African colonies. The 
Labour party contained within it many different views 
concerning African colonial policy, but the party did not 
play as significant a role in the decolonisation of Africa 
as it might have done because its leadership distrusted 
unconventional thinkers and ideas. In its desire to 
convince the electorate and the civil service that it could 
govern Britain and the empire 'responsibly', the Labour 
leadership seemed to lose sight of the fact that it had 
promised to reform Britain and the empire.
The conclusion must be that the Labour party would 
have achieved more in African colonial policy if it had 
been more willing to question conventional assumptions.
Over colonial policy as over other policies, the Labour 
party's radical rhetoric disguised the fact that its 
policies were pot very well thought out and were largely based 
on conventional assumptions. The party's conventionality 
was shown even more clearly when it was in office than when 
it was in opposition. The 'official' policy was not a. 
radical as the policy of Leys but even 'official* policy 
was not implemented. The Labour party failed to live up 
to its promises on African colonial policy. There were 
many contributing facto* to this failure: - lack of 
electoral interest; civil service reluctance to contemplate
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radical change;economic depress!on;lack of time; the fact that the 
Labour party never had a majority government in the intervar period; 
the difficulty of changing policies in far-distant places,the fact 
that the Governors and the civil servants in the African colonies 
were not very sympathetic to radical change; the intransigence of 
the white settlers in East Africa and the fact that the ’establishment’ 
in Britain,as shown in ’The Times* leaders,had sympathy for the 
settlers;the fact that the policy was rather vague and
not completely coherent, particularly on eoonomio development, the 
lack of influence of the A.CJT*Q, on the rank-and-file of the party 
and the willingness of the rank-and -file to follow the leadership 
over oolonial policy; the desire to prevent chaos and massacre 
which might have resulted if they had proceeded too rapidly, the 
difficulties of establishing a viable political and eoonomio structure 
in the African colonies; the electoral debacle of 1931 and the 
ensuing numerical weakness of the Labour party in Parliament in 
the thirties; the fact that the Labour party was in its 'adolesoenoe* 
as a British political party and did not want to ’soare off’ the 
voters by pursuing ’extremist' policies; the lack of trade union 
interest in the problem until the trade unions felt that jobs 
might be threatened; the more pressing international problem 
in the interwar years of Italian and German aggression; and the 
difficulty of achieving rapid change through parliamentary institutions. 
However,the major consideration seems to have been a lack of will 
among the leadership and many members of the party to aohieve rapid 
reform of the African empire. Most of the labour leadership 
and a majority of the ordinary party membership were largely
5 2 0
influenced by conventional ideas about Africa in the interwar 
period and did not regard the African as the equal, or even 
the potential equal, of the European. Those who thought 
differently never really managed to convince the rest of the 
party to follow their policies. However, it is only because 
of the efforts of men like Leys, Wedgwood, Ross and later 
Brockway, who were usually ignored by the leaders of the party, 
that the Labour party can claim to have an honourable record 
of concern for the welfare of Africans. The actual policy 
pursued by the party in office between the wars and, to a 
lesser extent, between 1945-1951 hardly justifies Hr. Ivor 
Richard * s claim that the Labour party has an honourable record 
as far as Africa is concerned.
Creech Jones did secure more official party recognition 
than most of the African experts. He was made Colonial 
Secretary in the third Labour Government. However, the 
policy the A.C.I.Q. hadvorked out between the wars was no 
longer appropriate when Creech Jones tried to implement it. 
Creech Jones also had great difficulty in persuading the 
other ministers in the Labour Government of the importance 
of pursuing a positive colonial policy. The Labour party 
largely wasted the interwar period as far as African colonial 
policy was concerned because it was unwilling to abandon 
traditional British assumptions about Africa and the Africans.
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